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ABSTRACT 
 
This dissertation takes up Friedrich Nietzsche’s notion of ‘good Europeanism’ 
and his related idea of Europe to show how the former disposition may be cultivated to 
achieve the latter—a reinvigorated culture on the continent. It does so by applying his 
vitalist politics and power ontology (will to power hypothesis and theory of decadence) to 
critique European integration in the broader context of globalization. The analysis 
enables me to theorize how “healthy” individuals might exploit opportunities in the 
present to become 'good Europeans', with the aim of realizing Nietzsche’s quasi-
cosmopolitan idea of Europe. It is my primary contention that Nietzsche’s diagnosis of 
Europe’s ailment remains relevant, as does his strategy, via a radically Dionysian 
affirmation of life, for overcoming the international order it has spawned. 
In doing so I utilize Nietzsche’s related perspectivalist epistemological stance and 
hermeneutical framework to build on Nietzsche's genealogy of morality. This shows the 
West’s present “slave moral” regime to be a further intensified development of 
secularized Christian–Platonic values. It arose through the fusing of liberal-optimism 
(belief in equality, emancipation, enfranchisement, etc.) with modernity’s doctrines of 
universalism, humanism, secularism, progressivism and rationalism. It also coextends 
with the positivistic orientation of scientism to transmit a secular faith in truth, and un-
paradoxically an injurious relativism and cynical worldview. It is through Nietzsche’s 
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vitalist perspectivalism that I understand the psychological-historical origins and current 
operation of the axiomatic narratives promulgated via the meta-discourse of ultra-liberal-
modernity. 
The same critical framework is applied to a doxagraphical survey of theories of 
European integration. These theories are understood as differing perspectives conceived 
within and informed by the same values matrix, and critiqued in chronological order of 
their appearance to reflect the evolution of the field. Problems of evaluation, 
indeterminacy and bias, and the form of reasoning privileged by the positivistic 
orientation conferred by scientism are examined in terms of how they inform the conduct 
of social science and conceptualizations and uses of fact. Acts of theorizing are 
understood as indicative of a will-to-truth which can positively augment life or negatively 
hamper it. I consider how the mainstream of the field has tended to reiterate the 
ideological presuppositions of ultra-liberal-modernity. Notable exceptions include recent 
constructivist approaches and discourse analysis critiques. These critical perspectives are 
productively broadening and potentially subverting the dominant conventions of the field. 
This raises the possibility that good Europeans may influence the future development of 
the EU as counter-theorizers of it. 
The EU is understood as a crucial locus of the globalization complex, a primarily 
reactive power constellation comprised of myriad institutions, processes and forces. A 
ressentiment-driven project, the globalization complex functions as an ideological 
juggernaut to universalize ultra-liberal-modern values. It affectively implements a 
negative will to nothingness as nihilistic power which culminates in a hyper-decadent 
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condition typified by resignation to its prerogatives. Its values are politically instantiated 
throughout the world via democratization and hegemonic capital process. 
I examine the spectacularized existential meanings and simulated ontological 
purpose provided by the globalization complex. These engage and automatize the masses 
by means of commercially generated, media promoted desires and an ethos of 
consumerism. These sustain a philistinic culture of conformity by means of which its 
ideological proponents, ascetic-consumerist priests of ressentiment, justify and naturalize 
their authority. Their influence extends a spirit of revenge against life’s radical 
contingency and temporality. It privileges homogenizing and ossifying modes of being to 
inhibit authentic becoming. 
However, the globalization complex cannot contain all the affective capacities its 
shrinking and simultaneous acceleration of the world generates. The increased 
interconnectivity between people that it facilitates and the reactive values matrix it 
imposes give rise to a changed mentality or consciousness. Life in within the 
globalization complex provides a few with a philosophical education that endows them 
with a broadened perspective on the differences between human types. They gain a 
profound appreciation of the need for the divergent worldviews that distinguish disparate 
cultures—forms of life imperiled by conventional globalization. This nurtures a 
reflective, historical consciousness and an acceptance of difference (entwined with their 
love of fate) that augments their emerging sense of globality and occasionally manifests 
itself in ways that escape capture. Among a few, globality fosters the skeptical-ironic 
disposition toward truth claims and craftiness characteristic of ‘good Europeans’. Such 
iconoclastic individuals may creatively challenge the legitimacy of ultra-liberal-modern 
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values, their distinctive striving symptomatic of a positive will to creative destruction as 
generative power and authentic becoming-other.  
To foster the development of the skeptical-ironic disposition, or Weltironie, of 
good Europeanism I suggest a six-fold skeptical praxis. This is based on the classical 
Pyrrhonean skeptical notions of akatalepsia (recognition of the impossibility of certain 
knowledge), epoche (the suspension of belief due to the contingency of truth), ataraxia 
(the ancient skeptic and stoic doctrine of disciplined withdrawal toward becoming what 
one is), apangelia (an avowal not involving a commitment to truth or falsity), adoxastos 
(the disciplined effort to avoid forming convictions and feigning agreement with 
prevailing value standards when necessary, which corresponds with the strategic use of 
masks), and finally, from the ancient cynics, the concept of parrhesia (fearless speech in 
mocking ascetic values). These practices support the necessary perspectivalist stance 
toward all truth claims to radically affirm the chaos of becoming. The adherents of such 
an anti-essentialist discipline revel in the fundamental contingency of life. 
According to Nietzsche’s vision, I consider how ‘good Europeans’ might achieve 
their aims in light of the prevailing values of our globalizing world. Acting as comedians 
of ascetic ideals they engage in kynical acts that may utilize the new technologies and 
enhanced communications provided by science and industry (key components of the 
globalization complex), to lampoon the anti-human decadence and nihilism of our age. 
Their inherently political mockery of the prevailing social discourses arouses the passion 
of other healthy types. They are spurred to similarly creative experiments and life-
affirming acts of defiance, and the ethos of ‘good Europeanism’ gradually spreads, 
thereby. Through their striving such ‘good Europeans’ (who, in our globalizing age, may 
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appear in any geographical locale) become capable of recognizing and exploiting 
unanticipated, abstract potentials of globality.  
Afflicted with the decadence of our age, they are not the Übermenschen Nietzsche 
anticipated, but prevenient to them. More likely to be perceived as buffoons than as great 
leaders, they are neither conventional revolutionaries nor “improvers of humankind”; 
they endeavor to discredit the ultra-liberal-modern order instantiated through the 
globalization complex. By prompting it to reactively assert its prerogatives and intensify 
itself, they make its contradictoriness, antagonistic impetus and hostility to difference 
more apparent. However gradually, this will erode its legitimacy, as good Europeans 
exploit its vulnerabilities. 
According to Nietzsche’s vision, I consider the ways in which ‘good Europeans’ 
would likely employ the democratic, egalitarian and populist sensibilities of the 
globalized masses, and how the EU could be hijacked to augment their aim. This could 
include the crafty use of human rights, artificial intelligence and bio-engineering to 
hasten our enervated epoch to its expiration. Efforts to challenge the reigning ascetic-
consumerist ideals are conditioning the possibility for the appearance of Übermenschlich 
individuals to (nomothetically) legislate an agonistic socio-political milieu predicated on 
a natural rank order of types. It is the hope of ‘good Europeans’ that such Übermenschen 
will one day inaugurate a transhuman future and create a higher culture for the 
flourishing of greatness that secondarily edifies the multitude with the meaning and 
purpose great works provide. 
I conclude that if humankind succeeds in transfiguring itself through the going-
down of our ultra-liberal-modern epoch (the most pervasive and decadent socio-political 
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order in recorded history) these Übermenschen, the progeny of contemporary ‘good 
Europeans’, will focus on the rehabilitation of the environment and preservation of the 
earth.  
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BOOK ONE 
 
Nietzsche’s Diagnosis of Liberal-Modernity and its Ineliminable Decadence 
 
Introduction 
 
Nietzsche's vitalist politics and corresponding power ontology provides a critical 
lens through which the values driving both contemporary European integration and 
globalization may be examined afresh. In this work I apply Nietzsche’s diagnostic 
method for appraising the role and utility of values for life to an assessment of Europe’s 
ongoing unification in the broader context of globalization. I theorize how Nietzsche’s 
good Europeans can exploit abstract potentials of globality to become who it is they are 
and transfigure the decadence of our epoch.1
I contend that the originally Western, ideologized ultra-liberal-modern values that 
prevail in our global age are propagated through axiomatic socio-political narratives that 
combine liberal-optimism with the modern doctrines of universalism, humanism, 
secularism, progressivism and rationalism.
 This suggests how their creative 
experiments and attempts at self-overcoming could revalue the nihilistic values 
enervating humankind to realize a Nietzschean idea of Europe – and remake the world 
accordingly.  
2 This meta-discourse co-extends with and 
supplements the positivistic orientation conferred by scientism, the customs, practices 
and duties of which comprises a secular-faith. The anti-natural value-standards, or “slave 
morality of decadence”, subtending this hegemonic power-knowledge regime are 
 2 
implemented universally through a multiplicity of reactive institutions, forces and 
processes comprising the conventional globalization complex.3 A ressentiment-driven 
project, the globalization complex comprises an authoritarian power constellation that is 
unprecedented in human history.4
I then explore how, via a set of “Nietzschean” tactics, European society and its 
supranational institutions might be so elementally transfigured by superlative individuals 
through a revaluation of the values subtending the reactive forces and leveling processes 
of globalization. It is my contention that the sort of ‘good Europeans’ to whom Nietzsche 
appealed and hoped to spur into action are being enabled, through the abstract, positive 
potentials of globality, to realize (an approximation of) his idea of Europe. This involves 
revaluing the decadent values of the present—our hyper-decadent, ultra-liberal-modern 
age—to initiate the development of a higher culture (Bildung) through which new 
political identities may be created that confer salubrious meanings to individuals and 
provide the societies they comprise with a sense of purpose in communal existence.  
  
Out of the analysis that follows I advance a strategy for attaining a transhuman 
condition through the exploitation of these contemporary developments. The aim is to 
illuminate how contemporary European institutions, particularly the European Union 
(EU) and the norms and practices it sustains, coextend with and promulgate the 
aforementioned norms of the globalization complex. I show how, despite being a locus of 
that complex, the same values and the modes of existence the EU maintains are giving 
rise to abstract potentials of globality that hold the promise, when realized, of 
transmuting them the reactive forces of globalization and its increasingly hegemonic 
socio-political and economic management of humankind. 
 3 
In becoming ‘good Europeans’ and working to achieve that distinctive idea 
through disciplinary regimes of self-creation, such individuals reinvent humankind’s 
future, enhance its vitality and enlarge the opportunities available to and varieties of 
becoming conceivable for the species. Concerned with the question of ultimate political 
significance, “what ought humankind to become?” their self-creation—as nomothetic 
legislation—hastens the development or arrival of over-human types, the Übermensch 
Nietzsche famously designated “as embodying the perfection, rather that the 
transcendence, of humankind.”5 Conway states that “the Übermensch is any human being 
who actually advances the frontier of human perfectibility.” This is intertwined with “the 
central task of politics,” which “is to produce (as a matter of design) those individuals 
who stand, ‘in relation to humankind as a whole,’ as exemplary human beings.”6 
Nietzsche conceived these superlative individuals as those capable of simultaneously 
assisting humankind in its going-down and acting as mid-wives at the birth of “a 
successor age to modernity”; a future, post-human condition.7 
Nietzsche’s vitalist politics and power ontology are indispensable to his general 
theory of decadence. Daniel Conway provides a concise definition of Nietzsche’s 
conception of decadence, as: 
a degenerative physiological condition, which characteristically manifests itself 
as: a growing disparity between the cognitive and volitional resources at one’s 
disposal; a yawing chasm that divorces intention from accomplishment; the 
widening gulf that separates what one wants from what one needs; and, most 
succinctly, an irreversible weakness of will.8 
  
Nietzsche employed this notion of decadence within a broader critical framework for 
evaluating political institutions, cultural vitality and the health of a people / society.  
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Conway further notes, “the enduring value of Nietzsche’s confrontation with 
modernity”, which symbiotically developed with his theory of decadence, “is strictly 
heuristic”, but as such it provides a persuasive, alternative set of interpretive tools for 
assessing the efficaciousness of dominant socio-economic, political and cultural 
institutions within the governing post-Enlightenment liberal framework that produced 
and continues to validate them.9  
Central to Nietzsche’s philosophical project is the quite radical argument that 
cause–effect relations are illusory and that consequently traditional Western 
philosophical assumptions about them have badly misled us.10 According to Nietzsche 
will to power—a dynamic array of anorganic forces—constitutes all that is, and becomes. 
Related to the Greek philosophical concept of dynamis (active and passive capacity, 
hence power and potentiality11), will to power describes the elemental nature of the world 
in terms as anti-foundationalist as any founding notion that has yet been conceived.12 The 
veritable Higgs-Boson of Nietzsche’s (and perhaps much of contemporary) philosophy, it 
must be acknowledged that there is in fact no less empirical evidence to support or 
independently verify Nietzsche’s notion of will to power and by extension his general 
theory of decadence than there is for substantiating the philosophical tenets of liberal-
modernity.13 This is in part due to the fact that the prevailing notion of cause and effect 
relations is erroneous, “an arbitrary division and dismemberment” of “a continuum out of 
which we isolate a couple of pieces… in [any one] moment of [which] there is an infinite 
number of processes that elude us.”14
Cause and effect are orders imposed on becoming by the human mind; they do not 
exist in the world. …Will to power, then, does not lurk behind affects, causing 
affects. Will to power consists of the affects themselves. It is the event by which 
 After citing this passage, Williams further explains:  
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becoming and affects are recognizable. …Yet our language leaves us little 
alternative for expressing Nietzsche’s position other than [to reference] ‘affects of 
will to power’.15 
  
Nietzsche asserts that both the conventional notion (that is, metaphysical fiction) of 
mechanistic causation and will to power are perspectives with important consequence for 
life. His symptomatological method of understanding—or “diagnosing”—those 
consequences prompted him to develop ‘will to power’ into an innovative (quasi-
cosmological) theory of the affects, and by extension the political, co-extending with a 
highly unconventional ontology.  
Nietzsche is primarily concerned with health and strength as symptomatized by 
ascending life, and how it may be generated from and/or augmented by culturally situated 
values facilitated by corresponding forms of socio-political organization. However, 
whilst his theory recognizes and engages this subjectivity, liberalism attempts to ground 
itself in reason and universalize a corresponding interpretation of human experience and 
the ideals that its construal of reality brings into being.16 Nietzsche gives us a compelling, 
genealogical explanation of how the slave moral (contemporary liberal-modern) 
paradigm arose and similar account of its self-justificatory discursive mechanisms and 
perpetuation up through the aforementioned, presently hegemonic institutions. Donnelly 
observes that: 
For the liberal, the individual is not merely separable from the community and 
social roles, but specially valued precisely as a distinctive, discrete individual—
which is why each person must be treated with equal concern and respect.17
Nietzsche rejected the liberal-modern notion of the individual. He also doubted the 
theoretical viability of extricating her from her community and warned against the 
practical effect of doing so.
 
 
18 
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Although neither Nietzsche’s general theory of decadence nor the long dominant, 
post-Enlightenment liberal-modern paradigm it elucidates can convince him of their 
“objective” superiority independent of the reality they comprehend, Nietzsche’s anti-
liberal theory arguably provides us with a more comprehensive and, by extension, valid 
perspective on the motives of human activity. This includes the values, norms and 
practices that arise to enable, perpetuate and justify it. It does not suggest an answer to 
the question of whether or not Nietzsche’s alternative would be more desirable than the 
status quo to most individuals. Toward the end of this work I address this question and 
advance a hypothesis that attempts to account for the core ideals of Nietzsche’s political 
vision. 
A central contention in this work is that through the perspectivist epistemological 
stance inbuilt to his general theory of decadence, Nietzsche provides a more expansive 
hermeneutical framework for evaluating ethico-political principles than does the liberal-
modern paradigm it challenges. As a plausible alternative to liberal-modernism it 
warrants being taken seriously on its own terms; the insights it provides when applied as 
a critical lens for appraising and comprehending the world also warrant serious 
consideration by extension. At the very least it can be confidently asserted that the 
critique of liberal-modernity Nietzsche’s theory essays prompted many of the most 
influential philosophical developments in Anglo-American and continental European 
thought during the 20th century, and to judge from the plethora of Nietzsche-indebted 
work presently being done across the social sciences and humanities, it clearly continues 
to inspire, goad and persuade. 
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Nietzsche anticipated that many would cite his theory’s lack of empirical grounds 
as a pretext for dismissing out-of-hand its veracity (even while they continued to 
unselfconsciously embrace its equally unproven by metaphysically gratifying antipodes), 
so he appealed to Europe’s historical experience via his genealogical methodology to 
stand as a foundation for and quasi-empirical corroboration of his analysis.19 His own 
skeptical critique of the Western philosophical tradition – its customary (if currently 
syncretic mixture of elemental Platonist, Cartesian, Kantian, etc.) notions of causality, 
epistemology, ontology, teleology and metaphysics – combined with both his 
subversively incisive redeployment of its own rationalist methodologies and his 
psychological account of human action to bolster his theory’s experiential claims.20
In addition to being of general interest to Nietzsche scholars there is a substantive 
reason for putting Nietzsche’s vitalism to such use. His will to power and theory of 
decadence are immanent to his perspectivalist hermeneutics and epistemology, as well as 
his genealogical illumination of how the anorganic forces comprising all existents find 
  
Nietzsche’s theory of decadence co-extends with his vitalist politics and power 
ontology in important ways that will be made clear below. It is enlisted throughout this 
work as a heuristic device for analyzing and evaluating European integration, the EU, the 
conventional globalization complex and the liberal philosophical presuppositions 
subtending each of these interrelated subjects. As a thought experiment, it provides 
valuable perspectives on and insight into the ultra-liberal-modern values subtending these 
contemporary European developments and suggests how they may be utilized, via a 
considered ‘good Europeanism’, as a basis for formulating a practical strategy by which 
to hasten, if not achieve, the re-naturalization of political life in a post-liberal Europe. 
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socio-psychological expression via involuntary drives and impulses. Together they also 
elucidate the role that instinct (the product of generations of breeding) plays in organizing 
those drives and impulses—both at the level of the so-called “individual” (the micro-
political sphere) and at the level of society (the macro-political sphere)—to foster the 
cultural life of peoples and civilizations. Its analytical payoff lies precisely in the unique 
insight it provides into the dependent and conditional process of value creation and truth 
legitimation.21
Central to my project is an attempt to explicate how the EU might be exploited by 
untimely ‘good Europeans’. I argue that through unanticipated abstract potentials of 
globality such thymotic ‘free spirits’ (Freigeist) may become who it is they are and 
overcome the reactive forces generated by the hegemonic, ultra-liberal-modern ideals 
dissipating life in our hyper-decadent age. Bergmann notes that “Nietzsche saw the free 
spirit’s ultimate ‘mission in removing all the barriers that stand in the way of the fusion 
  
Readers needn’t believe in the actuality of Nietzsche’s vitalist premises or 
necessarily subscribe to the hypotheses they turn out in order to take seriously their 
distinctive insights into the generation of reality. According to his theory of truth, or the 
affects, their apodicity and veridicality is not diminished thereby. Indeed, a reader would 
misunderstand his work—and the aim of this book—entirely if they took it as advancing 
any thesis with dogmatic certainty. Rather they ought to permit Nietzsche’s many dares 
to stimulate an appreciation of contingency and to cultivate within themselves the 
intellectual stance of Weltironie. The incomparable challenges his vitalist politics and 
power ontology pose to the Western philosophical tradition provide us with a set of 
perspectives / understandings that cannot be arrived at from another angle. 
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of mankind: religion; states; monarchical instincts; illusions of wealth and poverty; 
prejudices of health and race—etc.’”22 Toward such an end—which is prevenient to the 
conditions necessary for the development of authentic culture—I theorize how the anti-
natural, homogenizing objectives of the globalization complex may be hijacked and 
redeployed to hasten the eventual realization of Nietzsche’s idea of Europe.23  
These coherent explanatory propositions—informed by contemporary 
developments—should elucidate how their pursuit of natural aims consisting with a 
master morality of breeding and the philosophical education it advances is likely to 
transfigure Western civilization by establishing a new basis for culture (Bildung) from its 
ruins. According to Nietzsche, the institutionalization of a naturalized pathos of distance 
between types (an authentic embrace of difference) to augment and the fullest flourishing 
of those capable (the healthiest and highest exemplars of humankind) will multiply the 
varieties and supplement the development of elevated forms of life.  
In contending with criticisms of Nietzsche’s program, Conway concedes that 
“[b]linded perhaps by his [Nietzsche’s] romantic attachments to bygone epochs, he 
underestimates the political alternatives available to agents in late modernity”.24
The project of unifying Europe was, unsurprisingly, conceived in terms of the 
prevailing statist logic that serves as the basis for international politics and society. The 
 By way 
of putting some of those alternatives to use—and Nietzschean ends—I suggest a number 
of strategies for exploiting the existing, and really ineliminable resources available for 
countering the deleterious effects of our age’s ultra-liberal-modern values. In addition I 
propose ways in which Nietzsche’s good Europeanism can enable diverse modes of 
existence for Europeans and, by extension, all humankind.  
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ongoing unification process of formally sovereign European nations obviously has its 
origins in perceptible Euro-centric philosophical presuppositions and corresponding 
cultural biases. However, it may become a transcultural and syncretic one, as good 
Europeans, individually or acting cooperatively in sub-subaltern groups, creatively 
revalue the ascetic Anglo-European values and anti-culture of the conventional 
globalization complex through ever-transmogrifying potentials of globality.25 This 
prospect and capability may serve to enhance the becoming of free spirited individuals 
everywhere. Through abstract potentials of globality that arise within the conceptual 
spandrels of conventional globalization—the myriad fields of interaction and junctures 
between the institutions, processes and forces comprising the complex—and are 
exploited at the margins of those neglected spaces and/or non-spaces, exceptionally 
strong social mavericks may overcome themselves and revalue the nihilistic values of our 
hyper-decadent era.26
Central to this endeavor is a doxagraphical–historical critique of the power 
constellation comprised by the discipline of European integration theory understood as a 
will to truth symptomatic of an underlying will to power. I examine each of the major 
schools of thought within it from its early emergence to the present according to the 
critical framework Nietzsche’s vitalist politics and power ontology and his corresponding 
perspectivalist epistemological stance provides. I do so with a view toward the way each 
represents the anti-natural ultra-liberal-modern values (ethical/moral prejudices) 
informing its theoretical assumptions and symptomatizes the will to power of its major 
theorizers and co-extends with a broader, partisan political agenda, for determining the 
integration of Europe. Of particular concern is how these theoretical approaches 
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themselves constitute power constellations that (ant-)agonistically and involuntarily strive 
to realize and make dominant a perspective (will to truth and will to power) on Europe’s 
integration and the extent to which that perspective serves a declining or ascending form 
of life. 
Who should care about such a project and why? Firstly, anyone interested in the 
history of the idea of Europe, as it conditioned the possibility and prepared the ground for 
the contemporary project of European unification, which has profound affective power 
and manifold, measurable effects on the lives of Europeans, will value the significant role 
that Nietzsche played in fortifying it. A towering figure in the history of European 
philosophy and thought on Europe, Nietzsche articulated the existential challenges facing 
the continent during his lifetime and beyond it (the challenges he described were even 
then setting the stage for the crises, setbacks and developments of the 20th century) and 
defining an ideal for it as a life-affirming cultural realm with unique potential to enhance 
the positive growth of all humankind. The development and expansion of the EU, as an 
effort to perfect and universalize the “quantitative total state”27
Secondly, the extent to which key aspects of the ethos of ‘good Europeanism’ (as 
Nietzsche described it) are relevant and realizable universally should also interest all 
those conscious of the pervasive social malaise in our post-industrialized, overexcited and 
technologized age of “Empire”
 has, by extension, 
affected everyone in the world to varying degrees; Nietzsche’s thought helps us envisage 
ways by which the project may be perfected and thereby overcome.  
28 who desire its positive transmutation. The possibility of 
cultivating new modes of being conducive to the emergence of authentic free spirits 
capable of extraordinary creation and philosophers of the future able to enforce a new 
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disciplinary regime based on naturalized (and re-grounded) values concerns all those 
interested in augmenting the positive growth of humankind.  
As a theoretical framework for disclosing the promise in existent opportunities for 
such developments, among other things, international politics and European integration 
theorists are likely to be surprised by the utility a Nietzschean critique can provide their 
conceptual apparati. A number of twice-removed heirs of Nietzsche’s intellectual legacy 
have already impacted both of these fields through anti-foundationalist post-structural 
and “post-modern” assessments of major debates within the mainstream discourse.29
Integral to Nietzsche’s naturalist power ontology,
  
Thirdly, Nietzsche gives us a conceptual framework for understanding the 
signature tensions and contradictions of our age, to which I attach the moniker ‘ultra-
liberal-modernity’ to connote the intensification of the same decadent, all-too-human 
trends Nietzsche identified in the late 19th century. This said, the challenge of becoming 
‘good Europeans’ should be of interest to Nietzsche scholars as well as anyone who takes 
his thought seriously, as Nietzsche earnestly meant for his readers to do so. Furthermore, 
the task of doing so requires utilizing all the tools in Nietzsche’s theoretical box, 
compelling me to examine some of the recurring themes in his oeuvre and engage many 
of the ongoing debates in the literature. 
30 his vitalist politics provides a 
(perspectivally contingent) conceptual framework to effectively evaluate the 
globalization complex and abstract potentials of an emerging globality. It is my 
contention that an awareness of globality promotes a unique intellectual disposition 
toward truth and human potential. It does so by prompting the sort of conscience-
vivisection Nietzsche thought necessary for the cultivation of an awareness of “how the 
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illusion of being” gives rise to reactive “value judgments [and] all world defamation”. 
This stance—a self-undertaken effort to attain the understanding provided by multiple 
perspectives about one’s enlightenment, that is the quest for knowledge itself—indicates 
a conative disposition or (in Heideggerian terms) anticipatory resoluteness which 
originates in the understanding that “Becoming does not aim at a final state, does not 
flow into ‘being’”, and is indispensable to the development of good Europeanism.31 The 
broadened perspective on life (enlightenment) conferred by this distinctive propensity is 
at once opposite to and emergent from the philistinic culture of conformity enforced by 
the conventional globalization complex. By enabling vigorous individuals to become 
good Europeans, it stands to incrementally facilitating the realization of Nietzsche's idea 
of Europe.  
Expressions of the reactive forces, process and institutions of globalization as well 
as the positive prospects of globality can be identified in every area of contemporary 
human endeavor. Reflective of the interconnectedness of all the spheres of human 
activity, this fact makes Nietzsche’s assessment of the realms of conventional politics 
(which he abhorred—and his ‘good Europeans’ would subvert) and the sickening 
“culture” (a thoroughly decadent symptom of his declining epoch) seem difficult to 
square with our shared experience of everyday life. This is because we ourselves are 
thoroughly decadent and increasingly exhausted, despite the prevailing liberal-optimistic 
representation of the world. Nietzsche’s hope was for the generation of an authentically 
life-affirming, transformative culture (Bildung) for the eventual overcoming of 
humankind. 
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Though Nietzsche privileged culture over politics he recognized the significance 
of the political for organizing a social framework conducive to the growth of higher 
culture. To dismiss the import of the political in favor of concerns for culture in 
Nietzsche’s thought (as some scholars have done) is at odds with his identification of the 
complexity of European man and the crisis of nihilism in our hyper-decadent age.32 In his 
notebooks he wrote of the irrecuperable crisis of modernity that had plunged humankind 
into an abyss of seeming meaninglessness: 
What has happened, at bottom? The feeling of valuelessness was reached with the 
realization that the overall character of existence may not be interpreted by means 
of the concept of “aim,” the concept of “unity,” or the concept of “truth.” 
Existence has no goal or end; any comprehensive unity in the plurality of events is 
lacking: the character of existence is not “true,” is false. One simply lacks any 
reason for convincing oneself that there is a true world. Briefly: the categories 
“aim,” “unity,” “being” which we used to project some value into the world—we 
pull out again; so the world looks valueless.33
The prevalence of nihilism as a characteristic feature of contemporary Western 
anti-culture and the globalization complex that universalizes it constitutes a fundamental 
assumption of this work. As a primary symptom of decadence, the apodicity of nihilism 
 
  
This feeling of valuelessness (pathos) is taken, falsely in Nietzsche’s view, as 
hopelessness by those too sick to affirm life. The realization that all former meanings and 
purposes of life were illusory (be they beliefs in various notions of an other-worldly, 
super-sensible beyond or in the transcendentally universal truths of reason and empirical 
science) induces paralysis in most people. Humankind’s terrible new awareness—one to 
end the age of Christian-Platonic values—when taken as hopelessness, leads to nihilism, 
a condition of resignation that inhibits the creation of new values. This indifference, in 
turn, compounds the problem of decadence. 
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as a lived condition informs my critical diagnosis of the current social malaise originating 
from the West’s anti-culture. It is my primary contention that globalization (and the EU 
understood as an institutional loci and agent of the values constituting it) is disseminating 
ultra-liberal-modern values throughout the world and with them the existential ennui and 
sense of purposelessness that fosters passive resignation among the weak. This 
acquiescence is a foremost symptom of the intensified or hyper-decadence that has come 
to epitomize our age. 
The problem of decadence and its intensification via the duration and spread of 
nihilism is comprehensive, for decadence as Nietzsche recognized, infects every aspect of 
life in a degenerating epoch, such as ours.34 By extension, Nietzsche’s diagnosis of it as a 
problem and his prescribed cure are also inextricably imbricated in the decadence of our 
age. The degeneration typifying this apathetic condition is, according to Nietzsche’s 
general theory of decadence, produced by the waning instinctual organization of the 
drives and impulses at both the level of the political microsphere (that of the individual) 
and the political macrosphere (the inter-personal and communal). It is from these 
mutually constituting dimensions of human life that the socio-political and cultural 
aspects of our existence arise.35
Contrary to Nietzsche, or going further than he would have likely allowed, I shall 
argue below that these two realms of social activity, the political and the cultural, are 
inextricably enmeshed in one another. Nietzsche’s (somewhat romantic and nostalgic) 
affirmation of and emphasis upon culture and frequently contemptuous dismissal of the 
political (particularly in its conventional forms and appearances) represents a sort of 
lacuna in his self-understanding as a meta-political thinker. His analysis, which on many 
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levels is otherwise extremely compelling, distorted his view to conceiving pragmatic 
strategies for overcoming the crisis of late-modernity which he identified.  
His diagnosis inhibits the conceptualization of “solutions” in the conventional 
sense; a way out that might be generated within the spectrum of life-affirming human 
activity, even in a period in which resurgent (albeit secularized) slave-moral values had 
castrated a once feracious culture. It is also somewhat at odds with some other important 
aspects of his thought, namely his recognition and celebration of the involuntary eros36
This idea of good Europeanism recommends an ethos markedly less imperialistic 
than Kant’s cosmopolitanism, however. Such a project consisted with Nietzsche’s 
overarching vitalist objective of naturalizing everyday life by having the healthiest 
 
and expressive arête characteristic of a vital culture (Bildung) and natural politics and 
that each impels in the other. The political and cultural are always already cross-
germinating dimensions of humankind’s social existence, a feature of these interrelated 
phenomena about which Nietzsche occasionally signals an explicit awareness. 
Nietzsche’s ‘good Europeanism’ is one of the shorthand terms he uses, un-
ironically, throughout his middle and late periods, to designate the disposition he wished 
to inspire among his readers. It refers to the cultivated mentality embodied in uncommon, 
free spirited experimenters capable of recognizing the value that each of the continents’ 
self-designated peoples could, through the perfection of their respective cultures, bring to 
the project of perfecting European man and, by extension, humankind. Undeniably Euro-
centric, the notion iterates Nietzsche’s own habituated prejudices—a particular 
chauvinism privileging European civilization that was characteristic of his time.  
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individuals fulfill their role as physicians of culture and revaluing all values in that 
capacity. As Conway observes, Nietzsche:  
…locates the sole justification of human existence in the continued perfectibility 
of the species as a whole, as evidenced by the pioneering accomplishments of its 
highest exemplars.37 
 
This ongoing effort to perfect the species would encompass, over a long period, the 
overcoming of nationalism and associated all-too-human prejudices such as ethnic 
chauvinism, xenophobia, racism, etc., characteristic of the 19th and 20th centuries.  
This desire—the irrepressible creative volition of the type he designates ‘good 
Europeans’—necessitates the uniting of the continent via the diffusion of a radically 
inclusive, perspectivally expansive identity that takes the highest account of difference, 
possibly—but not necessarily—through the mutually agreed abolition of formal political 
divisions along national lines, so that “humankind [might ultimately] create the favorable 
conditions under which those great redemptive men can come into existence”38 in a 
deliberate and systematic process of political perfectionism organized by the best 
“against the indifference of nature”.39
Nicholas Martin contends that “[w]e are on safer ground when treating 
Nietzsche’s notions of ‘Europeanism’ and the ‘Good Europeans’ as foils to the Europe of 
the nineteenth century than as blueprints for the Europe of the twentieth.”
 
40 I concur in 
part with this, insofar as Nietzsche’s good Europeanism is a quasi-ideal and the artist–
philosophers who personify its characteristics, are correspondingly rare, but I maintain 
that Nietzsche thought of them as realizable types in the necessary, longer process of the 
self-overcoming and perfection of European man. While his good Europeanism certainly 
does not constitute a “blueprint” for Europe’s becoming, it does suggests an effective 
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trajectory for a few, exceptionally healthy specimens embodying humankind’s potential 
greatness. By extension it suggests that such cosmopolitan and iconoclastic individuals 
could, against the so-called “higher men” who enforce the slave-morality of the herd, 
condition the possibility for the eventual appearance of authentic Übermenschen—those 
futural individuals capable of revaluing the decadent values diminishing humankind, to 
initiate the overcoming of the species man and inauguration of a post-human era.  
I theorize how this development may be encouraged in the present through the 
conventional, primarily reactive institutions central to the globalization complex (by 
which I refer to the assemblages of forces, emerging networks, practical norms and social 
processes developing under the rubric of globalization) toward their ultimate destruction 
in creative affirmation of authentic becoming. In what may initially strike many 
Nietzsche scholars as counter-intuitive I shall argue that Nietzsche’s ‘good Europeans’ 
would actively encourage certain ongoing processes of globalization so that the state of 
globality and the transhuman condition it is likely to facilitate might be realized as the 
successor epoch to modernity. 
Another objective in undertaking this study is to provide an unique, 
“Nietzschean” analysis that will appeal to advocates and critics of globalization, and both 
the so-called “Europhiles” and “Europhobes” with regard to the European Union’s 
ongoing integration and expansion, by demonstrating how each of their respective diverse 
views capture a critical component of reality. In addition, it ought to appeal as well to 
scholars of East and Central European and post-Communist studies and those with 
concerned with controversial issues of democratization and human rights in the dawning 
post-liberal era.41 
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In book two I extend this Nietzschean critique to an examination of multiple 
theoretical perspectives on the process of European integration and the EU’s expansion, 
the actual variety of which are shown to describe a relatively narrow ideological 
spectrum. While symptomatic of the will-to-truth in the metadiscourse of ultra-liberal-
modernity and its proponents’ enfeeblement, all but the most recent schools of thought 
miss the mark as to what the EU is actually doing in terms of values.42
However they cut into the matter, none of the conventional theories of European 
integration individually seems to fully comprehend what taken collectively they have the 
potential to reveal, though (Nietzsche indebted) ‘discourse analysis’ and ‘post-modern 
  
European integration theorists are (like all descriptive theorists) motivated by an 
all-too-human will-to-truth, however partisan or biased their objectives or to whatever 
extent they are of a programmatic, practical or prescriptive variety, or some combination 
thereof. The perspectival limitations and hermeneutical deficiencies that follow from 
each theory demonstrate this, in addition to underscoring the impossibility of adequately 
capturing the enormous dynamic complexity at work in Europe’s unification process and 
their individual author’s will-to-truth (as a will-to-power). As with all inquirers, theorists 
of European integration all too often fail to identify theoretical opacities their efforts at 
illumination overlook. This inherent constraint – the predicament of all inquiry and 
critique – inclines theorists to make generalizations that lack nuance. They may focus too 
intently on the specifics of particular institutions, their bureaucratic organization and 
animating politics so that they miss general trends. Or in attempting to demonstrate the 
veracity of an abstraction (e.g.: anarchy, sovereignty, etc.) they may diminish the 
significance of contradictory details.  
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approaches’ have made great strides toward “unpacking” some of the theoretical conceits 
taken for granted in the discipline, as opposed to the bland inventory taking that serves 
only to repack them in the similarly unexamined baggage once more. A Nietzschean 
examination of the field of European integration theory illuminates dimensions of the 
discipline previously neglected, for the etiological action theory comprised by his vitalist 
politics and power ontology enable a different way of comprehending the functionality of 
key concepts in theories of European integration and International studies more broadly. 
This study should therefore be of value to those involved in Europe’s contemporary 
politics and integration process and assist them in augmenting its becoming.  
In book three I turn to globalization itself, taking the EU as a crucial instantiation 
of globalizing institutions at the level of the political macro-sphere, and its transformative 
processes. I understand the EU to be one of the principle engines of globalizing values. 
Drawing from major theories of globalization I explicate how the forces, institutions and 
processes of that leveling and homogenizing phenomenon are inadvertently giving rise to 
abstract potentials of globality.  
Of interest to international politics and political theorists alike will be the way in 
which a Nietzschean analytical framework illuminates the function of the underlying 
liberal–modern ideology within mainstream theories of globalization and European 
integration. It also exposes their considerable role in rationalizing the transformation of 
East and Central Europe in the post-Communist era, in addition to the possibly counter-
intuitive results for human freedom and becoming. The ramifications of its conclusions 
for human societies and the scope of possibilities for action for individuals within them 
are especially salient to contemporary concerns of political theorists, particularly those 
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receptive to critiques of the present that aspire to the post-liberal. Left post-moderns may 
find the conclusions as provocatively “conservative” or “reactionary” as statist thinkers 
find them unimaginably radical and “leftist”.  
If successful, the analysis should contribute to each of the aforementioned fields 
and interest areas by demonstrating, in Nietzschean fashion, the simultaneous validity of 
seemingly contradictory “truths” contained in various, disparate perspectives on 
European integration and globalization, characterized by neo-liberal, post-industrial 
capital process and its corresponding democratic state form. It shall also show how the 
qualitatively positive aspects of these ultra-liberal-modern trends may be combined to 
fundamentally alter our expectations of the former processes as well as the manner in 
which we may effectively contend with the oft-alleged ubiquity of reactionary power to 
contend with the unprecedented totalitarian potential of contemporary institutions. This 
paper thereby seeks to point toward how we may become what we are individually while 
radically affirming life so as to enhance the growth and vitality of humankind as it 
transitions into a post-liberal, transhuman future.  
I begin by applying Nietzsche’s vitalist critique of the political to an analysis of 
historical (genealogical) European unification, the EU and its eastward expansion, in the 
context of globalization. In so doing I will demonstrate the extent to which Nietzsche’s 
idea of Europe is being indeliberately realized through European unification. I explicate 
how, in such a theoretical context, globalization may be understood, counter-intuitively 
perhaps, as contributing to the vigor of European society and the extent to which 
individuals may become ‘good Europeans’ both within and outside of the EU. From the 
standpoint of a coextending post-modern anarchist politics43 I also examine how largely 
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reactive globalizing institutions, forces and processes may be augmented to hasten the 
emergence of abstract potentials of globality. I then suggest how the latter, positive 
potentials, which exist in nascent form, may be exploited by “godless anti-
metaphysicians” through a Nietzschean technique of the self based on six classic 
skeptical doctrines for living. The analysis utilizes disparate (“post-modern”) critiques of 
contemporary life in the post-industrialized West and largely rejects pessimistic 
conclusions about the future to posit a Nietzschean prescriptive formula toward the 
realization of a radically emancipatory politics conducive to the greatest multiplicity of 
becomings.  
Through this work I seek to dispel the notion that Nietzsche was an “anti-political 
philosopher” as Walter Kaufmann famously maintained.44
Despite his frequent eruptions against conventional politics, it must be recognized 
that Nietzsche steadfastly believed in the necessity of the rule of law and certain essential 
functions of community for the perfection of the species man. Unlike conventional 
political philosophers, his chief political concerns are with the desire and corresponding 
health indicated by the organizational form a community gives rise to, how that form 
facilitates the community’s durability, as well as the instincts it facilitates and to what 
ends they are directed. All of this is considered in terms of how effectively it generates a 
great and elevating culture (Bildung). However, he frequently remarked on customary 
 Kauffman made this claim as 
part of his career-long endeavor to rehabilitate Nietzsche’s reputation in America. The 
legacy of Kaufmann’s well-intentioned assertion is waning, but Nietzsche’s status as a 
political philosopher remains controversial among some scholars. Nevertheless, I 
understand Nietzsche to be a truly meta-political philosopher.  
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political concerns, such as forms of governance (monarchy, democracy, socialism, etc.,) 
the legitimation of authority, sovereignty, nationalism, international conflict, imperialism 
and foreign trade, among others.45 Nevertheless, it consists with Nietzsche’s own 
arguments that we comprehend the political as broadly co-extending with both the socio-
cultural and economic realms of human activity / expression; for he insists that the 
imposition of a “natural” (political) order on the many is a prerequisite for a creative 
society and the flourishing of a higher culture. 
Nietzsche thought culture would be impeded from fulfilling its proper role if not 
kept distinct from the state, and that the health of a polity—as opposed to the modern 
nation-state—would suffer if the mundane affairs of state and its pragmatic concerns 
were privileged over culture:  
If you invest all your energy in economics, world commerce, parliamentarianism, 
military engagements, power and power politics, – if you take the quantum of 
intelligence, seriousness, will and self-overcoming that you embody and expend it 
all in this one direction, then there won’t be any left for the other direction. 
Culture and the state – let us be honest with ourselves here – these are 
adversaries: ‘Kultur-Staat’ is just another modern idea. The one lives off the 
other, the one flourishes at the expense of the other. All the great ages of culture 
have been ages of political decline: anything great in the cultural sense is 
apolitical, even anti-political.46
 
 
 
The established “Bismarckian” notion in Wilhelmine Germany that a strong governing 
state apparatus is necessary for prosperity and a robust culture, is criticized here and 
taken as supporting Nietzsche’s broader critique of the decadence of modernity. While he 
suggests that great cultural achievements are possibly anti-political, this rhetorical 
provocation could not accurately be construed in such a way as to define him as an anti-
political philosopher.  
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Secondary Literature 
Each of the four books comprising this work includes an internal literature review 
salient to its broad themes. In terms of the secondary literature on Nietzsche my analysis 
is significantly indebted to Daniel Conway’s lucid explications of Nietzsche’s general 
theory of decadence, or vitalist politics and power ontology. Additionally, it draws on 
many other critical interpretations of Nietzsche’s politics, including those provided by 
Ansell-Pearson on the machinic becoming of man in the age of globality toward a 
transhuman future; Appel on Nietzsche’s affirmation of the ineliminable and highly 
nuanced role of cruelty in the world and discipline in Nietzsche’s ethico-political thought; 
Shaw on ‘Nietzsche’s political skepticism’, Call on the philosophically anarchistic 
implications / dimensions of Nietzsche’s politics. 
I make considerable use of Deleuze’s take on Nietzsche’s notions of force and 
becoming; draw on Detwiler’s understanding of the political implications of the death of 
God and the compulsion to revalue all values in its wake to cultivate future Übermensch. 
I cull important insights from Elbe’s works on Nietzsche’s idea of Europe; Hatab’s 
innovative contemplation of the possible Nietzschean uses of agonistic democracy; 
Heilke on Nietzsche’s response to the conundrum of life and the role of education for 
contending with the tragic dimensions of the political and Hunt on Nietzsche’s related 
notions of justice and immoralism and the role of his experimentalism for achieving a 
natural social order.  
I utilize David Owen’s reflections on Nietzsche’s critique of liberalism and the 
political tradition it spawned; Richardson’s views on the ‘Will-to-power’ as an 
ontological theory of becoming; Smith’s work on the combined role of Nietzsche and 
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Heidegger in transitioning Western civilization to a truly postmodern era and Thiele’s 
thought on Nietzsche’s celebration of heroic individualism and its consequences for 
understanding the political. I also cite other classics of the secondary literature by 
(alphabetically) Berkowitz, Heidegger, Hollingdale, Kaufmann, Lampert, May, Nehamas, 
Strong, Taylor, and Wilcox. 
Many other works of contemporary philosophy are cited throughout this work, 
including major texts by Heidegger, MacIntyre, Deleuze, Arendt, Rorty, Baudrillard, 
Sloterdijk, Debord, Virilio, Derrida and Foucault. It should be noted that my application 
of Nietzsche’s thought comprises an amalgam of Heideggerian and Deleuzean 
interpretation, which will be readily apparent to Nietzsche scholars. 
In book two I draw upon recent works on European history and seminal critiques 
of integration theory, including those by Chryssochoou, Rosamund, Wiener and Diez and 
Eilstrup-Sangiovanni, among others. I also utilize many of the field’s primary texts in 
approximately chronological order of their production to make a doxagraphical survey 
toward a genealogical critique of the field itself. In book three I make use of a gambit of 
globalization literature, including particularly influential works by Shaw, Robertson, 
Beck, Albrow and Khan, among many others. Books two through four are heavily 
informed by a plethora of contemporary international relations theory including works by 
Booth, Campbell, Wendt and Connelly. I also employ the human rights theories of 
Donnelly and Benhabib. Book four also draws from the secondary literature on Classical 
skepticism and transhumanist studies. 
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Methodology 
Nietzsche’s vitalist critique of the political, power ontology and perspectivalist 
epistemology and hermeneutical stance serves as philosophical framework for this 
analysis. It provides a unique interpretive standpoint for effective discursive and textual 
critique as well as historical analysis, the primary methodological tools applied in this 
study.47
Through a Nietzschean critique of theories of European integration and the EU in 
the broader context of globalization, I demonstrate the contemporary relevance of 
Nietzsche’s critique of liberal modernity and show how that critique extends the tradition 
of skepticism and invigorates its significance to life and the political. By extension I 
 From this standpoint and by these means I engage in some axiological process 
tracing (value formation and development) and empirical research into theories of 
European integration and EU institutions to discern the former’s historical development, 
and the latter’s institutional design and function. 
 This critical Nietzschean lens provides a means of evaluating how Europe’s 
unifying political institutions serve to edify life on the continent and transform 
international order. These theoretical tools also provide insights into how the EU’s 
institutions function within the constitutive matrixes of the globalization complex. While 
relevant EU treaties and documents provide abundant evidence of the “all too human” 
characteristics of institutionally instantiated forms of the bad-conscience and 
ressentiment Nietzsche identified in the human condition, they also substantiate the thesis 
that Europe is ineluctably moving toward the opposite of this, that is, in positive 
directions from a “Nietzschean” perspective. Differing strains of recent globalization 
literature corroborate this conclusion in their theorization of globality. 
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show how Nietzsche’s critical understanding of the political, (an assessment over one 
hundred years old but only now beginning to be taken seriously), has real significance to 
any genuine effort at a comprehensive understanding of the formative institutions and 
defining norms of our era. Finally, the synthesis shall demonstrate the salience of 
Nietzsche’s objective in our own age, which is the practical necessity of and prospects for 
exceptional, pluripotent individuals to become ‘good Europeans’.  
A unique method, Nietzsche’s perspectivalist hermeneutics and genealogy of 
morality provides an unconventional evaluative stance to elucidate important dynamics of 
these interrelated phenomena that standard assessments of European unification and 
globalization miss. I argue that a vitalist examination of the European idea pronounced by 
Nietzsche coextends with an authentically radical, ‘post-modern mode of “becoming-
anarchist”’ to paraphrase—and give a Deleuzean twist to—the way Lewis Call 
persuasively puts it. This idea paradoxically entails the co-determination of morality and 
politics as expressed by certain elemental globalizing forces in the present. 
In book three I postulate globality as the preeminent (type of) conceptual and 
normative paradigm of the dawning post-modern age – one antithetical to the hegemonic 
liberalism manifest in the metadiscourse of ultra-liberal-modernity; a plethora of 
institutions, processes and forces under the rubric of globalization. Each of the 
aforementioned developments in European unification is therefore seen as indicative of 
globalizing processes in themselves that aim to fulfill a reactive cooptation of cultural 
diversity and homogenization of ideational and identic difference. However, within each 
of globalization’s multivariate phenomena largely unrecognized, abstract and positive 
potentials of globality arise which present opportunities for authentically agonistic 
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becomings. The abstract potentials of globality destabilize and disrupt the conventional 
globalization complex, the ideological prerogatives of which inform and direct the 
continuum of activities and events constituting European unification. 
Furthermore, this inquiry critically assesses the hegemony of neo-liberal 
capitalism and the ideologically corresponding democratic state form that characterizes 
the dominant institutions and processes of globalization. Taken in summa these myriad, 
overlapping and mutually supporting institutions, processes and forces comprise a 
globalization complex, the loci of which lie within and simultaneously exceed the US and 
EU (among other places). In complicated ways this globalization complex transforms 
human life and (arguably) enhances human capacities to enable the realization of 
globality’s abstract potentials. This occurs largely despite the formers’ ubiquitous, hyper-
statist conventional politics, its bestowal of uncritical complacency via its ever-subtler 
and more refined governmentality.48
To achieve this my analysis also draws in part upon the Gramscian concept of 
mass-consent by interpolated subjects to hegemonic values that are universalized through 
ever-modified, rather than “post”, neo-imperialist doctrines. In the present these consist 
  
Consistent with the spirit of Nietzschean critique, this analysis comprehends 
European unification, EU expansion and the multivalent phenomena of globalization 
generally as products of the dominant, originally Western, ideological metadiscourse of 
ultra-liberal-modernity. It theorizes their simultaneous, “schizophrenic” development 
from it, their utilization and intensification of it as opening possibilities onto, or 
providing an impetus for a revaluation of all values (Umwerthung aller Werthe), toward a 
naturalized politics and/for the enhancement of culture (Bildung).  
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of Euro-centric “Western” ideological that, originally Anglo-European, have been 
significantly influenced by American practices in the last century. Furthermore, an 
Althusserian notion of the affective power of ideology, and its dissemination, 
naturalization and enforcement through the myriad (superstructural and structural) 
institutions, forces and processes comprising the globalization complex, comprises a 
background assumption throughout my work.49    
Nietzsche’s ‘epistemic framework and critical method’ affords a distinctive and 
astute perspective on the ways in which reaction and decadence contributed to the 
collective nightmare that Europe—and humankind by extension—suffered in the first 
half of the twentieth century.50 The valuable insights provided by Nietzsche’s vitalist 
thought extend to the globally transformative reorganization of international society that 
followed the catastrophes of the world wars, as well as Europe’s present condition, its 
future prospects and those of the human species. They do so by providing us with a 
compelling set of intellectual tools and psychological insights with which we may 
examine the nature of human desire, the diverse meanings ascribed to it, and the 
multitudinous forms of existence to which it gives rise. The issue of being fair to 
Nietzsche aside, however, it is the challenges his thought presents those who would 
accept it that are most formidable, as Conway asserts: 
Since we have never before witnessed the death of an epoch from the inside, we 
have no empirical means of confirming or disputing the jeremiad he so forcefully 
advances. Those who endorse his critique of modernity must consequently make 
it their own, concocting additional theoretical support if possible and 
compensating for his decadent influence in any event.51
Compensating for Nietzsche’s own decadence – which according to his analysis was 
expressive of the dissolution characteristic of his age – does not, in my view, present a 
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difficult challenge. For, although Nietzsche’s account laments the state of European 
man’s declining vitality in modernity and prophesied the period’s consequent doom, it 
also entails an exceedingly hopeful notion of what mankind might become through the 
transfiguration of its all-too-human decadence. The transfiguration he envisages, in which 
good Europeans – as free spirits – gradually realize their (Nietzschean) idea of Europe, 
will necessarily require the creative destruction of modernity’s injurious assumptions 
about human nature. 
The ambition motivating this project forces me to directly contend with the 
tensions, prima facie paradoxes and complexities that inhere to considerations of how the 
sort of life-affirming, natural order that Nietzsche advocated may be realized (as an 
always-realizing). This aim must be understood in the context of his broader concern with 
reinvigorating an authentic European culture (Bildung) for the type of great health it 
would generate for humankind.  
However improbable it is that Nietzsche’s ideal form of political order may be 
realized any time in the foreseeable future, it, and the historical / psychological / 
axiological analysis that generated it, is worth taking seriously. It is helpful insofar as it 
forces us to notice the deficiency of our present socio-cultural situation, the inauthentic 
modes of being it authorizes and the operation of the deleterious values that sustain them. 
I therefore attempt a careful explication of how a Nietzschean “political” program ought 
to be understood so to remain consistent with the ethos of Nietzsche’s naturalistic values, 
constantly aware of the extreme dangers facing those capable of (re: strong enough for) 
adopting it, who would reasonably dare to apply it only through the strategic cultivation 
of a sophisticated disposition and corresponding use of masks.  
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Nietzsche thought (re)establishing a healthy ethical basis for socio-political 
organization was the greatest task confronting mankind and thus could only be properly 
undertaken by the “strongest,” who are so by virtue of possessing the most positive 
affective will. This futural dimension of his thought is at once crucial to Nietzsche’s 
system and constitutes what might be taken as the prescriptive facet of it. As 
aforementioned, the strength to actively will and to endure the suffering that invariably 
results confers a nobility of spirit upon them that serves as the natural basis of their right 
to act as determiners of the “good.” Nietzsche effectively stipulates the conditions for 
overcoming the decadence of modernity in order to realize the maximal prosperity of 
mankind’s foremost exemplars. 
The analysis is also fundamentally concerned, as was Nietzsche, with 
considerations of agency and freedom (or liberty), albeit not from the traditional liberal 
sense that approaches these issue with an interest in asserting / demonstrating the 
inalienable rights and innate equality of individuals per se, but in terms of how human 
activity may be directed to cultivate favorable circumstances for the improvement of the 
exceptionally strong, healthy individuals whose maximal development is likeliest to 
advance mankind as a species. Ultimately, this does reaffirm certain Liberal assumptions 
about the necessity of meritocracy, access to opportunity and protection from undue 
subjugation or interference, if for radically different reasons and objectives. But the 
crucial difference is the reason (and reasoning) by which one might arrive at such 
conclusions.  
Among the most profound concern of political philosophers is negotiating the 
dilemma between the(ir) desire to realize the greatest liberty possible (defined ever more 
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broadly and inclusively to the present, as Hegel recognized) while regulating society to 
realize that desire; order social life to such an (culturally and historically relative) end – a 
paradoxical task that, in recorded history at least, has required some form of governance 
and methods of coercion. The existence of institutionalized governance and the necessity 
of its legitimation (about which Nietzsche was a thorough-going skeptic) constitutes a 
general acceptance of the need—at whatever level—for cruelty; the necessity of making 
and enforcing distinctions as well as managing their effects.  
Nietzsche’s recognition of this fact and its ineliminable necessity is often 
misrepresented by his opponents as a thoughtless endorsement of gratuitous cruelty 
and/or violence. It is not. Rather it sought to expose a well veiled characteristic of 
Western liberal democracies, that being their somewhat incoherent dream of abolishing 
all suffering—including it would seem, the striving required for their continuation. The 
excessive consumption (re: “wealth”) typifying Western life entails tremendous 
exploitation and cruelty hidden from view by the machinations of capital process. Yet, as 
I attempt to show below, the inherent contradictions of the ultra-liberal-modern 
ideological apparatus (promulgated by the globalization complex) give rise to 
vulnerabilities that ‘good Europeans’ of the Nietzschean variety can exploit. In doing so 
they may hasten the demise of the prevailing hyper-decadent order to initiate a successor 
era to modernity and a transhuman future.  
Nietzsche, whose views on the necessity of law and the mis/uses of punishment 
are complicated, accepts the inherent cruelty of the exclusions law entails, 
acknowledging that governance, in both its masterly / breeding and slavish / taming 
forms, involves a conceit, namely that some governing authority may “legitimately” 
 33 
intervene upon and compel people to comply with its bidding.52 Government is 
invariably usurpation. The entire tradition of Western political philosophy has been 
engaged in expounding pre- and pro-scriptions for this arrogation of right.53 Yet despite 
two and a half millennia of often violent debate, the constitution of authority and means 
of its legitimation is no more resolved today than in the city-states of classical Greece. 
The operation of establishing and justifying authority, both the effect and putative end of 
doing so, is a complex issue to which Nietzsche gave a unique response: government is 
most illegitimate when it is imposed by the congenitally botched on a society’s highest 
exemplars. If not a traditional political theorist, Nietzsche left us with conceptual tools 
for considering the political, and the dilemmas inherent to it, anew.  
 
Contending interpretations of Nietzsche and his project 
So-called “left” Nietzscheans, such as Foucault and Deleuze, more or less 
concluded that, as Nietzsche believed, every prerogative taken from an individual is a 
usurpation of some quanta of their innate autonomy and sovereignty; that by extension, 
all (conventional) power is usurpation. Through ultra-liberal-modern lenses this line of 
reason logically leads to radical anarchist conclusions about the nature of power and the 
objective for individuals in society.54
Rather, he insists that those who are so capable, rare individuals of unusual vigor, 
or übermenschlich (over-manly) types, would instinctively create values for their 
communities consistent with its highest potentials; their actions comprising nomothetic 
 But that would have been anathema to Nietzsche, 
who also believed that most individuals were not strong enough physically, spiritually or 
intellectually, to command themselves much less lead others.  
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legislations generative of socio-political frameworks that reorder the macro-sphere of 
communal life. In so doing the limited capabilities of weaker individuals could be made 
to effectively contribute to the betterment of the whole, re-naturalized social organism, 
rather than dissipating it.  
According to this notion as the society’s members (even its weaker ones) are 
invigorated the increasingly conscious objective of the community is the production of an 
ever greater vitality—a society in which extraordinary individuals engage in an authentic 
agon and their cultural achievements could thrive. A somewhat romanticized notion of 
Classical Athens served as Nietzsche’s model for this ideal, along with Renaissance Italy, 
which he cites as a consummate example of flourishing culture. 
Recent continental philosophers (such as Foucault, Derrida and Deleuze) do 
contend with Nietzsche’s “conservative” implications, as it were, for instance in the 
“positive” sense of Foucault’s recognition that we are constituted by disciplinary power / 
knowledge regimes and may develop through “techniques of the self”; likewise the 
Deleuzean notions of the fold, nomadism and lines of flight account for the positive, 
transformative potential in even the most “reactive” conditions. Many contemporary 
scholars following in the tradition of such “left Nietzscheans” do not effectively contend 
with the “conservative Nietzsche,” eliding important aspects of his thought because they 
disturb sacrosanct assumptions about human nature. To effectively contend with them 
means having to square Nietzsche’s anti-liberalism with their own ultra-liberal-modern 
aspirations.  
Accepting the explicit usurpation of prerogatives that constitutes power, 
Nietzsche is concerned with the attainment of a more natural political order that will 
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enhance the becoming of mankind and, ultimately, all of its members. There is not one 
precise type of Übermensch in Nietzsche’s view. Who may legitimately arrogate the 
conceits of “authority” to themselves?: those with the greatest vitality, which is broadly 
indicative of the strongest health, the best intellectual ability, the highest degree of nerve 
or daring, the deepest sensitivity and heritable talents, all of which are determined 
through creative acts in a genuinely agonistic socio-political setting. The predominant 
values of society must – if they are to maintain its health, the authentic telos of values in 
Nietzsche’s view – nurture and privilege such individuals, but the legacy of 
Enlightenment liberalism, which provided the philosophical basis and ideological 
objective for most of our world’s governing (globalizing) institutions, leveled all 
individuals through its mutually reinforcing discourses of rights and equality, stymieing 
the exceptions.  
Nietzsche identifies such ideologies with ochlocratic forms of rule and the herd 
mentality. The mindless conformity to which the phrase “herd mentality” refers arises 
from his psychological critique of weakness among those individuals comprising the vast 
majority. This mentality compels resignation to the status quo, reinforcing established 
codes of behavior through norms, mores and taboos; disciplinary regimes that generate 
insecurity and fearfulness within communities. These exclusionary practices comprise a 
“thou shalt” that implies the threat of social ostracism or marginalization by othering, to 
ensure the compliance of the masses with the will of those deemed arbiters of norms, 
whose authority empowers them to constitute themselves and leaders and their values 
(prejudices against or toleration of forms of difference) as mainstream.  
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Nietzsche’s ‘Genealogy of Morality’ explicates the process by which the majority 
in a society, the vast preponderance of whom in ancient societies were often slaves (the 
designation Nietzsche provocatively employs) who are initially just the losers in the war 
for dominance at the establishment of a society, come to constitute a type that, lacking a 
sense of its own agency, values out of ressentiment and a spirit of revenge.55 The slaves 
empower themselves by inverting the values of the masters, labeling them as evil while 
re-designating their own meekness as merit and their oppression by the strong as 
injustice.56 When successful over long periods, such as the Christian era, these slave 
values foster the forgetting of their ignoble origins and come to serve as rhetorical and 
conceptual devises for flattering their advocates as the arbiters of genuinely righteous 
virtues.  
The violences that characterized the former masters are excoriated and 
criminalized. Enactments of such natural behavior are tabooized and punished.57 A self-
described altruistic and selfless disposition is rewarded as the highest ideal; even today, 
the secular saint is revered above all others.58
A central aim of this project is that of illuminating the ways in which Europe’s 
political integration and the EU’s expansion – as a globalizing power constellation – are 
 The ascetic ideal she personifies (and the 
collective desire for subterranean revenge she fulfills), covers up its own means of 
coerced compliance. Ultimately that ideal itself is the culmination of ressentiment and 
mendacity; a celebrated model of “group think” that compels conformity and punishes 
difference to ensure mediocrity.  
 
The EU and its transfiguration of the nation-state 
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simultaneously enabling and impeding the fulfillment of Nietzsche’s idea of Europe. It 
considers the efficacy of his “political,” vitalist objectives and the capacity of 
extraordinary individuals to contribute to an evolutionary revaluation of values that may 
fundamentally transform human societies by organizing them for the perfection of the 
species’ strongest members. Through an anti-dogmatic strategy based on six classical 
skeptical tenants I allege that healthy individuals can attain a perspectivalist ethos—the 
“freedom from any kind of conviction” and delight in contingency—necessary for 
becoming a good European.59
In its present capacity the EU enforces the values of ultra-liberal-modernity as it 
geographically extends itself across the continent. It provides Europe’s citizen-
constituents with simulacrums of existential meaning and ontological purpose by 
 It is individuals such as these who are most likely to hasten 
our achievement of those objectives; goals for humankind that Nietzsche thought could 
only be realized following the major wars over ideology and nationalism he predicted for 
the 20th century—conflicts that, contra Fukuyama, are not in fact resolved.  
The European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC), was originally conceived in 
large part as a protectionist response to certain economic practices that would become 
characteristic features of globalization. Despite this, the organization would serve as a 
precursor to the formation of the European Economic Community (EEC) with the Treaty 
of Rome (1957). This group of communities (customs union and Euratom) antecedent to 
the EU, would evolve and expand significantly over the next five decades. In so doing 
what arguably were protectionist stratagems for Europe’s industrial and economic 
independence developed into a crucial locus of the globalization complex, and perhaps 
the most multifaceted power constellation in the world.  
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simulating both the democratic state form’s representative legitimacy and hierarchical 
authority.60 Through the EU’s pseudo-meritocratic promotion of neo-liberal capital 
process and its massification of desire (a nullification of authenticity), it augments the 
circulation of spectacularized modes being-in-the-world / forms of life that continually 
generate need and corresponding means to satisfy it. In so doing it tantalizes the masses 
with illusions of gratification and deflects them from their state of inauthenticity. Its 
enticements are offered to distract, occupy and sate their nihilistic will to consume— 
momentarily fulfilling in material terms both corporeal necessity and socio-political 
imperatives fostered by the aforementioned simulacrums.61
Situated in the broader context of the globalization complex, the EU’s institutions 
and practices are seen to ramify numerous features of the former. Ideologically 
supervenient to one another, they comprise differing degrees of institutionally 
instantiated forces and processes within the same dissipative ultra-liberal-modern value 
matrix, an ideological regime usefully understood to be propagating “Empire”. These are 
experienced variously—according to the type of individual and her vitality—as qualia. 
The is evidenced by the imposition of international order via the nation-state as 
  
This suggests how the numerous simulacrums of an emerging, globalized 
spectacular society produce and sustain a highly reactive simulation of the healthy--
authentically agonistic—social and political order necessary for the eventual overcoming 
of the human type. An ultimately undesirable, albeit necessary, modern veil of Isis that 
obscures its own ideological basis and ends, it is nevertheless conditioning the possibility 
of its own transfiguration by generating myriad opportunities for the incremental 
transvaluation of the slave-moral-unto-anti-natural percepts it is predicated upon. 
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privileged form of polity, followed by its systematic democratization, as well as the 
enforced adoption of the precepts of neo-liberal capital processes and conformity with the 
hegemonic regulatory mechanisms to which it has given rise. The globalization complex 
is typified by technological rationality coupled with a methodical and comprehensive 
massification of everyday life; its overarching functions and objectives compel fallen-
ness and inauthenticity in the social relations of individuals and lives of communities it 
transforms. It always already entails the superficially significant but ultimately transitory 
partisan debates that absorb the attention of the majority and deflect them from the deeper 
and invisible currents imperceptibly transforming their existences.  
According to this critical analytical framework, contemporary social and political 
life in the West and its globalized penumbra are understood as a product of innumerable 
expressions of a negative will to nothingness as nihilistic power manifested disparately 
through reactive force. These anti-natural impulses are legitimated through a hermeneutic 
of desire via disciplinary regimes of truth and responsibility that are in turn rationalized 
by ascetic-consumerist priests of ressentiment. The preponderating reactive forces of the 
metadiscourse of ultra-liberal-modernity are symptomatized in Europe’s ongoing 
unification, via the EU. It is a project dominated but not exclusively directed by ascetic-
consumerist priests according to the secularized slave-moral values and reified 
rationalism they enforce.  
As such Europe’s ongoing integration via the EU, in collaboration with other 
major IGOs such as the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), 
the Council of Europe (COE) and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), is 
fulfilling the largely dissipative ambition of European and international elites, all last-
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man types, alike. Yet contrary to this dark actuality Nietzsche suggests, in accordance 
with his vitalist conception of the political62 and corresponding idea of Europe, that an 
opposite desire for uniting Europe connects the continent’s representative exemplars 
across healthy ages – those periods of great cultural production between decadent, 
declining epochs.  
Highly contemptuous of the populist trends of his time for the increased danger 
they presented to the higher spiritualization of mankind and its exemplars, Nietzsche 
dedicated a great deal of thought to the consequences of post-Enlightenment 
democratization and the rise of socialism in the 19th century, coming to some prescient 
conclusions (published in 1880): 
The practical outcome of this spreading democratization will first of all be a 
European league of nations within which each individual nation, delimited 
according to geographical fitness, will possess the status and rights of a canton: in 
this process the historical recollections of the former nations will be of little 
account, since the sense of reverence for such things will gradually be totally 
uprooted by the domination of the democratic principle, which thirsts for 
innovations and is greedy for experiments.63
Although he could not fully anticipate the disorientation and corresponding 
increase in individual adaptability wrought by the political and technological revolution 
that characterized the twentieth century, he clearly identified the ethos that presupposed 
the innovations and experiments that produce it. The premonition was largely correct and 
could plausibly be said to characterize one of the primary objectives of European 
 
 
This passage suggests the trajectory the democratic impulse would set for the politics of 
the European continent, and it must be acknowledged that the EU is innovating political 
authority and accountability and arguably experimenting with supranational governance 
at once in conjunction with and over its increasingly canton-like member-states. 
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unification in the present, namely its furtive efforts to eliminate the former reverence of 
the nation among its member-states, whose identities it would subsume into a synthetic 
personality based on ultra-liberal-modern principles correlated to post-Enlightenment 
notions of representative democracy. 
In an oft cited section from the first volume of the same book, entitled ‘A Glance 
at the State,’ he endorses just this inevitability, having understood nationalism as an 
effort to stem what, as a consequence of these complicated changes in European society, 
brought “a weakening and finally an abolition of nations, at least the European,” and “of 
a continual crossing a mixed race, that of European man, [which] must come into being 
out of them.” In the same passage he concludes, “once one has recognized this fact, one 
should not be afraid to proclaim oneself simply a ‘good European’ and actively to work 
for the amalgamation of nations”.64 It is notable that Nietzsche—who disdained populism 
and democracy—advocated the amalgamation of European nations over the brand of 
shrill, vituperative nationalism that arose in reaction against that possibility. Such was his 
contempt of and anxiety over the ethnocentric, chauvinist nationalism that was gaining 
momentum across the continent in his day, and which the forces of populist democracy 
were exacerbating. 
From “Human, All Too Human,” the text marking the beginning of his middle 
period, until the end of his productive career, Nietzsche identified “‘good Europeans’” 
with a “supranational and nomadic type of man which, physiologically speaking, 
possesses as its typical distinction a maximum of the art and power of adaptation.”65
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They are proto-types of the philosophers of the future: 
[T]hose rare and rarely contented men who are too comprehensive to find their 
satisfaction in any kind of patriotism and know how to love the south in the north 
and the north in the south – the born midlanders, the “good Europeans”.66  
  
Such superlative individuals are compelled by their overflowing desire (desire understood 
as a complex assemblage of forces) to seek the unfamiliar and develop themselves, 
combine qualities and perspectives characteristic of Europe’s various regions in order to 
appreciate in personal and pan-European terms. 
This indicates an unconscious conative disposition or anticipatory resoluteness 
that corresponds with the physiological condition of exceptional strength or vitality; the 
preconditions necessary for fostering and enhancing individual and social development 
via acceptance of difference in otherness. Across the continent he perceived, to varying 
extents and in different guises: 
[T]he process of the assimilation of all Europeans, their growing detachment from 
the conditions under which races dependent on climate and class originate, their 
increasing independence of any definite milieu, as a unique “process of becoming 
European.” 67 
  
In our own era ‘the assimilation of all Europeans’ into a malleable instrument is being 
achieved in large part through continual cross-cultural exchange, instantaneous 
communication, the mega-media representations of desire, the merchandizing of ideas, 
values and products (massification and homogenization) and legal mechanisms born of 
treaty agreements that have profoundly transformed economic, political and social norms 
and practices. The machinic and technological aspects of this assimilation via integration 
efforts will be considered by means of Ansell-Pearson’s consideration of viroid life and 
possibilities of a future, transhuman condition. 
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Nietzsche concluded that an unavoidable process of assimilation would lead to the 
economic unification of the continent. He declared, “Europe wants to become one,”68 on 
the basis of forces personified in those rare, far-ranging types he dubbed ‘good 
Europeans’, those who, as “rich heirs of millennia of European spirit,” were most capable 
of recognizing the beautiful and infinite in what was foreign and unfamiliar (i.e., 
everything, as certain knowledge and “Truth” are unattainable since our limited 
understanding is always a perspective situated in a particular context).69
This is indeed what has come to pass. However, there is a relatively broad 
spectrum of opinion on how far the authority of the EU should extend over Europe today. 
Despite their many differences with regard to what Europe should become, most of the 
EU’s present supporters (Europhiles) and opponents (Europhobes) agree that its 
development as giving rise to a super-state. Although it clearly is a physical enlargement, 
and some would argue an ideational expansion of the classic state form, I argue that it is 
doing more than this, that while unifying Europe the present EU “super-state” indicates 
just one (early) phase in the radical overcoming of the state form itself.  
 However, their 
shared objective for the continent’s socio-political integration differed radically from that 
consistently articulated by arbiters of the liberal-modernist project, in terms of both its 
premises and its objectives. Antithetical to the popular democratic aim of attaining the 
greatest liberty for all—a condition which would make rulers of the rabble and amplify 
the decadence weakening society—the ambition of Nietzsche’s good Europeans was (and 
remains) to cultivate a well-ordered and compliant instrument of the people upon which 
the strongest might freely create edifying works and perfect themselves through agonistic 
contests.  
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As regards the nation-state, Nietzsche was always suspicious and frequently 
contemptuous, mainly seeing the modern state as deforming human development. The 
socio-political dimensions of our hyper-decadent era have been produced by the 
consolidation of the democratic nation-state and the rights of the individual over the 
course of the last half-century. With regard to the nation-state—the quintessentially 
European and thoroughly universalized form of internationally sanctioned polity—and 
the international setting within which it exists, this has been naturalized through an array 
of legal institutions for the normalization of its sovereign authority and legitimacy.  
The universalization of this formalized structure constituted an effort to abolish 
anarchy in the macro-political realm (that of the nation-state and international society), 
and has been thoroughly diffused into the micro-political realm (the level of the 
individual), which evinces similar transformations as those the nation-state has 
undergone and continues to undergo. It does so, to use Foucaultian terms, through 
corresponding technologies of the self—the largely simulated and disciplinary, ultra-
liberal-modern principles of free will and agency, the basis for which lies in our notions 
of the intrinsic and equal worth of persons, the inviolable rights that inhere to every 
individual, and—within the limits defined by common law—their undeniable capacity for 
self-determination. The legitimacy of the nation-state is now popularly understood as 
residing in its ability to ensure the dignity and rights of the individuals—or citizens—it 
serves. 
In the Western world the state form has undergone significant modifications over 
the past century. Among myriad other things, this includes the intersubjective adaptation 
of its powers to demands placed on it by ultra-liberal-modern values, which have arisen 
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as a result of forces both within the nation-state and outside of it. Since Nietzsche’s 
lifetime the nation-state has become the indisputably dominant organizing force for the 
political and social life of humankind—imposed universally by Anglo-European powers 
throughout the course of the 20th century.  
Nietzsche opposed the preeminence of nation-states. Zarathustra’s identification 
of the simulated veracity of this “new idol” remains prescient, as the state form—whose 
perfection is widely held to be the democratic variety of it—has been geographically, 
notionally and legally extended to encompass every polity around the world. Today the 
democratic state form is reified in numerous ways, from multiple legal institutions to 
reactive expressions of populist patriotism.70
State is the name of the coldest of all cold monsters. Coldly it tells lies too; and 
this lie crawls out of its mouth: “I, the state, am the people.” That is a lie! It was 
creators who created peoples and hung a faith and a love over them: thus they 
 In a subtler way, the EU re-invokes identic 
affiliations based on historical tradition and sentimental nostalgia through its simulations 
of political enfranchisement and simulacrums of community. In the absence of 
unproblematic identic roles, it has come to act as an identic surrogate, personified, albeit 
somewhat ambiguously, by a neo-cosmopolitan “European” identity that takes the 
banalization of difference as a basis for belonging and the aim of its form of citizenship. 
This contrivance depends on ambiguity in order to sustain what diluted meaning it is able 
to generate.  
As a new “super-idol” the EU seeks to supply the “all-too-human” psychological 
need of its subjects (or “citizen-constituents”) for legitimate authority while gradually 
supplanting the waning power of its member states (as Europhobes throughout the 
community have long known): 
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served life. It is annihilators who set traps for the many and call them “state”: they 
hang a sword and a hundred appetites over them.71 
 
The EU’s architects, managers and bureaucratic functionaries are sophisticated 
descendents of those who in Nietzsche’s lifetime set the traps called the state, are 
(involuntarily) enacting their reactive roles, ones necessary for Europe’s future life-
affirming development.  
I maintain a position likely to strike both apologists for Europe’s ongoing 
integration process and Nietzscheans as counter-intuitive: that integration is 
indeliberately producing conditions of possibility for the emergence of a 
comprehensively transformative, positive will to creative destruction as generative 
power, thereby. The EU will very likely enable certain exceptionally strong individuals of 
future generations to “look beyond the state”72
Identifying what Nietzsche desired for Europe is simpler than describing how he 
thought it could be—let alone would be—achieved. “Nietzsche wished to foster the 
reconstruction of Europe as a cultural entity, led by a new aristocracy, shaped by 
indigenous artists and poets, which could assume global leadership in the age of great 
politics that he predicted.”
, and drape a new faith and love over their 
contemporaries, those whose predecessors passively received the EU as a super-state and 
willingly accepted their incorporation within it as citizen-subject-constituents in our own 
era. 
73 Having seemingly created another, enlarged personification 
of “the people” in the EU, its “long-eared and short-sighted” designers venerate the cold 
monster—as Nietzsche’s Zarathustra dubs the modern state—revering it while remaining 
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oblivious of the ways in which their endeavor promises to foster the conditions necessary 
for the recrudescence of genuine free spirits with the strength to slay it. 
Nietzsche conceives these daring experimenters—artist–philosophers capable of 
revaluing our decadent values—as simultaneously witting and unwitting annihilators. 
Impelled to obey life-affirming regimes of self-imposed discipline (askesis) for the task 
of self-creation (auto-poiesis) through involuntary enactments of their native volition, 
they gradually bring new modes of being into existence—a salubrious aesthetic-political 
production of life-forms that destroys decrepit, petrified orders (in our own case the 
ethno-nationally based bureaucratic state with which Nietzsche was quite familiar). By 
doing so their valuations re-habilitate a social preference for the instinctual organization 
of drives and impulses characteristic of vigorous individuals. This re-invigorates the 
macro-political life of their communities while preserving disciplinary measures for the 
“all-too-many”, those being the majority who, congenitally weak and terminally sickened 
by decadent values, are incapable of being aroused by the erotic passions of their highest 
exemplars.  
As the actual and figurative descendants of the late 19th century’s “international 
homeless financial recluses”74 the all-too-many loose themselves in vulgar hedonism and 
crass consumerism. However a few, whom I name ascetic-consumerist priests of 
ressentiment, rapaciously exploit the order generated by the globalization complex, to 
profitably utilize its institutions, forces and processes to stimulate the herd’s 
multitudinous appetites and manipulate its perceptions. These are the leaders and 
apologists for the ruling order, who maintain the reactive values hegemonic throughout 
the globalization complex today, and include politicians and pundits, government 
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officials and bureaucrats (civilian and military), business executives, corporate managers, 
the mainstream media, “white-collar” workers, labor leaders, educators, etc.  
There is a hierarchy too among these administrators of status-quo ascetic-
consumerist values. As the “managers” of our dissipative social order a few of these 
individuals stand completely outside the order they enforce. At the highest levels are 
found the genuine ascetic-consumerist priests of ressentiment referenced above, which 
include CEOs, high-ranking politicians, etc. Beneath them a variety of hebetated 
automatons function to ensure the continuation of social-order and the labor of the all-
too-many. These veritably zombified consumers occupy a place at once within and at 
some distance from the majority, a group which includes investment bankers, lobbyists, 
executives, administrators, professors, etc. These highly paid professionals tend to enjoy 
a materially comfortable life and get an extra paragraph of two in their obituaries at the 
end of it.  
Most managers and executive are indistinguishable from the all-too-many, lost in 
myopic concerns through which they expend themselves. Their feeble energies and 
passions are absorbed in the supervision of everyday labor—the toil that the masses are 
engaged to perform as modern wage-slaves. The striving of these low-ranking ideologues 
consists of mimetic performances always-already in adherence with the dominant matrix 
of anti-natural values. Their enactments’ are motivated by a desire for security and the 
promise of prosperity. Comfort is the reward that prompts them to unwittingly ape the 
accepted norms of “professionalism”; their compensation that of conventional safety and 
“success”.  
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Executives, managers and wage-slaves, white and blue collar workers alike, 
labor—however consciously—to ensure that the slave-moral order functions to 
ameliorate and/or co-opt any threat to it. They serve a critical function as ideological 
soldiers who implement the doctrines of equality and rights that sustain the prevailing 
slave-moral order and herd mentality. There are of course, exceedingly rare exceptions 
within the hierarchized order of these automatons. However, they are likely to be self-
censoring and dissipated by the necessity of masking their differences to maintain their 
position and abide accepted conventions of the reigning culture of conformity, dissent 
from which—always understood as a default on their existential debt to, and a betrayal of 
the community that provided for them—is harshly punished. There are generally no 
exceptions among those populating the higher levels of the conventional power structures 
that order contemporary Western society. These well-vetted and credentialed ascetic-
consumerist priests of ressentiment must on some level comprehend their function and 
zealously embody their role as the “enforcers” of anti-natural ideals.  
Yet as any sense of obligation to and the perceived veracity of the state dissipates, 
the “all-too-many” remain “trapped” by the conventions of a secularized slave morality 
that demands devotion to the dying monster’s “confusion of tongues of good and evil: the 
sign of the state.” As those for whom “the state was invented,” comprehend no 
alternatives to the semiotic conceits upon which the conceptual snares in which they are 
caught arose, they are fated to go down with it. Just as their “leaders” fail to recognize the 
ways in which they destroy the state as they seek to expand—or “supranationalize”—it, 
the masses do not comprehend that their idol, the state, is in fact dying: “just as news of 
the death of God takes a long time to reach us, so too does news of the death of the 
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state.”75 The eminent death–or the conspicuous decrepitude unto dying–of the state, was 
palpable to Nietzsche by the late 1870s. 
The EU’s arbiters and the political functionaries, technocrats and bureaucratic 
who enact their will are, collectively, the inheritors of Europe’s historic great power 
states. In the shadow of US hegemony since World War Two, these ascetic-consumerist 
priests of ressentiment have been happy to allow the US to hold their sword while 
dedicating themselves to the pursuit of economic greatness and the cultivation of the 
“restless affairism of doing” wherein every person is required to give an accounting of 
themselves in terms of how busy they are against the classic notion of leisure toward the 
ersatz virtue of workaholism (the liberal form of secular piety).76
Europe’s representative exemplars over the past half century have performed the 
limited role of social engineers (as opposed to great nomothetic legislators) and made 
substantial contributions to the project of unifying Europe. In less significant ways 
countless others, from entrepreneurs to bureaucrats and anonymous workers, have also 
incrementally transformed Europe according to its ultra-liberal-modern model. Yet from 
the outset of their self-described “grand” project to establish a new political order by 
unifying the continent, the instigators of a noble, federalist vision for the unification of 
the continent, Jean Monnet, Robert Schuman, Altiero Spinelli, Mario Albertini, who had 
themselves risen from among the ranks of “the superfluous” that “steal the works of the 
inventors and the treasures of the sages for themselves,” but whose vision arguably 
 The corporate-military 
leadership of the US, as the singular “super-state” manically pursuing military might 
largely for the benefit of its and its international allies’ plutocratic elites, has been happy 
to oblige. 
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elevated them above the base allegiances of more common types, and who had to manage 
that vision so that it would not be turned into total “sickness and misfortune”.  Yet, 
however noble certain elements of the federalist vision may have seemed, they consisted 
with the signature prejudices of their age, and were already infected with liberal-modern 
values which they would invariably serve as a means of perfecting. The founders of what 
would become the EU were not nomothetic legislators, but “plucky bricoleurs”, who 
gathered the waning energies of an exhausted people to extend the duration of a declining 
era by briefly stabilizing it.77
The aim of post-War Europe’s institutional designers was the transfiguration of 
the continent’s disparate, territorially defined nation-states and their relations (understood 
at once in spatio-temporal terms) through the practical application of a conceptually 
refined philosophical and legal complex developed upon the traditions of liberal-
modernity. The ultra-liberal-modern value norms that resulted were an instantiated, 
widely-shared set of now-familiar attitudes and beliefs. A central contention in this work 
 
Not paradoxically, “superfluous individuals”, as Nietzsche provocatively labeled 
the masses, would be essential to the achievement of Europe’s economic and political 
integration. In his view they included the bureaucrats, technocrats and exemplars in state 
philosophers, prime ministers and presidents, etc. As conformists to prevailing 
convention these passive nihilists had previously contributed to the murderous excesses 
of some of the most degenerate state forms ever known. In the aftermath of World War 
Two, such individuals were therefore rather easily persuaded to collaborate in the 
recuperative liberal-modern project of realizing a pan-European scheme for the 
amalgamation of the continent’s peoples and nations.  
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is that in ideological form, these beliefs have been sublimated so thoroughly via 
moralizations of decadence that they operate on a largely unconscious level, informing 
popular conceptions of justice and fairness, panoplies of “inalienable” rights and 
corresponding expectations of the constitution of legitimate authority and the 
responsibilities of those in / with “power”.  
Today this essentially decadent ultra-liberal-modern ideology informs all aspects 
of everyday life, including the positivistic mind-set, materialist expectations, quantitative 
economic standardization of value and the creation of co-extending and ultimately 
unified civil institutions and laws to contend with common security concerns. As 
Lampert writes in considering Descartes’ skeptical analysis of the law, “Belief often 
occurs without knowledge of belief. Belief is itself a form of obedience entailing 
submission to the believed; knowing what one believes liberates from that submission 
and from the actions it dictates.”78
Against the arbiters of the globalization complex, good Europeans seek—through 
conscience-vivisection—to examine the psychological and philosophical impetus for 
these beliefs and expose their dissipative affects. Therefore they are spiritual and 
intellectual opponents of the ascetic-consumerist priests of ressentiment who, since the 
Second World War, have universalized their secularized Christian–Platonic, anti-natural 
and anti-cultural beliefs through the extension of capital process, technological rationality 
and the systematic massification of desire. Good Europeans—those with a supra-
 Nietzsche’s skeptical, good Europeans, understand 
ultra-liberal-modern values to serve as the ideological basis for the hegemonic moral 
framework of our age, and the first such set of value-standards and principles to be 
successfully extended globally.  
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European, authentically affirmative view of the earth—instinctively seek to overthrow 
their enfeebling, ultra-liberal-modern regime and reverse its diminution of humankind.  
A thorough revaluation of values, including a deconstruction of the privileging of 
the nation-state as the preeminent political form and basic unit of the international 
system, will be required if the resulting political entity is to be more than the sort of 
“super-state” toward which Europe seems headed.79 For this revaluation to occur, “the 
superfluous,” whom Zarathustra described as “impotent paupers and swift, clambering 
monkeys,” need to be preoccupied.80
From the chaos and destruction of two world wars in the first half of the twentieth 
century the originators of European unification reconceived, albeit in ultra-liberal-modern 
terms, the political order needed to temporarily invigorate humanity according to a 
deepened sublimation of conventional slave-morality. Eschewing overtly revolutionary 
programs that would automatically be opposed by “idolators of the state” and its 
“preachers of death,” (characteristics that they had once unconsciously personified, but 
now strove to discredit in careful expressions of disdain for the failed values of the past, 
such as bellicose nationalism) they sought to gradually evolve political life by re-
establishing it on older traditions while maintaining a semblance of the all-too-familiar 
order, so to amalgamate the nations of Europe into one over a long span, rather than 
 As they are ineluctably enticed by the conventional 
power ongoing reactive developments offer, this poses no challenge. By engrossing the 
attention of the ambitious, the transformation of the nation-state via integration may 
fortuitously serve ‘good Europeans’ as a means of acquiring the space and time they 
require to instigate such a revaluation. 
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dispensing with the state itself, which would jar an already distressed continent and 
surely prove counter-productive.   
In pursuing their ambition, they recognized (after Nietzsche) that a wider sense of 
cohesion would have to be cultivated, at least between the respective nations of Western 
Europe. A mutual sense of belonging between former enemies would need to create in 
order for the new polity they envisaged to function effectively. The process would require 
more than formal treaty agreements to foster the changed mentality this idea of Europe 
required. With little more to go on but historical enmities and the wounds of war, these 
conditions would have to serve as a starting point for a future, integrated European 
community.  
The ineffectuality of the League of Nations and shared suffering at the hands of 
the Nazis in the first half of the 20th century fostered the common desire to rebuild a 
destroyed continent. In addition to the desire to regenerate bankrupt economies, 
guarantee free trade and stimulate competition a corresponding awareness of the need for 
radically deepened cooperation toward achieving that aim was evident. New legal 
institutions such as the United Nations and the Bretton Woods accords were codifying a 
new international order to assure a broad measure of security and thereby provide 
conditions for the European project of economic and political integration. 
The pre-existing web of practical illusions grounding notions of truth and justice 
that arbiters of integration could exploit due to Europe’s experience of grief and 
tremendous desire for renewal would provide the catalyst and ready-made justifications, 
when needed, for the slow but sure fulfillment of their aspiration. The ambition to 
achieve European unification necessitated much productive and fruitful meditation on the 
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dynamics of cooperation and compromise in various spheres of inter-personal belonging 
and identity, including local affiliation, regional autonomy and national sovereignty, etc., 
including the need for a fundamental revaluation of the efficaciousness of the nation-state 
system for human life. The latter in particular would be especially long in coming, and 
arguably has yet to happen. But measurable progress toward the alleviation of immediate 
physical misery in post-War Europe would enable arbiters of integration to seriously 
entertain such potentially dangerous revaluations and prevail over skeptical naysayers, 
nationalists and other advocates of the status quo European state system who opposed it.  
With hindsight across the twentieth century we can see opportunities for deepened 
integration both seized and lost as those “whose conscience bears the weight of the 
overall development of humanity, […made] use of the prevailing political and economic 
situation.81
Through Nietzsche’s vitalist notion of the political, we understand that the post-
war instigators of European integration were involuntarily pursuing something that was, 
 But the long-term endeavor of those with a shared comprehension of 
Nietzsche’s noble idea of Europe has steadily paid dividends, and as their ambition 
increased and the momentum accelerated for realizing the continent’s unification via 
populist democratic means, that ambition gained broader acceptance. As opposed to 
atavistic statesmen promoting ‘great politics’ of the sort that culminated in the twentieth 
century’s world wars (and whose presence is still felt in the politics of nations), the 
arbiters of European integration—whom Nietzsche would likely have derided as 
“‘improvers’ of mankind”—have by a number of matrixes economic, institutional and 
cultural, succeeded in profoundly altering life for their fellow Europeans and by 
extension for individuals globally. 
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in part at least, very positive. I refer to their desire to overcome certain suicidal 
tendencies from which European culture, and humankind, had barely survived. 
Tragically, their proposed solution fell back on the logic that had generated the original 
problem, leading them to create institutions that were bound to develop over the 
following decades into another, albeit less-homicidal monstrosity. The EU we study 
today replicates some of the worst aspects of the old state form which it, at least in part, 
strove to overcome. However, it has also come to present potentials upon which a ‘good 
European’ might productively build.  
It is my primary contention that Nietzsche’s meta-political concerns, his diagnosis 
of Europe’s cultural (re: existential) sickness and his proposed “cure”, comprise a 
strategy that remains relevant, via a radically Dionysian affirmation of life, for 
overcoming the irrecuperably decadent nation-state that typifies the hegemonic form of 
social organization imposed by the globalization complex in our hyper-decadent age of 
ultra-liberal-modernity. The major institutions of the globalization complex, particularly 
the EU, already embody certain (ascetic) ideals that a ‘good European’ might reverse 
and/or exploit to hasten the eventual attainment of an authentically natural agon and 
revivified culture (Bildung) for the maximal flourishing of salutary individuals. 
It is important to state that Nietzsche’s works tell us next to nothing about how, 
precisely, the formal political institutions of Europe, which he largely reviled, ought to be 
re-organized. We may confidently infer that he envisaged a system of rule organized 
through a natural hierarchy of types. This would be a form of governance capable of 
sustaining a maximally agonistic state of affairs while preserving a flexibly adaptable, 
authentically aristocratic order. Some analysts have drawn close comparisons between 
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Plato’s Republic and the sort of order Nietzsche’s works would suggest he prefers. He 
adamantly rejected revolutionary programs in favor of more gradual, fundamentally 
recuperative change, when the sort of traditions (and institutions) that ensure the duration 
of a life-affirming polity governed by its preeminent specimens can no longer be 
sustained.  
According to Nietzsche’s diagnosis of European society such was the case in his 
lifetime, and would determine Europe’s foreseeable future. This prompted him to 
dedicate much thought to contemplating what conditions conduce to the production of the 
best (healthiest) individuals and communities and thereby maximize human flourishing, 
namely the facilitation of the highest potentials of humankind’s healthiest exemplars. 
Appel writes that at the very least: 
Nietzsche deserves his place in the canon of political philosophy not because he 
provides a detailed institutional account of the optimal type of polity, but rather 
because his sweeping denunciation of liberalism, democracy, socialism, 
feminism, and other offshoots of modernity leads him to formulate (albeit in a 
sketchy and unsystematic manner) an alternative, radically aristocratic model of 
politics that bears serious examination.82
Anglo-American political philosophers nevertheless largely dismissed Nietzsche 
until the 1960s due chiefly to the legacy of systematic, instrumental abuse of his works 
first at the hands of his sister and then by the Nazis. Misunderstanding of his thought was 
compounded among his sleepier readers by his (often purposefully ad hominem) 
polemics. The latter, as Conway explains, “are best understood as occasions for 
galvanizing an internal resistance to the moralists, priests, dogmatists, and decadents who 
inhabit[ed] his own polycentric soul.”
  
 
83 There was a utility to his polemics that served an 
important role in Nietzsche’s becoming, that is, in the self-overcomings crucial to the 
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development of his own micropolitical, corporeal politics and to his evolution as a 
philosopher. 
Nietzsche’s political advocacy (bodied forth in persistent admonitions and advice 
as well as the practical implications for life of his thought) suggests a strategy by which 
his favored polity might be attained over-against nihilistic alternatives spawned by 
liberal-modernity. As Hutter notes: 
Nietzsche’s entire effort at philosophical legislation, besides radically denying the 
myth of progress, is oriented very much to a present potentially filled with joy and 
ecstatic self-experience.84 
 
That experience corresponds with (among other things) an ironic or skeptical disposition 
toward all truth claims, for in Nietzsche’s view “the need for faith, for anything 
unconditional… is a proof of weakness”.85
His chief hope, that “philosophers of the future” might contribute to a revitalized, 
re-naturalized order predicated on their revaluation of all values (Umwerthung aller 
  
Legislators of the future comprehend “all knowledge [as] …only a means for 
creation. They gain an awareness of the contingency of their ubiety or emplacement in a 
world increasingly (futurally) determined by globality as a foundation for all authentic 
identic conceptions. Joyous experimentation and ecstatic self-creation are essential 
elements in the skeptical practices of good Europeanism. They reciprocally fortify the 
will to affirm all of life which is also a will to avert the diminution to mediocrity 
promoted by liberal optimism under the guise of prosperity. The specifically political 
dimension of this, although counter-intuitive to conventional political scientists, consists 
of a productive agonism that realizes a Dionysian or tragic-aesthetic worldview 
(Weltanschauung).  
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Werthe), directly corresponds with (and is demonstrated by) a central concern that runs 
throughout his works: the future of European man, culture and civilization. As Conway 
observes, 
Nietzsche’s political thinking centers around a simple, yet powerful thesis: human 
existence is justified only by the presence of those exemplary individuals who re-
define the horizons of human perfectibility.86  
 
The perfectibility and overcoming of the human species as an objective must be 
understood in the specific, unavoidably political sense in which Nietzsche meant it.  
The task of legislating a morality of breeding, propaedeutic to that undertaking 
requires truly great politicians, charismatic leaders in Weber’s sense, a megalopsychoi as 
Aristotle understood the term, who are first of all mythopoeists capable of revaluing all 
values and (re-)establishing a convincing basis for communal society, so as to 
nomothetically create a viable new order thereafter. I elaborate on this throughout the 
material below. 
In his middle and late works Nietzsche would come to identify those 
aforementioned individuals as ‘good Europeans’ and their efforts at perfection with a 
noble idea of Europe. My interest lies in employing Nietzsche’s thought to critique 
present developments in the institutional politics of Europe in a practical, meaningful 
way, and to demonstrate how the EU may unintentionally foster such a type and idea. 
From this I extrapolate means by which his objectives might more methodically be 
achieved. I seek to do so by demonstrating the salience of Nietzsche’s thought to the EU 
project in the broader context of globalization. I understand the functioning of the 
globalization complex, as a form of Empire.87  
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On the contrary, the contemporary globalization complex has clearly identifiably 
power centers and is much less “postcolonialist and postimperialist” than they assert it 
is.88 The primary mistake of their analysis is to conflate the ideologically driven aims of 
the conventional globalization complex with what it aims at or has in reality achieved. I 
would agree that their description of Empire quite aptly portrays the reactive ideals and 
objectives of the globalization complex, but they have by no means been reached, even, 
arguably, in the centers of the complex itself. Furthermore, it is not at all clear that they 
ever will or could be attained. Out of this awareness my life-affirming, Nietzschean 
analysis identifies actual possibilities for the realization of truly radical sorts of freedom 
and the corresponding emergence of new modes of invigorated life. Freedom should be 
counted among Nietzsche’s central concerns, contrary to the impression popularized in 
the late-20th century by the Continental philosophers and the ‘new Nietzsche’. As 
Mandalios makes clear: 
Against radical denunciation of freedom proffered by Derrida and Deleuze—
freedom as essentially a bourgeois humanist illusion… Nietzsche offer[s] an 
alternative (post-liberal) conception… Rather than eschewing freedom in 
reference to the modern world… Nietzsche can be understood as a serious thinker 
of human freedom and its political moment vis-à-vis his complex conception of 
will, power and freedom [sic] and their necessary entwinement ultimately with 
responsibility.89
Not surprisingly, Nietzsche’s particular notion of freedom contrasts with the prevailing, 
popular conceptions of it, as freedom from obligation or responsibility, in so far as his 
concern centers on potentiality and the possibilities of becoming. The question that 
occupies his politics therefore is individual ‘freedom for what?’ freedom to do 
something, as opposed to the ultra-liberal-modern anxiety with freedom as the abolition 
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of restraints and obsessive concern with freedom from what?’ understood merely in terms 
of resistance to something.  
Nietzsche’s idea of freedom is inextricably enmeshed in the agonal process of 
becoming what one is, as well as the ethos of his good Europeanism. This sort of free 
spirit is capable of revaluing the anti-natural values that preponderate in the present to 
actualize their (Nietzschean) idea of Europe: a socio-political environment promoting 
cultural greatness. Its potential realization entails providing skeptical, axiological 
critiques of our hyper-decadent age (as I attempt to provide below regarding European 
integration and efforts to theorize it), to spur action and thought toward the development 
of a morality of breeding. The values conferred by the moral education this would entail 
would cultivate the pathos of distance necessary for a natural hierarchy of types and 
corresponding socio-political order.  
This also requires the actual hybridization of European man (a process that, I shall 
argue below, the EU is facilitating) to produce a much-turned, wily type (polytropoi) 
willing to don multiple costumes and masks. Strengthened by attempts at self-perfection, 
cheeky good Europeans, inflamed by the hypocrisy and violence of prevailing values, 
laughingly deride the life-denying conventions enforced by reactive moralities of taming, 
out of awareness conferred by their hard-earned sense of world-historical irony. Their 
moral pluralism (quasi-cosmopolitan acceptance of the difference fostered by becoming) 
conditions the possibility of philosophers of the future who may hasten humankind’s 
going-down and the simultaneous ascendency of the Übermenschen at the dawn of a 
post-human future.90
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Nietzsche’s diagnosis of decadence: the political problem of our age  
In our hyper-decadent, ultra-liberal-modern age of dissipating instincts the pursuit 
of military and economic greatness, rather than indicating a noble impulse largely 
expresses the reified ressentiment of the comprehensive war-machine manifested by the 
hegemonic democratic state and neo-liberal economy. It represents the diversion of 
needed energy from the noble pursuit of a genuinely life-affirming higher culture.91 Post-
industrial militarism and the exaltation of speed, consumption and wealth has come to 
serve as surrogates for all that had previously counted as meaningful cultural activity, as 
well as comprising the essential ingredients of the poison-mixers, who concoct pretexts to 
reinforce the prerogatives of their destructive apparatus to regulate life on the planet. The 
ersatz, philistinic culture they fabricate is effectively vacuous, and directly augments 
reactive force by commending ressentiment of authentic health, strength and beauty. Its 
sophisticated will to nothingness infuses spectacular forms of desire to distract and 
entertain the crowd, thereby inducing amnesia and paralysis.92  
According to Nietzsche the national (now ultra-liberal-modern, globalized) state 
depends upon, naturalizes and simultaneously exalts a crass materialism that corresponds 
with a misleading notion of individualism. Together these place the highest social value 
on monetary wealth. This “wealth” becomes synonymous with conventional success and 
personal validation, both of which cover-up a nihilistic (death) drive.93
Zarathustra implicitly criticizes Locke and other teachers of the modern 
commercial state by condemning the emancipation of acquisitiveness, or of the 
desire for more than one needs, that such teachers counseled as the basis of a new 
 Lampert remarks 
on Zarathustra’s contempt of the forces such proponents of the state, and its philosophical 
initiators, made (and continue to make) use of: 
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political order. The modern state also appeals to might, and while Zarathustra has 
just roused the martial spirits of his listeners, he judges ignoble the appeal to 
might in the modern state, because it is in the service of either mere appetites or 
justice as equality.”94
In Nietzsche’s view human societies result from the gradual amalgamation of 
small herds into larger ones through diverse processes of peaceful amalgamation and 
violent conquest gives rise to larger communities occupying a geographical territory, with 
a shared language, worldview (Weltanschauung) and defining sets of customary norms. 
From a people, extraordinary exceptions, or genuine individuals emerges only rarely, and 
they are likely to endure persecution or ostracism for being unusual; they may be 
  
 
However, super-states such as the US and EU, whose existence is a symptom of the 
dissipative force of hyper-decadence of the present age, rather than merely encouraging 
acquisitiveness like their late-modern imperialist predecessors, are increasingly amenable 
to redirection by artist–philosophers with the verve to surreptitiously subvert their 
sustaining values in plain sight.  
These courageous individuals promote potential co-optations of shallow 
acquisitiveness—the crass consumerism that realizes the spectacular existential meanings 
and simulated ontological purposes circulated by the globalization complex—to liberate 
active potentials from, or reverse, its reactive control over bare life. This is to say they 
strive to destabilize the reigning anti-natural order that compels instinctual organization 
of drives and impulses; the now basic (albeit value-constructed) urges the prevailing 
(acquisitive) disposition of herd society in the globalized world indicates. The intensely 
all-too-human war-machines or super-states of the present age could, in Nietzsche’s 
optimistic view, be transfigured to direct human activity at authentically generative aims.  
 64 
dismissed as eccentric or locked away as insane and even suffer death for the differences 
that set them apart from their herd, or community. It is only very recently in the historical 
development of human societies that a single person could prosper, let alone survive for 
very long outside his community.  
The post-Enlightenment notion of the individual was an innovation on the concept 
of personhood and the situatedness of the self that was in turn exaggerated in the 
Romantic era of the early and mid-19th century. Nietzsche recognized that the late-
modern notion of individualism prevalent in his own day was a recent and somewhat 
overstated idea of what was practically achievable, much less desirable, for the vast 
majority. For the masses, whose utility and highest function was that ordained for them as 
a socially-constituted self, self-creation and self-governance were impossible to conceive. 
On Nietzsche’s notion of ‘the herd’, Danto observed that: 
The herd would have been made up of individuals, but they could not have been 
aware of themselves as such, and deviations from the norm would simply have 
perished, cast out like alien bodies, through inability to express their wants. 
Within each herd there would be a profound and virtually irresistible force 
making for homogeneity …there could have been differences between herds, 
because each would have worked out its language against the conditions that 
made for its survival; and as these vary, so do herds.95
In most societies and epochs some form of the herd mentality and variant of slave 
morality (as an intensity relative to the cultural terms with which it corresponds) is likely 
to prevail. This is because the mediocre are able, by virtue of their sheer numbers as the 
overwhelming majority, to impose an inversion of natural values upon the strongest, the 
 
 
The herd mentality lends itself to and ramifies the naturalization of slave morality 
because people cannot legislate for themselves individually and come to resent anyone 
with the strength to do so.  
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natural masters. From these (here very abbreviated) premises Nietzsche provided the first 
really radical, genealogical critique of the inter-related phenomena of Judaeo-Christian 
morality96, Western rationalism,97 the metaphysical semiotics of truth98 and discourses of 
modernity99.   
According to Nietzsche’s vitalist conception of the political, institutions in 
decadent epochs are organized to stifle the vicissitudinary nature of the human organism, 
considered at the individual, micro-level of the political or the communal, macro-level of 
political life. The law itself, conceived to facilitate a set of anti-natural ideals, serves this 
perverse aim. The function of effective political organization in periods of decline 
becomes managing decrepit capacitors whose efficient discharge of the amoral force or 
agency of life as will-to-power that involuntarily flows through them falters and 
gradually break them down.100  
In healthy ages political institutions serve to augment an instinctual arrangement 
(for which the law provides naturalizing grounds) that facilitates the increase of will-to-
power in capacitors (organisms) at all levels, effectively facilitating change in culturally 
specific and therefore salubrious contexts.101 As a political institution cobbled together 
from the wreckage of a thoroughly exhausted era, the EU (though still a molar aggregate) 
may be utilized to transition Europe and mankind to a higher form of polity – made an 
instrument of machinic heterogenesis through / for rhizomatic becomings that reconfigure 
ontology and segue us from a human to a transhuman condition.102 
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Fulfilling Nietzsche’s all-too-human desire for a comprehensive revaluation of 
values toward the overcoming of humankind: my conjecture 
 
As a primarily reactive, stultifying development of the political drives, arbiters of 
conventional state authority in our hyper-decadent, ultra-liberal-modern age may 
unwittingly contribute to the transmutation of the reactive values they enforce through the 
realization of their vulgar desires. For in doing so they thereby create opportunities for 
their antipodes to initiate naturalizing, salubrious revaluations of prevailing herd-values 
to enhance human naturalness toward the development of genuinely post-modern, post-
liberal forms of political community. If the healthiest individuals – burgeoning 
übermenschlich types of the present day – can more freely exert themselves and 
inadvertently enhance each others’ disparate efforts at self-perfection to the greatest 
extent possible thereby, they may redeploy and weaken guises of modernity’s envy, greed 
and egocentricity. By masking the radical implications of their aims, they can 
approximate the decadent arbiters of spectacular desire to overwork the acutely liberal 
disciplinarity of the slave moral matrix that constitutes and sustains conventional 
authority, and ultimately exhaust it. Advantageous chances to create the authentically 
healthy values necessary for a future, transhuman condition might then be seized upon. 
Nietzsche’s notion of the Übermensch should not be (mis)understood according to 
the crude and reductive popular stereotypes of it that abound. According to Ansell-
Pearson it was in fact partially conceived against what it was Nietzsche falsely 
understood to be the social dimensions of Darwinism: 
Nietzsche construes the experimental creation of the Übermensch not in 
‘Darwinian’ terms as a superior type evolving through natural selection; rather, he 
configures it in terms of a notion of emergent cultural complexity and 
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deterritorialization, laying particular stress on the hybridic emergence of diversity 
and difference within the order of things.103
Eschewing overtly “revolutionary” pseudo-solutions to decadence, exemplary 
individuals accept the need to maintain, even develop, familiar economic structures that 
partially satisfy the herd’s crude appetites without entirely sating them, thus 
disseminating and intensifying the values of neo-liberal capital processes, including its 
mutually reinforcing notions of debt, guilt and accountability, and supporting concepts of 
(simulated) free-will and responsibility / culpability. They seek to exploit the state’s 
sublimated might by redirecting the martial spirit it rouses into activities of commerce 
and trade, along with the ressentiment that molds the herd into homo economicus. The 
ultra-liberal-modern simulation of freedom as an uninhibited ability to consume is 
likened to equal access to products, goods and services which presence reductive notions 
of both justice as fairness and equality of opportunity among the all-too-many. This 
 
 
Übermenschlich types may come about quite randomly in the midst of broad institutional 
change. Übermenschlich characteristics in strong individuals spur the passions of the 
more exceptional, who undertake more rigorous regimens of self-discipline to re-create 
themselves. Their emergence occurs in a complex socio-cultural and corresponding 
political context. In the right circumstances this generates an authentically agonistic 
milieu that stimulates a rupture with the forms of life that preceded (and enabled) it. This 
social event provokes others, invigorating some individuals. Their experiments impel 
innovative expressions of difference, modify language, and incite the development of 
new meanings and change the cultural setting in which they act. This alters the political 
environment for further transformations of and experiments on life by the strong.  
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perfectly co-extends with representative democracy, which is also consumed by the 
multitude.104 
With the attentions of the herd (innumerable, willfully docile subjects of 
consensus) absorbed by such endeavors, their preoccupation and surplus production 
might afford rare exceptions – who will emerge unexpectedly without respect to social 
class or pedigree – a chance to open windows of thought from inside their communities. 
The drafts of fresh air let into societies largely enfeebled by a toxic miasma of anti-
natural values will serve to refresh other, similar types. Once relieved of the oppressive, 
disciplinary ressentiment of the herd, which remains distracted by the “need” to consume, 
they can do so without suffocating in its poisonous air. 
The sort of opportunities Nietzsche believed his philosophers of the future would 
involuntarily create for revaluing the hyper-decadent values of our ultra-liberal-modern 
age are being made possible through unanticipated abstract potentials of globality. These 
possibilities are continuously generated from the cycle of responses and/or oppositions to 
the prerogatives and hegemony of the conventional globalization complex. Both as 
unwitting and quite conscious comedians of the reigning ascetic-consumerist ideals, these 
kynical ironists engage in imaginative subversions, deflections and creative 
incorporations of the globalization complex. They undermine its ongoing effort to re-
interpolate all that defies or escapes it and all those it reduces to citizen-constituents, the 
subjects of its dissipative order.105
It would not be inaccurate to state that Nietzsche’s “oppositional ethics” (or 
agonistic method of valuating) may be rendered into a very complex and thoroughly 
unconventional—or authentically agonistic—adversarial politics (if only because 
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morality, a symptom of desire, always subtends the political), but the term oppositional 
must be understood in a particular Nietzschean sense. This will become clear in the 
affective practices (praxis) it suggests, which will strike many fervent, ultra-liberal-
modern crusaders as counter-intuitive. Based on a skeptical, ephectic drive, it does not 
correspond to the usual methods or aims of “revolutionary” programs (i.e.: it does not 
advocate the immediate overthrow or destruction of prevailing hierarchies for the 
liberation of the masses). This paper therefore constitutes an examination of how 
Nietzsche’s oppositional morality could serve as a basis for transforming contemporary 
political life via the action of good Europeans.  
However, in utilizing his critical framework I do not rigorously interrogate the 
presuppositions of Nietzsche’s vitalist politics, within which his theory of will-to-power, 
decadence, force, self-overcoming, etc., figure importantly. To do so would replicate 
work others have done better than I could and divert me from my aims. Yet I 
acknowledge that, as Conway observes, Nietzsche’s critique of his age is an immanent 
one and no empirical evidence can convincingly substantiate the grounds he gives us for 
his appraisal or persuade us to accept his universalization of the philosophical 
explanations or conclusions he develops from it. It failed to resonate more broadly in 
Nietzsche’s own lifetime largely because it did not adequately capture the complex 
dynamics of the (very real) sweeping changes he saw occurring throughout Europe and 
the world. This is mainly because his appraisal (for reasons arguably similar to the 
theoretical weaknesses that plagued Marx’s analysis of the transformative forces of his 
age) did not adequately appreciate the political significance of perceived enhancements in 
 70 
the material conditions of life for millions of human beings throughout Europe in 
Nietzsche’s own day.  
These ostensible improvements were an apparent result of technological / 
scientific innovation, advances partially attributable to the post-Enlightenment ethos of 
liberal-modernity. Whatever the actual relation, ultra-liberal-modern ideologues claimed 
as “advancement” each transformation of everyday life that scientific progress, 
technological innovations and industrialization produced. They were less willing to 
attribute the homicidal / suicidal excesses of that same technology—typified by the 
Holocaust and Hiroshima—as similarly resulting from the liberal-modern ethos, 
however.106  
Less an analytical failure than evidence of his consistent incredulity toward 
“progress”, Nietzsche’s unique analysis leads to interesting and not entirely unpersuasive 
results. Nor, when applied with specificity, are its conclusion merely ex post facto 
confirmations of its premises. It even seems to have provided Nietzsche with some 
measure of predictive power, as he presciently anticipated some of the turmoil that 
marked the last century of European history. I maintain that the apodicity and veridicality 
of Nietzsche’s system (including the will to power hypothesis, corresponding theory of 
decadence and eternal return of the same) is no more vulnerable to positivistic critique 
than any of the major philosophical systems in Western intellectual history.107
 
 However, 
Nietzsche’s provides a distinctly effective means—via his perspectivalist epistemology 
and hermeneutics—for critiquing the metaphysical presuppositions of positivistic 
scientism. 
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Aesthetic politics, the problem of decadence and Nietzsche’s philosophers of the 
future 
 
Nietzsche’s conception of the political is highly aesthetic, which strikes many 
conventional political scientists as counter-intuitive, if not absurd. He understands the 
political as the organization and maintenance of a communal life. As such it is a specific 
form of aesthetic or cultural practice concerning the creation of superlative individuals. 
He maintained “beauty is for the few” (pulchrum est paucorum hominem), a phrase he 
employs sporadically throughout his works,108
Nietzsche hierarchy of values and related rank order of types (Rangordnung) was 
conceived to reflect the natural qualities and dissimilarities between individuals; therefore 
he cannot be construed as an elitist in the ordinary sense. This aspect of his vitalism 
 and it is clear that he may be accurately 
understood as an aristocratic radical in the sense that the healthy / decadent continuum of 
his vitalist politics describes a spectrum ranging from higher to lower ordering among the 
disparate forms of human life. These correspond with the differing capacities and 
instinctual organizations of types of people without regard to their ethnic, racial or 
cultural origin. The health of the human organism is his chief concern and the basis of his 
vitalist politics and power ontology. He contends that healthy and sick types occur within 
and among all human groups, but certain cultural forms enhance the health (strength) or 
exacerbate the sickness (decadence) of the society from which they arise. The goal of 
politics—understood as the intrinsically creative endeavor of organizing human 
communities—ought to be the cultivation of those most capable of flourishing (the 
strongest, healthiest types). This is dependent on the systematic enhancement of a 
salubrious culture (Bildung) toward the elevation of the species. 
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constitutes a key part of his politics, and if one can accept its premises it is arguably the 
most inclusive sort of partiality. It is a notion that can be traced back in origin through the 
Western philosophical tradition, specifically in the works of Machiavelli, Aristotle and 
Plato, each of whom provided similar conceptions of the proper aim of a polity: the 
enhancement of the natural talents and best features of their populaces, especially the 
health of the community’s strongest members. 
From such a perspective, Nietzsche saw the intensifying decadence of European 
life in the late 19th century as symptomatic of the diminishing significance of these 
essential collective meanings. This was confirmed by the erosion of traditional authority, 
the rise of socialism, anarchism and a nihilistic relativism that actively rejected all 
meaning. Nietzsche perceived an ominous portent in developments, asserting that they 
augured trouble for Europe’s immediate future. He presciently foresaw that the 
dissipation of shared beliefs and unifying meanings would, in “the next century, bring the 
struggle for the domination of the earth” between the most dangerous factions. This 
would produce “the compulsion to great politics” in the best individuals as well, namely 
those strong enough to resist the spreading infirmity of the age. It was in this latter, 
hopeful possibility that his optimism was sustained.  
Nietzsche believed the prevailing condition of decadence was bound to lead to 
wars the like of which the world had never known. Consistent with the ultra-liberal-
modernist project’s reactive will-to-truth, alternative visions of the future—as 
possibilities for becoming—were to be preemptively eliminated. In the most extreme 
cases, such as that of the National Socialist takeover of Germany, the logic of abolishing 
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all difference cultivated an association of every sort of otherness, however insignificant, 
with an existential threat to society itself.  
The cliché Difference engendre haine arises from recognition that the dissimilar 
frightens and unfamiliar customs or beliefs often provoked conflicts between peoples. 
But hatred of difference itself (whatever its origin or identification) functioned to 
intensify them throughout the early twentieth century. This negative compulsion to great 
politics first arose in different strains of nationalism and socialism vying with (equally 
reactive) free-market capitalism for hegemony over the continent. Proponents of differing 
forms of the liberal-modernist ideology vied to eliminate their liberal-modernist 
“opponents”. Through this ultimate war on difference, waged in the latter half of the 
century by non-lethal means, the liberal-modernist project has succeeded in unifying 
Europe through the systematic, ongoing standardization and mediocritization of much of 
what was/is distinctive and differentiating; the banalization of precisely those qualities 
which by their nature formerly provoked regenerative competition on the continent.109 
Yet, as this “disease of will” hastens Europe’s cultural degeneration, a newly 
invigorated and unified will to defy enforced massification and homogenization of 
difference has developed in spite of and in distinction to it.110 The simultaneous 
improvement of the type man through the creative acts of courageous exceptions is being 
effectuated by those ‘good Europeans’ of our age.111
The aim of this order is the containment of becoming-other through the 
worldwide extension of uniform desire to co-opt and interpolate difference. Globalization 
 However, the reactive momentum of 
globalization (understood as a plane of consistency that inhibits lines of flight), is 
symptomatic of a negative will to impose a universal normative order. 
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ramifies the hyper-decadence of European cultural realm’s declining age and, 
culminating in a nihilistic form of Empire, suggests the wars of the twentieth century may 
have been a minor prelude of the all-too-human paroxysms such nihilism may yet spawn. 
That a state-driven process of European integration has occurred largely through the work 
of ascetic-consumerist priests of ressentiment and culminated in the EU and Europe’s 
other chief supranational institutions (the OSCE and COE) does not, of course, mean that 
Nietzsche’s idea of Europe is in any way attained. It does suggest however, that 
opportunities for the over-coming of the state form are being generated—if unwittingly—
by the aforementioned arbiters of integration (a potential that is examined below). In 
contrast to the motives for integration espoused by conventional Europeanists, 
Nietzsche’s: 
…vision of what it means to be a “good European” is intellectually more 
persuasive in a secular context because it allows for an experimental questioning 
of the will-to-truth; that is supremely affirmative of an understanding of existence 
that does not try to vest all of its creative efforts in ascetic ideals; that 
demonstrates immense spiritual vitality and courage in understanding this 
experiment; and that is also more optimistic than the pessimistic reaction found in 
much of the literature on the crisis of the European idea.112
Such an experimental questioning (via Nietzsche’s own vitalist politics) of the motivating 
will-to-truth behind both defunct and current ideas of Europe expressed in their differing 
visions of the continent’s future, serves as a basis for devising and implementing the 
means of attaining a supremely affirmative idea of Europe rooted in the most life-
affirming or inclusive will-to-truth conceivable. Of particular interest here is that reactive 
statist will-to-truth epitomized by the institutionalized aims of the EU, against which 
Nietzsche’s idea of Europe emphasizes the multiplicity of types, wealth of difference and 
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correspondingly tremendous diversity of possible becomings Europe and its broader 
cultural realm contains, all of which his ‘good Europeans’ seek to radically enhance. 
The EU, despite being the product of a primarily molar state-form, provides 
mechanisms through the ultra-liberal-modernist norms and ideals it naturalizes that ‘good 
Europeans’ of the Nietzschean variety can utilize to achieve their objectives. These 
objectives include instantiating an “order” conducive to the continuous enhancement and 
utmost thriving of humankind’s highest exemplars through a comprehensive revaluation 
of the now ubiquitous ascetic-consumerist values that construct and delimit possibilities 
for desiring in contemporary life. Corresponding with the conative disposition or 
anticipatory resoluteness that may be fortified by globality in our era of globalization, it 
is probable that an increasing number of exceptional individuals—European or other 
persons globally—are becoming amenable to and capable of undertaking such a radical 
revaluing of the values characteristic of globalization. 
However, these are largely latent potentials; positive becomings continually 
struggling to overcome the inhibiting forces of our media dominated era of mass-
consumerism, which squanders much potential through myriad diversions and 
entertainments while making a veritable religion of labor/work through the reification of 
productivity.113 Nietzsche deduced that Europe’s deteriorating culture would gestate 
potentials for renewed authenticity, condemning Europe’s burgeoning “commercial 
culture” which deleteriously inhibits strong instincts “at the expense of manifesting 
human presence”.114 The “fundamental idea of a commercial culture” concerned a 
negative type of appraisal, the act of evaluating the worth of a thing, be it material goods, 
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a work of art or ideas themselves, according to a coarse supply and demand calculus that 
distorts and prejudices all values.115 
This type of assessment, based upon the mass appeal of a thing, panders to the 
lowest common denominator and achieves hegemony as the reified mode of appraisal 
over all other modes of valuing as a commercial culture develops. It is also dependent – 
as Marx famously expounded – upon a new form of wage-labor; a degrading form of 
servitude that alienates its subjects from themselves and the product of their toil while it 
evacuates all “spirit” from the dehumanized culture it perpetuates. Nietzsche saw this 
development as one coextending with the democratic ethos or leveling tendency of his 
day. Nietzsche fully expected its effects to be intensified and thoroughly naturalized in 
the 20th century; a form of character perversion “imprinted in every will and every 
faculty: it is this of which …men of the coming century will be proud if the profits of the 
commercial class are right to give it into your possession!”116 
This reactive becoming-same (or “molarity”) has resulted in a highly sublimated 
form of (self-)glorified slavery, as young men who might otherwise cultivate their nobler 
character or talent or the industry innate to themselves are systematically employed 
instead: “purloined from themselves, trained to being worn out daily and taught to regard 
this as a matter of duty.” These “poor beasts of burden”, the vast majority, are, in a 
commercial culture, methodically habituated to perceiving labor for others as an intrinsic 
good in their own self-interest. “[T]hey cannot do without it and would not have it 
otherwise.”117
While the herd occupies itself, working to earn its living and partake of  frivolous 
entertainments, certain anomalous or untimely individuals are likely to be “freed” by the 
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surplus of its toil to dedicate themselves to nobler aesthetic creation.118 In becoming 
‘good Europeans’ they come to recognize and diagnose the affliction of decadence 
sustained and perpetuated by the metadiscourse of ultra-liberal-modernity. Thenceforth 
their struggle is one of limiting and ultimately reversing the infirmity it spreads: 
democratization and its concomitant leveling tendency via an absurdly egalitarian 
populist ethos and its cultivation of an obedient “type prepared for slavery in the most 
subtle sense.”119 Their “cure” requires the therapeutic exploitation of the vast potential of 
this circumstance. Turning the disease of liberal values against itself, ‘good Europeans’ 
subvert the debilitating hegemonic order from within and gradually establish a natural 
political arrangement predicated on a rank order of perspectives. The hierarchic order 
they strive after would allow the existing “wealth of types”120 to prosper and even 
sanction its expansion so to maximally facilitate becoming. Such a natural order would 
abet the enlargement of greatness and enhance the dignity and capabilities of every sort 
of person, allowing the fullest expression of Dasein.121  
Toward attaining the fullest realization of this, ‘good Europeans’ intuitively 
recognize the paradoxical value of reactivity and the intensified decadence of our age: 
technological innovation has diversified the variety of forms creative impulses may 
take.122 Properly directed, the fruits of the negative will are not (and cannot correctly be 
understood as) limited to the passive resignation or frenzied consumption of the 
contented and blinking last man,123 for the state of affairs that sustains the herd’s pathetic 
condition may counter-intuitively inspire the odd great work of visual art, drama, 
literature or music.  
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Rather, a multitude of possible contributions, the like of which Nietzsche could 
not have anticipated have (in the form of broadly delivered basic education, astonishing 
feats of engineering and advanced communication; certain applications of technology to 
food production—the so-called “green revolution”; radical innovations in medicine and 
health care, etc.) provided a sense of ersatz “spiritualization,” that is, a palliative sense of 
meaning that is not altogether valueless. It is sufficient for the herd, whose members are 
incapable of the sort of freedom expressed in the strength symptomatic of the 
extraordinary conation124, and anankê125
Nietzsche saw the historic role of ascetic priests of ressentiment as that of 
promoting all-too-human notions of equality and the fatuous ideals of a fictive social-
justice to inhibit and/or corrupt those would-be exceptions. Ascetic priest are the great 
despisers of life who foster values of self-denial and proclaim the inferiority of this world 
, characteristic of the will-to-power enacted by 
best types, pluripotent exceptions. The majority’s indifference—or at least, ignorance—
of those higher types’ struggle for self-perfection is useful for insulating the latter, who 
are hardly imputrescible, from the debasing influence of the bourgeois vulgarians who 
define “good taste”, determine “propriety” and dominate “culture” in a declining age 
such as our own. The apathy of the mediocre majority vis-à-vis their own genuine 
becoming leads to the state of fallenness and their eventual ruinance, (Heidegger’s notion 
for of a in which they no longer have time to care about their own lives). Although this 
condition inspires the freest spirits with dread, the weak settle into a passive acceptance 
of it and find a perverse form of contentment thereby. Their dread spurs them into 
oppositional stance toward this condition of hyper-decadence and the arbiters of such 
extremely nihilistic values that come to be taken by the all-too-many as commonplace. 
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in part as a means of defusing the potential greatness of rare exceptions who are 
otherwise likely to undermine their authority. They sought, as Nietzsche puts it, to “level 
mountain and valley”, to weaken the strong in order to protect themselves and gain power 
over others, namely their betters. 
However, I will argue below that the obliviousness of the many to the daunting 
potential of the very exceptional few, and even their opposition to the idea of greatness as 
it undermines their belief in the intrinsic equality of all, can actually be cultivated by 
insuring the former’s relative comfort through a steady rise in their levels of 
consumption. This is conventionally understood by contemporary ascetic-consumerist 
priests of ressentiment as their ‘standard of living’ and re-presented to the all-too-many 
as an “objective” indicator of “improvement” in the lives more generally. In complex 
ways it corresponds with current conceptions of “empowerment”, ideals of prosperity and 
jejune and narcissistic notions of happiness. 
It also corresponds—in the opposite direction—with (residually Christian) 
moralistic efforts to deflect attention away from puerile and vain efforts at self-
affirmation that conflict with the values of humility and the celebrated rejection of the 
corporeal. In this direction the striving for meaning and purpose is conducted toward 
raising the material prosperity of those who are comparatively poor. The pity of the rich 
is deliberately focused on the needs of the “destitute”, particularly those inhabiting exotic 
locales. The value systems of these underdeveloped societies are systematically 
discredited and subverted so that they may come to perceive and believe themselves to be 
disadvantaged. Their “deprivation” is them given various causes so that blame for it can 
be ascribed and effort more coherently made to ameliorate their plight and correct their 
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deficiency. On the macro-economic level billions of dollars in aid is lent to the 
governments of poor countries, which over decades produced even greater pretexts for 
pity among the citizens of rich, developed nations, as a new class of highly indebted poor 
countries arose in which misery and suffering seemed more pronounced and urgent than 
ever.126 
Nietzsche’s meta-politics is concerned precisely with the production of conditions 
of possibility for versatile “freer” spirits, rather than the elimination of suffering. Among 
those with the strength to encourage, intensify and exploit the perverse conditions of 
contemporary life to their own ends (self-overcoming in the pursuit of excellence) the 
aim sought is the fruition of a more profound and willful suffering. The active generation 
of a vital culture seeks to elevate and ultimately, develop mankind.127 In the future it may 
do so by extricating the strongest from our miasmic condition of hyper-decadence in 
globalization128, pulling them back from a nihilistic abyss of meaninglessness in which 
the rest will willingly and perhaps “happily” remain, according to their own all-too-
human, perverse standard. 
Throughout his career-long critique of late-modernity Nietzsche maintained that 
“democracy has ever been the form of decline in organizing power,” and he characterized 
“modern democracy, along with its hybrids such as the “German Reich” as the form of 
decline of the state.”129 He maintained that the “solitary personality”: 
…can maintain and develop itself most easily in a democratic society: namely, 
when the coarser means of defense are no longer necessary and habits of order, 
honesty, justice and trust are part of the usual conditions.130
This fascinating note betrays Nietzsche’s awareness of the practical and strategic use that 
the highest affirmers of life could make of conventional morality and ochlocratic 
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(literally mob-power) forms of political organization—such as democracy—that it 
spawned.  
In precisely this context I assert that the nomothetic acts of ‘good Europeans’, by 
legislating the emerging, deterritorializing global age, will assist the perfection of the EU 
in ways likely to transform it beyond recognition. In so doing they will overcome its 
present reactive form so that their heirs may eventually dispense with the exhausted and 
repressive state form entirely, as well as the inhibition of human potential it comprises. 
This is to speak of what is required to bring to parturition the age of globality—a 
transhuman future—that now gestates within a few. 
David Owen has constructively expanded on the appearance of such individuals. 
He understands Nietzsche to be advocating the instantiation of an authentic rank order of 
values (Rangordnung) corresponding with the natural hierarchy of perspectives and types 
to cultivate exemplars (e.g., ‘good Europeans’) whose great cultural achievements will 
hasten the ultimate overcoming of the ascetic ideals that inhibit the improvement (and 
overcoming) of the species man.131
The tragic idea of the self corresponds with the prevailing Greek notion prior to 
the Socratic reification of reason over passion. In this natural “tragic” view, agents are 
 This objective would require the intensification of 
every dimension of our all-too-human existence, and does not suggest a leaping over man 
but his metamorphosis. Nietzsche hoped to accelerate the elimination of the conceptual–
physiological constraints on becoming introduced by the false Christian-Platonic binaries 
that differentiated a true, noumenal world from the apparent (and therefore “inferior”) 
phenomenal world. In so doing ‘good Europeans’ like himself would reestablish the 
primacy of a tragic view of the self over the disabling moral view of the self.  
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inseparable from their actions, which are articulated through fate and express a good 
conscience. The moral idea of the self privileges “truth” over eros to postulate the notion 
of accountability; by falsely separating an agent from his acts it provides a basis for the 
concept of guilt, allowing the assignation of culpability and punishment, practices 
symptomatic of bad-conscience.132 In broader, macro-level political terms pertaining to 
Nietzsche’s own notion of liberation, Ansell–Pearson cites ‘Of old and new law-tables” 
from Thus Spoke Zarathustra, writing that the passage: 
…makes clear that liberation consists in freeing ourselves from the metaphysics 
of morality and the morality of metaphysics; compulsion, dogma or statute, and 
the metaphysical categories (necessity and purpose, good and evil, etc.). In short, 
the innocence of becoming, of time as such, is to be restored, and where time qua 
transience is conceived as the moment that both gathers and splits up the past and 
future.133
Smith states that, “philosophers of the future”, for lacking the necessary native 
volition, will remain “locked in a Spirit of Revenge” never to experience the autonomy of 
the good Europeans Nietzsche anticipates. However, they “can, properly trained, be the 
Free-Spirit’s ‘well trained hounds’ and ‘servants’,” who will be “implicated as priests in 
[the] new religiosity” that affirms Dasein through a conscious engagement with the 
abysmal ground of our Being-unto-death, experienced as ecstatic Dionysian insight into 
No-thingness that stimulates renewed (Apollonian) orderings and creation.
 
 
Such innocence of becoming occurs to varying degrees among the range of types 
separated by the pathos of distance. Only once modernity’s illusory notion of 
metaphysical freedom is forgotten—after the long period of decadence which we are in 
ends—will rare, genuine free spirits be able to stand above humankind and revel in the 
innocence of their becoming.  
134 Though the 
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philosophers of the future might recognize the contingency of all values and truths, they 
are compelled to create values and enforce them dogmatically by the requirement of 
impressing forms upon and providing stable meanings to those who cannot survive 
without them (the vast majority). 
The project for philosophical laborers on the noble model of Kant and Hegel is to 
establish some large class of given values… and press it into formulas, whether in 
the realm of logic or politics (morality) or art. It is up to these researchers to make 
everything that has happened or been valued so far look clear, obvious, 
comprehensible, and manageable, to abbreviate everything long, even “time” 
itself, and to overwhelm the entire past.135 
 
The all-too-many, who “need to have form impressed upon them from without”, must 
eventually be made to forget the counter-productive chimera of metaphysical freedom 
through new values whose grounds seem naturally indisputable.136 This is necessary in 
order to create a base upon which both the cultivation of humankind through 
philosophical education and breeding can be sustained, and the leisure required by 
“genuine, revenge-free ‘free Spirits’” who are the only ones capable of authentic 
philosophic individuality and spiritual liberation can be supported.137 Such an 
“aristocratic ethos” is inclusive insofar as it promotes the attainment of a diverse and 
natural rank ordering of types that serves as a moral backdrop for all. It constitutes a 
moral code that has nothing to do with the (modern) drive to transform morality into a 
science, which it will have overcome.138
This recognition of varying degrees of (un)freedom corresponding to the quanta 
of force one may expend as will-to-power and the grouping of types for social 
expediency pertaining thereto has interesting implications vis-à-vis the perceived need for 
a re-authenticated ‘idea of Europe,’ to serve as a ground for the project of European 
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unification in our ultra-liberal-modern, hyper-decadent age of sublimated nihilism. Elbe 
usefully observes that since the death of god imbuing Europe with a meaningful idea of 
itself—the task of philosophers of the future—would prove difficult. 
In Nietzsche’s account the demand for a more meaningful idea of Europe would 
persist not only because of the pragmatic necessities of European policy-makers, 
but also because Europeans have traditionally been accustomed to having the 
balm of metaphysics and ‘true’ worlds to fall back upon in their quest to find the 
deeper meaning of existence.139  
 
Elbe correctly concludes (in the same section) that this would invariably be experienced 
“as a profound loss of spiritual vitality”, and would likely give rise to nostalgia for 
defunct notions of Europe and reactive ideals of what constitutes “European-ness”. 
Indeed, such reaction presently plagues efforts to define what characteristics 
warrant full, formal inclusion—via various sorts of codified legal enfranchisements and 
citizenship, etc.—in the emerging EU polity, as well as its arbiters’ attempts to construct 
a new European identity and corresponding ethos. The latter’s ever more uniformly 
(mimetically) articulated expression of the EU’s will-to-truth across its disparate member 
states, as well as a simultaneous profusion of dissenting wills emanating from various 
corners of the continent are all symptomatic of the anxiety over identity-as-belonging that 
the project itself has generated. A truly Nietzschean idea of Europe would likely seem 
incomprehensible to many citizens of the Union across the political spectrum, including 
both those who support the project and those advocating their nation’s withdrawal from 
it, according to the impulse, whatever its manifestation, to systematically exclude others 
from each based upon their national origins, cultural heritage, ethnicity or race.140
The ideals of inclusion and efforts at protecting diversity upon which the EU’s 
social, political and cultural statutes are predicated are putatively antithetical to such 
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chauvinisms, which arise in opposition to the attributes of individuals that stand to enrich 
European-ness and life on the continent.141 The aspiration of forging a unity out of the 
continent’s diverse panoply of peoples and types reflects the EU’s origin in an account-
giving endeavor motivated in part by a spirit of revenge against time and Europe’s 
collective past, particularly the horrors of World War Two. It also indicates an aversion 
to certain kinds of radical difference and a corresponding effort to homogenize the most 
(conflicting) opposite values and variations within its domain. 
EU human rights statutes and civil laws guaranteeing regional autonomy, cultural 
protections, universal enfranchisement and legal equality comprise the primary and 
arguably most positive expression of its attempts to preserve authentic diversity whilst 
forging a new and expanded unity, albeit not for the conventional slave-moral ethos upon 
which they are predicated. Such efforts usually breed reaction, as they constrain maximal 
freedom and becoming in various and complex ways in order to protect and nurture the 
weak. They also replicate identic essentialisms privileged by the EU’s newly instituted 
order while discrediting and condemning those deemed unfavorable to it.142 This 
disciplinary mechanism compounds the grief inflicted upon a growing number by their 
shared awareness “that we can no longer believe those dogmas of religion and 
metaphysics” that formerly provided us with comforting essentialisms and secure 
grounds for living.143
The spectrum of these reactions (both positive and negative in conventional 
liberal terms) epitomize the profound naturalization of the spirit of revenge, as it 
corresponds with the deepening crisis of nihilism characteristic of contemporary life both 
within the Anglo-European cultural realms and outside of them in the age of 
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globalization. The universal dissemination of Europe’s hyper-decadent, ultra-liberal-
modern values means that its predicament of nihilism and meaninglessness is being 
experienced in some form or other nearly everywhere in the world.  
The slave-moral pessimistic disposition toward the human condition, which is 
typified by a rejection of Dionysian reverie and its embrace of the tragic, in favor of the 
mitigation of all suffering, is being gradually universalized by the globalization complex. 
This should not be surprising however, nor is it entirely lamentable as “Nietzsche 
predicted that only large empires would be capable of acting politically in the age of 
global politics at the culmination of modernity.”144 The global spread of the European 
form of decadence promotes a brand of pessimism which inhibits recognition of the 
“supranational, nomadic cosmopolitan type” that is developing out of its decay, which – 
as Nietzsche hoped – is realizing the possibility of “a united European people capable of 
the task of global mastery,” for which the multiple, mutually reinforcing spectacles of 
globalization are prevenient.145
The “mastery” of which Nietzsche spoke – and fervently advocated – should not 
be misconstrued in terms of a frightening imposition of power-over-others in the tradition 
of conventional tyranny or antagonistic and coercive power relations. Rather, it referred 
to the crucial project of self-mastery toward radical self-affirmation by which the 
healthiest become who it is they are, and to their mastery over the world via the 
nomothetic acts they spontaneously perform that provoke (the eros of) others, spurring 
their emulation in the socio-political realm.
 
146 These are plainly taking form in our world 
via the realization of abstract potentials of globality which are evident in myriad aspects 
of contemporary life in nearly all regions of the world.  
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This ‘global mastery’ involves the recognition and acceptance of diversity and 
purposeful enrichment of disparate types, each fortified by their respectful 
acknowledgement of the other. The task facing good Europeans—“atheists and 
immoralists”—is to increase that mastery and direct it to life-affirming projects. This 
would come to involve the highest exemplars of every European people and enhance the 
development of an advanced, supra-European awareness (Bildung).147  It would serve to 
strengthen those capable of flourishing and edify the hoi polloi with meaning and 
purpose. I argue below that such developments are being actualized in the present 
through the vis creativa inherent to emergent abstract potentials of globality.  
Among Nietzsche’s primary objectives was that of inspiring his readers to 
“become ‘good Europeans’”.148 He hoped to arouse astute iconoclasts, spurring them to 
dispense with anti-natural moral conventions and intellectual prejudices. Their passionate 
works, as kynical ironists would productively lampoon the decadent values of our age. 
This would provide a palliative to the nihilism that dissipates the volitional resources of 
Europe’s peoples, especially those who would other-wise emerge as its highest 
exemplars. Moreover, it would facilitate the realization of an idea of Europe 
corresponding with the ambition of Nietzsche’s aristocratically radical political 
philosophy and his recognition “that Europe wants to become one”.149
In advocating the notion of ‘good Europeanism’ Nietzsche sought to recuperate 
elements of a mainly defunct set of ideals and persuade future free spirits to dedicate 
themselves to creating a new Europe (and world) in which the best and healthiest would 
legislate with the aim of improving humankind physically, intellectually and 
“spiritually”. This idea of Europe would be the culmination of his project of translating 
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man back into nature to overcome the nihilism of the present.150 He expected it to prompt 
Europeans to “transcend narrow nationalism and accomplish a mingling of many old 
races and stocks”, a process that would ultimately culminate in a “new European 
culture.151  
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BOOK TWO 
Toward What End Does Europe Want to Become One? Polity Making and the 
Theorization of European Integration 
 
Section One 
Nietzsche’s perspectivalist epistemology and corresponding critique of science: the 
political as world-creation and interpretation 
 
Introduction 
In this book I critique theories of European integration and the purposes they 
serve through the perspectivalist lenses of Nietzsche’s vitalist politics and power 
ontology.152 Such a thought experiment, and the unconventional analysis is provides, 
strives to deduce the function of values informing conceptualizations of Europe’s 
integration and the organization of the EU itself, as well as the motives for those values. 
It illuminates “the preponderating power of the moral prejudices” that underlies the 
project of integrating Europe and unconsciously informs rationales for it.153 This provides 
insights into the maintenance of established understanding (perspectives) of Europe and 
their incremental transformation within the dominant ultra-liberal-modern ideological 
matrix.154
Through this assessment I seek to furnish a Nietzschean understanding of the 
recent construction and evolving role of European identity/ies. ‘Popular culture’ is also 
considered as a force advancing ascetic-consumerist ideals in the economic integration 
and socio-political amalgamation of the continent. A doxographical survey toward 
genealogical critique, this appraisal of mainstream scholarly theorizing of European 
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integration from the end of World War Two to the present sets up my exposition of how 
the good Europeans Nietzsche anticipated might cheerfully engage in the task of 
remaking the continent and the world.  
The books following this one specify the aim of good Europeans in doing so, that 
chiefly being to revalue the reactive values out of which the EU developed in accordance 
with their quasi-cosmopolitan, active values. They thereby seek to inaugurate a new, 
revitalized era predicated on a genuinely agonistic socio-political milieu for the 
generation of an authentic culture. Against the sickening nihilism of our hyper-decadent 
age which good Europeans seek to end, such a life-affirming environment would 
augment the flourishing of those with the health necessary to truly prosper. Nietzsche 
envisaged that in doing so these Übermenschlich, if preparatory exceptions would elevate 
the human species and hasten its eventual overcoming. He considered this objective of 
culture the greatest of all conceivable ‘political’ endeavors. 
Recalling Laplace’s dictum, “[t]he weight of evidence for an extraordinary claim 
must be proportioned to its strangeness”, I must acknowledge that Nietzsche’s arguments 
pose weighty challenges to the precepts of ordinary social science and democratic 
political theory. This includes explicating how such theories indicate variations on the 
prevailing, anti-natural will to truth, assessing their value for certain forms of life or 
modes of being-in-the-world, and prospects for their eventual transmutation into life-
affirming practices through a revaluation of our hyper-decadent values. The assessment is 
supported by discursive critique and empirical analysis, as well analysis of the mutually-
constitutive role ideology plays in the generation and legitimation of such theories and 
how the mainstream of the field they comprise has recently been challenged in ways that 
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suggest how conventional understandings about European integration may be overcome 
to transform Europe in authentically life-affirming ways.  
In sections one and two of this book I examine Nietzsche’s anti-dogmatic 
perspectivalist hermeneutical and epistemological stance and coextending vitalism in 
terms of how such a critical framework may be utilized to glean an understanding of 
contemporary theories of European integration. I draw on Nietzsche’s texts and on 
seminal assessments of his critique of science, utilizing his critique of the metaphysical 
presuppositions of certain, persistent notions within Western philosophy, such as free will 
and the autonomy of the putatively agentic individual. I also employ his related critiques 
of the univocality of reason and the corresponding (empiricist) prejudices of science to 
show how its knowledge creation for ‘Truth’ legitimation inhibits the conditions 
necessary for authentic culture, which Nietzsche’s new philosophy, or gay science, would 
be tasked with providing.155
Nietzsche deduced that empirical science cannot, despite popular misconceptions 
of it, be self-grounding. His desire (itself implicated in the same Christian–Platonic will 
to truth that generated science
  
156) to establish a more plausible or naturalistic basis for 
knowledge prompted a critical endeavor to push scientific reason to its furthest logical 
consequences. In so doing he illuminated the metaphysical faith in reason perpetuated by 
the cultural framework it had spawned. He thereby recognized, as Ansell Pearson notes, 
that “[s]cience suffers from the fact that it lacks independence, that it is always placed in 
the service of a value-creating power, never creating values.” However, rather than reject 
science for seeming to provide itself with an axiomatic starting point, Nietzsche re-
conceived it in aesthetic terms, as a form of artistic production, with art understood as an 
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instinctive interpretative/creative endeavor impelled by the anorganic force conducted by 
and involuntarily discharged (given expression) through life. By doing so he sought “to 
give articulation to a gay science” capable of overcoming a “science [that] unconsciously 
performs its own kind of revenge on man by arriving at results that serve to belittle 
him.”157
Nietzsche was quite enthusiastic about the potential of science and its uses for the 
elevation of humankind. However, while engaged in the major debates of his day – 
particularly biologism and evolution (both of which significantly influenced his own 
thought) he was very critical of the fetishization it was undergoing. These mid- and late 
  
The privileging of scientific reason over all other means of knowledge creation 
via the contemporary discourse of scientism originates in a will to truth that coextends 
with (and was arguably formative of) the ideologically hegemonic metadiscourse of ultra-
liberal-modernity. The reactive interests of the modern state, which seeks to realize the 
ideals of ultra-liberal-modernity and employs the discourses of scientism to rationalize 
this operation, are served as well, thereby. Through its ultimately linguistic (artistic) 
depiction of the ‘real’—an institutional instantiation of a will to nothingness that 
culminates in hyper-decadence—the metaphoricity of scientific reason, particularly as 
manifested in contemporary political science and theories of European integration, has 
momentous epistemological implications for the self-understanding of individuals and 
communities. Nietzsche’s vitalist conception of art and the perspectivalist hermeneutic to 
which it gives rise provides the critical disposition and corresponding methodology of the 
doxographical survey and genealogical analysis of the major theories of European 
integration that follows. 
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19th century developments were formative of many contemporary popular conceptions of 
science. They led to the reification entailed in the privileging of scientific methodologies 
as a means for ascertaining ‘truth’ to “sustain, legitimate and reinvigorate the values of 
the Judaeo-Christian tradition, [and reconstruct] religious orthodoxies in a secular, 
scientific form” in the wake of the death of God.158 Nietzsche recognized the dangers this 
presented of a new, metaphysical dogmatism, particularly as science was systematically 
deployed to discredit other forms of knowledge creation.159  
Throughout this book I aim to show that however effectively Nietzsche’s 
perspectivalist hermeneutical and epistemological stance questioned some of the 
principle conceits of Western philosophy (and by extension, science) he ultimately does 
not—and did not intend to—wholly reject analytical science.160 Nietzsche meant only to 
situate science as one method of accessing the world; one particularly effective 
theoretical approach within the encompassing framework of his meta-theoretical 
perspectivalism, “which shifts the basis of the problem of science from science to art and 
then beyond the question of art to the question of life”.161
Holding Nietzsche’s critique to be successful on its own terms, I argue that it 
offers significant insights into the limitations of science, particularly as applied to the 
study of the social realm with specific relevance to the examination of political processes 
undertaken by theories of European integration. In so doing it conversely illuminates the 
proper place and acknowledges the benefits of mainstream positivistic, analytic, 
objectivist scientific practice. Similarly, Nietzsche would have approved of today’s 
 Therefore his actual position on 
this complex subject—as well as many others—is at odds with the popular caricature of 
his thought as comprising an unnuanced form of relativism.  
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normative social science as a legitimate form of knowledge generation, but objected to its 
underlying values, or ideological motivations. He would have understood it—and its 
“reality-falsifying simplifications”—as a ressentiment-driven project symptomatic of our 
hyper-decadent, cynical age.162
In the books that follow this one, contemporary Europe is shown to be a catalyst 
for augmenting both life-affirming and life-denying developments, the balance of which 
will be critical to the future of humankind. In book three, Europe, under the aegis of the 
EU, is situated in and shown to comprise a major organ—or power constellation—of the 
broader globalization complex. The decadently nihilistic ethos of globalization is 
 
The third section of this book consists of the aforementioned doxographical 
survey of the major schools of integration theory within a broadly genealogical evaluative 
framework. It comprises the bulk of this book, and aims to point toward an understanding 
of how the discipline—as a knowledge–power regime in the Foucaultian sense—has 
developed. The evolution of the field (considered in terms of a disciplinary power–
knowledge regime) is understood first in terms of the development and maturation of an 
epistemic community, and second as comprising a veritable research tradition. Third, and 
lastly, I survey some of the ways this mainstream has recently been challenged in 
productive ways by post-Nietzschean critical methodologies that have illuminated some 
of the field’s strengths and weaknesses. The section also aims to demonstrate how the 
power–knowledge regime it comprises corresponds with the hegemonic values (meta-
discourse) of ultra-liberal-modernity and its coercive project of universalizing a 
secularized form of slave-morality, the decadence of which Nietzsche saw as the 
European sickness. 
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contrasted with the positive abstract potentials of globality to which it gives rise and 
which good Europeans might exploit both to become who they are and to effect a 
revaluation of values. Finally, in book four, I explain how the EU can be hijacked, 
exploited and redirected by good Europeans, as I contend it can be throughout the work. 
As comedians of the ascetic ideals upon which the EU was founded, good Europeans 
may condition the possibility for the emergence of Übermenschlich types capable of 
revaluing the dissipative values of ultra-liberal-modernity to realize a Nietzschean idea of 
Europe. 
 
Part One: A Brief Review of Nietzsche’s Vitalist Critique and its Utility to an 
Analysis of European Unification  
 
Nietzsche’s vitalist critique of modernity and associated call for a revaluation of 
all values (Umwerthung aller Werthe) – a rejection of and challenge to the entire 
Christian–Platonic “slave moral” tradition – was intended to resonate among healthy 
individuals and incite them to “become ‘good Europeans’”. In proffering this critique he 
was principally concerned with explicating how human life may degenerate or be 
invigorated by values through the forms of socio-political organization they produce. The 
socio-political organization of a healthy society functions as a basis for the development 
of a higher culture and is secondary, and subordinate to it. The political is essential for 
ensuring the natural rank order of types necessary for an authentically agonistic milieu in 
which the strongest exemplars, or geniuses, may flourish.  
Nietzsche sought to explain how healthy, “masterly” values facilitate the 
flourishing of those capable of it by giving rise to an authentically agonistic higher 
culture, while anti-natural moralities of taming (specifically the Christian–Platonic 
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tradition) were motivated by slave ressentiment and realized by appeal to common 
desires so as to impede humankind’s greatest potential.163 He opposed slave moralities of 
taming because they originate in ressentiment and seek to enforce an unnatural equality 
between types by leveling disparate forms of life to eliminate difference. It is important 
to recall that Nietzsche: 
[O]ffers no plan for restoring decadent souls to a more robust standard of vitality. 
He is interested neither in prescribing a recuperative system of instincts nor in 
rallying the anemic and infirm to unlikely feats of heroism and nobility. Decadent 
souls can do nothing by enact their constitutive chaos, expressing themselves 
creatively in their own self-destruction.164 
 
Values themselves are symptoms of the health—or instinctual organization—of 
individuals, at the political microsphere, and the health of a culture, via its socio-political 
organization, at the political macrosphere.165 
In the work that follows I am specifically interested in how healthy individuals 
might involuntarily challenge the hyper-decadent values of the prevailing ultra-liberal-
modern, “free-market” democratic state form and its globalization complex, through 
kynical engagement—prankish acts that mock and spoof reigning ascetic ideals.166
The empirical evidence Nietzsche musters to substantiate his unsettling 
contentions seemed to him readily apparent to anyone with the strength to see it.
 
Though doomed to fail, in part because they are invariably affected by the decadence of 
their abject epoch, they hasten its exhaustion and eventual transfiguration by prospective 
Übermenschlich types, whose success in instigating a transhuman future their 
naturalizing acts foreshadow and incrementally facilitate. I focus specifically on the EU 
as a crucial locus and driving force of the globalization complex. 
167 
Despite the observed facts he draws upon from late 19th century Europe to support his 
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case (e.g.: democratization and enfranchisement, the rise of a middle class bourgeoisie, 
growing nationalism and anti-Semitism, etc.,), his characterizations do not in themselves 
prove the existence of the decadence he identifies. This raises the issue of what 
substantiating empirical support Nietzsche musters in making his arguments about 
differing value systems and their correspondence to human types, social forms and levels 
of culture. What factual corroboration could be cited to sustain such a critique and verify 
its conclusions? It must be acknowledged that there is little in the world by way of 
material support to validate his conclusions. As Conway remarks, 
His diagnosis of modernity may strike us as scintillating, provocative, even 
persuasive at times, but we have no epistemic warrant to following him in 
pronouncing it true.168
Nietzsche’s perspectivalist hermeneutical and epistemological stance—which can 
be understood as a skeptical, though not relativistic, heuristic device— together with his 
power ontology, by means of which he radically challenged the Western tradition of 
ontology, provides his critical technique of evaluation and the conclusions arrived at 
thereby with a distinctive analytical facility. As with every philosopher preceding him, 
and perhaps every philosopher since, his grounds for asserting the “truth” of his theory 
may be challenged. However, Nietzsche’s understanding of “truth” (and all related 
  
 
Nietzsche’s psychological analysis of human behavior and communal life (politics) 
informed his axiological assessment of his and Europe’s historical situation. He sought to 
fortify his thesis through a genealogy of morality, in which he would trace the historical 
origins and development of opposing moral trends. It was developed most famously in 
On the Genealogy of Morality, a work whose themes elaborate previously developed 
philosophical investigations and analyses. 
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concepts such as ‘certainty’, ‘fact’, ‘reality’, etc.) distinguishes his thought from the 
tradition that preceded it, and much of Western thought since has in some way or other 
constituted a response to it. 
In a famous passage from the aforementioned work, he states his case for 
perspectivalism thusly: 
From now on, my philosophical colleagues, let us be more wary of the dangerous 
old conceptual fairy-tale which has set up a ‘pure, will-less, painless, timeless 
subject of knowledge’, let us be wary of the tentacles of such contradictory 
concepts as ‘pure reason’, ‘absolute spirituality’, ‘knowledge as such’: -- here we 
are asked to think an eye which cannot be thought at all, an eye turned in no 
direction at all, an eye where the active and interpretive powers are to be 
suppressed, absent, but through which seeing still becomes a seeing-something, so 
it is an absurdity and non-concept of eye that is demanded. There is only 
perspective seeing, only a perspective ‘knowing’; the more affects we allow to 
speak about a thing, the more eyes, various eyes we are able to use for the same 
thing, the more complete will be our ‘concept’ of the thing, our objectivity.169 
 
Conway helpfully remarks on this passage, noting that Nietzsche’s perspectivalism 
rejects the “traditional interpretation of Objectivity as disinterested contemplation.” He 
further states that the passage demonstrates how, through perspectivalism, Nietzsche:   
[A]ttempts to account for those affective ingredients and determinants of 
knowledge that traditionally have been ignored or discounted by orthodox 
epistemologists. His reconstituted notion of objectivity (consistently noted by his 
use of quotation marks) suggests that knowledge is a function of the embodied 
expression of our affective investment in the world. His perspectivism thus 
presupposes an account of knowing subjects as radically situated in the world and 
in their bodies. …Second…his perspectivism is strategically designed to 
recuperate the metaphorics of vision that have dominated (and perverted) 
representational epistemology. …[T]he pursuit of Nietzschean objectivity requires 
us to deconstruct…binary oppositions and integrate the supposedly antagonistic 
terms within each.170
The authority of Nietzsche’s perspectivalist and co-extending vitalist theses (will to 
power), even in the absence of a “dynamometer” or some other method of quantitatively 
demonstrating it, is supported by philosophical critique, directly observed evidence, long 
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reflection on the psychological motivations of human behavior from myriad firsthand 
experience, and historical/genealogical evidence.171 
Nietzsche himself realized that the factual bases of his theory, like all such ‘truth’ 
claims, was contingently perspectival and remained open to dispute.172 Nevertheless, he 
thought it provided superior insights into the presuppositions of conventional notions of 
truth and what has counted for knowledge and so remains an excellent framework for 
critical analyses as well as discerning the operation of metaphysical fictions.173 By 
contrast to conventional philosophies of analytical science, Babich asserts that “[a] 
properly Nietzschean…perspectivalism…offers knowledge an infinite domain, 
but…offers knowledge seekers no such infinite and no sure method and no truth.”174 For 
obvious reasons this will frustrate dogmatists of truth. However, Nietzsche’s insights 
have been echoed by contemporary philosophers of science, such as Paul Feyerabend, 
whose aim was theorizing how knowledge is best attained against the privileging of 
reason and conventional methodology.175
[T]he sophisticated fallibilism exemplified by today’s scientists and endorsed by 
the public conception of “objectivity,” features the same turn to absolutism that 
characterizes relativism. Hence, through ever-more-accurate approximations, 
science and its philosophy claim absolute knowledge or truth via an indirection, a 
feint concealing the aim that fosters the project at hand. If the method of science 
  
Babich contrasts Nietzschean perspectivalism with the casual relativism with 
which it is often, and incorrectly, conflated by those unwilling to admit its implications or 
possibly unable to comprehend them. Such a conception of relativism is actually 
equivalent in its absolutism to analytical science, which is likely why it resonates with 
conventional thinkers.  
She observes that: 
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does not “yet” yield truth, the point of this disingenuous “yet” affirms that science 
is on its way to no other goal.176 
 
Babich’s recognition of the link between how scientists conceive of what it is they 
do and what they ought (rightly) to aim to achieve, and public (mis-)conceptions of same, 
points to the deeper operation of ultra-liberal-modernity’s metanarratives via its primary 
discourses of rationalism, universalism, secularism, progressivism and humanism. The 
post-Enlightenment faith in truth (and positivistic or “scientistic” confidence in the ability 
of science to discover, represent and convey it via knowledge, predicated as it is on the 
aforementioned discourses), comprises a central tenet in the ideological scheme of the 
globalization complex and the EU as one of its dominant and integrative organs. 
Nietzsche’s indictment of the decadence of late-19th century European life was 
fraught with self-implicating. However, this did not pass unnoticed, nor go unremarked 
upon, by him. As Conway notes, Nietzsche’s identification of the great nascent potential 
and distinctive brand of turmoil characteristic of his age is itself a symptom of his own 
besetting decadence, a “fact” he recognized.177 Nevertheless his struggle to overcome it 
provides a positive example for transforming political life. The values he endorses are 
ultimate affirmations of life and supply desirable objectives for humankind’s exemplars. 
Although likely disturbing to ultra-liberal-modern sensibilities, his perfectionist aims 
body forth a radical, authentically optimistic vision of human becoming against the 
prevalence of passive nihilism. Nietzsche envisaged a fundamental transformation of 
society and its political institutions through the utilization of our revitalized powers and 
energies. 
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Disputes over his theory’s “objective” validity occur in the context of scientism’s 
authority to define the terms of debate, so it is unlikely to get a fair hearing among those 
convinced that their methods, etc., are superior to any alternative. Its practical 
applicability will continue to be doubted too, as long as science is dominated by a 
“plebeian empiricism” and linear, analytical method, and so long as the majority clings to 
metaphysical fictions of objective “Truth” that seek to disclose reality as such; an 
absolutist notion corresponding with the anti-natural, tyrannizing ethos of the secularized 
slave morality of taming that righteously demands the “Truth”. Nietzsche was concerned 
with illuminating the irreversible decadence characteristic of European life in his era, the 
age of late-modernity, and the nihilistic forces which he predicted would intensify until 
they culminated in a worldwide calamity in the coming centuries.178 He believed his 
particular nuanced variety of vitalism was capable of illuminating these phenomena and 
providing as objective a basis as could be conceived for a fundamental revaluation of 
values. According to his vitalism—and corresponding politics—the virtues of an era 
indicate its ascending or declining life and the condition of its health: 
In its measure of strength every age also possesses a measure for what virtues are 
permitted and forbidden to it. Either it has the virtues of ascending life: then it 
will resist from the profoundest depths the virtues of declining life. Or the age 
itself represents declining life: then it also requires the virtues of decline, then it 
hates everything that justifies itself solely out of abundance, out of the 
overflowing riches of strength.179
Again, the core of this philosophical framework can be found in his genealogical 
critique of morality, which developed in part from a psychological theory of the 
 
 
By these criteria he determines the health of modernity, a brief overview of his critique of 
which is necessary to establish primary points of his conception of the political and its 
applicability to EU expansion in the context of globalization. 
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unconscious instincts and drives, their correspondence to human strengths and 
weaknesses, and role in generating the ressentiment and bad-conscience which largely 
characterize the socio-political organization of contemporary Western civilization. 
Genealogy reveals the “essence” of the values constituting a system of morality, and their 
evolutionary cycle: in what contexts and from what conditions they are created, how 
efficaciously they serve the ends of culture, why they get overthrown and what they 
indicate about the relative health of the society that spawned them. If we accept his total 
rejection of the possibility of “universal values” and “transcendent truths,” ancient idols 
whose hollowness he demonstrates by striking with the hammer of life-affirming 
skeptical criticism, the salience of his genealogical methodology to any serious inquiry 
into values becomes clear. A comprehension of how and for what reasons certain values 
evolved, including the interests they serve, is less crucial to adducing their objective 
“truth” per se, than for determine their significance for life. 
Nietzsche’s desired revaluation of values (which would reinstate healthy virtues 
of the sort usurped in the West by decadent Judaeo-Christian morality and Platonic 
metaphysics) and explication of the slave-moral inversion of good and bad, from which 
European anti-naturalism arose, corresponds with the genealogy of morality that 
produced the famous distinction of master and slave moralities that later evolved into a 
healthy / decadent dichotomy. Nietzsche advocated reversing the Christian order to 
restore the natural hierarchy between individuals and the hierarchy of moralities it had 
eliminated. He grasped the opposition this objective would encounter due to the 
entrenched decadence of slave morality in modern Western society and recognized the 
violences achieving it would require.  
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In ‘On the thousand and one goals’, Zarathustra asserts the link between 
esteeming the world, an indispensable human action that imbues existence with meaning, 
and the simultaneous creation of values. Furthermore he elaborates on the violence 
invariably entailed by changes of values: 
Only man placed values in things to preserve himself – he alone created meaning 
for things, a human meaning.  Therefore he calls himself ‘man,’ which means: the 
esteemer. To esteem is to create: hear this you creators! …Through esteeming 
alone is there value. Change of values – that is a change of creators.  Whoever 
must be a creator always annihilates.180 
 
Zarathustra would overturn the prevailing moral order to emancipate individuals from 
their subjugation to the morality of the weak, confer upon the ego its rightful good 
conscience and put it to productive use:   
The delight in the herd is more ancient than the delight in the ego; and as long as 
the good conscience is identified with the herd, only the bad-conscience says: I.181  
 
Such facultative individuals would “go under” to create virtues in which “the fire of love 
and the fire of wrath” would glow, thereby setting a goal for humanity to provide it 
purpose. From Nietzsche’s meta-ethical theory of morality his critique of modernity 
emerges. According to Nietzsche the last spiritually edifying, culturally generative epoch 
in Europe was the Renaissance, exemplified by the proliferation of arts he takes as 
symptomatic of the invigorated human spirit characteristic of the period. Nietzsche 
contrasts this with the reactive, anti-natural forces that produced the Reformation and 
conditioned European culture for the Enlightenment.182
Nietzsche identified modernity as an epoch characterized by increasing decadence 
and decline; hence everyone born into the era was, to varying degrees, certain to exhibit 
symptoms of these unhealthy defining characteristics. No one could completely escape 
modernity’s degenerative effects, and Nietzsche recognized his own contamination by 
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them.183 Nietzsche famously explicated slave morality’s role in naturalizing ressentiment 
as the “spirit of revenge”, and the bad-conscience operationalized through guilt, its 
cultivation of herd instincts, subjugation of humanity and means of taming or forcibly 
excluding the strongest individuals in society from governing institutions.184  
On the development of herd instincts in men and the simultaneous growth and 
role within communities of an essential morality for the maintenance of order and 
continued prosperity, Nietzsche observed: 
By morality the individual is taught to become a function of the herd, and to 
ascribe to himself value only as a function. As the conditions for the maintenance 
of one community have been very different from those of another community, 
there have been very different moralities; and in respect to the future essential 
transformations of herds and communities, states and societies, one can prophesy 
that there will still be very divergent moralities. Morality is the herd-instinct in the 
individual.185 
 
This herd instinct is not necessarily slavish in its character. It does tend to lend itself to 
the emergence of such a morality when the mediocre majority adopts anti-natural ascetic 
ideals and corresponding world–defaming values and seeks to universalize them.  
When the majority succeeds in imposing its dissipative values on its betters – 
healthy creators – slave morality comes to prevail. Every morality describes a set of 
(disciplinary) values particular to a people (and integral with its culture) and delimits 
social relations among its members accordingly: 
Wherever we meet with a morality we find a valuation and order of rank of the 
human impulses and activities. These valuations and orders of rank are always the 
expression of the needs of a community or herd: that which is in the first place to 
its advantage – and in the second place and third place – is also the authoritative 
standard for the worth of every individual.186
Among the factors determining the health of any system of morality is who, the strong or 
the weak, its valuations and orders of rank serve by design to enhance. 
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Autochthonous moralities, the ethos and nomos native to a social organism, (as 
opposed to those imposed from outside) symptomatize a mode of life felicitous to the 
greatest becoming of each within a natural rank order of types (Rangordnung). These 
moralities develop out of the instinctual arrangement of impulses and drives at the macro-
level of the community. By instantiating a rank order of values a morality gives 
expression to the shared native volition that, so affirmed, unites individuals in 
community. It also ensures that future members of the community feel an inborn duty to 
preserve the morality that serves to justify it, the basis of their identity and belonging.  
From this vitalist perspective the adherence of a community’s members to its/their 
traditional or prevailing moral strictures serves to indicate the health of the society, apart 
from socio-cultural practices sustained by the values it enforces. At the micropolitical or 
individual level, an autochthonous morality determines the worth of a person according 
to how effectively she can conform to its behavioral strictures and carry out its 
regulations (here Nietzsche anticipates what Foucault would label disciplinary regimes). 
“[D]epending on the agents in question, all ascetic techniques are potentially both 
coercive and empowering.”187 In a naturally ordered polis an agent’s performative 
enactment of his community’s morality code determines his success within it and, to a 
certain extent, the likelihood of his attaining his own moral perfection. Collectively, a 
culturally cohesive populace strives for political perfection through performative 
enforcements of its dominant morality. The sociogenic perpetuation of a community’s 
instinctual organization naturalizes certain social drives and impulses that come to be 
privileged and understood as typifying it, or constituting its self-identity. These are 
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frequently expressed via exclusionary ascetic ideals that valorize the community’s 
political preferences.188 
These conclusions were enunciated throughout Nietzsche’s condemnation of post-
Enlightenment, liberal modern values that emphasized equality and rights. He took the 
disposition underlying such values for the secular rationalization of a creeping slave 
morality (anti-natural ascetic herd values) designed to ingratiate the ressentiment of the 
many, and beyond this to recognize the futility of the “redemptive measures designed to 
cure the ills of modernity” he had previously prescribed. Conway states that in his post-
Zarathustran writings Nietzsche,  
“…acknowledges that the institutions of modern Europe are simply too corrupt to 
serve in the macropolitical capacity he had mistakenly reserved for them [in his 
earlier works] …that, independent of the macropolitical resources at his disposal, 
he is in no position to orchestrate the redemption of modernity.”189 
 
Europe’s contemporary institution are no less corrupt, but may nevertheless be subverted 
by the macropolitical capacities conferred by abstract potentials of globality. 
Nietzsche did not distinguish between varieties of liberalism, which strikes some 
contemporary political scientists as problematically unnuanced. However, it should be 
understood that he generalized about liberalism not to elide the existence of differences 
between various factions of liberals in his own era (the range and diversity of which has 
only increased in the century following his death), but to speak of those broad traits he 
identified as characteristic of all varieties of liberalism and its unifying ethos. Nietzsche 
believed modernity’s dissipative affects would compel the most decadent and socialistic 
consequences of the liberal ideology and diminish the life of future Europeans thereby. 
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Nietzsche anticipated the further degeneration of socio-political life in the West, 
which he believed would have to completely exhaust itself before a new regenerative 
order might be founded. As Albrow summarizes, “He recognized the crisis of the modern 
and foretold what has become the postmodern.”190 Nietzsche’s prognosis for Europe, 
based on his diagnosis of the destructive course the nihilism of his age had set mankind 
upon, bode an ominous portent for the continent, and by extension the world, in the 
centuries to come. Yet it also hinted at the ongoing struggle that could evolve more of the 
robust ‘good Europeans’ he envisaged, even if in the meantime, their efforts at self-
overcoming remained confined to the micropolitical, or individual level. As Conway 
notes:  
In a strong age overflowing with vital energy, externalized in the institutions and 
festivals of a healthy people, lawgivers would have neither the need nor the 
inclination to restrict their legislations to the political microsphere. But in a 
decadent age unable to sustain the vitality of a people’s signature institutions, 
lawgivers have no choice but to legislate from within the political microsphere.191
Struggling to legislate to the greatest extent possible the inner, instinctual ordering 
of their impulses and drives through regimens of self-overcoming (willfully self-
prescribed askesis), their experiments, kynical challenges and prankish acts may serve to 
augment the overcoming of the decadence of their age even as they only strive to perfect 
themselves. “In some extraordinary cases ascetic disciplines will have a fortifying, 
 
 
In the case of the EU, which might aptly be characterized in Weberian terms as a 
remodeled “iron cage of bureaucracy”, it is certainly not the case that the sort of 
nomothetic lawgivers Nietzsche envisages legislate. In our hyper-decadent age the EU—
a kakistocratic ochlocracy—is governed by sickly idealists out of a spirit of revenge to 
preserve ascetic-consumerist values. 
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fructifying effect on agents, inadvertently endowing them with unanticipated freedoms 
and affording them greater political latitude.”192 These strong exceptions abide by the 
instinctual ordering of the drives and impulses comprising their native volitions (and 
expand the pathos of distance within themselves and between themselves and others) to 
preserve and enliven what is noble in themselves and their community as well as their 
progeny (literal or otherwise).193 
 
Part Two: The intensification and universalization of European decadence during 
the 20th century 
  
According to Nietzsche, the intensifying decadence of European life in the late 
19th century was symptomatic of the diminishing significance of the essential shared 
meanings (traditions) necessary to sustain vital communities. This was confirmed by the 
erosion of established authority, the rise of socialism, anarchism and a nihilistic 
relativism that actively rejected all customary meaning. Nietzsche perceived an ominous 
portent in developments, asserting that they augured trouble for Europe’s immediate 
future. He presciently foresaw that the dissipation of shared beliefs and unifying 
meanings would, in “the next century, bring the struggle for the domination of the earth” 
between the most dangerous factions. This would produce “the compulsion to great 
politics” in the best individuals as well, namely those strong enough to resist the 
spreading infirmity of the age. It was in this latter, hopeful possibility that his optimism 
was sustained.194
In the late-modern era a reactive will to preserve outmoded teachings on the 
meaning and purpose of existence qua tradition arose in different strains of nationalism 
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and socialism, which vied with (equally reactive) “free-market” capitalism for hegemony 
over the European continent and the world. Proponents of differing forms of ultra-liberal-
modernist ideology vied to eliminate their liberal-modernist “opponents”, and continue to 
do so. Through a war on particularizing notions of difference and their reification via 
identity waged in the latter half of the twentieth century by commercial means, the 
liberal-modernist project has succeeded in unifying Europe. The materialist ethos of 
consumer culture now permits corporations to co-opt and re-present or spectacularize 
identities of every sort for mass-consumption; the danger of reified identity has been 
eliminated through its systematic banalization.  
It has done so through a process of ongoing standardization and mediocritization 
of much of what was/is distinctive and differentiating between groups, and by 
transforming perceptions and desires in ways that eliminate some of the need for reliance 
upon traditional cultural identifiers and weaken the appeal of their corresponding 
prejudices. Yet liberal-modernity has banalized precisely those qualities (communal 
meanings and worldviews) which by their nature formerly provoked regenerative 
competition on the European continent.195
Yet, as this “disease of will” hastens Europe’s cultural degeneration, a newly 
invigorated and unified will to defy enforced massification and homogenization of 
difference has developed in spite of and in distinction to it.
 The price of integration and peace attained by 
adherence to liberal-modern precepts has been the diminution of certain forms of life; the 
attainment of Europe’s new security comes at the cost of difference.  
196 The simultaneous 
improvement of the type man through the creative acts of courageous exceptions is being 
effectuated by those ‘good Europeans’ of our age.197 However, the reactive momentum of 
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globalization (understood as a plane of consistency that inhibits lines of flight), is 
symptomatic of a negative will to impose a universal normative order. 
The aim of this order is first the containment and then the management of 
becoming-other through the worldwide extension of ultra-liberal-modernity’s 
metadiscourse of economic optimism and the univocality of reason, the leveling action of 
which functions to co-opt and interpolate difference, leaving only semblances of former 
(autochthonous) meanings in their wake. Globalization disseminates new technologies 
(improved scientific and medical discoveries, ever quickening methods communication 
and efficient ways of conducting business) and transforms expectations, but it ramifies 
the hyper-decadence of the West European cultural realm’s decline and pathogenically 
universalizes its values as it does so, culminating in a nihilistic form of ‘Empire’. 
The reasons for the apparent “success” of the ideological discourses of ultra-
liberal-modernity are complex. Quantifiable improvements in the material conditions of 
life in most parts of the world cannot be discounted, for they provide powerfully 
persuasive evidence in favor of practices which developed out of the disposition and 
ideas of modernity. Yet the dominance of the discourses and the value-constellation or 
world-view they sustain contributes to their validation. Taken in summa, the meta-
discourse succeeds by propagating anti-natural ideals that confer an enlightened false 
consciousness that deludes its uncritical adherents so thoroughly that they are rendered 
incapable of identifying their best interests.198
In actuality both its positive and negative effects undercut the efficacy of 
autochthonous cultural practices and compel the renegotiation of identic categories, the 
purpose and proper function of community and, by extension, the basis of belonging and 
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security. This risks fomenting moral panic as old ontologically reified differences 
reemerge in intensified and vicious new forms, in response to perceived challenges to 
moral normativity.199 The repetition of such reaction and the conflicts they cause, and the 
ongoing generation of the conditions prevenient to them suggests that the horrible wars of 
the twentieth century may have been a minor prelude to the depressingly all-too-human 
paroxysms the nihilism of ultra-liberal-modernity may yet spawn.200 
The post-War statist logic and international order enabling the process of 
European integration has occurred largely through the work of contemporary ascetic-
consumerist priests of ressentiment, frequently evangelizing devotees of the metaphysical 
faith in progress determined to convert humankind (forcibly if necessary) into free agents 
of ultra-liberal-modern values—the secular age’s salvific canon and algodicy.201 It has 
culminated in the EU as well as Europe’s other chief supranational institutions (the 
OSCE and COE), and a whole host of international institutions including the UN, WTO, 
World Bank, etc., the dominance of which means, of course, that Nietzsche’s idea of 
Europe is in no way attained. The radical extremes of that logic counter-intuitively does 
suggest however, that opportunities for the over-coming of the state form are being 
generated—if unwittingly—by the aforementioned arbiters of integration (a potential that 
is examined below).202
…vision of what it means to be a “good European” is intellectually more 
persuasive in a secular context because it allows for an experimental questioning 
of the will-to-truth; that is supremely affirmative of an understanding of existence 
  
In contrast to the motives for integration espoused by conventional Europeanists, 
and with regard to the crisis of meaning that has arisen lately in the EU itself, Elbe asserts 
that Nietzsche’s: 
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that does not try to vest all of its creative efforts in ascetic ideals; that 
demonstrates immense spiritual vitality and courage in understanding this 
experiment; and that is also more optimistic than the pessimistic reaction found in 
much of the literature on the crisis of the European idea.203
The EU, despite being the product of a primarily molar state-form, provides 
mechanisms through the ultra-liberal-modernist norms and ideals it naturalizes that ‘good 
Europeans’ of the Nietzschean variety can utilize to achieve their objectives. These 
objectives include instantiating an “order” conducive to the continuous enhancement and 
utmost thriving of humankind’s highest exemplars through a comprehensive revaluation 
of the now ubiquitous ascetic-consumerist values that construct and delimit possibilities 
for desiring in contemporary life. Corresponding with the conative disposition or 
anticipatory resoluteness made possible by globality (a stance enabled by but not 
identical to the prevailing ethos of globalization), it is probable that an increasing number 
of exceptional individuals—European or otherwise—are becoming amenable to and 
 
  
Such an experimental questioning (via Nietzsche’s own vitalist politics) of the motivating 
will-to-truth behind both defunct and current ideas of Europe—as  expressed in their 
differing visions of the continent’s future—serves as a basis for conceiving and 
implementing a supremely affirmative idea of Europe. Of particular interest here is that 
will-to-truth exemplified in the prerogatives and modus operandi of the EU, against 
which Nietzsche’s idea of Europe emphasizes the multiplicity of types, wealth of 
difference and correspondingly tremendous diversity of possible becomings Europe and 
its broader cultural realm contains, all of which his ‘good Europeans’ seek to radically 
enhance. 
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capable of undertaking such a radical revaluing of the values characteristic of ultra-
liberal-modern globalization. 
However, these are largely latent potentials; positive becomings continually 
struggling to overcome the inhibiting forces of our media dominated era of mass-
consumerism, which squanders much potential through myriad diversions and 
entertainments while making a veritable religion of labor/work through the fetishization 
of productivity.204 Like Marx, whose work he did not know, Nietzsche foresaw this 
emerging as a dominant feature of Europe’s deteriorating culture. In the latter half of the 
19th century, Nietzsche condemned Europe’s burgeoning commercial and Bourgeois 
culture for its deleterious consequences vis-à-vis authentic becoming. He observes that 
the “fundamental idea of a commercial culture” concerned a negative type of appraisal, 
the act of evaluating the worth of a thing, be it material goods, a work of art or ideas 
themselves, according to a coarse supply and demand calculus that distorts all values and 
reduces all esteeming to pecuniary considerations.205
This type of assessment, based upon the mass appeal of an object, panders to the 
lowest common denominator and achieves hegemony as a commercial society usurps the 
proper role of culture. It is also dependent – as Marx famously expounded – upon a new 
form of wage-labor; a degrading form of servitude that alienates its subjects from 
themselves and the product of their toil (robbing them of passion for those activities in 
which they engage), as it evacuates all “spirit” from the dehumanized culture it 
perpetuates. Unlike Marx however, Nietzsche saw this development in terms of “ascetic 
psychology”, one that explained both the Bourgeoisification of industrializing Europe 
and its democratic ethos, as well as the “revolutionary” reaction against its abusive 
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excesses, which (re)asserted the slave moral anti-naturalism exemplified by the leveling 
tendency of his day.206 Nietzsche fully expected its effects to be intensified and 
thoroughly naturalized in the 20th century; a form of character perversion “imprinted in 
every will and every faculty: it is this of which …men of the coming century will be 
proud if the profits of the commercial class are right to give it into your possession!”207 
This reactive or molar becoming-same has resulted in a highly sublimated form of 
(self-)glorified slavery, as young men who might otherwise cultivate their nobler 
character and innate talents are instead employed in a matrix of machinic economic 
relations: “purloined from themselves, trained to being worn out daily and taught to 
regard this as a matter of duty.” These “poor beasts of burden”—the vast majority—are, 
in a commercial culture, methodically habituated to perceiving labor for others as an 
intrinsic good in their own self-interest. “[T]hey cannot do without it and would not have 
it otherwise.”208 
It was Nietzsche’s view that as these work-slaves exhausted themselves with 
earning a living and diverting themselves from their predicament through frivolous 
entertainments, the surplus of their toil is likely to free certain anomalous or untimely 
individuals to dedicate themselves to nobler aesthetic creation.209
However, in becoming ‘good Europeans’ a few lucky strikes may come to 
recognize and diagnose the affliction of ultra-liberal-modernity and the infirmity it 
spreads: democratization and its concomitant leveling tendency has cultivated an 
 In our hyper-decadent 
age it is also probable that workers will transfigure their work into a means for self-
realization, and just as probable that those freed from the burden of working will 
succumb to the temptations of passive nihilism propagated by our popular culture.  
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obedient “type prepared for slavery in the most subtle sense.”210 Their “cure” requires the 
therapeutic exploitation of the vast potential of this circumstance. Turning the disease of 
liberal values against itself, ‘good Europeans’ subvert the debilitating hegemonic order 
from within and gradually establish a natural political arrangement predicated on a rank 
order of perspectives. The hierarchic order they strive after would allow the existing 
“wealth of types” to prosper and even sanction its expansion so to maximally facilitate 
becoming.211 Such a natural order would abet the enlargement of greatness and enhance 
the dignity and capabilities of every sort of person, allowing the fullest expression of 
Dasein.212  
Toward attaining the fullest realization of this, ‘good Europeans’ intuitively 
recognize the paradoxical value of reactivity and the intensified decadence of our age: 
technological innovation has diversified the variety of forms creative impulses may 
take.213 Properly directed, the fruits of the negative will are not (and cannot correctly be 
understood as) limited to the passive resignation or frenzied consumption of the all-
contented and blinking last man,214
Rather, a multitude of possible contributions, the like of which Nietzsche could 
not have anticipated have (in the form of broadly delivered basic education, astonishing 
feats of engineering and advanced communication; certain applications of technology to 
food production—the so-called “green revolution”; radical innovations in medicine and 
health care, etc.) provided a sense of ersatz “spiritualization,” that is, a palliative sense of 
meaning that is not altogether valueless. It is sufficient for the herd, whose members are 
 for the state of affairs that sustains the herd’s 
obtunded condition may counter-intuitively inspire the odd great work of visual art, 
drama, literature or music.  
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incapable of the sort of freedom expressed in the strength symptomatic of the 
extraordinary conation215, or anankê216
Nietzsche saw the historic role of ascetic priests of ressentiment (initiated by the 
Jewish revolt in and denaturalizing inversion of values) as that of promoting anti-natural 
notions of equality and ideals of a fictive social-justice to inhibit and/or corrupt would-be 
exceptions. Ascetic priest are the great despisers of life who foster values of self-denial 
and proclaim the inferiority of this world in part as a means of dissipating human spirit 
and the potential magnitude of extraordinary, pluripotent individuals who would likely 
undermine their authority if permitted to excel. Through ideological legerdemain they 
sought, as Nietzsche puts it, to “level mountain and valley”. By weakening the strong 
, characteristic of the will to power enacted by 
best types.  
The majority’s indifference—or at least, ignorance—of those higher types’ 
struggle for self-perfection is useful for insulating the latter, who are hardly 
imputrescible, from the debasing influence of the bourgeois vulgarians who define “good 
taste”, determine “propriety” and dominate “culture” in a declining age such as our own. 
The apathy of the mediocre majority vis-à-vis their own genuine becoming leads to the 
state of fallenness and their eventual ruinance, (Heidegger’s notion for of a in which they 
no longer have time to care about their own lives). Although this condition inspires the 
freest spirits with dread, the weak settle into a passive acceptance of it and find a perverse 
form of contentment thereby. Their dread spurs them into oppositional stance toward this 
condition of hyper-decadence and the arbiters of such extremely nihilistic values that 
come to be taken by the all-too-many as commonplace. 
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they could protect themselves and perpetuate their power over others, particularly their 
betters.  
The newspaper culture and corresponding emergence of public education 
epitomized their methods of indoctrination and systematic weakening in his era; in our 
own the beliefs subtending that nascent economic optimism have morphed into an anti-
intellectual volksgeist characterized by uncritical faith in consumer driven populism 
inextricably bound up in an entrepreneurial form of market democracy. Supposedly 
fostering creativity opportunities and “synergizing” potentialities (according to the 
messianic proponents in the “New Economy’s” self-described “creative class”), it is 
actually nihilistic and intrinsically philistinic (opposed to the aesthetic in all its “elitist” 
forms) “culture of abjection”.217 The enfranchised herds of the Western world slavishly 
embrace and defend their democratically legitimated subjugation, rightly convinced that 
fulfillment of their coarse aspirations—to consume in safety—lies in the preservation and 
extension of social structures that condition their desires in Pavlovian fashion, according 
to the quasi-religious doctrine of unregulated free-market capitalism.218
I argue below that this long-conditioned hostility of the many to the awesome 
potential of great exceptions could be exploited for life-affirming ends. By continuing to 
ensure the herd’s relative comfort—and facilitating its terminally nihilistic tendencies 
thereby—authentic creators might re-naturalize dissipative values and instantiating an 
authentic socio-cultural agon. Such means of mass-manipulation are already well 
understood by contemporary ascetic-consumerist priests of ressentiment who encourage 
the crowd’s opposition to the idea of individual greatness which undermines their belief 
in the intrinsic equality of all. They employ conventional matrices of prosperity that focus 
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on ‘standard of living’ to estimate the ability of individuals and societies to consume. 
These include per capita income, rates of home ownership, inflation, etc., all of which are 
re-presented to the all-too-many as “objective” indicators of the conditions of life and—it 
is hoped—evidence of its “improvement”, more generally.  
This corresponds with the economic optimism of ultra-liberal-modern discourses 
and their mutually reinforcing narratives of “empowerment”, which transmit jejune ideals 
of prosperity and solipsistic notions of happiness. It also affirms Sloterdijk’s thesis about 
the prevalence of a cynical, albeit enlightened false consciousness in the de-
industrializing advanced economies of the West and other loci of globalization. By 
extension it also corresponds – in the opposite direction – with (residually Christian) 
moralistic efforts to deflect attention away from this-worldly efforts at self-affirmation 
that conflict with the values of humility and the rejection of the corporeal. The desire for 
meaning and purpose is conducted in this direction by way of a secular extension of the 
notion that the growth of material prosperity or amelioration of poverty, relatively 
considered, indicates God’s grace. This reaffirms the logic of the ultra-liberal-modern 
ideology among the religiously devout and secular materialists, alike. Where the moral 
authority of churches or secular, Christian–Platonic institutions (the division between 
which is increasingly blurred in Western societies) no longer succeeds in focusing the 
pity of the rich on philanthropically attending the needs of the “destitute”, secular reason 
persuades by way of the aforementioned economic optimism—with a recent emphasis on 
assisting those inhabiting exotic locales.219
In accordance with the univocality of reason assumed by the arbiters of 
globalization, the value systems of these underdeveloped societies are systematically 
  
 119 
discredited and subverted so that their members may come to perceive themselves as 
disadvantaged. Their “deprivation” is attributed to various structural causes 
corresponding with the mantra of promoting and perfecting “free-market” democracy (the 
solution), so that blame for their poverty can be ascribed and effort more coherently made 
to ameliorate their plight and correct the systemic deficiency. On the macro-economic 
level billions of dollars in aid is granted to the governments of poor countries, which over 
decades produced even greater pretexts for pity among the citizens of rich, developed 
nations, as a new class of Heavily Indebted Poor Countries (HIPCs) arose in which 
misery and suffering seemed more pronounced and urgent than ever.220
Nietzsche’s meta-politics is concerned precisely with producing conditions of 
possibility for versatile, “freer” spirits, rather than the elimination of suffering, per se. 
Those with the strength to encourage, intensify and exploit the perverse conditions of 
contemporary life to their own ends (a project of self-overcoming in the pursuit of 
excellence) attain a more profound understanding and acceptance of suffering, one 
informed by an awareness of the benefits of existential pain and the introspection and 
higher-knowledge it prompts. The active generation of a vital culture seeks to elevate and 
enhance humankind.
 
221 In the miasmic state of hyper-decadence our age of globalization 
fosters, the strongest must be aroused to extricate themselves to the extent they can, for in 
doing so they will likely invigorate the culture and hasten the future overcoming of the 
species man222. Among the witnesses to their going-down in passionate self-expenditure 
through creative acts or kynical squandering, other would-be free spirits are lured back 
from the abysmal meaninglessness and cynical resignation to which the majority readily 
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succumb. They are inspired to reject the dismal temptations of the world-weary and their 
longing for contentment.223 
In critiquing liberal-modernity’s preferred political form, Nietzsche maintained 
that “democracy has ever been the form of decline in organizing power,” and 
characterized “modern democracy, along with its hybrids such as the “German Reich” as 
the form of decline of the state.”224 Yet he also recognized that the “solitary personality”: 
…can maintain and develop itself most easily in a democratic society: namely, 
when the coarser means of defense are no longer necessary and habits of order, 
honesty, justice and trust are part of the usual conditions.225
David Owen has constructively expanded on the appearance of such individuals. 
He understands Nietzsche to be advocating the instantiation of an authentic rank order of 
values (Rangordnung) corresponding with the natural hierarchy of perspectives and types 
to cultivate exemplars (e.g.: ‘good Europeans’) whose striving and self-overcoming will 
 
 
This fascinating note betrays Nietzsche’s awareness of the practical and strategic use that 
the highest affirmers of life could make of conventional morality and ochlocratic forms 
of political organization—such as democracy—that it spawned.  
In precisely this context I assert that the nomothetic acts of ‘good Europeans’, by 
legislating the emerging, deterritorializing global age, will assist the perfection of the EU 
in ways likely to transform it beyond recognition. In so doing they will overcome its 
present reactive form so that their heirs may eventually dispense with the exhausted and 
repressive state form entirely, as well as the inhibition of human potential it comprises. 
This is to speak of what is required for the conception of a new epoch in humankind’s 
evolution—to imagine the parturition of a new age, that of globality—and how it may be 
made to gestate within a few. 
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hasten the ultimate transfiguration of the type man. This objective would require (and so 
his aforementioned advocacy entailed) the intensification of every dimension of all-too-
human existence, and does not suggest a leaping over man but his metamorphosis. 
Nietzsche hoped to contribute to this in so far as he could accelerate the elimination of 
conceptual–physiological constraints on becoming introduced by the false Christian-
Platonic binaries that differentiated a “true”, noumenal world from the “apparent”, (and 
therefore “inferior”) phenomenal world. In so doing ‘good Europeans’ like himself would 
reestablish the primacy of a tragic view of the natural self over the disabling moral view 
of the self as metaphysical subject. 
The tragic idea of the self corresponds with the prevailing Greek notion prior to 
the Socratic reification of reason (logos) and its privileging over passion (eros). In this 
natural, “tragic” view, agents are inseparable from their actions, which are articulated 
through fate, the acceptance of which expresses a good conscience. The moral idea of the 
self coextends with the negative will to nothingness as nihilistic power that privileges 
objective “truth” in order to postulate corresponding notions of guilt and accountability. 
By falsely separating an agent from his act it provides a basis for assignations of blame: 
the identification of responsible parties, designations of fault and the imposition of 
punishments; practices symptomatic of a prevailing bad-conscience at the macro-political 
level.226
…makes clear that liberation consists in freeing ourselves from the metaphysics 
of morality and the morality of metaphysics; compulsion, dogma or statute, and 
the metaphysical categories (necessity and purpose, good and evil, etc.). In short, 
 With regard to the means by which Nietzsche conceived possibilities of 
emancipation from life-calumniating values, Ansell–Pearson cites ‘Of old and new law-
tables” from Thus Spoke Zarathustra, writing that the passage: 
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the innocence of becoming, of time as such, is to be restored, and where time qua 
transience is conceived as the moment that both gathers and splits up the past and 
future.227 
 
In culturally specific ways such an innocence of becoming occurs at the macro-political 
level when the naturally existing range of human types is reflected in a corresponding 
pathos of distance. Only when released from modernity’s illusory notions of 
metaphysical freedom through active forgetting will the born commanders be able to 
revel in the innocence of their becoming without undo restraint.  
Smith asserts that, “philosophers of the future”, for their lack of the necessary 
native volition, are likely to remain “locked in a Spirit of Revenge”, never to experience 
the freedom of the free spirits Nietzsche anticipates. However, they “can, properly 
trained, be the Free-Spirit’s ‘well trained hounds’ and ‘servants’,” who will be 
“implicated as priests in [the] new religiosity” that affirms Dasein through a conscious 
engagement with the abysmal ground of our Being-unto-death, experienced as ecstatic 
Dionysian insight into No-thingness that stimulates renewed (Apollonian) orderings and 
creation.228 Though the philosophers of the future might recognize the contingency of all 
values and truths, they are compelled to create values and enforce them dogmatically by 
the requirement of impressing forms upon and providing stable meanings to those who 
cannot survive without them (the vast majority). 
The project for philosophical laborers on the noble model of Kant and Hegel is to 
establish some large class of given values… and press it into formulas, whether in 
the realm of logic or politics (morality) or art. It is up to these researchers to make 
everything that has happened or been valued so far look clear, obvious, 
comprehensible, and manageable, to abbreviate everything long, even “time” 
itself, and to overwhelm the entire past.229 
 
By contrast, Nietzschean philosophers would legislate from the stance of Weltironie. 
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The all-too-many must eventually be made to forget the counter-productive 
chimera of metaphysical freedom through new values whose grounds seem naturally 
indisputable. This is necessary in order to cultivate mankind through education and 
breeding for the support the leisure required by “genuine, revenge-free ‘free Spirits’” 
who alone are capable of authentic philosophic individuality and by extension, such 
liberation.230 Such an “aristocratic ethos” is inclusive insofar as it promotes the 
attainment of a diverse and natural rank ordering of types that serves as a moral backdrop 
for all. It constitutes a moral code that has nothing to do with the (modern) drive to 
transform morality into a science, which it will have overcome.231 
This recognition of varying degrees of (un)freedom corresponding to the quanta 
of force one may expend as will to power and the grouping of types for social expediency 
pertaining thereto has interesting implications vis-à-vis the perceived need for a re-
authenticated ‘idea of Europe,’ to serve as a ground for the project of European 
unification in our ultra-liberal-modern, hyper-decadent age of sublimated nihilism. Elbe 
usefully observes that since the death of god imbuing Europe with a meaningful idea of 
itself—the task of philosophers of the future—would prove difficult. 
In Nietzsche’s account the demand for a more meaningful idea of Europe would 
persist not only because of the pragmatic necessities of European policy-makers, 
but also because Europeans have traditionally been accustomed to having the 
balm of metaphysics and ‘true’ worlds to fall back upon in their quest to find the 
deeper meaning of existence.232  
 
Elbe concludes that this would invariably be experienced “as a profound loss of spiritual 
vitality”, and would likely give rise to nostalgia for defunct notions of Europe and 
reactive ideals of what constitutes “European-ness”.233 
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Indeed, such reaction presently plagues efforts to define what characteristics 
warrant full, formal inclusion—via various sorts of codified rights, enfranchisement and 
citizenship, etc.—in the emerging EU polity, as well as its arbiters’ attempts to construct 
a new European identity and corresponding ethos. The latter’s ever more uniformly 
(mimetically) articulated expression of the EU’s will-to-truth across its disparate member 
states, as well as a simultaneous profusion of dissenting wills emanating from various 
corners of the continent, are all symptomatic of the anxiety over identity-as-belonging 
that the project itself has generated. A truly Nietzschean idea of Europe would likely 
seem incomprehensible to many citizens of the Union. Across the political spectrum, both 
those who support the project and those advocating their nation’s withdrawal from it, 
according to the impulse, whatever its manifestation, to systematically (re)define 
collective identity based upon ideals pertaining to factors such as national origin, cultural 
heritage, ethnicity or race.234
The ideals of inclusion and the tolerance of diversity are not necessarily at odds 
with efforts to protect identity, however. The EU’s social, political and cultural statutes 
are putatively antithetical to xenophobic and racist chauvinisms, which arise in 
opposition to attributes deemed enriching to European-ness and life on the continent.
 
235 
While progressive from a liberal stance, the aspiration of forging a unity out of the 
continent’s diverse panoply of peoples and types also reflects the EU’s origin in an 
account-giving endeavor that was motivated in part by a spirit of revenge against the 
burdensome and un-dischargeable debt imposed by Europe’s shared past, particularly the 
horrors of World War Two. On a deeper level it also indicates an aversion to certain 
kinds of radical difference, notably religious, conservative and nationalistic viewpoints. It 
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corresponds with the liberal effort to homogenize the most opposite (conflicting) values 
within its domain. 
EU human rights statutes and civil laws guaranteeing regional autonomy, cultural 
protections, universal enfranchisement and legal equality comprise the primary and 
arguably most positive expression of its attempts to preserve authentic diversity whilst 
forging a new and expanded unity. However, they do not transcend the conventional 
slave-moral ethos upon which they are predicated but increase the mindless contentment 
of the last man through psychological weakness. While it is possible to comprehend 
human rights and economic liberalization in terms of culture-creation, such efforts 
usually breed reaction, as they constrain maximal freedom and becoming in various and 
complex ways in order to protect and nurture the weak. In their conventional institutional 
instantiations they have also tended to fortify identic essentialisms privileged by the EU’s 
newly instituted order while discrediting and condemning those deemed unfavorable to 
it.236
This disciplinary mechanism compounds the grief inflicted upon a growing 
number who share an awareness “that we can no longer believe those dogmas of religion 
and metaphysics” that formerly provided us with comforting essentialisms and secure 
grounds for living.
  
237 The spectrum of these reactions (both positive and negative in 
conventional liberal terms) epitomize the profound sublimation of the Spirit of Revenge 
corresponding with the deepening crisis of nihilism characteristic of contemporary life 
both within the Anglo-European cultural realms and outside of them in the age of 
globalization. The universal dissemination of Europe’s hyper-decadent, ultra-liberal-
modern values means that its predicament of nihilism and meaninglessness—the culture 
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of abjection and conformity typified by a ‘cynical, enlightened false-consciousness’—is 
being experienced in some form or other nearly everywhere in the world.238  
The slave-moral pessimistic disposition on the human condition, which is typified 
by a rejection of both Dionysian reverie and the embrace of the tragic in favor of the 
mitigation of all suffering, is being gradually universalized by the power constellations 
comprising the globalization complex (which Hardt and Negri have—in an idealistic and 
sanctimonious reaction—dubbed “Empire”). This should not be surprising however, nor 
is it entirely lamentable, as “Nietzsche predicted that only large empires would be 
capable of acting politically in the age of global politics at the culmination of 
modernity.”239 The global spread of the European form of decadence promotes a brand of 
pessimism which inhibits recognition of the “supranational, nomadic cosmopolitan type” 
that is developing out of its decay, which Nietzsche hoped, might realize the possibility 
of “a united European people capable of the task of global mastery”. However 
paradoxical or counter-intuitive, the multiple, mutually reinforcing tenets subtending the 
metadiscourse of ultra-liberal-modernity and corresponding spectacles of globalization 
are prolegomenous to the appearance of the creative experimenters required for this 
task.240
The “mastery” which Nietzsche fervently advocated referred to the crucial project 
of self-mastery and the process of radical self-affirmation by which the healthiest become 
who it is they are, and to their mastery over the world via the nomothetic acts they 
spontaneously perform that provoke (the eros of) others, spurring their emulation in the 
socio-political realm.
 
241 These are plainly taking form in our world via the realization of 
abstract potentials of globality which are evident in myriad aspects of contemporary life 
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in nearly all regions of the world. This ‘global mastery’ involves the recognition and 
acceptance of diversity and purposeful enrichment of disparate types, each fortified by 
their respectful acknowledgement of the other. The struggle facing ‘good Europeans’ in 
the present is to increase that mastery and direct it to life-affirming projects that involve 
the highest exemplars of every European people so as to cultivate an efflorescent, supra-
European culture and fortify its best members. I argue below that the real potential for 
such developments is being actualized through the vis creativa inherent to emergent, 
abstract potentials of globality.  
Among Nietzsche’s primary objectives was that of inspiring his perceptive 
readers to “become ‘good Europeans’”.242 His appeal was directed at strong (i.e.: healthy) 
individuals, whom he hoped might dispense with anti-natural moral conventions and 
intellectual prejudices to attain this goal. It aimed to provide a palliative to the nihilism 
that dissipated the volitional resources of the continent’s peoples, especially its 
representative exemplars, and to facilitate the realization of an idea of Europe that 
corresponded with the ambition of Nietzsche’s aristocratically radical political 
philosophy and his recognition “that Europe wants to become one”.243
In advocating ‘good Europeanism’ Nietzsche sought to recuperate elements of a 
mainly defunct set of ideals and persuade future free spirits to dedicate themselves to 
creating a new Europe (and world) in which the best and healthiest would legislate with 
the aim of improving mankind physically, intellectually and “spiritually”. This project of 
translating man back into nature so as to overcome the nihilism of the present (BGE: 230) 
would culminate in the transformed–consciousness symptomatic of the sociogenic 
realization of his idea of Europe. An associated concern was the socio-cultural becoming 
  
 128 
of Europeans who would, he hoped “transcend narrow nationalism and accomplish a 
mingling of many old races and stocks” to forge a “new European culture [in which] the 
Jews were to be amalgamated into Europe and the Russians were to [serve as] Europe’s 
great “Other”.244
The EU, as an institutional instantiation of post-Enlightenment, ultra-liberal-
modern values coextending with the globalization complex (even if conceived in large 
part as a response against the economic dimensions of globalization), provides the 
continent’s herds (its disparate, if increasingly homogenized citizen-constituents) with 
 This ambition had important temporal and teleological dimensions that 
illustrate the practical importance of Nietzsche’s vitalist politics, power ontology, and 
perspectivalist epistemology that will be examined in depth below.  
 
Part Three: The EU and its transfiguration of the nation-state 
A central concern of this project is that of examining the ways in which Europe’s 
political integration and the EU’s expansion – as globalizing institutions and processes – 
are simultaneously enabling and impeding the fulfillment of Nietzsche’s idea of Europe, 
his “political,” vitalist objectives and the capacity of unusually powerful individuals to 
contribute to an stirring revaluation of all values (Umwerthung aller Werthe) that may 
fundamentally transform human societies by organizing them for the perfection of the 
species’ strongest members. In the final book of this work I shall also outline a non-
dogmatic strategy based on six classical skeptical tenants, through which such persons 
may hasten our achievement of those objectives; goals for mankind that Nietzsche 
thought could only be realized following the major wars of nationalism and ideology he 
correctly predicted for the 20th century.  
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simulated existential meaning and ontological purpose,  by simulating political 
legitimacy in the guise of the democratic state form’s egalitarianism and representative 
authority.245 In the post-industrial, advanced capitalist societies of the West, the radical 
extension of the franchise, steadily rising levels of consumption and social security have 
obtunded the senses of the masses, while serving as anodynes to relieve the nausea that 
would otherwise result from the absurdity of contemporary life, despite and also because 
of the bad faith it propagates.246  
The EU does so while simultaneously fostering the spectacles of prosperity, 
which are continually generated by neo-liberal capital process’s circulation of 
commodified desire to tantalize the masses with illusions of ultimate gratification; 
enticements offering to sate their nihilistic will to consume.247
Situated in the broader context of the globalization complex, the EU’s institutions 
and practices are seen to ramify numerous features of the former. Ideologically 
supervenient to one another, they comprise differing degrees of instantiated institutions, 
forces and processes within the same ultra-liberal-modern value matrix, an ideological 
regime usefully understood to be propagating Empire. The is evidenced by the imposition 
 This makes clear how an 
over-arching simulacrum of an emerging, thoroughly spectacularized global society can 
produce and sustain a highly reactive simulation of the agonistic social and political 
order, which in a radically authentic form is necessary for the eventual overcoming of the 
human type. An ultimately undesirable, albeit presently indispensable “post-modern” veil 
of Isis that obscures its own ideological basis and ends, it is conditioning the possibility 
of its own transfiguration by generating myriad opportunities for the incremental 
transvaluation of the slave-moral anti-natural ideals upon which it is predicated. 
 130 
of international order via the imposed universalization of the nation-state as privileged 
form of polity, That order, to whatever degree effective in its numerous national and sub-
national instantiations, tends to be followed by some measure of liberalization, or 
systematic democratization, as well as the enforced adoption of the precepts of neo-
liberal capital process. This compels a corresponding level of conformity with the 
hegemonic political and socio-economic regulatory mechanisms of the democratic free 
market ‘New Economy’ consensus, the prerogatives of which the international order 
serves to universalize.248
Contemporary social and political life in the West, and to a lesser extent its 
globalizing penumbra, are understood according to Nietzsche’s vitalist politics as a 
product of a homogenizing negative will to nothingness as nihilistic power manifested via 
disparate expressions of reactive force. The anti-natural impulses subtending 
contemporary ultra-liberal-modern nation-state’s ideologized values are legitimated 
through a hermeneutic of desire via disciplinary regimes of truth and responsibility that 
are in turn rationalized by ascetic-consumerist priests of ressentiment. The 
  
The EU, as an extensive organizational aggregate of smaller, diverse power 
constellations, functions within the even larger globalization complex. It is typified by 
technological rationality and aims at the methodical, comprehensive massification of 
everyday life; its overarching imperatives compel fallen-ness and inauthenticity in the 
social relations of individuals and lives of communities it transforms. It always already 
entails the superficially significant but ultimately transitory partisan debates that absorb 
the attention of the majority and deflect them from deeper, invisible currents 
imperceptibly transforming their existences.  
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preponderating reactive forces of ultra-liberal-modernity are symptomatized in Europe’s 
present unification, via the EU. It is a project dominated but not exclusively directed by 
ascetic-consumerist priests according to the secularized slave-moral values and reified 
rationalism they put into practice. As such Europe’s ongoing integration via the EU (in 
collaboration with the continent’s other major IGOs, including the OSCE, CoE, WEU 
and NATO) is fulfilling the largely dissipative ambition of European and international 
elites who personify the last-man type Nietzsche abhorred. Yet contrary to this dark 
actuality Nietzsche suggests, in accordance with his vitalist conception of the political249 
and corresponding idea of Europe, that an opposite desire for uniting Europe connects the 
continent’s representative exemplars across healthy ages – those periods of great cultural 
production between decadent, declining epochs.  
Highly contemptuous of the populist trends of his time for the increased danger 
they presented to the higher spiritualization of mankind and its exemplars, Nietzsche 
dedicated a great deal of thought to the consequences of post-Enlightenment 
democratization and the rise of socialism in the 19th century, coming to some prescient 
conclusions (published in 1880): 
The practical outcome of this spreading democratization will first of all be a 
European league of nations within which each individual nation, delimited 
according to geographical fitness, will possess the status and rights of a canton: in 
this process the historical recollections of the former nations will be of little 
account, since the sense of reverence for such things will gradually be totally 
uprooted by the domination of the democratic principle, which thirsts for 
innovations and is greedy for experiments.250
Although he could not fully anticipate the disorientation and corresponding 
increase in individual adaptability wrought by the political and technological revolutions 
that occurred in the twentieth century, he clearly identified the ethos that presupposed the 
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innovations and experiments that produce it. The premonition was largely correct and 
could plausibly be said to characterize one of the primary objectives of European 
unification in the present, namely its furtive efforts to eliminate the former reverence of 
the nation among its member-states, whose identities it would subsume into a synthetic 
personality based on ultra-liberal-modern principles correlated to post-Enlightenment 
notions of representative democracy. 
In an oft cited section from the first volume of the same book entitled ‘A Glance 
at the State,’ he endorses just this inevitability, having understood nationalism as an 
effort to stem what, as a consequence of these complicated changes in European society, 
brought “a weakening and finally an abolition of nations, at least the European,” and “of 
a continual crossing a mixed race, that of European man, [which] must come into being 
out of them.” In the same passage he concludes, “once one has recognized this fact, one 
should not be afraid to proclaim oneself simply a ‘good European’ and actively to work 
for the amalgamation of nations”.251 It is especially notable that Nietzsche – who 
disdained populist democracy intensely – should choose the democratic amalgamation of 
European nations over the shrill, vituperative nationalism that arose in reaction to it. Such 
was his contempt for and anxiety over the ethnocentric, chauvinist nationalism that was 
gaining momentum in his day.  
From “Human, All Too Human,” the text marking the beginning of his middle 
period, until the end of his productive career, Nietzsche identified “‘good Europeans’” 
with a “supranational and nomadic type of man which, physiologically speaking 
possesses as its typical distinction a maximum of the art and power of adaptation.”252
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They are proto-types of the philosophers of the future: 
…[T]hose rare and rarely contented men who are too comprehensive to find their 
satisfaction in any kind of patriotism and know how to love the south in the north 
and the north in the south – the born midlanders, the “‘good Europeans’.”253  
  
Such superlative individuals are compelled by their overflowing desire (desire understood 
as a complex assemblage of forces) to seek the unfamiliar and develop themselves, 
combine qualities and perspectives characteristic of Europe’s various regions in order to 
appreciate in personal and pan-European terms. 
This indicates a conative disposition or anticipatory resoluteness corresponding 
with a physiological condition of exceptional strength or vitality; the preconditions 
necessary for fostering and enhancing individual and social development via acceptance 
of difference in otherness. Across the continent he perceived, to varying extents and in 
different guises: 
…the process of the assimilation of all Europeans, their growing detachment from 
the conditions under which races dependent on climate and class originate, their 
increasing independence of any definite milieu, as a unique “process of becoming 
European.” 254 
  
In our own era ‘the assimilation of all Europeans’ into a malleable instrument is being 
achieved in large part through continual cross-cultural exchange, instantaneous 
communication, the mega-media representations of desire, the merchandizing of ideas, 
values and products (massification and homogenization) and legal mechanisms born of 
treaty agreements that have profoundly transformed economic, political and social norms 
and practices. The machinic and technological aspects of this assimilation via integration 
efforts will be considered by means of Ansell-Pearson’s consideration of viroid life and 
possibilities of a future, transhuman condition. 
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Such complexifying assimilation, Nietzsche concluded, would of necessity lead to 
the economic unification of the continent. Nietzsche declared, “Europe wants to become 
one,”255 on the basis of forces personified in those rare, far-ranging types he dubbed 
‘good Europeans’, those who, as “rich heirs of millennia of European spirit,” were most 
capable of recognizing the beautiful and infinite in what was foreign and unfamiliar (i.e., 
by which he means everything, as certain knowledge and “Truth” are unattainable since 
our limited understanding is always a perspective situated in a particular context).256 
However, their shared objective for the continent’s socio-political integration differed 
radically from that consistently articulated by arbiters of the liberal-modernist project, in 
terms of both its premise and its objectives. Their aim is to cultivate a well-ordered and 
compliant instrument of the people upon which the strongest may freely create edifying 
works and perfect themselves through agonistic contests.  
Despite their many differences with regard to what Europe should become, most 
of the EU’s supporters (Europhiles) and opponents (Europhobes) agree that its 
development as giving rise to a super-state.257
The socio-political dimensions of our hyper-decadent era, typified by a ‘cynical, 
enlightened false-consciousness’, have been produced by the consolidation of the 
democratic nation-state and the rights of the individual over the course of the last half-
 Although it clearly is a physical 
enlargement, and some would argue an ideational expansion of the classic state form, I 
argue that it is doing more than this, that while unifying Europe the present EU “super-
state” indicates just one (early) phase in the radical overcoming of the state form itself. 
As regards the nation-state, Nietzsche was always suspicious and frequently 
contemptuous, mainly seeing the modern state as deforming human development.  
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century.258
Despite significant modifications of its powers over the past century and its 
adaptation to more recent demands placed on it by ultra-liberal-modern discourses, the 
state indisputably remains the dominant organizing force for the political and social life 
of humankind. Zarathustra’s identification of the simulated veracity of this “new idol” 
remains prescient, as the state form—whose perfection is widely held to be the 
democratic variety of it—has been geographically, notionally and legally extended to 
 As it has been perpetuated by the nation-state—the quintessentially European 
and thoroughly universalized form of polity enjoying preeminent international 
authority—and the international setting, or structured system, within which it operates—
this disposition has been naturalized through an array of legal institutions and the 
normative recognition of it (and their) authority, legitimacy and sovereign power. The 
universalization of this formalized structure constituted an effort to abolish anarchy in the 
macro-political realm (that of the nation-state and international society), and order the 
world into a system of relatively homogenous units. It has been thoroughly diffused into 
the micro-political realm (the level of the individual), which evinces similar 
transformations as those the nation-state has undergone and continues to undergo. It does 
so, to use Foucaultian terms, through corresponding technologies of the self—the largely 
simulated and disciplinary ultra-liberal-modern discourses of agency the basis for which 
lies in our notions of the intrinsic and equal worth of persons, the inviolable rights that 
inhere to every individual, and—within the limits defined by common law—their 
undeniable capacity for self-determination. The legitimacy of the nation-state is now 
popularly understood as residing in its ability to ensure the dignity and rights of the 
individuals—or citizens—it serves. 
 136 
encompass every polity around the world. Today the democratic state form is reified in 
numerous ways, from multiple, mutually ramifying legal institutions to reactive 
expressions of patriotism (such as the daily recitation of the pledge of allegiance in 
American school rooms) and occasional paroxysms of nationalism (as occurred 
throughout the former Yugoslavia in the 1990s). In a subtler way, the EU re-invokes 
identic affiliations based on historical tradition and sentimental nostalgia through its 
simulations of political enfranchisement and belonging. These increasingly validate the 
over-arching simulacrum of community it represents.  
In the absence of unproblematic identic roles, it has come to act as an identic 
surrogate, personified, albeit somewhat ambiguously, by a neo-cosmopolitan “European” 
identity that takes the banalization of difference as a basis for belonging and the aim of its 
form of citizenship. This contrivance depends on ambiguity in order to sustain what 
diluted meaning it is able to generate. As a new “super-idol” the EU seeks to supply the 
“all-too-human” psychological need of its subjects (or “citizen-constituents”) for 
legitimate authority while gradually supplanting the waning power of its member states 
(as Europhobes throughout the community have long known): 
State is the name of the coldest of all cold monsters. Coldly it tells lies too; and 
this lie crawls out of its mouth: “I, the state, am the people.” That is a lie! It was 
creators who created peoples and hung a faith and a love over them: thus they 
served life. It is annihilators who set traps for the many and call them “state”: they 
hang a sword and a hundred appetites over them.259 
 
The EU’s architects, sophisticated descendents of those who in Nietzsche’s lifetime set 
the traps called the state, are (involuntarily) enacting their reactive roles, ones necessary 
for Europe’s future life-affirming development.  
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These idealistic ideologues are indeliberately producing conditions of possibility 
for the emergence of a comprehensively transformative, positive will to creative 
destruction as generative power, thereby. They will thus enable certain of future 
generations to “look beyond the state”, and hang a new faith and love over their 
contemporaries, those whose predecessors passively received the EU as a super-state and 
willingly accepted their incorporation within it as citizen-subject-constituents in our own 
era.260 
Identifying what Nietzsche desired for Europe is simpler than describing how he 
thought it could be—let alone would be—achieved. “Nietzsche wished to foster the 
reconstruction of Europe as a cultural entity, led by a new aristocracy, shaped by 
indigenous artists and poets, which could assume global leadership in the age of great 
politics that he predicted.”261
Nietzsche conceives these daring experimenters—artist-philosophers capable of 
revaluing our decadent values—as simultaneously witting and unwitting annihilators. 
Impelled to obey life-affirming regimes of self-imposed discipline (askesis) for the task 
of self-creation (auto-poiesis) through involuntary enactments of their native volition, 
they gradually bring new modes of being into existence—a salubrious aesthetic-political 
production of life-forms that destroys decrepit, petrified orders (in our own case the 
 Having seemingly created another, enlarged personification 
of “the people” in the EU, its “long-eared and short-sighted” designers venerate the cold 
monster—as Nietzsche’s Zarathustra dubs the modern state—revering it in an expanded, 
supranational form, while remaining oblivious of the ways in which their endeavor 
promises to foster the conditions necessary for the recrudescence of thymotic iconoclasts 
with the strength to slay it.  
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ethno-nationally based bureaucratic state with which Nietzsche was quite familiar). By 
doing so their valuations re-habilitate a social preference for the instinctual organization 
of drives and impulses characteristic of dynamic iconoclasts. This re-invigorates the 
macro-political life of their communities while preserving disciplinary measures for the 
“all-too-many”, those being the majority who, congenitally weak and terminally sickened 
by decadent values, are incapable of being aroused by the erotic passions of their highest 
exemplars.  
As the actual and figurative descendants of the late 19th century’s “international 
homeless financial recluses”262
There is a hierarchy too among these administrators of status-quo ascetic-
consumerist values. As the “managers” of our dissipative social order a few of these 
individuals stand completely outside the order they enforce. At the highest lever are 
found the genuine ascetic-consumerist priests of ressentiment referenced above, which 
include CEOs, high-ranking politicians, etc. Beneath them a variety of hebetated 
automatons function to ensure the continuation of social-order and the labor of the all-
 the all-too-many loose themselves in vulgar hedonism 
and crass consumerism. However a few, whom I name ascetic-consumerist priests of 
ressentiment, rapaciously exploit the order generated by the globalization complex, to 
profitably utilize its institutions, forces and processes to stimulate the herd’s 
multitudinous appetites and manipulate its perceptions. These are the leaders and 
apologists for the ruling order, who maintain the reactive values hegemonic throughout 
the globalization complex today, and include politicians and pundits, government 
officials and bureaucrats (civilian and military), business executives, corporate managers, 
the mainstream media, “white-collar” workers, labor leaders, educators, etc.  
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too-many. Effectively zombified, these people occupy a place at once within and at some 
distance from the majority, a group which includes investment bankers, lobbyists, 
executives, administrators, professors, etc. These highly paid professionals tend to enjoy 
a materially comfortable life that culminates in an extra paragraph of two in their 
obituaries at the end of it. However, they are in the main indistinguishable from the all-
too-many and most notable for the extent to which they choose to lose—i.e.: expend—
themselves in the myopic pursuit of conventional success. 
These are the supervisors of mundane labor, the potentially soul-destroying sort of 
toil for healthy types that absorbs the energy and dissipates the passions of the masses 
who are engaged to do it as modern wage-slaves. The endeavors of these low-ranking, 
false-consciousness afflicted ideologues comprise an endless series of mimetic 
performances always-already in adherence with the dominant matrix of anti-natural 
values; their largely mindless enactments’ are motivated by the promise of a reward 
prompting them to unwittingly ape the accepted norms of “professionalism”; their 
compensation that of conventional security and “success”.  
All of them, however (un)consciously, work to ensure that the slave-moral order 
functions sufficiently well to ameliorate and co-opt any threat to it. They serve a critical 
function as ideological soldiers who implement the discourses of equality and rights that 
sustain the prevailing slave-moral order and herd mentality. There are of course, 
exceptions within each rank-order of automaton. However, these exceptions are 
exceedingly rare and must mask their differences to maintain their position; the 
punishments are harsh for betrayal. There are generally no exceptions among those at the 
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higher level of genuine ascetic-consumerist priests of ressentiment, for they comprehend 
their function and zealously embody their role as enforcers of anti-natural ideals.  
Yet as any sense of obligation to and the perceived veracity of the state dissipates, 
the “all-too-many” remain “trapped” by the conventions of a secularized slave morality 
that demands devotion to the dying monster’s “confusion of tongues of good and evil: the 
sign of the state.” As those for whom “the state was invented,” comprehend no 
alternatives to the semiotic conceits upon which the conceptual snares in which they are 
caught arose, they are fated to go down with it. Just as their “leaders” fail to recognize the 
ways in which they destroy the state as they seek to expand—or “supranationalize”—it, 
the masses do not comprehend that their idol, the state, is in fact dying: “just as news of 
the death of God takes a long time to reach us, so too does news of the death of the 
state.”263
The EU’s arbiters and the political functionaries, technocrats and bureaucratic 
managers who enact and or serve its will—as well, on a more abstract level, as the 
citizen-constituents of the polity it comprises—are, collectively, the inheritors of 
Europe’s historic great power states. In the shadow of US hegemony since World War 
Two, these ascetic-consumerist priests of ressentiment have been happy to allow the US 
to hold their sword while dedicating themselves to the pursuit of economic greatness and 
the cultivation of the “restless affairism of doing” wherein every person is required to 
give an accounting of themselves in terms of how busy they are against the classic notion 
of leisure toward the ersatz virtue of workaholism (the liberal form of secular piety).
 The eminent death–or the conspicuous decrepitude unto dying–of the state, was 
palpable to Nietzsche by the late 1870s. 
264 
The corporate-military leadership of the US, as the singular “super-state” manically 
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pursuing military might largely for the benefit of its and its international allies’ 
plutocratic elites, has been happy to oblige. Hardt and Negri’s thesis on “Empire” – 
however problematical in other aspects – usefully explicates certain of these phenomena. 
While failing to qualify as Europe’s representative exemplars in the Nietzschean 
sense, a few more conventional visionaries, performing the limited role of social 
engineers (as opposed to great nomothetic legislators) have made considerable 
contributions to the project of unifying Europe. In less significant ways countless others, 
from entrepreneurs, to bureaucrats and anonymous workers, have also transformed 
Europe in their wake. Yet from the outset of their self-described “grand” project 
(conceived as a “new” political order through the political unification of the continent) 
the instigators of a noble, federalist vision for the unification of the continent, Monnet, 
Schuman, Spinelli, Albertini, who themselves had risen from among the ranks of “the 
superfluous” that “steal the works of the inventors and the treasures of the sages for 
themselves,” but whose vision arguably elevated them above the base allegiances of more 
common types, and who had to manage that vision so that it would not be turned into 
total “sickness and misfortune”.  
The objective of Europe’s post-War designers was the transfiguration of the 
continent’s disparate, territorially defined nation-states and their relations (understood at 
once in spatio-temporal terms) through the practical application of a conceptually refined 
philosophical and legal complex developed upon the traditions of liberal-modernity. The 
ultra-liberal-modern norms that resulted were an instantiated, widely-shared set of now-
familiar attitudes and beliefs. These included a positivistic mind-set, materialist 
expectations, eventual economic standardization and the creation of co-extending and 
 142 
ultimately unified civil institutions and laws to contend with common security concerns. 
A thorough revaluation of values, vis-à-vis the nation-state as the preeminent political 
form (including its founding, essential characteristics such as sovereign independence 
and territorial integrity, in addition to its absolute power to determine and confer formal 
communal identity and political belonging through citizenship) would be required if the 
resulting entity was to be more than a mere “super-state”. For this, “the superfluous,” 
who Zarathustra describes as “impotent paupers and swift, clambering monkeys,” had to 
be persuaded to strive after the conventional power it appeared to promise.265
In pursuing their ambition, they recognized (after Nietzsche) that a wider sense of 
cohesion would have to be cultivated, at least between the respective nations of Western 
Europe. A mutual sense of belonging between former enemies would need to create in 
 
From the chaos and destruction of two world wars in the first half of the twentieth 
century the originators of European unification reconceived, albeit in ultra-liberal terms, 
the political order needed to temporarily invigorate humanity according to a deepened 
sublimation of conventional slave-morality. Eschewing overtly revolutionary programs 
that would automatically be opposed by “idolators of the state” and its “preachers of 
death,” (characteristics that they had once unconsciously personified, but now strove to 
discredit in careful expressions of disdain for the failed values of the past, such as 
bellicose nationalism) they sought to gradually evolve political life by re-establishing it 
on older traditions while maintaining a semblance of the all-too-familiar order, so to 
amalgamate the nations of Europe into one over a long span, rather than dispensing with 
the state itself, which would jar an already distressed continent and surely prove counter-
productive.   
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order for the new polity they envisaged to function effectively. The process would require 
more than formal treaty agreements to foster the changed mentality this idea of Europe 
required. With little more to go on but historical enmities and the wounds of war, these 
conditions would have to serve as a starting point for a future, integrated European 
community. The ineffectuality of the League of Nations and shared suffering at the hands 
of the Nazis in the first half of the 20th century provided a basis for reciprocal empathy 
and fostered the common desire to rebuild a destroyed continent. In addition to the desire 
to regenerate bankrupt economies, guarantee free trade and stimulate competition a 
corresponding awareness of the need for radically deepened cooperation toward 
achieving that aim was evident. New legal institutions such as the United Nations and the 
Bretton Woods accords were codifying a new international order to assure a broad 
measure of security and thereby provide conditions for the European project of economic 
and political integration. 
The web of practical illusions grounding notions of truth and justice that arbiters 
of integration could create from out of Europe’s experience of grief and desire for 
renewal would provide the catalyst and justification for the slow but sure fulfillment of 
their aspiration. The ambition to achieve European unification necessitated much 
productive and fruitful meditation on the dynamics of cooperation and compromise in 
various spheres of inter-personal belonging and identity, including local affiliation, 
regional autonomy and national sovereignty, etc., including the need for a fundamental 
revaluation of the efficaciousness of the nation-state system for human life. The latter in 
particular would be especially long in coming, and arguably has yet to happen. But 
measurable progress toward the alleviation of immediate physical misery in post-War 
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Europe would enable arbiters of integration to seriously entertain such potentially 
dangerous revaluations and prevail over skeptical naysayers, nationalists and other 
advocates of the status quo European state system who opposed it.  
With hindsight across the twentieth century we can see opportunities for deepened 
integration both seized and lost as those “whose conscience bears the weight of the 
overall development of humanity, […made] use of the prevailing political and economic 
situation.266
Despite being dedicated soldiers of the liberal-modern values that foster the 
hyper-decadence of our age, the post-war instigators of Europe’s integration initiated a 
transformation of the governing order that would be very positive for the overcoming of 
certain suicidal tendencies from which European culture, and humankind, had barely 
survived. If imperfect and bound to develop over the following decades into a 
monstrosity that would replicate some of the worst aspects of the old state form which it, 
 But the long-term endeavor of those with a shared comprehension of 
Nietzsche’s noble idea of Europe—or some related variation on it—has steadily paid 
dividends, and as their ambition increased and the momentum accelerated for realizing 
the continent’s unification via populist democratic means, that ambition gained broader 
acceptance. As opposed to atavistic statesmen promoting ‘great politics’ of the sort that 
culminated in the twentieth century’s world wars (and whose presence is still felt in the 
politics of nations), the arbiters of European integration—whom Nietzsche would likely 
have derided as “‘improvers’ of mankind”—have by a number of matrixes economic, 
institutional and cultural, succeeded in profoundly altering life for their fellow Europeans 
and by extension for individuals globally. 
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at least in part, strove to overcome, the EU would also come to presents potentials upon 
which a ‘good European’ of the Nietzschean variety might productively build.  
It is my primary contention that Nietzsche’s diagnosis of Europe’s (cultural) 
ailment remains relevant and his proposed “cure”, via a radically Dionysian affirmation 
of life, comprises a strategy for overcoming the irrecuperably decadent nation-state—the 
hegemonic form of social organization—and the international order it imposed 
throughout the world. The contemporary globalization complex enforces the anti-natural 
will to truth motivating this order. It is a ressentiment-driven project for the enslavement 
of humankind by means of ascetic-consumerist ideals naturalized by the meta-discourse 
of ultra-liberal-modernity. Among the complex assemblages comprising the globalization 
complex, a troika of like European institutions—the EU, OSCE and COE—best 
exemplify its ascetic ideals. The technological rationality and liberal optimism at their 
core, along with the inevitable hypocrisy that arises in the gap between their righteous 
principles and more pragmatic practices, give rise to a cynical ethos that ‘good European’ 
would subvert, reverse and/or exploit to attain an authentically natural agon. Such a 
genuinely salubrious socio-political milieu, being conducive to the creative becoming of 
rare, profligate geniuses, would condition the possibility for a revivification of culture for 
the maximal flourishing of salutary individuals. 
It is important to state that Nietzsche’s works tell us next to nothing about how, 
precisely, the formal political institutions of Europe, which he largely reviled in his time, 
ought to be re-organized. We may however, confidently assume that he envisaged a 
system of rule governed through a natural hierarchy of types that would sustain a 
maximally agonistic state of affairs while preserving a flexibly adaptable, authentically 
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aristocratic order. Some analysts have drawn close comparisons between Plato’s 
Republic and the sort of order Nietzsche’s works would suggest he prefers. He adamantly 
rejected revolutionary programs in favor of more gradual, fundamentally recuperative 
change, when the sort of traditions (and institutions) that ensure the duration of a life-
affirming polity governed by its preeminent specimens can no longer be sustained.  
Such was the case – according to Nietzsche’s diagnosis – of European society in 
his lifetime. He dedicated much of his energy and thought to contemplating what 
conditions conduce to the production of the best (healthiest) individuals and communities 
and thereby maximize human potential, namely the facilitation of the highest potentials 
of humankind’s healthiest exemplars. At the very least, as Appel writes: 
Nietzsche deserves his place in the canon of political philosophy not because he 
provides a detailed institutional account of the optimal type of polity, but rather 
because his sweeping denunciation of liberalism, democracy, socialism, 
feminism, and other offshoots of modernity leads him to formulate (albeit in a 
sketchy and unsystematic manner) an alternative, radically aristocratic model of 
politics that bears serious examination.267
Anglo-American political philosophers nevertheless largely dismissed Nietzsche until the 
1960s due chiefly to the legacy of systematic, instrumental abuse of his works first at the 
hands of his sister and then by the Nazis. Misunderstanding of his thought was 
compounded among his sleepier readers by his (often purposefully ad hominem) 
polemics. The latter, as Conway explains, “are best understood as occasions for 
galvanizing an internal resistance to the moralists, priests, dogmatists, and decadents who 
inhabit[ed] his own polycentric soul.”
  
 
268 There was a utility to his polemics that served 
an important role in Nietzsche’s becoming, that is, in the self-overcomings crucial to the 
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development of his own micropolitical, corporeal politics and to his evolution as a 
philosopher. 
Nietzsche’s political advocacy (bodied forth in persistent admonitions and advice 
as well as the practical implications for life of his thought) suggests a strategy by which 
his favored polity might be attained over-against nihilistic alternatives spawned by 
liberal-modernity. As Hutter notes: 
Nietzsche’s entire effort at philosophical legislation, besides radically denying the 
myth of progress, is oriented very much to a present potentially filled with joy and 
ecstatic self-experience.269
His chief hope, that “philosophers of the future” might contribute to a revitalized, 
re-naturalized order predicated in part on their attempts at a revaluation of all values 
(Umwerthung aller Werthe), directly corresponds with (and is demonstrated by) a central 
concern that runs throughout his works: the future of European man, culture and 
civilization. As Conway observes, “Nietzsche’s political thinking centers around a 
simple, yet powerful thesis: human existence is justified only by the presence of those 
exemplary individuals who re-define the horizons of human perfectibility.”
 
 
As I will show below, that experience corresponds with (among other things) an ironic or 
skeptical disposition toward all truth claims, an awareness of one’s ubiety or 
emplacement in a world increasingly determined by the futural implications of globality 
as a foundation for all authentic identic conceptions (ontology), and the ethos of good 
Europeanism that results and reciprocally fortifies the will to affirmation of life. The 
specifically political dimension of this, although prima facie counter-intuitive to 
conventional political scientists, consists of a productive agonism that realizes a 
Dionysian, or tragically aesthetic worldview (Weltanschauung).  
270 
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The perfectibility of genuine individuals toward the overcoming of the human 
species as a goal (the involuntary “aim” evinced in disparate ways as a positive will to 
creative destruction as generative power via their becoming) must be understood in the 
specific, unavoidably (and ultimately political) sense in which Nietzsche meant it. The 
task of legislating a morality of breeding prevenient to that undertaking requires truly 
great politicians, charismatic leaders in Weber’s sense, a megalopsychoi as Aristotle 
understood the term, who are first of all mythopoeists capable of revaluing all values and 
(re-)establishing a convincing basis for communal society, so as to nomothetically create 
a viable new order thereafter. I elaborate on this throughout the material below. 
In his middle and late works Nietzsche would come to identify those 
aforementioned individuals as ‘good Europeans’ and their efforts at perfection with a 
noble idea of Europe. My interest lies in employing Nietzsche’s thought to critique 
present developments in the institutional politics of Europe in a practical, meaningful 
way, and to demonstrate how the EU may unintentionally foster such a type and idea. 
From this I extrapolate means by which his objectives might more methodically be 
achieved. I seek to do so by demonstrating the salience of Nietzsche’s thought to the EU 
project in the broader context of globalization. I understand the functioning of the 
globalization complex, as a form of Empire.271
On the contrary, the contemporary globalization complex has clearly identifiably 
power centers and is much less “postcolonialist and postimperialist” than they assert it 
is.
  
272 The primary mistake of their analysis is to conflate the ideologically basis of the 
conventional globalization complex with its dystopic aims or it has in reality achieved. 
While their description of Empire accurately explicates the reactive ideals and objectives 
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of the globalization complex, they have by no means been reached—contrary to Hardt 
and Negri’s assertions—even, arguably, in the primary organs or loci of the complex 
itself. Furthermore, it is not at all clear that they ever will or could be attained. Out of this 
awareness my life-affirming, Nietzschean analysis identifies actual possibilities for the 
realization of truly radical sorts of freedom and the corresponding emergence of new 
modes of invigorated life. Freedom should be counted among Nietzsche’s central 
concerns, contrary to the impression popularized in the late-20th century by the 
Continental philosophers and the ‘new Nietzsche’. As Mandalios makes clear: 
Against radical denunciation of freedom proffered by Derrida and Deleuze—
freedom as essentially a bourgeois humanist illusion… Nietzsche offer[s] an 
alternative (post-liberal) conception… Rather than eschewing freedom in 
reference to the modern world… Nietzsche can be understood as a serious thinker 
of human freedom and its political moment vis-à-vis his complex conception of 
will, power and freedom [sic] and their necessary entwinement ultimately with 
responsibility.273
A Nietzschean idea of Europe is inextricably enmeshed in an agonal process of 
authentic becoming; a task requiring rare courage possessed only by a few exceptions. In 
striving to realize their passions with a mocking wit and inclination to prankishness, good 
Europeans—kynical ironists—revalue the anti-natural values that preponderate in our 
 
 
Not surprisingly, Nietzsche’s particular notion of freedom contrasts with the prevailing, 
popular conceptions of it, as freedom from obligation or responsibility, in so far as his 
concern centers on potentiality and the possibilities of becoming. The question that 
occupies his politics therefore is individual ‘freedom for what?’ freedom to do 
something, as opposed to the ultra-liberal-modern anxiety with freedom as the abolition 
of restraints and obsessive concern with freedom from what?’ understood merely in terms 
of resistance to something.  
 150 
present, abject condition. In so doing they provoke others and may thereby gradually 
actualize Nietzsche’s ideal pan-European hope for the overcoming of the human and 
fidelity to the earth. Its potential realization impels perspectivalist critiques of the 
dominant prejudices in our hyper-decadent, cynical age (as I attempt to provide below 
regarding European integration and efforts to theorize it), to spur action and thought. 
Toward this end I employ doubly ironizing language in the course of my analysis to 
underscore how 
the distortion, elision and falsification that are for Nietzsche the defining 
characteristics of language abstract from the concrete individuality of experience 
and construe it in terms of universal qualities and properties, imposing an order 
which makes the world (or what we understand as the ‘world’) thinkable and 
communicable.”274  
 
This spotlights how the accepted rhetorical tropes and central concepts of European 
integration theory, as well as debate about them, rather than comprising a mere 
descriptive idiom separate from the phenomena of its investigation, constitute a dynamic 
notional figuration of the EU that actually works upon and shapes its physical 
organization and institutional functioning.  
Unappreciative of their role (a will to power as a will to truth) in this creative / 
performative act, the major theorizers of integration theory perpetuate the metaphysical 
fiction that they are examining ‘reality’ as such, and expressing literal meanings about 
“discrete, self-identical entities in the world”.275
However, the primary aim is to demonstrate how such a critical perspective on 
theories of European integration, as generative of the EU within the broader context of 
 The simultaneously deliberate and 
unwitting dogmatism of this tendency and its disciplinary role in always already 
reinforcing the meta-discourse of ultra-liberal-modernity is also examined. 
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globalization (all understood as mutually re-enforcing and self-immunizing power 
constellations), might provide one means of naturalizing (Nietzschean) moral education 
to revalue the anti-natural values of our ultra-liberal-modern epoch. This is necessary for 
the generation of a natural pathos of distance, hierarchical rank order of types and 
corresponding socio-political order.  
For my purposes that latter objective (a Nietzschean moral education) requires 
showing how the hybridization of European man (a process that, I shall argue below, the 
EU is facilitating) is producing a much-turned type (polytropoi) willing to don multiple 
costumes and masks to become who it is they are. Strengthened by attempts at self-
perfection, the kynical good Europeans Nietzsche described (and hoped to impassion 
through his works) laugh at and mock the life-denying conventions enforced by reactive 
moralities of taming, out of awareness conferred by their hard-earned sense of world-
historical irony. Their moral pluralism (quasi-cosmopolitan tolerance of difference and 
becoming) conditions the emergence of radical affirmers who may hasten humankind’s 
going-down—the final collapse of our decadent age—and the simultaneous ascendency 
of Übermenschlich individuals at the dawn of a post- or transhuman future.276 
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Section Two 
Theorizing European Integration: the Will to Truth in the Service of Life? 
  
Part One: Conceptualizing the Ongoing Formation of an Emerging Polity 
 
Twenty-three centuries before the advent of the European Union, Aristotle noted 
that “all men by nature are actuated with the desire of knowledge”.277 Concerns with this 
desire to know, the passion (eros) generated by the search for truth and the limitations to 
our knowledge are central to Nietzsche’s perspectivalism. This makes it, along with the 
vitalist theory of the political and power ontology it informs, quite appropriate as a 
critical apparatus for analyzing theories of European integration.  
According to Nietzsche’s diagnosis of the instincts, drives and impulses 
prevailing at the macro-level of the political sphere of life and determining European man 
in his decadent era, Nietzsche diagnosed the decline of European culture and anticipated 
further degeneration in the centuries to come. He hoped that the diminution of Europeans 
that this would advance could be utilized to raise a higher type of individual capable of 
nomothetically revaluing Europe’s—and the West’s—liberal-modern values:  
The homogenizing of European man is the great process that cannot be obstructed: 
one should even hasten it. The necessity to create a gulf, distance, order of rank, is 
given eo ipso [through or by that very fact or quality]—not the necessity to retard 
the process.278 
 
The European Union would likely strike Nietzsche as a step toward achieving this aim, 
even if the creation of the sort of pathos of distance he had in mind is furthest from the 
EU’s purpose and objectives. 
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In this section I aim to problematize conceptualizations of European integration, 
understood as disparate ideas of Europe, from the 1940s to the present. I seek thereby to 
demonstrate two important points, those being how the ultra-liberal-modern discourses 
subtending the present-day EU became hegemonic and how theories of European 
integration effectively construct understandings of the project and concurrently imbue it 
with meaning. Integral to this is a lengthy, chronologically ordered, doxographical 
examination of the major schools of thought theorizing these complex and dynamic socio-
political processes. European integration is considered as a field within the broader 
academic discipline of International Studies, which from a loosely historical perspective 
further illuminates how most of its major contributors have, wittingly or not, functioned as 
apologists for its hyper-modern ideological assumptions.  
In a political distillation of the ethos of our age’s predominant ultra-liberal-
modernity ideology in the early 1970, Rawls (“the first philosopher of the last man” as 
Allan Bloom aptly described him) asserts that: 
Each person possesses an inviolability founded on justice that even the welfare of 
society as a whole cannot override… Therefore in a just society the liberties of 
equal citizenship are taken as settled; the rights secured by justice are not subject 
to political bargaining or to the calculus of social interests.279
It goes without saying that Nietzsche would have responded to such a contention with 
great laughter. Recalling LaPlace’s dictum (“The weight of evidence for an extraordinary 
claim must be proportioned to its strangeness”), Rawls’ first assertion seems very bold, 
particularly given its utter lack of demonstrability or any sort of corroborating evidence to 
validate it from the text or elsewhere (i.e.: nature). On the contrary, the entire course of 
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recorded human history persuades us otherwise. The second statement exemplifies the 
dogmatism subtending the established, anti-natural liberal order. 
Like all polities in the contemporary West, the EU has developed according to the 
liberal-modern ideological premises Rawls limned and refined. It continues to develop at 
the intersection of the real and the imaginary, or aspirational, and to overlap both of these 
realms (as, one might argue, like all human activity). This is to say the EU is at once a 
notional phenomena and a concrete set of existing institutions and functioning practices. It 
strives to accord with a set of as yet imperfectly realized—and some would contend, 
unattainable—ideals; ideals that play a significant part in determining its design. 
Where there is ambiguity over the EU’s actuality (the efficaciousness and/or 
influence of its institutions) or its unrealized ideals (that to which it aspires) it exists in the 
minds of many of its citizens in/as a hyper-real state. A plethora of factors – media 
depictions, government propaganda, statements by its officials, academic studies of it, etc. 
– contribute to the conscious reception of it among its citizen-constituents. It is 
experienced and perceived as representative of many things, but it is arguably the first 
post-modern polity: a seemingly beneficent, albeit ersatz, copy of democracy, 
enfranchisement, accountability and liberal equality.  
Classical notions of political power are problematic in the European context, since 
there is no ‘A’ who has such power over any ‘B’ that s/he can get this ‘B’ to do 
something that ‘B’ would not otherwise do. Within the EU system, ‘power’ seems 
to work as a circulating medium, analogous to money, within what is called the 
political system.280
Van Ham notes that in addition to ambiguities in its exercise of power, its character as a 
government and the gap between its democratic ideals and the provisions it makes to 
 
 
 155 
realize them, it provides only a representation of belonging that lacks any autochthonous 
origin or certain reality.  
In the postmodern condition European democracy has become hyperreal. It has 
become a functioning, legitimate and moderately effective way of governance now 
looking for ‘its’ Volk, ‘its’ demos, which is slowly crumbling under its searching 
hands.281
This ambiguousness has implications for EU studies. From a Nietzschean 
perspective, the fields of EU studies and European integration theory strive to do more 
than make the EU comprehensible. In the first place their investigations constitute a form 
of pale reflecting; they take themselves to be refracting the discernable light of superficial 
appearances through critical lenses to reveal innumerable – and otherwise invisible – 
aspects of an (all-too-)human creation, which they then call knowledge. The practitioners 
of this knowledge are generally scientific satyrs who, as mandukagati, think the way 
 
 
In so far as it occupies the realm of the hyperreal – as a governing entity that arguably 
lacks a broad or certain constituency – the EU constitutes the largest and most compelling 
example of a hyperreal polity ever to have existed.  
The EU is the mainly reactive albeit dynamic product of abstract considerations as 
a making of events and the agonistic generation of schemes to resolve disputes which 
disparate conceptualizations and understandings of those events spawned, but with 
enormous and increasing bureaucratic and legislative authority. Its reality is augmented in 
part by its existence as a virtual entity with enormous affective power, simulating the 
values upon which it was and continues to be predicated to realize (i.e.: institutionally 
instantiate) its idea; on many levels its actuality is only knowable abstractly, even as it is 
lived / performatively enacted. 
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frogs walk, clinging to logocentric discourses such as the reification of cause–effect 
relations by which responsibility is imputed to individuals as such, of state sovereignty, 
of the equality of all persons before the law, of free will, of inalienable rights (and the 
moral indignation they illicit), etc., among other sacrosanct metaphysical fictions.282  
They are partisan advocates of our era’s dominant ultra-liberal-modern 
metanarrative, and ideologists, witting or otherwise, who are intent upon persuading their 
academic audiences and the Western public within whose universities and colleges they 
generally work, of its necessity and of the EU’s co-extending duty to realize it. The 
authors of these manifold representations of Europe and its integration carefully 
simulate—and arguably achieve some relative measure of—objectivity, from a concern 
with “Truth” that culminates in a fixation with methodological issues, quantitative 
analysis, data sets, etc., as in much social–scientific inquiry. However, as the very same 
philosophical presuppositions generate both the interpretive framework for analysis and 
the subject of inquiry, they risk becoming caught in argumentative circularity.283
As ultimately creative acts and implements, the theories—each a variation on the 
same ultra-liberal-modern will to truth (a metanarrative realized via the aforementioned 
ideological discourses)—cannot be said to constitute an unbiased study of the EU’s 
economic, political or social integration of the continent. Those theorizing and practicing 
European integration simultaneously create the entity many of them presume to 
dispassionately analyze. Therefore the scientific pretensions of theories of European 
integration, qua science, are always-already somewhat dubious (or ought to be), 
according to Nietzsche. This is, importantly, not to say—nor to imply—that Nietzsche 
would have maintained that they do not usefully explain the EU’s political and economic 
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processes, or that they do not consider genuine matters of knowledge. Rather, it is to 
argue that they create a particular kind of knowledge which reciprocally serves to verify a 
certain understanding of the world that corresponds with the theorists’ desires; it 
legitimates the expectations and/or stakes its practitioners have in the results it produces.  
Unlike physicists, biologists or geologists, there is a very real sense in which 
conventional theorists of European integration create the object of their inquiry as they 
analyze it. This occurs through an ongoing intercourse between scholars that to varying 
degrees accounts for or is informed by the views, beliefs and judgments of elected 
officials, policy makers, media and public opinion-makers, myriad political factions 
representing the multitude, and socio-cultural trends. Together this cacophony of voices 
generates a feedback loop in which those scholars synthesize events and pronounce 
estimations of them in analyses always already informed by disciplinary prejudices that 
correspond with broader ideological aims and frequently validate certain partisan policy 
objectives. While of little to no interest to the European public(s), their scholarship 
influences some leaders and policy makers, affecting their understanding of the project in 
which they are engaged. By a trickle-down effect these theories may ultimately exercise 
some influence on public perceptions, but ascertaining the extent to which they do would 
be nearly impossible.  
Theorists of European integration are engaged in a circular reproduction – and 
mimetic performance – of the very values, norms and practices from which the EU 
developed and takes its legitimacy. This in part helps explain why they so often remain 
unconscious of the ought implicit in their own seemingly detached analysis, as they rather 
feebly ape “hard science” standards of "objectivity". However, contemporary theorizing 
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is radically transforming the field—and the social sciences more broadly—by exposing 
the operation of underlying ideological assumptions, interrogating reified, metaphysical 
assumptions (e.g: sovereignty, anarchy, etc.) and problematizing the field's tendency 
toward argumentative circularity. 
To better use the artist analogy, conventional integration theorists may be likened 
to individual artists who, painting from palettes of limited hues, have collectively worked 
on a mural over many decades, a mural whose contested scenes are frequently painted 
over and whose margins remain ambiguous. What the mural depicts is largely due to on-
going and highly contested attempts to perfect what had been done at the center of the 
rendering. Only recently has an effort been made to rethink these received notions of 
theme and method that has limited it, and to innovate or even dispense with them by 
reconceiving the aim of the work and its subject.  
In this analogy the post-structuralist, deconstructivist and post-modern thinkers 
now coming into the field (and who are all intellectually indebted to Nietzsche) are 
comparable to cubists, expressionists and even montage artists, for they employ the 
painterly equivalent of riotous colors and alternative perspectives to illuminate richer 
detail in a more vivid depiction of the subject under scrutiny. Their innovative theoretical 
challenges make up a conceptual pastiche that casts doubt on the long use of 
monochromatic shades and tones their less daring predecessors employed to achieve the 
conventional images that formerly constituted the whole picture. In so doing they have 
also painted far beyond the unduly inhibiting borders of the old portrait to demonstrate 
the indeterminate limits of the wall it occupies. 
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The main theories of European integration operate within the same analytical – 
ideological paradigm (interpretation being valuation), and comprise a complex power 
constellation. They take themselves as constituting a progressive research project that 
seeks to explain the dynamic processes of Europe’s political, economic and social 
integration appraise its role in international society and anticipate its future development 
and prospects through examination of the institutions of the European Union. These 
theories are animated by ongoing debates over terms and merits of competing 
perspectives in lively conceptual and methodological debates that make it intellectually 
fertile. They are primarily concerned with relations between EU member-states and the 
institutions to which their increased cooperation has given rise. These theoretical analyses 
(interrelated and competing perspectives) examine socio-political phenomena and their 
transformation – matters that also fall under the purview of international relations 
theorists, insofar as they concern relations between sovereign states in a system of 
anarchy, etc. As a field EU studies also examines the creation and functioning of treaties 
and institutions created to administer these policy and procedural changes, in addition to 
the tensions generated by the new sort of quasi-domestic European sphere to which they 
have arguably given rise. 
Efforts to theorize European integration initially arose in response to the 
theoretical questions generated by the formal, intergovernmental cooperation and new 
institutional arrangements conceived in the aftermath of World War Two. These 
historical, transformative measures included the creation of three primary 
intergovernmental institutions to direct Western Europe’s redevelopment following the 
war. These included the COE, the European Coal and Steel Community and 
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EURATOM—predecessors to the contemporary EU—and the OSCE, which had its 
origins in the Helsinki Accords and developed out of the Council for Security and 
Cooperation in Europe, which those accords produced in 1975. The broad and deep 
interconnectedness of Europe’s primary intergovernmental organizations—as related 
power constellations—is significant. It serves as evidence for (and establishes the 
apodicity of) the ideological equipollence enforced by the meta-discourse of ultra-liberal-
modernity. 
The CoE is a key European organization from which many of the EU’s non-
economic policy rules have taken their queue. The CoE has enhanced the EU’s credibility 
as a global arbiter of human rights and democratic values. It can plausibly be said to 
serve as a sort of institutional vestibule for applicant countries to the EU itself, as 
countries seeking admittance to the EU modify their domestic laws and foreign policy 
postures to comply with CoE requirements. Within the auspices of the CoE the 
Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms was created 
1950 and entered into force in September 1953; the institutional bodies tasked with 
implementing it was the European Commission of Human Rights, created in 1954, and 
the European Court of Human Rights, created in 1959. The laws set forth and oversight 
provided by the former and the binding rulings of the latter oblige EU member states in 
ways that both determine and transform its regulatory authority and practical governance 
in both economic and non-economic areas of its purview. The decisions of these CoE 
institutions also effect the dissemination of human rights norms internationally, 
encouraging their enforcement and discouraging would-be abusers, particularly those 
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autocratic governments whose economic reliance on trade with Europe motivates them to 
remain in good standing with the EU. 
Further institutional overlap occurs through the authority of the OSCE, which is a 
much broader organization whose membership includes 56 nations, including the US and 
Canada, as well as ‘Partners for Co-operation’ as diverse as Japan and Thailand, Morocco 
and Egypt. The organization focuses on numerous aspects of regional security and 
stability (ensuring and perfecting the status-quo), promoting democratization and a broad 
range of norms from media freedom to anti-trafficking and gender equality. It has also 
taken up the need for environmental regulation and a centralized authority in the 
ecological impact of human activity and its socio-political and economic consequences, 
understood in terms of security. In troubled and developing regions of the world it acts to 
safeguard political transparency through elections monitoring and assistance. It strives to 
manage and mitigate potential sources of conflict, encourages negotiation toward 
domestic and international dispute resolution, seeks to provide aid in humanitarian crises 
and engages in post-conflict assistance and reconstruction. Each of these organizations 
functions to promote and implement democratic norms and compel adherence to human 
rights law, which directly enhances the objectives (both economic and non-economic) 
and raison d'être of the EU. The overlapping aims and purposes of the CoE, the OSCE 
and the EU (among others, which include a broad range of intergovernmental institutions 
such as the EBRD, NATO and the United Nations) is to effectively promote and 
universalize the ultra-liberal-modern values that subtend the globalization complex in all 
its dimensions.   
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From a Nietzschean perspective the major theories of European integration in 
function as facets of a hegemonic outlook and methodology that aims to maintain 
privileged ontological assumptions and achieve a corresponding human good. It is a 
social science that seeks to preserve certain forms of life and privileged modes of being 
through a discernable disciplinarity. The on-going consolidation and refinement of 
Europe’s institutional processes and its continuing expansion – as well as scholarly 
explanations of these phenomena – are invariably imbricated in the privileged ideas and 
values inhering to them. By recognizing this ‘good Europeans’ may better understand 
how the coercive, hyper-decadent values of our ultra-liberal-modern epoch cultivate 
‘cynical, enlightened false-consciousness’, and how the practices arising through its 
discourses can be combated.284
Furthermore, according to Nietzsche’s perspectivalist hermeneutical and 
epistemological stance, we may grasp how the EU—as described, authorized and 
reinforced in the world by those theorizing it in veritable enacts of its ideals—represents 
the diminution of man through the commendation of a mediocrity legislated through an 
economic–juridical order, the perfection of which aims at enforcing universal 
humaneness (!) while exciting the acquisitive desires of the spiritually botched and 
enabling their fulfillment. I refer once again to both the ethos (mindset) and praxis 
(practical effects or consuetude) sustained by ultra-liberal-modernity, which equates 
everyone according to basest physical necessity for economistic utilitarian ends so as to 
rationalize reducing us to “subtly ‘adapted’ gears [that] represent minimal forces” as a 
part of its machinery. This process is motivated and sustained by the instinctual drives 
and impulses of weakness, that take “satisfaction in the dwarfing of [hu]mankind”, and 
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are typified by precisely the sort of “economic optimism” Nietzsche combated.285 As 
such European integration is shown to be fulfilling Nietzsche’s predictions about the 
systematic weakening of Europeans and by extension humankind, a fact that bolsters both 
his psychological theory of the affects (will to power) and his proposed solution. After 
analyzing the complex ways in which theories of European integration theory body-forth 
a neo-liberal will to truth, I explicate how the EU and co-extending globalization 
complex might be exploited, in Nietzschean fashion, by good Europeans.286 
It is important to understand why, from a Nietzschean perspective, theorizing 
about European integration has to date barely attained a modicum of the impartiality it 
presumes as an objective scientific study and how most of its proponents are blind to 
and/or unconcerned with this fact. It is largely due to the preponderating influence of 
(now customary slave-moral) values – the individual attitudes and/or group prejudices 
that act upon specialists theorizing it. Of great significance to Nietzsche, this matter is 
little noted by theorists of European integration. As Babich keenly observes: 
Science, in its natural and social research expressions, perpetuates its own loyalty 
to its absolute by the same expedient Nietzsche shows always to have been 
employed in the service of the ascetic ideal: that is, one renounces the appearance 
of one’s ideal. Thus, science renounces metaphysics as it renounces any claim of 
its own to an absolute status. But in this, it searches for a knowledge that cannot 
be called “knowledge” in the traditional (metaphysical) sense, and it delights in 
the exploration of the limits of this knowledge—this is its metaphysical sense—so 
transgressing its own boundaries.287
The self-deception of science’s putative un-metaphysical objectivity as an 
epistemological issue occupied Nietzsche from early in his career and prompted him to 
argue that even through the best science we still “discover” only the limited and 
conditional nature of our logic—a revelation of our fractional perspectives on the subject 
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of inquiry that suggests the need for a tragic culture over the prevailing Socratic 
optimism. 
Deeply skeptical of the will-to-truth they symptomatize, Nietzsche was familiar 
with the positivistic orientation conferred by discourses of scientism that were nascent in 
his era.288
This movement spurred a concerted effort to transform the study of social 
processes into putative sciences even as Nietzsche wrote. While scientific methodology 
was appropriate for the natural sciences such as chemistry, physics, biology, etc., where it 
had developed, its application to the study of social life significantly altered what had 
long been the concern of philosophers and a part of the activity of philosophizing. The 
discourses of scientism changed the character of these subjects of inquiry, particularly in 
their academic manifestations, transforming them into the distinct disciplinary fields of 
political science, sociology and economics, etc., whose purview would be determined and 
supervised by experts.
 In accordance with the post-Enlightenment, modernist ethos of scientific 
methodology, which privileged empirical evidence or observed facts, data sampling, 
hypothesis testing, reproducibility, etc., these discourses gradually reified reason and 
fetishized mechanistic causality. As their powerful impetus revealed natural law and 
transformed the material conditions of life throughout the Occidental (Western) world by 
way of technological advances, their demonstrated potential to increase the power of 
humankind over nature was irresistible to those interested in social phenomena, the 
organization of human communities and their dynamic relations.  
289 It is quite likely that Nietzsche would have had little patience 
for the emerging social sciences or its narrow specialists. He would surely have thought 
their philosophical (and methodological) foundations fatuous and redundant in terms of 
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their ideological origins. Furthermore he would have been highly suspicious of the 
character of the knowledge (via quantitative research) they generated.290
European integration theory, also referred to as EU studies, constitutes a sub-field 
within international politics studies, which themselves occupy places within the broader 
academic discipline of Political Science. The field constitutes the activity of one area of 
theorizing, and the ongoing scholarly debates it informs. This refers to a set of works 
describing processes of political, economic and social integration in addition to the 
specific unfolding of thought traceable over the previous six decades. While I examine 
the largely similar, if not identical assumptions and intentions shared by the respective 
authors discussed herein, the field does not equate with an independent reality or suggest 
a possibly un-Nietzschean construction of a non-existent thing. It refers to an intellectual 
development: the various interrelated and interdependent analyses of European 
integration. The complicated ways in which academic disciplines (and the knowledges 
 
Rather, EU studies and the various strains of European integration theorizing 
collectively reiterate ideological rationales for achieving the objectives of the EU’s 
conventional – reactive – arbiters (the aforementioned contemporary ascetic-consumerist 
priests of ressentiment), while giving the slave values justifying those objectives the 
appearance of a good-conscience. As individual scholars engaged in theorizing European 
integration are thoroughly imbued with the philosophical and ideological prejudices that 
inspired and sustain the very integration processes they study, they will unconsciously do 
so. If they wish to attain conventional success within the academic discipline of EU 
studies that has arisen to legitimate Europe’s integration, they will actively seek to 
become even better ideologues than their peers. 
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they generate) are institutionally reified and the extent to which they are self-reifying is a 
matter not directly taken up in this work. 
Utilizing Nietzschean perspectivalism291 as a hermeneutical apparatus, the main 
debates within and between the various schools comprising the field of European 
integration theory—specifically the major contributions of functionalism, 
transactionalism, neo-functionalism292, and concordance systems theory, as well as the 
important theoretical approaches of liberal intergovernmentalism293 and supranational 
institutionalism294—are understood in Nietzschean terms as collectively comprising a set 
of philosophically redundant, if varied expressions of a shared will-to-truth in the context 
of which they appear practically analogous and in the service of similarly reactive 
ends.295
This entails (re-)considering the specific ways each school challenged what was 
then considered to be the prevailing wisdom within the mainstream discipline. I do so by 
  
In this section I focus specifically on the theoretical explanations of the EU’s 
development or evolution through the theoretical lenses of Nietzsche’s perspectivalist 
epistemological and hermeneutical stance, according to the evaluative framework 
provided by his vitalist politics and power ontology. Specifically, I examine how the 
major theoretical schools of European integration have developed according to the 
metadiscourse of ultra-liberal-modernity and positivistic social-science, then attend some 
of the exciting challenges to these conventional—largely statist—ways of understanding 
the integration project. By doing so I intend to essay an untimely historical 
comprehension of the EU, and to shed light on where Western civilization presently is, 
and where it may be directed to go.  
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reflecting on the work of a particular thinker considered representative of each school in 
terms of the theoretical problems each identified. I examine how their respective critiques 
of certain, then prevalent, points of received wisdom within the field ramified the ultra-
liberal-modern values Europe’s integration symptomatized, specifically its will-to-truth 
(a reactive will to power) and seek to show how their striving to give a better account of 
integration processes further naturalized ressentiment even as it seemed to advance, or 
perfect, the field. Each thinker/school is genealogically situated in the context of the 
thought that preceded it toward understanding why the need to posit a new, ostensibly 
enriching perspective on the project of Europe’s integration, arose, how well it fulfilled 
this need and generated new questions or needs for scholars to contemplate or resolve.  
I examine what the major strands of EU studies took to be their innovative 
contribution, how the respective challenges they each presented were received within the 
field and how they each contributed to a broader comprehension of the integration 
process. As Rosamund asserts, 
EU studies should not just be accumulating a cache of information about the EU. 
Rather, it should receive a further conceptual injection from conventional political 
science, the message being that the EU raises issues of concern to pluralists, 
systems theorists, students of public policy-making, analysis of party systems, and 
scholars of political cleavage formation.296
Going beyond this privileging of concern specific to the discipline of political 
science however, I attempt to situate each “school” historically, both in a meta-political 
context and in terms of how it contended with the hegemonic ideological thrust of the 
integration project. The latter point pertains to both the disciplining affects of prevailing 
discourses and conventional power relations and to Nietzsche’s critique of their origins 
and functions. 
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As a matter of promulgating the ascetic-consumerist values characteristic of our 
ultra-liberal-modern era (and European integration in particular), I examine the role 
theories of European integration play in intellectually validating the economistic logic of 
the ideological apparatus it serves to actualize, via its (re-)privileging of reason and the 
ethos of scientism (i.e.: rational choice theory and the positivistic orientation) it confers 
on mainstream social studies. Additionally, I analyze how this inextricably coextends 
with and further ramifies the hegemonic discourses empowering the globalization 
complex. Lastly, all of these considerations are weighed in order to assess how each 
school furthered a distinctive vision of Europe’s becoming and/or augmented the growth 
of a hegemonic power-knowledge regime and the admittance of post-Nietzschean 
(Foucaultian and Derridian “post-modern” perspectives) have recently transformed the 
field at its margins. This includes a critical assessment of some of the functions each 
school performed in enlarging the field’s diversity of thought as well as the ideological 
variance permitted by the latter and how each stands in a particular relation—as 
potentiality—to Nietzsche’s notion of ‘good Europeanism’.  
In critiquing the assorted schools of thought comprising the field of European 
integration theory, I strive to provide a Nietzschean assessment of the discourse of 
scientism and the state-centric thinking that co-extends with the ideological discourses 
that motivate them and which they simultaneously rationalize. In the case of the former, I 
endeavor to explicate the way in which reified principles of science, in conjunction with 
the privileging of reason and empiricism to ensure the appearance of rigor, has long 
imposed a positivist orientation on mainstream EU studies. Among my primary aims is to 
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deconstruct—or suggest a way of deconstructing—the argumentative circularity that 
often informs the theories. 
Innovative recent works employing alternative methodological approaches have 
begun to broaden the field’s range, but the inroads these have made have sometimes been 
impeded by a certain reticence among the discipline’s practitioners. However this is 
gradually being overcome by exciting theoretical innovations, including certain strands of 
institutionalism, multi-level governance theory, post-modern IR theory, discourse 
analysis and meta-theoretical perspectives. 
It remains the case that conventional realism, rational choice analysis, game 
theory and statistical modeling of trends or phenomena all exemplify a persistent feature 
of the discipline: the desire to uncover objective reality, or “Truth”, in a fashion after the 
so-called “hard” natural (or physical) sciences. It is one that constrains what the study of 
the political, conceived as a science, may do by enforcing conformity with a set of norms 
that effectively standardizes all academically “legitimate” inquiry. Discourses of 
scholarly legitimacy, their function, transformation and the historical context in which 
they arise and change are particularly relevant to the genealogy of European integration 
theory and its production of knowledge.297
With regard to the dominance of state-centric thinking, I argue that it comprises a 
reactive will-to-truth that perpetuates an ideological view to reinforce and naturalize the 
hegemony of conventional norms of sovereignty, legitimacy and power—the very sort of 
power politics Nietzsche rejected as characteristic of the German Reich. Furthermore it 
systematically inhibits the development of alternative perspectives on Europe and is 
therefore likely to blind students of Europe to the radical, dynamic potential for 
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becoming-other which Europe’s formal integration presents and which good-Europeans 
might exploit through the abstract potentials of globality. I attempt to show how some 
recent developments in European integration theory, such as constructivism, discourse 
analysis and post-modern critiques represent a turn within the field and by extension the 
discipline of political science that is highly indebted to Nietzsche, a fruitful, alternative 
perspective from which Europe’s integration may be differently, and perhaps more 
productively understood. 
A number of serious challenges confront one in making such a Nietzschean 
critique of EU studies effective. First, in what ways is a Nietzschean analysis potentially 
useful to those engaged in such theorizing? It should serve to de-familiarize those doing it 
of some essentialisms and performative operations in their conceptualization of the 
processes under study. At the same time it runs the risk of being overly-reductive and 
promptly dismissed as glib and/or superficial as a consequence. Second, although 
Nietzsche’s view of the impetus behind European integration theory is not implausibly 
suggested by his thorough-going skepticism—one inextricably related to his critique of 
Western science—it may be asked how effectively the critical-analytical framework 
provided by Nietzsche’s vitalist politics and power ontology function as a standard for 
evaluating the particular theoretical approaches and aims of European integration 
theorists.  
This is of particular concern given that such a Nietzschean assessment is primarily 
based on his assessment of the psychological–historical development of morality, and the 
cultural world created through our valuations. Nietzsche’s theory is an appropriate 
hermeneutical framework for such a critical examination, for as it must be acknowledged, 
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the EU, in all its myriad aspects, is ultimately reducible to the observable consequences 
of human behavior, taken at any number of levels of analysis, from the acts of individuals 
to group, institution and community interactions. This is to acknowledge that many 
different methodological approaches yield useful insights into social life, and the 
privileging of one (such as positivism) is unduly constraining.  
Yet, from Nietzsche’s critical perspective, physics envy—the pothos of social 
scientists to theorize with the empirical power of those in the physical sciences, with 
independently replicable accounts for phenomena through time and verifiable means of 
predictive power—is a form of desiring that fosters the illusion we can step outside 
ourselves to see the world as it is. In fact all we can produce is self-referential kinds of 
knowledge, always already imbricated in the (study of the) world. Nietzsche’s view is 
that knowledge is objective only insofar as it relates to its own presuppositions. In the 
realm of the social sciences in particular, the sphere of human activity, we can never 
arrive at independent facts about the world which are separate from or unpolluted by 
human experience. This is the essential dilemma of (social) scientific methodology, that 
any question or analytical approach admits certain criteria while invariably excluding 
others from consideration.298
Inquiry itself, which consists of investigating some unknown to expand human 
comprehension, is inherently impeded by our inability to identify certain unknowns 
necessary to the explanation sought after (an epistemological paradox). Recognition of 
this (arguably sophistical) problem, and the futility it might seem to suggest, prompts 
 To attain a satisfactory degree of certainty the scientist 
contends with known factors (however well understood) that frame the questions that can 
be asked, while others are downplayed or neglected out of ignorance.  
 172 
some to succumb to nihilistic resignation via acceptance of fanciful, wholly imaginary 
accounts of reality. We immediately realize that the driving impulse of inquiry, the desire 
to know (the volitional impulse motivating all will-to-truth) is very similar, if not 
identical with the impelling conative force of life, or Will to power. We are involuntarily 
disposed to act. And we always act in a relative condition of ignorance, moving through a 
world far more complicated that we can conceive. In summa all scientific investigation 
can at best result in failure to account for dynamic processes in order to reach a result of 
doubtful sureness. We are “successful” when our results generate hope by presenting 
further lines of possible inquiry. Nietzsche recognized this element of Dionysian tragedy 
in the human quest for knowledge and truth and, although a thorough-going skeptic, kept 
questioning and even daring to posit some answers. Babich states that according to 
Nietzsche, “the pursuit of truth is always rooted in error, precisely because error is the 
condition of life.”299 She quotes an unpublished note by Nietzsche’s from his notebooks 
of 1881: 
I recognize something [as] true only in opposition to an actual living untruth. 
Thus truth comes into the world as a concept completely lacking power and first 
acquires power by inmixture with living errors. And for this reason, one must 
permit errors to flourish and acknowledge their dominion.300
The Apollonian urge for meaning and order gets debased in a decadent age 
through the reactive force which gives it expression in a negative will to nothingness a 
 
 
As a thoroughgoing skeptic, Nietzsche simultaneously saw all knowledge claims as false 
and as essential operations for generating and sustaining the meanings necessary for life, 
even if they are inevitably self-deceiving. The ineliminable human desire for truth 
exemplifies both our highest (noblest) and lowest (basest) impulses.  
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nihilistic power, an inclination characteristic of the prevailing will-to-truth in the ethos of 
scientism. In a position analogous to Nietzsche’s own with regard to the incontrovertible 
“truth” of any theoretical perspective (the apodictical efficacy of which is usually taken 
for granted by its proponents), theorists of European integration study highly complex 
activities and dynamic relations retrospectively, applying close textual analysis, critical 
interrogation and empirically-based data, among other means, to posit explanatory 
hypotheses and theorems. In all fairness then it must be admitted that Nietzsche’s 
psychological theory of the affects (i.e.: his vitalist politics and power ontology) and 
philosophical critique of morality is equal in its aptness as a method for accessing 
theoretical attempts to explain socio-psychological phenomena such as European 
integration as well as to the act of theorizing: all the empirical observations, critical 
reflections and philosophical extrapolations there from.  
What of special significance can an examination of EU studies through 
Nietzschean lenses persuade those engaged in such work? It is hoped that the critique will 
demonstrate how differing sorts of unconscious desire (active/positive or 
reactive/negative) symptomatize a involuntary volition consisting of instincts, drives and 
impulses that spur the development of (forms of) knowledge. The dispositions entailed in 
a certain body of knowledge, inclines toward a corresponding life form—or perspectives 
that are simultaneously realizing and realized by a Dasein. These inculcate differing 
orientations among those in their presence (shared or public knowing) and generate 
correspondingly interrelated worlds. What is known is, from this perspective, always 
indicative of the vitality of an organism (taken on multiple levels from the individual to 
the community, etc.). Those engaged in EU studies may thereby comprehend the ways in 
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which a form of knowledge may serve to preserve unhealthy, declining forms of life or 
augment healthy modes of existence, and reevaluate their own views and work 
accordingly.  
Another issue concerns how it is Nietzsche’s thought (and my presentation of it, 
in particular) avoids seeming, or actually being, as dogmatic in its “conviction” of 
possessing a superior perspective on the world as those EU scholars tend to be via their 
respective understandings of Europe. Lastly, consideration is given to the extent that the 
EU (as portrayed by the various schools of European integration theory) and the 
conventional globalization complex may be conditioning the possibility for the 
realization of Nietzschean objectives, namely the fostering of ‘good Europeanism’ 
toward the realization of his idea of Europe, and if not how they might be made to do so 
via a revaluation of values. 
This analysis will show how various schools of European integration theory have 
sought to explain, critically analyze and sometimes even to predict the integration 
process, and how their precepts originate in philosophical prejudices that condition their 
inquiry according to a corresponding native volition. Through the lenses of Nietzsche’s 
vital politics and power ontology the field is seen as mainly dissipative and conservative, 
an attempt to explain events – or mask reaction – with theoretical explanans of polity, 
policy or political analysis that more or less accord with the precepts of the hegemonic 
discourses of scientism. That is they foster an appearance of endeavoring to comprehend, 
explain and even forecast Europe’s transformation by theorizing in objective and 
replicable ways.  
 175 
However, what mainstream theorizing on European integration makes apparent is 
that its insights and developments often serve to refine and sublimate the ideological 
pretexts for integration in terms that announce the project’s continuation via the 
preservation of a harmful form of order.301
Since the early-1990s the field has opened up considerably, admitting a number of 
innovative critical approaches. The durability of the aforementioned debate, which still 
fervently persists, as well as the discipline’s resistance to radical challenges to its 
traditional assumptions, is indicative of the role that the academy and scholarly 
convention has and continues to play in shaping the study’s development. As European 
integration theorists always have multiple treaties, functioning institutions and 
dynamically interacting individuals to examine there has seemed to be little interest in 
 The discipline’s primary schools of thought, 
from about the mid-1960s through the early 1990s could be characterized as having fed in 
cannibalistic fashion on each others and their own respective hypotheses to re-assert 
nuanced New perspectives developed through the critical application of insights are then 
presented as “new” directions in the field about every decade or so. Until about the mid-
1990s the dominant philosophical schism in the fields overarching discourse was between 
state-centric and supranational institutional perspectives. These roughly comprised a 
dyad, one side of which occupied by supporters of those who believed Europe’s 
integration process to be better explained through the interactions of individual, sovereign  
states and those convinced that it was better understood through the supranational 
institution that had arisen between them. Although it should be said that the degree to 
which the latter view was discernable less “state-centric” in a broader philosophical sense 
than its liberal opposite is debatable. 
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delving too deeply into and/or examining the philosophical principles presumed by the 
project itself. It seems there are—or have been, at any rate—strong incentives not to 
interrogate those highly revered values informing its privileged narratives.  
Given its generally positive and flattering disposition toward its subject of 
inquiry, the discipline not only functions in self-validating ways that perpetuate its own 
legitimacy, but upholds a worldview (Weltanschauung) supportive of the status quo. It 
need not directly advocate the preservation of the social structures, institutions and modes 
of being under its consideration, but ideologically secures them against challenges. 
Consequently it often amounts to something more analogous to sympathetic reportage 
than to critical theorizing. In truth however, it is a mixture, as all social studies invariably 
are. A performative enactment of a widely shared will to truth, those theorizing Europe’s 
integration make strong claims to objective comprehension of reality in “truth as 
correspondence” terms, even if they do not seek predictive power for their hypotheses. It 
is not that they fail to glean truths about the world, but that they create them. This is not 
problematic so long as their intellectual punditry is recognized as constituting a ‘not-
showing’ (obfuscation) that announces the legitimacy of the tenets propagated by the 
meta-discourse of ultra-liberal-modernity.302
EU scholars often disagree over how to define central concepts and develop / 
employ different frames of reference, a fact which provides the field its spectrum of 
(relatively) diverse, contending views. This inhibits the development of a commonly 
 The authority its axiomatic narratives confer 
serves to justify the EU’s imposed (“ascetic-consumerist priest” dominated and driven) 
re-organization of European life and its ascendancy over all other political forms on the 
continent.  
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agreed upon explanation of EU institutions, their structure and functioning—permitting a 
“chaos” that is arguably productive and has the potential to be radically so.303
While those in the field need not agree about definitions of foundational concepts 
such as sovereignty, interdependence, etc., this does significantly complicate their ability 
to assert / claim shared truths. Theories of European integration arguably benefit from the 
plethora of views this disagreement generates, but it often has an antagonistic effects, 
rather than sustaining genuinely positive agonisms within the field.
 However, 
the mainstream of the field does naturalize a decadent value system—the ideological 
juggernaut of ultra-liberal-modernity—consciously or not. A Nietzschean critique should 
therefore be of interest on multiple levels, if only for illuminating certain problems 
intrinsic to efforts to theorize European integration.  
The analysis suggests that most such theorizing is symptomatic of a misguided 
striving that culminates in acts of ‘becoming-same’. This amounts to a falling back into 
the average everyday-ness of conventional EU studies scholarship only occasionally and 
then accidentally approximates the values of ‘good Europeanism’. Disciplinary strictures 
prevents those working in the field from conceiving viable alternatives to its ultra-liberal-
modern mainstream; possibilities for Europe’s authentic becoming-other. Nevertheless 
recent critical challenges are invigorating the field and provide hope that it can break out 
of these strictures. 
304 The mainstream 
field’s limited diversity is not attributable to an intellectually honest Nietzschean 
perspectivalism, but rather the opposite: strident dogmatisms buttressed by the 
positivistic orientation conferred by the discourse of scientism and its privileging of 
reason and “empirical data”.  
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Diez and Wiener observe that, “theories serve different purposes.” Yet while 
differences of understanding, however insignificant, over foundational concepts 
underscore the differences in the purposes theories may serve, by design or otherwise, 
they do not indicate meaningful ideological conflicts. With regard to the aim of 
theoretical perspectives on European integration and the purposes they serve, Diez and 
Wiener assert that “what they all share …is that they are not primarily concerned with the 
development of particular policies, but with abstract reflection on European 
integration.”305
As an academic sub-field it was situated within international relations theory and 
its branch of international organizations theory (which emerged in the aftermath of World 
 While this is the case, that reflection has tended not to give much scrutiny 
to the ideological presuppositions informing integration and its theorization. 
The broader historical context of the EU’s development and concurrent 
emergence of regional integration theory is important for understanding each. Systematic 
scholarly efforts to explicate processes of regional integration roughly coincided with the 
outset of the Cold War in the early 1950s and the emergence of European federalism. 
Scholars initially strove to provide explanations for as well as predictive power about the 
factors required for or inconducive to the integration of disparate nation-states occupying 
a common area of the world. Yet as recognition increased of the uniqueness of the 
European project and the conditions enabling it, scholars recognized that the insights 
developed from studies into Europe’s integration would be largely inapplicable to other 
regions. As it became clear by the early 1960s that similar developments were not in 
evidence elsewhere the primary subject of their attention was Western Europe, where 
significant progress toward the creation of common institutions was occurring.  
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War Two). In this academic context a set of interrelated theoretical perspectives and 
corresponding debates on Europe’s integration have evolved. In so far as they 
collectively comprise a field, it has been broadened by insights from the fields of 
comparative politics and international political economy. More recently specifically post-
Nietzschean perspectives have been brought to bear on it in the form of post-modern and 
discourse analysis approaches. These have arguably opened the field up in significant and 
exciting ways.  
Rosamund suggests that in attempting to explain dynamic processes of inter-state 
and supranational institution building in (initially the Western half of) Europe over the 
past half-century, many scholars have not been “reflective” enough “about …the 
theoretical roots of their work”.306 He attempts to productively defamiliarizes our 
habituated experience and received understandings. A difficulty that is unlikely to ever be 
adequately resolved for those attempting to scientifically ground their analysis on precise 
empirical facts was identified by Haas: 
[T]he task of selecting and justifying variables and explaining their hypothesized 
interdependence cannot be accomplished without an agreement as to possible 
conditions to which the process is expected to lead. In short, we need a dependent 
variable.307
Yet there is a very real sense in which such agreement already exists, if unconsciously. 
The critical lens of Nietzsche’s perspectivalist hermeneutic provides tools conventional 
political science (and EU studies) lack, a device that facilitates the identification of the 
underlying axiomatic narratives that inform commonly shared attitudes and automatic 
beliefs. These value prejudices condition the choice of factors identified as relevant to a 
veridical explanatory account of reality. Ignorance of their operation in conditioning the 
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act of theorizing leads to exaggerated accounts of the actual differences between 
conventional theoretical stances.  
The variables upon which any given analysis is conducted would be disputed even 
if they shared a common aim or produced results possessing discernable predictive 
power, because the objective veracity of the particular choices they represented – 
themselves indicative, again, of a hermeneutic of desire expressed via a will-to-truth – 
can not be known with unassailable certainty. I refer to the choices / judgments informing 
a designation of dependence among possible variables. For instance, in the debate 
between neofunctionalists and federalists, attempts to reconcile the principles of 
autonomy (state sovereignty and legal prerogatives) within a system of mutual 
governance prompted strong disagreement. This arose because of:   
…the challenge [of capturing] the dynamics of two complementary objectives: 
strengthening the political viability of separate but not entirely autonomous (as 
opposed to idealized notions of the Westphalian nation-state system) domestic 
orders through the institutionalization of the principle of joint sovereignty and the 
practice of political co-determination.308
Balancing the changing expectations of evolving notion of national sovereignty 
with the demands of new, supranational institutions of the EU has prompted promises of 
democratic accountability (which never satisfy advocates of democratic accountability), as 
well as soft, institutional coercion via rule enforcement (which consists with agreed upon 
 
 
A real-world dilemma (maintaining [or conceding] a degree of national autonomy within 
the emerging framework of collective authority) generated this theoretical dispute. The 
notional disagreements it produced ultimately spurred the EU and its member states to 
negotiate a specified degree of autonomy for its nation-state constituents within the EU’s 
inter-governmentally determined, overarching supranational framework.  
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democratic processes) and “harder” sorts coercion, which come in economic, diplomatic 
and other forms, as when Jorg Haider’s victory in Austria resulted in that country’s 
suspension from certain institutions of the Union. 
Few if any theorists of European integration argue that the philosophical 
presuppositions of ultra-liberal-modernity are controversial or invalid.309
Even those individuals, groups and parties less enthused about the EU likely 
accept its principle values. Whether they do or not they are compelled by its ascendancy 
to continuously deal with its prerogatives. They may struggle to modify or oppose EU 
initiatives, but only through institutional procedures the EU, with its member-states, 
determines. Today the social, cultural and political dimensions of life on the continent are 
thoroughly dominated by the EU and the values it disseminates and enforces. Those ultra-
liberal-modern values are, wittingly or not, always already affirmed by the mainstream 
theories of European integration, the interrelated concerns of which (sovereignty and self-
determination, the jurisdictional reach of institutions, individual rights, etc.) take those 
values, as their ground, for granted. This risks the self-reification of the field of EU 
 The EU and the 
values subtending it are taken for granted as desirable – exemplifying a rational, 
progressive, secular, humanist, and democratic endeavor. These sublimated ideological 
stances are not merely encouraged by the institutional culture its numerous agencies foster 
but are enforced comprehensively through socio-political mechanisms of control such as 
education, civic participation and legal duties, as well as through a complex array of bio-
power relations it implements. Its advocates are enthralled with the EU as a “project” and 
eager to participate in the universal extension of its values and norms, which they, 
naturally, share.  
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studies. In so far as the field claims authority to debate and explain European integration 
and EU politics, it abets the EU’s reification of certain notional-unto-ideological aspects 
of itself, as well.  
More recently some critics in the social constructivist and discourse analysis 
schools of European integration have examined the values, ideals and identic forms linked 
through rights based notions of equality, perceptions of legitimacy and political 
enfranchisement (the EU’s project of developing a new, highly responsible citizen so 
adept at promise-keeping as to be self-policing) to gain deeper insight into the motivations 
driving Europe’s integration. But the exercise of theorizing the EU’s changing 
institutional dynamics (politics of policy making, policy implementation, and the 
emerging community as a polity – reflections on the EU’s ever evolving and qualified 
facticity) absorbs the intellectual energies of most integration theorists. As opposed to 
critically deconstructing the philosophical presuppositions of ultra-liberal-modernity, the 
overarching rationality it serves and form of life the EU as an institutional manifestation 
of these particular values symptomatizes—and which I argue their analyses largely 
support—they examine the EU according to the meta-discourse it universalizes. 
Theorists of European integration analyze its operational functions and 
contemplate the challenges they pose to the discourses of sovereignty and the nation-state. 
This is undertaken with an eye to its effects both within the community and to the macro-
political entity, which obtains a semblance of sovereign authority in its own right, its 
determination of community social and regulatory policies, initiation of reform, mediation 
of competing interests among its members, and its proper role and degree of influence in 
the international community. Controversy ensues over the proper criteria for determining 
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where emphases should “correctly” be placed for understanding the EU’s various systems, 
the implications of their operations, over how to verify hypotheses alleged to possess 
predictive power, over agreement about dependent variables (the problem of confirming 
that an outcome was in fact determined by the factors supposed to be responsible for the 
anticipated result) and myriad other disagreements have all fueled argument. However, as 
liberal, ideologic nomologists, few (if any) seriously questions, much less casts doubt 
upon, the intrinsic merit of the ideological presuppositions validating the EU project. A 
perusal of the literature reveals that little of broader practical or philosophical significance 
is ultimately to be known by it, and that academic debate over what is known arguably 
makes even less difference to the status quo (i.e.: foreign policy formulation, development 
practices, the applicability or enforcement of international law, etc).310
 
 
This said there is arguably a broad range of perspectives conveyed by theories of 
European integration within the relatively narrow liberal paradigm in which such 
scholarship operates. These range from the somewhat atavistic to what in its own terms 
might be called surprisingly avant-garde. However, as in every social science discipline 
the scholarship contends with some fundamental concepts that are notoriously polysemous 
(e.g.: sovereignty, legitimacy, anarchy, etc.) and their various interpretations of meaning 
can be taken as partially responsible for some degree of the range of that thought as well 
as much of the disagreement between the various schools.  
Many of these analysts and averagely myopic social scientists disagree even on the 
grounds for defining less philosophically broad terms (e.g.: interests), and the appropriate 
parameters of their application, which can be expected in a debate over the traits and 
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character of an institutional apparatus or the development of broader, associated trends. 
[C]ompeting theoretical approaches tend to disagree on background conditions and 
process variables, where power lies in the general system, the need for more or 
less integration, the impact of formal or informal structures, the feasibility or 
desirability of ascribing a political telos to the process and so on.311 
 
Yet despite disagreements between rival theoretical approaches to theorizing European 
integration, the aforementioned major strains comprising the corpus of the field express 
perspectival variations symptomatic of the same reactive will-to-truth.  
According to Nietzsche’s vitalist politics and power ontology the majority of 
scholarly theorizing on the subject has served to reinforce a traditional statist view of the 
world and, wittingly or not, constitutes an apologia for a corresponding reactive idea of 
Europe. Contrary to Nietzsche’s quasi-cosmopolitan idea of Europe, the statist notion—
the notable variations of which describe the different schools of European integration 
theory—functions to further normalize conventional power whilst periodically 
repackaging itself in neoteric forms. While the Nietzsche’s critical theoretical frameworks 
arose from deliberation on and genealogical critique of the axiological origins (the source 
and/or foundation of values) of the contemporary European condition, with normative 
ramifications for political organization and institutional practice, the mainstream schools 
of European integration theory take the ultra-liberal-modern values subtending their 
subject of inquiry for granted.312 The field has arisen via predominantly praxiological 
concerns (the basis for and efficacy of practices) with (predominantly Western) European 
modes of intergovernmental cooperation, economic and political integration and the 
emerging supranational institutional framework to which such collaboration has given 
rise.  
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In the Nietzschean view they comprise involuntary expressions of desire; almost 
automatic enactments of will to power that realize value judgments (their origin in 
esteeming) that underlying the aim or objective they strive to reach or develop (their 
telos). Corresponding with this, an emphasis on praxiological (to the veritable neglect of 
the axiological dimension) aspects of the integration processes was characteristic of 
integration theory from the appearance of neofunctionalism in the early ’60s—federalist 
and functionalist approaches being early, qualified exceptions: they did focus more 
attention of the axiological dimension. This persisted at least until the late 1980s, when 
social constructivism and discourse analysis entered upon the scene and began to 
challenge more traditional approaches to (and definition of) theory, that, as Diez and 
Wiener state, is “understood as a causal argument of universal, transhistorical validity and 
nomothetic quality, which can be tested through the falsification of a series of 
hypothesis.”  
These latter approaches deconstructed meanings in radical (specifically post-
Nietzschean) ways, interrogated the conditionality and reification of identic categories and 
examined the situatedness and dependency of all meaning and truth upon the discourses, 
the values (through an axiological exposition), and the practices that naturalize them. 
Given the many purposes that the spectrum of integration theories and approaches serve, 
Diez and Wiener go on to assert that: 
European integration theory is thus the field of systematic reflection on the process 
of intensifying political cooperation in Europe and the development of common 
political institutions, as well as on its outcome. It also includes the theorization of 
changing constructions of identities and interests of social actors in the context of 
this process.313 
 
Through the three major historical phases of integration interest in outcomes has changed 
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from one of seeking to provide predictive tools to that of adducing how efficacious EU 
institutions are at achieving the outcomes they desire across myriad policy areas and 
among diverse constituencies, as well as how integration is forcing a re-determination of 
concepts of belonging, identity and legitimacy vis-à-vis evolving notions of community, 
region, state, nation and Europe itself.  
Insofar as Nietzsche’s oeuvre can be taken as a serious, if systematically 
unsystematic series of reflections on the forces keeping Europe from developing common 
political institutions, the changing constructions of its disparate identities and the interests 
of its myriad social actors in the context of these processes, he was indisputably a proto-
integration theorist. Through his vitalist politics and power ontology Nietzsche directly 
and conscientiously theorized the forces that would likely stimulate the future unification 
of Europe.  
If each distinct school of European integration theory evokes different nuances of 
the same discursive set of political desires, nuances that conflict with the emphases of 
other theoretical viewpoints, these varied perspectives (competing desires) can each be 
said to enact features of a much larger discursive power-knowledge regime. The variety of 
thought the field seems to encompass serves a transparently dissimulative function, 
deterring us from its overarching ideological aim, axiological foundation and its 
praxiological function. The latter aspect of mainstream theorizing about Europe’s 
integration serves to articulate and lend validity to the EU’s employment of the guilt and 
ressentiment formative of the bad-conscience of the European public whom it directs. 
Whether the EU is better understood (re: interpreted) in terms of its state-centric 
intergovernmental aspects or with an emphasis on those features that seem to qualify it as 
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a supranational community, does not detract from its broader ultra-liberal-modern pre-
suppositions and meanings. Even the discourse analyses and social constructivist 
approaches, while innovative and largely indebted to a Nietzschean view to the 
contingency of all epistemological meanings and ontological purpose the EU may be said 
to generate, provide just a little deeper insight into the conative disposition or anticipatory 
resoluteness of the few who, by cultivating a new natural desire (i.e.: nature) among those 
capable of the required self-discipline, may drive European unification, in the more 
significant, supra-institutional sense, “forward”.  
Partisan-cum-academic positions and the debates that follow between them 
dominate the field of European integration theory and absorb the energies of its 
practitioners, students and interested novices, so that few, if any of them recognize the 
over-arching political agenda they abet.314
Though the EU is chiefly concerned with taming Europe’s masses and refining the 
institutional apparati for doing so along familiar (reactive) ultra-liberal-modern lines, it is 
serving an essential function in realizing Nietzsche’s idea of Europe and therefore its 
significance should not be minimized by Nietzscheans who are off-put by the necessary 
dirt of conventional politics. It would benefit good Europeans to comprehend the affective 
dynamism of the EU as a complex of multifarious power constellations, which includes 
the disparate theoretical understandings / rationalizations of it (the various schools of 
 They provide outward signs of the spreading 
chaos among the all-too-many (i.e.: the relativity of values, the laisser-aller and lack of 
reverence for anything) that must eventuate in a more fundamental revaluation of values 
premised upon authentic new grounds led by the aforementioned few: thymotic 
philosophers of the future, becoming, according to their native volition, good Europeans.  
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European integration theory examined below), if they are to subvert it and put it to use as 
an instrument for realizing a genuinely noble idea of Europe.  
This is not to suggest that scholars working in the field are not aware of the 
difficulty (or impossibility) of comprehensively theorizing Europe’s integration. It is 
unlikely that any of those working in the discipline fail to appreciate the complexity of the 
subject. Working within the hegemonic ultra-liberal-modern ideological paradigm 
Schmitter reflects upon the immense difficulty of theorizing something as multifaceted as 
the EU, concluding: 
…no single theory will be capable of explaining its [the EU’s] dynamics and 
predicting its outcome. The EU is already the most complex polity ever created by 
human artifice and it is going to become even more so before it reaches its end 
state—whatever that will be. Efforts to select out specific events, policies, or 
institutions and subject them to simplified assumptions may produce momentary 
‘confirmations’ of a specific theory, but often at the expense of contrary evidence 
and countervailing trends.315
As Europe’s, and the EU’s, leaders, politicians and bureaucrats clamber to achieve 
their respective partisan objectives and re-present their various agendas to their respective 
publics (the citizen-constituents whose putative imprimatur ostensibly validates or 
legitimizes their authority), a somewhat parallel academic disputation adds to the din.
 
 
But of course selecting out is exactly what theorists of European integration are forced to 
do to produce the sort of analysis – complete with dependent and “independent” variables 
to bolster the validity of its ultimately arbitrary choices and corresponding claims – that 
resonates with the discipline. Theorizing Europe’s integration might be even more 
complicated than it now seems to most scholars working the field if they were capable of 
interrogating the values subtending it—not to mention the disciplinary conceits that 
normalize them—in a serious and sustained way. 
316 
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Their combined chatter is distilled by media (whose operations consist with its values), 
from scholarly articles to respected mainstream journals to the popular tabloid press, to 
(in)form a spectrum of public opinion and arbitrate between disparate conventional views. 
Fused in complex ways with differing historical understandings, cultural and ethnic 
sensibilities and received according to varying socio-economic cleavages, this spectrum of 
ideologically conditioned opinions develops into convoluted national and supranational 
public discourses. These in turn always already serve the ‘superstructural’ framework 
provided by the ultra-liberal-modern paradigm by immunizing it against effective—re: 
threatening—critical scrutiny. These discourses continually tempt any would-be dissenter 
to fall back into the inauthentic Publicness of the They and rejoin the all-contented herd. 
The member-state governments and the EU itself attempt to manage these discourses to 
their best advantage, further compounding their inauthenticity and deflecting demands 
from their citizen-constituents for genuine accountability by seeming to provide an 
account of themselves. None of this is a function of conscious collusion; rather it is a 
result of the ideological operation of ultra-liberal-modernity, specifically the distortions of 
the political (a becoming-inauthentic) caused by the desire it fosters for ease and the 
elimination of all suffering. 
Through concerted and ongoing public relations efforts the EU represents itself as 
an authentically agonistic and democratic, ever-expanding green pasture to the human 
herds (or, in its own jargon, the “constituent publics”) it manages. This is done through 
numerous means, a telling example of which includes the “Europa” website itself.317 The 
official website of the EU, Europa subtly promotes the agenda of integration whilst 
seemingly amenable to public debate about, as if European integration—its raison 
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d’être—is that open to question or negotiable. It generates a simulation of its ideal, 
posturing as a free and participatory endeavor to ingratiate the ethos arising from radical 
notions of enfranchisement and popular democracy.  
In this instance (among others) the EU promotes a simulacrum of itself that hides 
arguably less democratic methods of its operation and its elite driven agenda, even as it 
reveals crucial paradoxes central to questions about its legitimacy.318 As if motivated by 
some concern over or doubt about its authority or some sense that it needs to appear so 
concerned, the Europa website expressly invites European citizens to submit their inputs 
as to the future direction and character of the EU.319
These complexities notwithstanding, concerted efforts have recently been made to 
devise ‘A European Strategy for Culture’, with the stated aims of, “promot[ing] cultural 
diversity and intercultural dialogue, [utilizing] culture as a catalyst for creativity in the 
framework of the Lisbon Strategy for growth and employment, and [advancing] culture as 
a vital aspect of the EU's international relations.” These goals were expressed in the 
European Commission's first-ever Communication on culture in May of 2007 and adopted 
by European Ministers of Culture in November 2007.
 Yet this debate—and the egalitarian 
impression it is meant to foster—is delimited by a broad notion of identity carefully 
created and systematically instantiated into law by the EU itself—even if most European 
citizens are ignorant of it. Most Europeans have difficulty defining what it means to be 
European, and what characteristics (political, social or cultural, etc.) are distinctly 
associated with ‘Europe’. That, it seems, is what the EU takes itself—in large part at 
least—as being for; a conceit which begs a whole host of questions about the coherence of 
the values upon which it is predicated.  
320 In relevant sections below I 
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address each of these objectives, focusing on the first aim in terms of the paradox raised 
by the official promotion diversity, which effectively neuters it; the second as it pertains to 
the systematic effort to advance the prerogatives of free–market fundamentalism and the 
‘New Economy’; and the third point in the context of globalization’s role in universalizing 
European norms and the sickness of its nihilistic, ultra-liberal-modern ethos. 
Political opposition that cannot be accommodated within the EU’s agenda is 
systematically co-opted and/or suppressed.321 Broadly inclusive identic and cultural 
definitions of the ‘European’ and belonging are similarly imposed—compelling a multi-
cultural civic ethos on presumed citizens, a form of particularism that excludes alternative 
forms of otherness and presumes a far-reaching degree of political authority. While 
publicly working to alleviate any (perception of a) democratic deficit, entrenched 
representative interests’ ensure that a unified European polity emerges that conduces to 
their notion of the good: hyper-decadent ascetic ideals that foster a ‘cynical, enlightened 
false-consciousness’, and calumniate life. These enfeebling ideals are extolled by the so-
called “higher men,” who presume to act in the interests of their less conventionally 
“successful” but similarly congenitally botched fellows—the weakly majority of people—
by leveling mountain and valley. They thereby subdue and frustrate the best and 
perpetuate the fantasy of an inherent equality and corresponding dignity between all 
persons, making society poorer overall.322
From this attenuation of self-centered concerns a transformed disposition results, 
both among individuals and within communities. The changes it confers are fairly 
comprehensive, affecting the expectations individuals have of each other as fellow 
citizens and toward their society and its politics. A similar change occurs within the 
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attitudes of larger communities toward one another. This may perhaps lead to more 
peaceful relations between states, as obviously seems the case in Europe, but this is in 
some part due to the emasculation of individuals and corresponding spiritual neutering of 
their communities or nation-states. Risse observes that as both a result of this, and an 
indication of the EU’s conventional success: 
…attachment to ‘Europe’ is [now] strongly correlated with support for the EU and 
willingness to cede authority and sovereignty to EU institutions in various policy 
domains.323
The imperative to yield aspects of domestic control over certain economic, 
political and social policies to the supra-national institutions of the EU correlates with 
globalization’s narratives of free trade and accountability for the sake of greater 
consumption and prosperity. These narratives resonate by mollifying the comfort and 
security seeking masses. Yet interesting and similar internal conflicts have emerged 
within every state aspiring to EU membership. For, as eager as they tend to be to benefit 
from EU membership, they are often reluctant to accept certain of the conditions imposed 
by accession, and often push back against them, demanding concessions from Brussels. 
This process was especially evident in the long period of accession negotiations between 
the former Soviet satellite states of Central and Eastern Europe and the EU, as they strove 
to preserve as much autonomy as possible. With regard to the EU’s Eastern enlargement 
 
 
This underscores the fact that reactive powers personified in the contemporary ascetic-
consumerist priests of ressentiment (bureaucrats, technocrats, corporate and business 
interests, the marketing and advertising industries, the mega-media, etc.) have prevailed in 
defining Europe and European-ness in the context of the meta-discourse of ultra-liberal-
modernity.  
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Tsoukalis noted that “membership of the Union is perceived as a highly political choice 
linked to the consolidation of democracy, the preservation of peace and security, and full 
participation in common European institutions.” He went on to acknowledge that “EU 
membership [is] unavoidably linked to the process of modernization and 
Europeanization”. That has indeed been the case as the waves of accession in 2004 and 
2007 produced uneven effects throughout the new (formerly Communist) member-
states.324
Nietzsche’s vitalist politics and power ontology may be construed as loosely 
corresponding with the cosmopolitan–communitarian divide in international politics 
studies, insofar as his ‘good Europeanism’ cultivates a qualified cosmopolitanism for the 
healthiest that is based upon a pathos of distance that maintains a natural hierarchy and 
corresponding rank order of types. Through their erotic regimes of self-creation and 
discipline, the best, as genuinely (and relatively) autonomous individuals, are capable of 
cosmopolitan valuing and engaging in contests over values in an authentic agon with 
similarly healthy types. The vast majority, however, take their heteronymous existential 
meaning and ontological purpose from their participation in communitarian practices, 
through enactments of received traditions and conformity to customary beliefs.
 
325 The 
latter is demonstrated by the contemporary European consumers, who take satisfaction in 
easy assurances of their equality and rights, indifferently acquiesce to being represented in 
the realm of organized, official politics and almost uncritically adopt one or more of the 
readymade identic typologies which describe the narrow spectrum of “normal”. Their 
socialized selfhood is constructed for them and adopted—not without some degree of 
coercion—according to processes of indoctrination through which they come to recognize 
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themselves and “others”.326 In the loci of globalization identic categories, affiliations and 
modes of life are marketed via the culture industry and veritably “consumed” like 
products, in a process of (in)authentic self-branding by their “client–adherents”.327 
The EU deploys strategies of socio-political massification to normalize a social 
imaginary consistent with a set of socio-economic and increasingly political ends and 
secularized ascetic values combined with a consumption-oriented notion of success. In 
light of the EU’s thoroughly ideological aims, Nietzsche would perceive conventional 
efforts to theorize it (i.e.: European integration)—efforts that originate in the same ultra-
liberal-modern milieu that gave rise to the EU—as consisting mostly of pseudo-
philosophical, essentially partisan debate. Setting aside its obvious role in manifesting a 
particular set of discourses, it would strike him as “a confusion of idealist dogmatism and 
knowledge”, an elevated extension of the ‘newspaper culture’ he despised whose common 
sources are crass populism and the reactive tenets of our age’s ultra-liberal-modernity.328
The most distinguishing and possibly life-affirming features of the field’s chief 
schools of thought lie at the margins of that broader anti-natural philosophical program; 
the unwitting dogmatism of many integration theorists’ exposes their respective agenda 
(for some this could be simply put in terms of their being either “for” or “against” the 
maintenance of the “traditional” nation-state), differences in their views point at 
ideological presuppositions left un—or under—examined and at the obvious, albeit 
incomplete, nature of the empirical claims they make.
  
329 All effort at such empirically 
grounded social “science” is in (its) “truth” an engagement in the observation of events, 
elaboration of subjective impressions of effects (symptoms) and supposition about 
affective capacities that cannot be measured in any precise or efficacious way. This is not 
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to say that descriptive theorizing is entirely without value, and Nietzsche himself certainly 
would have recognized that fact. 
To expand on a point made in the introduction to this chapter, an ineliminable 
dilemma in the social sciences, particularly those concerning political phenomena, is the 
choice of “independent variables”, upon which a respective inquiry or take on social 
reality is based. Nietzsche insists that in order to maintain a good-conscience, we must be 
constantly mindful of the fact that the act of choosing always already entails excluding 
certain considerations, potentially even as much of relevance as a theoretical endeavor 
may endeavor to account for; the conceit that any putative “independence” has been, or 
ever can be attained in the determination of variables veils an effort to cultivate the 
illusion of methodological and/or pedagogical rigor for the sake of objectivity, to imbue 
the perspective it aims to promulgate (i.e.: the conclusion it settles upon) with authority 
and sustain the illusion of its unconditional “truth”.  
What is concealed is that all such variables are always wholly dependent and 
situated in a temporal—that is, ever changing—context. The resultant, always-already 
subjective viewpoint conditions perceptions that validate belief in and habituate us to its 
veracity, until their arbitrary determinants and possibly figmental origins are forgotten. 
Thereafter the truth of the viewpoint is taken for granted until such a time as conditions 
may indisputably contradict—and thereby de-habituate—us of the presumptions that long 
sustained it as true.  
Although theorists of European integration agree on much, for much of the EU’s 
facticity (in the Heideggerian sense of that term) is not productively disputed, their aim of 
disclosing the truth about the EU’s institutions and their functioning raises a problem 
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similar to the paradox of knowability. Namely, when they argue in the course of 
theorizing that certain truths about the EU are knowable their initial understanding of the 
truth of what is known is destabilized by the process of attempting to demonstrate it.330  
This paradox of knowability is complicated by the presentation of evidence to the contrary 
presented by other theorists: one theorist asserts that unification is driven by states and 
provides evidence demonstrating this hypothesis while another asserts that it is motivated 
by supranational institutions and provides evidence to validate that proposition. To 
paraphrase Dewey, the operation of knowing conditions what can be known; as Nietzsche 
recognized a half-century earlier, “the true and valid object of knowledge” cannot be 
understood independent of our consideration of it, which makes the truth of what is known 
problematic.331 
Furthermore, there are undoubtedly facts about the EU that are true but unknown; 
however, the way theorists of European integration are conditioned to see blinds quite 
probably them to the existence of certain of them. Given the way in which mainstream 
European integration theorizing has evolved—according to the conceptual constraints of 
International Relations theory paradigms and the narrow statist logic with which it largely 
deals, in conformity with the positivistic orientation conferred by the discourses of 
scientism—alternative perspectives originating outside the political science discipline are 
needed to illuminate presently unappreciated or even unknown “truths”. It is my 
contention—explicated at the end of this chapter—that recent theoretical approaches 
indebted to Nietzsche’s critique of traditional Western metaphysics and epistemology are 
doing so.  
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Examples of such aforementioned empirical matters include the historical record, 
the organization’s key, defining events, the actual treaties that established and govern it, 
the design, role and function of its five primary institutions, as well as the committees, 
programs, and multi-layered bureaucratic apparatus that makes it all work. All of this 
constitutes the pragmatic ground without which more profound debate could not 
coherently occur. That shared pragmatic ground provides a basis upon which assumptions 
about what is un-problematically known form, but which also cultivates a disposition 
toward inquiry and to what ought to be theorized. From there a wide range of divergent 
perspectives arise from which theoretical standpoints develop. What is fundamentally 
disputed between them is the correctness of characterizations given the evidence mustered 
to justify their differing suppositions. The depiction or characterization of facts given in 
the course of interpreting them, and the significance those facts are thereby accorded 
comprise, in considerable part, the principal antecedent, motive state or reason for 
asserting the reasonableness of a set of claims. Their persuasiveness endows the theory 
they comprise with credibility, by extension. These proto-theoretical choices, themselves 
psycho-political in their essence, inform the act of rationalizing a theoretical proposition 
on the basis of a largely subjective causal account.  
We cannot know—unless straightforwardly told, and we may even then have 
compelling reasons to doubt—how directly ideological inclinations affect the perception 
of facts that gives rise to the characterizations out of which theoretical positions arise. 
Individual theorists of European integration, as authors, are themselves riven by multiple 
motivational and interest cleavages, much as the subject they study. Nietzsche’s vitalist 
politics is concerned with analyzing the psychological motives for the portrayals that 
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effectively assess the relative value of myriad facts and determine their proper place in an 
explanatory conjecture. As unconscious memoirs on the parts of their respective authors, 
the accounts of European integration underlying theoretical explanations of it are of 
primary interest here. 
The value of ordinary theoretical advances depends of course upon their 
“correctness”, but that is in part determined according to how effectively the explanatory 
work they do relates to an established theory or “legitimate” discourse by solving some 
problem associated with it. In the course of doing this, it persuasively augments and/or 
reaffirms the prevailing theoretical perspective. Thus a sort of feedback loop arises that 
largely validates the received wisdom of the governing view. Occasionally, however, a set 
of radical insights produces an extraordinary theory that overturns a long dominant 
knowledge paradigm, as Thomas Kuhn explicated in his influential work ‘The Structure of 
Scientific Revolutions’ (1962).  
Of greater interest here, however, is the sociogenic dimension to the 
aforementioned feedback loop in the maintenance of a scientific paradigm or power–
knowledge regime. The apodicity of a perspective-become-theory and its ability to 
causally account for some aspect of our world underlies its ability to compel, determining 
its prospective authority. But it is made credible via a mimetic process of repetition (in 
education, popular media, etc.) and by application to technological innovations, economic 
processes and socially transformative practices—all of which contribute to its dominance. 
Our knowledge of the world is more efficacious when the sociogenic dimension of 
its origins is understood. Namely, that it does not merely arise from an ever-increasing 
understanding of empirically demonstrable facts, but at least equally through our 
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interpretation of facts according to a will to truth. Social-science therefore serves us well 
as an essential tool for the life sustaining endeavor of creating necessary illusions of truth, 
a point Nietzsche consistently affirmed, but the empirical apodicity of a perspective, that 
is the correspondence of its truth claims to the world, is not necessarily related to its utility 
for social life or the maximal flourishing of intrepid iconoclasts.  
Nietzsche is not advocating an anti-realist stance, however; so long as a 
perspective originates in life-affirming strength—a positive will to creative destruction as 
generative power—what ultimately matters from Nietzsche’s standpoint is not its putative 
truth (or, the reliability of its vagueness) but how it can be sustained long enough, via 
tradition, to augment the development of a higher culture. Through the invigorating 
effects of an elevated culture humankind’s preeminent exemplars may be enabled to do 
so. Part two examines how theories of European integration are or are not achieving that 
with regard to the European Union, arguably the most progressive, innovative and 
dynamic polity in the world today. 
 
Part Two: European Integration Theory: a Doxographical Survey toward 
Genealogical Critique 
 
From Federalism to Functionalism 
Theorizing European integration naturally came into its own after World War 
Two, with the creation of intergovernmental institutions on the continent (i.e.: the OEEC 
[now the OECD] and ECSC), though precedents predated that conflict. The theoretical 
stances of federalism and functionalism were both established by the mid-1940s within 
the nascent discipline of international studies. With the reorganization of occupied and—
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by 1949—divided Europe, many key developments to future economic and political 
integration occurred simultaneously. 
Federalist visions of a united Europe have been articulated in various guises going 
back through the thought of 19th century progressive figures such as Giuseppe Mazzini, 
and to 18th century thinkers, including Immanuel Kant whose cosmopolitan notion (in 
Perpetual Peace, 1795) entailed qualified federalist ideals, and antecedents such as the 
United States’ Articles of Confederation (1775) and Constitution (1787). Examples of 
quasi-federal approaches to political comity in Europe included the union of Swiss 
cantons, and to a lesser degree the 19th century unification of Italy and Germany and the 
early 20th century establishment of the Union of Soviet Socialistic Republics. In Western 
Europe, federalist ideas gestated in the minds of progressive European reformers for two 
centuries. Then, in late 1946, the Union of European Federalists was founded in Basel to 
promote the unity of the continent along corresponding lines.332  
Federalism is distinguished by scholars from both federation and confederation as 
discrete forms of political organization. While a confederation is a joining together of 
formally autonomous states along narrowly specified lines, a federation is a formally 
unified political body comprised of formerly sovereign states. Scholars generally agree 
on this definitional distinction. The relationship between federalism and federation is 
more complex however, for as Burgess observes, “federalism informs federation and vice 
versa,” but their internal “diversity notwithstanding, all federations are composite states 
that constitute a single people.”333  
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The motivations for and practical utility of the federal model of political 
organization are many. As Michael Burgess notes: 
Past federations have been founded upon distinct territorial identities and interests 
as well as upon minority cultures, sub-state nationalisms, religious differences, 
and a range of socio-economic factors that served to underline societal cleavages 
having political salience. The unity of federations therefore has traditionally been 
based upon the preservation and promotion of certain federal values that together 
allow these differences and diversities to breathe and flourish.334 
 
Although the EU is an outgrowth of cooperation conceived to ensure greater economic 
security, it has come to encompass all the factors Burgess mentions. The federal values, 
which exemplify ultra-liberal-modern, neo-liberal concerns, is explicated in the Acquis 
Communitaire and the new (and recently revised) constitution. 
The EU, a neoteric sympolity, is (contemporary neo-liberals would argue) the 
fortuitous result of an agonistic process that has realized many of the aims pursued by 
earlier advocates of European unification. It is an achievement that rests on the crucial 
appreciation that “Europe” is a polysemic notion. This awareness has become a maxim of 
its development, and enables it to account for and accommodate diverse perspectives—or 
feign doing so. Its raison d’être contains echoes of many previous thinkers’ ideas on the 
subject, including the principles of civitas gentium (an international union of peoples) and 
foedus pacificum (avoidance of war) in Kant’s Toward Perpetual Peace. It shares 
Nietzsche’s concern for what European man is to become, if wholly incapable of 
consciously pursuing his goals; even less so his promotion of the abolition of nations.335
Quand même, I argue below that the EU is enabling good Europeans to seriously 
contemplate just such a radical future transformation of the political organization of 
communal life. The EU has certainly fulfilled one of his predictions, which originated in 
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opposition to the prevailing nationalism of his age and asserted that “the economic 
unification of Europe is coming of necessity”.336 
Similarly compelling reasons for unifying the continent as those which Nietzsche 
observed started to gain traction among progressive elites and small segments of 
European publics following the First World War. The pan-European movement entered 
popular consciousness during the early 1920s. Their cause continued to gain momentum 
throughout the inter-war period, some even merging with the anti-fascist movement by 
the mid-1930s.337 At that time the federalist ideas for a future unified Europe competed 
with alternate visions including Julien Brenda’s rationalist universalism and the 
International Paneuropean Union founded by Count Richard Coudenhove-Kalergi. While 
the EU is not (yet) a formal federation, the principles of federalism were favored among 
key arbiters of Europe’s unification (the “father’s of Europe”). They were preferred in 
large part for their practical viability in reaching agreements between sovereign states and 
arguably played a significant role in the development of the EU’s primary institutions. 
Rosamund states that:  
[F]ederalism most commonly describes political systems in which there is a 
division of authority between central and regional or state government. Federal 
systems are usually understood as resting on historic compromises involving the 
permanent compact between territorial units… [whereby they place themselves 
under] common, centralized institutions… [while] retaining at least a measure of 
autonomy.338 
 
In many parts of the world, and Europe as well, the federal model enables multi-ethnic 
and multi-cultural nation-states to exist (Belgium being a case in point); holding distinct 
units together in a political unity over centrifugal forces of identic particularism that 
would otherwise pull them apart. 
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Burgess asserts that “the core of the federal idea… is based upon the notion of a 
voluntary union of states and peoples—the result of a bargain, treaty, contract, or 
covenant freely entered into—that is binding upon its members and rooted in mutual 
respect, recognition, reciprocity, tolerance consent, and equality.” These organizing 
principles are clearly operative at many levels of institutional governance among many 
nation-states in the world today, including some that are not formal federations, such as 
Spain and the UK, Nigeria and Kenya. Moreover, these principles describe just as aptly 
key aspects of the EU which lead many to believe that federalism lies at the heart of the 
logic integrating Europe. Indeed, among EU member-states today Germany, Austria, and 
Belgium are formal federations. Although the EU appears to embody key principles of 
federalism, the extent to which it actually does so is a contentious issue among theorists 
of European integration. Scholars have debated the degree to which the EU operates 
along federalist lines since the Treaty of Rome (1957). This issue will be examined in the 
context of each of the sections below. 
Burgess argues that although “the EU is not intended to become either the USA or 
a Switzerland writ large… a complex interaction between economic and politics…by the 
member states of the EU…has resulted in a new kind of federal union the like of which 
has never been seen.”339 He believes this demonstrates that the influence of federalism in 
post-war Europe was not “merely transitory” as critics have alleged, but has “in reality… 
displayed a strong continuity [on the] thought and practice [of unifying Europe] 
throughout the subsequent half-century.”340
Chryssochoou affirms this when he asserts that “there may well be different but 
equally federal sets of principles and structures composing a federal polity, which 
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nevertheless need to be seen in a wider symbiotic perspective.”341 In other words, federal 
systems may differ from one another, taking their unique significance and inner-
regularity from the respective entities that comprise them, while still remaining federal 
arrangements. Despite “considerable variation in purposes, identities, cultural traditions, 
financial resources, political and constitutional symmetry, organizational logic, conflict-
resolution mechanisms, constitutional amendment procedures, power-sharing 
arrangements,” Chryssochoou identifies “the democratic representation of all 
participating units… as a common defining property” of all federalist arrangements.”342 
Burgess thinks the structural organization and functioning of Europe’s major 
intergovernmental institutions reflect federalist notions of collaborative governance. In 
the election of representatives to the European Parliament, the overriding powers of the 
Court of Justice (ECJ), the principle of Qualified Majority Voting, the independence of 
the European Commission from member-state governments, and the accession process 
for EU membership he sees manifestations of federalist principles operative in the EU. 
Regarding the evident character and functioning of the contemporary EU he writes that 
the principles of federalism have undeniably transformed the continent, whether or not 
that fact is readily and fully acknowledged as such:  
Europeans [now] have to recognize and deal with the emerging federal reality that 
is staring them in the face. Together the Maastricht, Amsterdam and Nice treaties 
have combined to build upon Monnet’s Europe by accelerating and accentuating 
its federal direction. [C]onsiderable institutional and policy evidence has 
accumulated to substantiate the claim that the EU already constitutes a federal 
Europe.343 
 
That the constitution of 2005 is presently being promulgated into law by a treaty process 
strengthens Burgess’ claim.344 
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By the early to mid-1950s scholars theorizing international politics were turning 
their attention to the exciting prospect of political and economic integration among 
sovereign nation-states. Formal integration was increasingly seen as a serious potential 
solution to the traditional rivalries and ructions that spawned the cataclysmic conflicts 
that had devastated the European continent twice in a span of little more than three 
decades. Working in the field of political science, which was itself relatively new as an 
academic discipline, early integration theorists attempted to articulate a cogent, 
parsimonious model of Europe’s integration process that could serve both to explain it 
and provide predictive power.  
Those practical objectives of the nascent integration which had been attained by 
the mid-50s, while largely effective for the state actors involved in their respective areas 
of cooperation (ECSC and EURATOM—which merged in 1967— cooperation was 
largely limited to the realm of energy technologies in atomic power and raw materials 
allocation within the strategically significant coal and steel sectors), had given rise to the 
need for more centralized authority structures. In the course of the study’s unfolding new 
theoretical responses arose as novel challenges presented themselves and unforeseen 
needs created by integration processes arose. Innovation also occurred whenever the 
prevailing theoretical paradigm came to seem inadequate. Efforts to explain any number 
of evident facts or important dynamics compelled academic advances. But the federalist 
impulse was not universally shared, and examples of failed efforts at federalism 
abounded. A useful alternative and convincing challenge to the post-war federalist 
approach was functionalism, a theoretical perspective that had arisen from the Europe’s 
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tumultuous inter-war experience of the 1930s. It emerged on the scene in the mid-1940 
and resonated widely for over a decade.  
Rosamund writes that “like federalism, functionalism was a branch of the broad 
movement that sought to theorize the conditions for ending human conflict and which 
found intellectual space in the turbulent political climate of the 1940s.” Functionalism, as 
the theoretical perspective came to be known, was initiated by David Mitrany as a 
theoretical response to multiple crises, particularly the organized mass conflict of the 
twentieth century’s world wars, and unresolved threats to international peace and life on 
the European continent. It was an inter-war theoretical effort conceived to meet the 
challenge of alleviating the underlying sources of conflict in the international state 
system. In his seminal 1943 work A Working Peace System, David Mitrany had 
idealistically asserted “peace will not be secured if we organize the world by what divides 
it.”345  
Mitrany’s functionalist analysis was meant to suggest a practical way out of what 
he perceived to be inherent limitations to the nation-state and the failed international 
system it had given rise to.346 He postulated that cooperation between states in specific, 
functionally linked activities would (and had, albeit in nascent form, proven to) be more 
effective than unilateral state action: 
The essential principle is that activities would be selected specifically and 
organized separately, each according to its nature, to the conditions under which it 
has to operate, and to the needs of the moment. It would allow, therefore, all 
freedom for practical variation in the organization of the several functions, as well 
as in the working of a particular function as needs and conditions alter.347
This approach would account for the fact that “not all interests are common to all, and 
that the common interests do not concern all countries in the same degree.” Therefore, 
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Mitranian functionalism was conceived as an alternative to the discredited political 
unions of the past, which had bound “together some interests which are not of common 
concern to the group, while cut[ting] asunder some interests of common concern to the 
group and those outside it.”348 
Among his central aims was to conceive a viable means of productively utilizing 
the very competitive incentives that often produced counter-productive conflict between 
territorially defined nation-states to ramify mutually beneficial assistance. He did so by 
emphasizing the common benefits attained through self-interested mutual aid in 
accomplishing certain specified functions.349 He suggested that this joint effort in defined 
areas of activity could be accomplished by shifting the source of state legitimacy and the 
basis of the international system away from territorially defined unions, to the efficient, 
cooperative performance of necessary functions toward the fulfillment of each nation’s 
respective needs. This would give rise to “collective rational thinking” toward problem 
solving and possibly conflict resolution.350 He thought of functional cooperation as an 
unexpectedly simple way of fixing what was fundamental broken with the international 
system:   
Instead of breaking up government mechanically into a pyramid of subordinate 
territorial areas, we need for our new ends rather to dissect its tasks and relevant 
authorities on lines that correspond to and fit those tasks. Instead of keeping up 
the old and barren attempt to establish a formal and fixed division of sovereignty 
and power, a division which changing conditions continually puts out of joint, we 
could with a little insight and boldness distribute power in accordance with the 
practical requirements of every function and object.351
Mitrany saw such a strategy as a workable way of mitigating the structural rigidities built 
into international politics that hindered cooperation between states and complicated the 
 
 
 208 
settlement of conflicts thereby. However, with regard to certain tensions this produced, 
Chryssochoou states that: 
[T]he ‘functional imperative’, as the basic law governing the evolution of the 
European integration process, rejected the inevitability of constitutional 
requirements and fixed divisions of functional and political authority, and instead 
focused on problems which… cannot be solved separately by each government 
acting alone. 
 
The intuitive reasonableness of the method is apparent. Yet for its striking simplicity it 
was no less revolutionary as a means of reorganizing the basis for relations between 
nation-states to promote more effective cooperation between human societies.  
Another positive consequence of functionalism was that it would potentially 
enable the development of supra-national authorities without impinging on the autonomy 
of states. According to Henig’s general observation, 
…postulates, and makes a virtue of, integrated decision-making structures 
operating within defined sectors, such as coal or agriculture. Within those sectors 
there [would develop] ‘supra-national’ institutions but elsewhere governments 
and states [would] retain their traditional authority. …A degree of functional 
integration may [therefore] be compatible with a broadly inter-governmental 
approach [to integration]. 352 
  
Yet as Henig also observes, “early proponents [namely Mitrany] of integration argued 
that successful operation of supra-national structures [produced by functional 
cooperation]… would generate a demand for more.”353
Qualified by technical expertise, specialists in various issue areas would comprise 
assemblies to determine policy and political action, a style dubbed “management 
committee government” that Mitrany believed would naturally assume democratic 
characteristics. Such cooperative decision-making among experts would lead to greater 
efficiency in the administration of services by functional agencies. This would create 
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felicitous conditions out of which, he presumed, such committees of experts, whose 
authority would be legitimated by their knowledge, would constitute pressure groups 
whose shared sense of responsibility would prevail over any partisan affiliation or 
ideological doctrine.  
Mitrany believed such mutual cooperation would gradually lead to integration as 
national governments and citizens recognized the benefits of deepening material 
assistance between states. The logic of functional integration would enhance the 
freedoms of all participants, providing strong disincentives to any act potentially 
disruptive of the process. Therefore it held practical advantages over more idealistic 
alternatives for integration, such as a potentially fractious and exclusionary “union of 
peoples” based on a tenuous “promise of peace” as proposed by Kalergi’s Pan-European 
movement.354
Mitrany, via these positivistic notions of human reason and progress (the faith of 
scientism), was responding to the problems generated by the historic shift in European 
governance that concluded World War One, which saw many of the continent’s imperial 
monarchies dissolved or transformed into mere figureheads of state. Thus he was 
motivated to provide a critique of certain intrinsic impediments to federalist attempts at 
integration, “the common defects of sectional unions”, including what he dubbed 
continental and ideological unions. He also developed his functionalist alternative in 
contrast to the failed League of Nations system.
 Elements of the sort of technocratic expertise in government and mutual 
cooperation between states advanced by Mitrany are quite evident today at various levels 
of international society. Among IGOs, the EU in particular functions through organized 
working committees, independent investigations and commissioned studies.  
355 
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An early opponent of a qualified state centrism who precociously emphasized the 
“material interdependence” of states, Mitrany’s contribution was to explicate how a 
functionalist notion of authoritative legitimacy toward cooperative, incremental 
integration could transform traditional, representative voting democracies.356 The latter 
were inferior precisely because any segment of the mob could raise a candidate to power 
within a declining (kakistocratic) form of “government by politicians”. In the age of late-
modernity secular and “democratic” political authority—the dominion of charismatic 
ascetic-consumerist priests—had replaced former, de-legitimated sources of institutional 
power, but had not yet established effective means of administrative control. This created 
a volatile situation in which the tenuous authority of states was easily contested by 
opposing democratic forces. In the best scenario it lead to the mismanagement of 
societies and their conflicts, and increased the possibility of widespread disorder. While 
still advocating similarly democratic institutional means, Mitrany sought to reverse 
accepted wisdom concerning the division of sovereignty and power, asserting that: 
instead …of asking by whom should sovereignty and power be exercised, we 
should rather ask upon what objects they should be exercised; …in other words, 
the real question is not ‘who are the rightful authorities,’ but rather ‘what are the 
rightful ends – and what the proper means for them?’ 
 
He suggested that the basis of authority itself be transformed so as to “derive from the 
performance of a common task” rather than “the possession of a separate ‘right’.357
Functionalism would enable “the application of carefully examined, but not 
necessarily politically structured, strategies for transcending (national) territorial 
boundaries in tackling issues of a technical nature,” that would ineluctably build 
international institutions.
 
358 These in turn would induce a normative transformation to 
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mitigate conflict in the world by stimulating a shift of popular loyalty from the nation-
state to un-dogmatic international institutions created to perform specified tasks in the 
common human interest. Recognizing that: 
Empire and League having failed to find a way to an active international unity, 
because outstripped in different ways by the growth of social life, some reformers 
would now try federation; yet the very number and variety of the schemes 
proposed, limited territorially or ideologically, show that a scheme that might 
bring all peoples together cannot even be through of, 
 
Mitrany believed a functionalist approach to international integration would create “a 
peace that would bring [nations] actively together”. What was required above all for a 
peaceful existence between increasingly co-dependent states was “[t]he growth of new 
administrative devices, and especially of planned public action… in the international 
sphere.” 359
Nietzsche would have been immediately suspicious of such a rationalistic method 
for the governance of human communities and would certainly have thought it all-too-
human. Yet given the widespread decadence of the age he likely would have supported it, 
as a means of eroding the authority (and popular veneration) of the state. Such an 
administration of affairs seems to echo utilitarian concerns and is bound to reproduce 
many of the distortions that inhibit the becoming of the best. While attempting to contend 
with the tendency of “nation-states to uphold certain sorts of dogma which distract policy 
from the maximization of public welfare,” and which when regarded “as a given, … 
 
However optimistic his approach, Mitrany took the category of “expertise” for 
granted, reifying power / knowledge regimes and the technocratic rationality they 
reproduced as a just and desirable basis of a new method of social administration and 
normatively transformed international order.  
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impose an unnecessary inflexibility [upon] thinking about how the requirements of 
human beings could be served”360
The base impulse to rule over others for its own sake in a negative will to 
nothingness as nihilistic power was unconsciously reiterated – if in an inverted manner – 
in functionalism’s reduction of human life to sets of material requirements that could 
most effectively be met by rational means. Though Nietzsche’s experience of the Franco-
Prussian war was traumatic, and he viewed the war and its outcome as abhorrent, it did 
not fundamentally alter his view on the value of conflict for society.  Peace, in and for 
itself, was he believed a reactive value motivated by the slave’s desire for a insipid 
comfort and rejection of the natural rank order of types (Rangordnung). However 
repulsive and cynical the official justifications for organized warfare may have seemed to 
him after his traumatic experiences behind the front lines, campaigning against conflict 
seemed equally repugnant to him. Nietzsche’s rejection of the pacifist trends of his time 
is complicated: despite having later come to see the manifold dangers in unified 
Germany’s growing power and its imperial ambitions as one of the disastrous 
consequences of the Franco-Prussian war, condemning warfare generally and advocating 
 the functionalist solution shares the primary 
assumptions about the ends of human community of liberal-modern idealists. It also 
replicates in quasi-utopian terms the view, that at the inter- or supranational level the 
highest purpose of political community lies in its acting to effectively ameliorate the 
banal, commonplace struggle individuals experience in meeting their mundane, if 
essential needs; an objective that had already been adopted by that coldest of cold 
monsters, the nation-state (at least in the industrialized world, where it was most 
thoroughly instantiated).  
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its ban from the realm of possible human activities was a life-denying strategy more 
likely to compound the original problem than to progress mankind into a utopian future.  
Though Nietzsche viewed the wars between modern European nation-states as 
wholly reactive, futilely destructive and symptomatic of his—and by extension, our— 
epoch’s decadence, they were also for those very reasons, unfortunately necessary; a 
continent wide peace, if attained, would be plausibly more harmful. Moreover such a 
peace would be doomed anyway, for by preserving a toxic status-quo it could overcome 
neither the unnatural desire for radical equality through the annihilation of authentic 
difference nor the ressentiment born of weakness and rationalized via slave-morality that 
motivated such a desire. The all-too-human contradictions generated by modernity’s anti-
natural ideals would exacerbate the underlying sources of conflict throughout European 
society, a notion Mitrany corroborates.  
Rather than crudely conceiving the organization of political community as a 
means to abolish suffering and conflict through the mutual attainment of common needs, 
Nietzsche thought it should structure a culturally specific and salubrious agon within 
which each might attain the highest of which they are capable for the greater enrichment 
of culture – and its infrequent efflorescence – and the thriving of the exceptional geniuses 
it may eventually produce. Nietzsche’s view on the peace of our time (the motivation for 
which he anticipated and extensively critiqued) has important implications for the 
understanding his philosophical oeuvre imparts vis-à-vis the tenets and aspirations of an 
ultra-liberal-modern project such as the formal unification of Europe and the institutional 
apparatus of the European Union.   
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Again, the functionalist thesis of European integration envisioned a world of 
technocratic experts supervising the creation and administration of a newly prosperous 
Europe. Its institutions would be designed to produce a civilization constituting the most 
effective feeding trough at which its constituent masses would ever have gorged. It would 
maximize efficiency across numerous areas of production and administration, resulting in 
a peaceful sort of well-managed “utopia”; an appealing pasture to provide as much 
contentment as devisable, one in which the herd would happily stay – having found their 
place and being too fearful of jeopardizing their material security (re: comfort) to 
undertake dangerous ventures or risk even a necessary conflict. To underscore this 
critical perspective on the theory’s concern with maximizing public welfare, Rosamond 
reminds us that “Ernst Haas alluded to the idea that functionalism bears some 
resemblance to the Marxist-Leninist aspiration of replacing the ‘government of men’ 
[whose primary concern is that of preserving their power] with the ‘administration of 
things [in pursuit of the common good through the management of political 
economy]’”.361
Furthermore, Mitrany himself acknowledged the prevalence of irrationality in 
prevailing methods of political organization and conflict (mis)management, yet 
proclaimed his faith in man’s ‘social nature.’ Functionalism failed to contend with the 
likely unwillingness of the masses to relinquish the “enfranchisement” they enjoyed via 
representative institutions within the nation-state framework in any practical way.
  
362 
Even in Nietzsche’s productive period, the increasingly enfranchised and impudent 
crowd would never willingly relinquish the democratic processes they had “won”, having 
become accustomed to expressing their putative collective agency through them. Nor 
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would they have stood by as those newly acquired “rights” were supplanted by issue 
specific supranational assemblies comprised of reputed experts.363 The growing 
prominence of the state as a “new idol,” which, with or without popular support defends 
its own prerogatives and cultivates fervent and insidiously reactive forms of nationalism 
and patriotism to sustain the loyalty of its subjects, would not be so easily challenged. 
Bismarck’s Reich had demonstrated this to Nietzsche less than a century earlier.  
With delusions of ideological neutrality (a common conceit among the apostles of 
scientism) premising his favored program for Europe’s integration, Mitrany’s supposedly 
dogma free functionalist approach advanced a sophisticated replication of herd values 
and failed to effectively contend with the fundamental source of the reactive power it 
sought to alleviate. I refer to the corruption that the spirit of revenge (conceived in 
Christian–Platonic form as an opposition to difference and becoming—“the injustices”—
of life), symptomatized in a negative will to nothingness as nihilistic power, introduces to 
the bodies and the behavior of intrinsically weak individuals. It initiates a harmful 
deformation of instincts prevenient to the production of “rational” experts.  
Against federalism Mitrany argued that “the organization of a federal group 
would have to be rigid, arid so therefore will be its relations with other similar units.” 
This led him to identify a paradox he thought inherent to federalism and problematic for 
any genuinely viable international system of states:  
In so far as successful it would engender a group patriotism, thus in the end 
reproducing in all political essentials the relationship which has existed between 
states and the League [of Nations] rather than that between a state and its local 
bodies, or that of a federation to its members. The center of gravity of the new  
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international life, that is, would again be misplaced, unless the scope and 
authority of the smaller units were to be correspondingly lesser that those of the 
wider grouping – and in that case they could not be close federations.364 
 
Yet despite recognizing some of the problems of federalism with regard to his aim of 
realizing a new international society through coordinated, functional action, his 
functionalist alternative did not seem to recognize that the solution it provided fused 
ideals developed on the basis of existing trends of cooperation. His alternative hints at the 
obsolescence of states, and possibility of overcoming the nation-state system in favor of 
“a union of peoples”, whose “functional representation [could be managed] somewhat on 
the lines of the governing organs of the ILO”.365
Rosamund observes four general sorts of critical responses to functionalism. 
According to his summary, functionalism assumes “that the determination of needs is an 
objective and technocratic exercise”, making it “difficult to see how functionalist logic 
would work in the normal conditions of a market economy”. Indeed, making the 
determination of needs “an objective and technocratic exercise” would create the danger 
of constraining the very articulation of need in society, unnaturally formalizing its 
expression by sanctioning only those expressed according to the dictates of the 
bureaucratic organization(s) that would emerge (the disastrous five-year plans of state 
 In its affirmation of liberalism and 
democracy Mitrany’s alternative was already conditioned by the values and forms of 
political life which, at the state or macro-political level, he seemingly opposed. There is a 
sense in which his vision of a functional organization unconsciously symptomatized 
many problems of creating / maintaining effective order in an increasingly complex 
international society organized around the nation-state which, however defective or 
harmful constituted the most (only?) practical unions of peoples in the mid-1940s. 
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controlled economies such as the former Soviet Union, with the shortages of basic goods 
and the stubbing out of innovation and experimentation that resulted, immediately springs 
to mind).  
Second, Mitranian functionalism entails a naïve faith “in the ability of human 
beings and governments to move in rational directions”. This objection refers in part to 
the likelihood that groupthink, or a myopic form of accepted wisdom would arise within 
such groups of experts’ empanelled to determine solutions to socio-political problems. 
That is, their own inherently limited perspectives or worldview (Weltanschauung) would 
come to inhibit their ability to consider viable possibilities outside the disciplinary 
epistemic regime that would simultaneously constitute the technocratic authority of their 
knowledge and describe its limit – a limit they would be unlikely to perceive.  
Third, as Haas later observed, functionalism “has a poor record of prediction,” 
although, Rosamond states, this could be argued to be invalid, as functionalism is taken 
by some to be “about advocacy rather than prediction”. Yet it is difficult to see how such 
a putatively positivist advocacy can be efficacious if it completely lacks any predictive 
power; moreover, can advocacy be strictly separated from a desire for some specific 
future outcome, which necessarily involves a thought experiment in which values and 
implicit, if not explicit predictions (if only weak ones) are involved? Forth, functionalism 
is perceived by many to lack scientific rigor. But this has been attributed to the possibility 
that, having emerged out of (methodologically imprecise) idealist debates of the inter-war 
period, “Mitrany’s …intended audience was not always an academic one.366
While being a fairly consistent advocate and defender of science, Nietzsche would 
have been skeptical of 20th century efforts to “fortify” the social studies with the 
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imprimatur of science and probably seen it as a symptom of bad-conscience.367 And the 
aforementioned areas of criticism still do not attend the problem of what sort of will-to-
truth the Functionalist model sought to develop and institutionalize, reifying as it did 
some of the most reactive aspects of status-quo knowledge-authority structures, the state 
system that legitimated them and the anti-natural forms of hierarchical power that 
resulted in a naturalized spirit of revenge. 
The school of functionalism has been an influential strain of European integration 
theory throughout the past fifty years, both as the intellectual precursor to neo-functional 
integration theory and for having significant influence on other, more recent schools of 
thought, such as interdependence and regime theory. Functionalism’s relevance persists 
because its approach to collective problem solving continues to be so widely applied at 
all levels of national and international society.368
Populist objections that EU methods are anti-democratic are easily overcome (i.e.: 
made irrelevant) via functionalist techniques of bureaucratic organization. According to 
the disciplining authority of the prevailing power / knowledge regime that reifies its own 
self-serving rationality, when popularly elected representatives of the herd empanel 
specialist committees or appoint experts to governmental and intergovernmental agencies 
tasked with recommending a policy course via studied consideration, negotiating 
settlements and agreements or making determinations of fact, a popular (or “democratic”) 
imprimatur is conferred on their decisions by extension, and their will may be said to 
have been realized democratically. In our dominant, post-Weberian culture of 
 This is to say, it continues to satisfy 
important dimensions of the prevailing pathos of truth. 
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technocratic rationality, any objections to the privileging of bureaucratic expertise are 
likely to be dismissed as unreasonable, if not insane. 
The bureaucratic organization of governmental and civil authorities according to a 
technological rationality which ramifies the prerogatives of a hegemonic epistemic 
community divides competencies into various areas of expertise that must, in the macro-
political spheres of life, be recognized as a defining characteristic of European 
modernism. The Western (i.e.: European/Anglo-American) habit of systematizing 
knowledge, in tandem with a corresponding legal culture for the management of human 
resources and institutions has developed as an effective mechanism for the enforcement 
of accountability according to a particular will-to-truth. This strict standardization of 
conduct and apportionment of responsibility represents another unifying feature of 
European-ness, a characteristic feature of European Gemeinschaft. Together these 
organizational features, as modes of being, are symptomatic of the underlying ethos of 
seemingly disparate European cultures. Conventional globalization is in no small part the 
exportation of this methodological framework for organization in myriad applications and 
disparate forms to polities outside the Western world where it developed 
autochthonously. Thus the globalization complex exhibits key elements – albeit largely 
reactive ones – of the unifying ethos at the core of the prevailing idea of Europe where it 
is imposed (as in the colonial era) and/or adopted (as in our post-colonial period) beyond 
Europe’s cultural frontier.  
Despite being, to varying degrees, mimetic manifestations of ‘Europeanization’, 
the imposition/adoption of this unifying ethos outside of Europe through globalizing 
institutions, processes and forces (throughout the colonial and our post-colonial era) is 
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multiplying its core (exclusionary) concept(s) of organization in frameworks for socio-
political inclusivity. These frameworks, as institutional instantiations of a particular mode 
of life, actively interpolate (annex) the other and hybridize belonging in a particular 
setting or milieu, through the interpretive screens that are the autochthonous cultures that 
they encounter. The European ethos central to the globalization complex thereby gives 
rise to new forms of becoming that are wildly diverse and which contain at their core a 
seed from which protean expressions of an elemental ‘good Europeanism’ might 
germinate. This ethos—however problematic in ideological terms its imposition or 
adaptation outside of Europe may be—has had quantitatively and qualitatively 
discernable benefits. It continues to develop in unexpected, positive and active ways, 
through the realization of abstract potentials of globality. 
 Specific to Europe, a primary concern of integrationists over the last seven 
decades has been the contentious issue of what sort of institutional apparatus is most 
conducive to the unification of the continent, and how it might be perfected. It must be 
said that the bureaucratic method of building and managing common institutions through 
a technological rationality is, in all its dimensions, an essential element and expression of 
the prevailing idea of Europe, and has proven adaptable enough to persist through various 
transmutations of institutionalization. It is therefore to be celebrated as demonstrative of 
the agreement of elites among [European] peoples in their common acceptance of 
diversity facilitated by institutions at once flexible and efficacious enough to preserve a 
higher order through its preservation of a miscellany of types.  
As such the EU’s hierarchic, bureaucratically organized and technocratically 
executed method of integration counter-intuitively exemplifies important concerns of 
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Nietzsche’s own idea of Europe. For, although imperfectly, it does in some part account 
for his interest in and support of the abolition of divisive nationalisms and instrumental 
utilization of the best aspects each people, cultural realm (e.g.: Romantic, Germanic, 
Slavic, etc.) and religious tradition (Catholic, Protestant, Orthodox, etc.) has to offer the 
continent as a whole, to comprise an ethos for its elevation. Nietzsche’s ideal for 
Europe—‘good Europeanism’—is implicit in his idea of it. Its highest potential was to be 
realized via a radically life-affirming anti-essentialist overcoming of the slave moral 
values that had straight-jacketed individuals, communities and entire peoples over much 
of the preceding fifteen hundred years.  
The identic categories that developed in that time comprised the primary basis for 
belonging within the respective communities they delimited, inherently limiting 
possibilities for becomings therein. A naturalization of ethnic and national prejudices, 
exclusionary notions of community conditioned perspectives among groups and nations 
across the continent in largely counter-productive ways. Conversely, Nietzsche’s idea of 
Europe presents a vision of a Europe that accounts for and affirms difference whilst 
defusing the hatred and suspicion spawned by deleterious stereotypes so that the greatest 
number may thrive relatively unconstrained by the irrational chauvinisms of the past. 
Although chords of this high-mindedness may be heard in the shallow political 
correctness so prevalent in the spectacles of our day, Nietzsche’s vision was far more 
deliberate and (according to the tenets of his vitalist notion of the political and power 
ontology) conscientiously grounded in reality – that is man’s authentic nature. His sights 
were set on a farther horizon, Europe’s eventual unification, the need for which 
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coextended with the distant aim of overcoming the debilitating political organization of 
life inflicted upon the healthiest through the values of liberal modernity.     
A genealogical critique of the major theories of European integration requires 
consideration of their historical context; the generation and response of its institutions to 
dynamic events of which it was a part. In examining the unfolding of Europe’s late-20th 
century process of political cooperation, social integration and more formal economic 
unification (all of which Nietzsche anticipated), as well as the activity of theorizing these 
activities, it should be noted that the character of Europe’s common institutions both 
resulted from and influenced events at the level of individuals, parties, regions, member-
states, and non-members within and outside of Europe. Beyond indicating a particular 
outcome of contending wills to power and the trajectory that has set Europe on, or the 
psychological setting within which those wills arose or the relative degree of health it 
symptomatizes among Europe’s constituent peoples, it is the result of the whole of 
occurrences in the world leading up to it and happenings throughout the duration of its 
existence to the present, which are obviously far too complex to adequately summarize 
here. Nevertheless, an attempt to provide an overview is necessary to comprehend the 
context of these transformative occurrences. 
As the benefits of cooperation achieved through the EC became evident by the 
1960s, closer economic cooperation was pursued and political integration began to seem 
to many both inevitable and predictable. In 1965, the Treaty of Brussels (effective in 
1967) provided a common institutional framework for the “three Communities,” namely 
the ECSC, EEC and Euratom. Previously each of the communities had a separate Council 
and Commission (or High Authority in the case of the ECSC), but the Brussels Treaty 
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combined their powers into a single Council of Ministers (after 1994 the Council of the 
European Union) and a single Commission. Thus the present institutional character and 
shape of the future EU had begun to emerge. The organization was then known simply as 
the EEC, and its closer integration intensified philosophical and partisan political debate 
within and between each member state over whether the community’s mandate should 
eventually supercede its members’ national sovereignty or whether it should emphasize a 
more inter-governmental character of cooperation between politically distinct but closely 
associated states.  
The Luxembourg compromise followed a brief crisis instigated by French 
President De Gaulle’s veto of EEC’s effort at budgetary reform on the basis that it was 
too supranational.369
Neo-functionalism became the dominant theory in integration studies in the early 
1960s, in part to account for inadequacies in the functionalist school of thought. But it 
also occurred in response to the behavioralist challenge across the social sciences. In an 
effort to answer basic questions such as why integration processes might occur, and how 
 This compromise established the recognized right of member states 
to veto any legislation that a national government believed impinged on critical areas of 
national sovereignty or vital security interests. De Gaulle’s veto was a reassertion of the 
prerogatives of national self-determination, which seemed at the time to put a brake on 
the potential depth of Europe’s functional integration. 
This establishes the backdrop for the next major theoretical perspective to emerge 
on European integration, and it is among the most influential to date. 
 
Neo-functionalism 
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might they be made desirable or encouraged, neo-functionalism took the development of 
common institutions in Europe as the focal point of its examination. With their attention 
on Europe, scholars in this theoretical school strove to explain certain integration 
outcomes. This begged certain questions however, such as how exactly any conclusions 
the neo-functionalist perspective reached could be universally applicable, even in the 
abstract, outside the European cultural realm (broadly construed) and its particular, if 
internally varied, historical and social contexts.  
Neo-functionalism also drew upon the behavioralist trend in social science 
research to offer a provocative and seemingly useful explanatory thesis for the 
Community’s integration dynamic. This entailed an intensification of faith in scientism, 
through: 
the growing impulse to render the study of social phenomena more ‘scientific’. 
This meant that theories were devices for generating testable hypotheses and that 
theoretical evaluation would be bound up with the extent to which research driven 
by the theory in question produced a depiction of ‘reality’ that confirmed or 
denied the hypothesis.370
The behavioralist trend transformed notions of academic legitimacy in the social sciences 
and the form of its inquiry. Disciplinary authority became dependent upon the 
parsimoniousness definition of a problem and the application of rigorous scientific 
standards and statistical methods in research to produce quantitative results. Proponents 
of the approach believed that it defined the terms of a successful demonstration of the 
“accuracy” of a theoretical approach. From a Nietzschean perspective, it was a 
sophisticated if philosophically problematic performative enactment of an ideal of 
scholarly objectivity: the mimicking of the positivistic orientation compelled by the 
discourses of scientism. 
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In brief, neo-functionalism, much like its functionalist predecessor, emphasized 
the interactions of diverse actors pursuing a variety of interests and stressed processes 
over outcomes. It asserted that technical cooperation in specific areas of shared concern 
would have a spillover effects, or positive ramifications for further mutual aid in other 
sectors and activities. This would generate a cooperative momentum that would affect 
numerous areas of economic and social governance as well as political authority, leading 
to closer cooperation and transparency, mutual trust and ever-deepening integration.371
Ernst B. Haas’s The Uniting of Europe, which first appeared in 1958, became a 
landmark text on Europe’s integration process and a starting point for his influential neo-
functionalist view. The theory that emerged held that as disparate and competitive nation-
state actors collaborated in various policy realms, whether functional or otherwise, new 
and relatively independent transnational competences would arise between them. At this 
early stage in Europe’s integration Haas observed that the process was occurring 
primarily along economic lines. However, he acknowledged even then that “economic 
integration, however defined, may be based on political motives and frequently begets 
political consequences. The existence of political motives [for economic integration]…in 
Western Europe is clearly established.”
 
Ernst B. Haas and Leon N. Lindberg were the major figures of the neo-functionalist 
school from the late 1950s until the early 1970s. In attempting to provide a Nietzschean 
analysis of the neo-functionalist development in theorizing European integration I will 
focus primarily on the former (Haas), utilizing his works and contemporary critical 
assessments of them. 
372 Cooperation leading to political integration 
was likely to occur more gradually.  
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Through a “process of bureaucratic interpenetration, usually referred to in the 
literature as engrenage,” the converging demands of states would necessitate the 
establishment of central authorities to manage cooperation.373
As Rosamund puts it, “neo-functionalism’s appearance coincided with the 
development of pluralism in political science [and] in many ways …can be read as a 
pluralist theory.”
 This would incrementally 
build trust to create a basis for greater loyalty between rival political entities, fostering 
the prospect of ‘good-Europeanism’. The mitigation of nationalist chauvinisms and 
xenophobic prejudices would ultimately alleviate any basis for conflicts between states, 
which would lead to the rational prioritization of mutually beneficial cooperation over 
narrow, national self-interests to maintain the beneficial dynamic of ever-greater 
exchange (understood in terms of mutual aid) across ever-expanding domains of activity.  
The anticipated result was a mutual reinforcement of expanding shared interests, 
one that has, arguably, been incrementally realized throughout the process of European 
unification. Such collaboration would lead to changed perceptions and expectations as 
well as a transformation of identity within each community involved (re: nation-states 
acting as sovereign actors), as they came to recognize and enjoy the practical benefits of 
cooperation. Following classic economistic reasoning this increase in material prosperity 
and existential security would continually generate the rational desire for further 
integration, necessitating additional cooperation and providing a renewed impetus for 
integration, ad infinitum. 
374 Indeed, Haas himself had written “it is the thesis of this study that the 
processes implied in integration are merely a special expression of the logic of pluralism 
…which tends to lead toward the formation of countervailing aggregates of economic 
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interest, freedom of organization and bargaining in western Europe.”375 On the premise 
that “functional integration requires pluralism”376 it was the neo-functionalist’s view that 
such pluralism was initiated by elite socialization, in which high-ranking officials seek 
the cooperation of their peers in neighboring states in order to resolve problems or reach 
agreement in issue areas of mutual concern. Working together to manage international 
problems, these elites would create an impetus for mutual management that would take 
form in agencies combining the knowledge, perspectives and talents of each states’ most 
influential members.377  
Prior to 1944–1945, the impulse for such cooperation extends back to early 
modern Europe in a developmental process punctuated by (at least) three transformative 
events, the peace of Westphalia (1648), the Congress of Vienna (1815) and the Treaty of 
Versailles (1919).378 But the neofunctionalists asserted that a far more profound degree of 
trans-national cooperation was occurring following the second World War, one that was 
gradually subordinating the nation-state itself to the prerogatives of an emergent, supra-
national economic community and ultimately a unified polity as well. Chryssochoou 
observes, “An essential part of the neo-functionalist strategy was the identification of the 
Community method as the new modus operandi of the general system.” This method, he 
explains:  
…consisted, inter alia, of high levels of elite socialization, joint lobbying 
activities by organized interests, the Commission’s right of legislative initiative, 
the involvement of national governments in complex negotiations at the European 
level and a certain culture on the part of the Commission for upgrading the wider 
Community interest.379
Old forms of discipline (in the Foucaultian sense of a constructive and interactive 
dynamic process of power-knowledge relations) took new guises to moderate norms and 
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expectations as an incrementally transformed power–knowledge regime, one dynamically 
symptomatic and productive of the changed jurisdictions and institutional character of the 
authority it mediated.  
To restate: as mutual policy formulation and collaboration generated its own 
momentum, the neofunctionalists perspective was fortified by an observable increase in 
the need for cooperation as spillover between issue-areas occurred. Moreover, as elite 
interests converged upon a generally agreed upon understanding of the project of 
integration, it became easier to transform the attitudes of the masses – to bring them 
onboard as it were, as well. Voter sentiments across member states were gradually 
transformed in favor of the EU as it increasingly sought their imprimatur. This occurred 
not only through an increase in direct voter involvement in determining the future course 
of the union via referenda and the election of parliamentary representatives but also 
through the extensive marketing (spectacularization) of putatively common Europe-wide 
objectives. This was plainly evident in the late 1980s and 90s.  
To legitimate their agenda, EU elites and other arbiters of integration consistently 
promoted the prerogatives and interests of EU institutions, e.g.: their continued 
development and the eastward expansion of the Union. Validating their intuition that the 
beneficial affects of elite socialization – the optimism of the post-war Western European 
ethos, which was crucial to developments that would culminate in the EU – the media 
willingly perpetuated the desire to make the EU a reality. It did so through mass-media 
support of the view that optimism would be catching as the benefits of regional 
cooperation were realized, and this would transform the attitudes of average European 
citizens.  
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The aforementioned new European ethos was gradually legitimated and 
mainstreamed among publics of the EU’s member- and aspirant-states. To gain broad 
acceptance an democratic idea of Europe, one amenable to the all-too-many, was 
promoted. By appealing to the timorous and the spiritual dwarfs through populist values, 
the highly sublimated ressentiment of ascetic-consumerist priests—whose primary 
objective was a unified European market—exploited the herd’s susceptibility to crass 
consumption. This was a secularized, slave-moral compensation for the absence of any 
greater metaphysical grounding for existence in the wake of World War Two and the 
Holocaust, let alone the death of God. 
As the neofunctionalists identified, the primary aim of conventional advocates of 
European integration, has been to maximize profits by facilitating economic flows 
through centralized (quasi-federal) supra-governmental institutions. From the perspective 
of these “flies of the marketplace” greater coherence and efficiency in the management of 
a trading bloc or region and the broader global system of which each is a part is 
intrinsically rational and desirable. Such ideals are asserted via the cacophonous and 
bedazzling spectacle that masks the inauthenticity generated by the artificial and 
exaggerated desires it cultivates. These originally Christian–Platonic ideals, sublated 
through secularization, provide existential meanings and ontological purposes to passive 
nihilists in a hyper-decadent age typified by a ‘cynical, enlightened false-
consciousness’.380 According to the dictates of the New Economy ‘free market 
fundamentalism’ every human need is fulfilled by consumption, and every period of life 
is defined by it: childhood, education, work, marriage and family, and death. 
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As a means of perfecting this set of ultra-liberal-modern, anti-natural ideals, 
Europe’s conventional economic and political integration enhances activities and forms 
of life that systematically deflect those endowed with healthy instincts and strong drives 
from their authentic selves and opportunities for radical self-overcoming (acts of 
becoming-other). However, as I try to show below, Europe’s integration and the broader 
forces of globalization also generate unanticipated, abstract potentials of globality that 
may enable the healthiest free spirits to become who it is they are. These transformative 
conditions for becoming are also shown to be the invariable result of the achievement and 
extension of the objectives of ascetic-consumerist priests of ressentiment.381 
The neo-functionalist premise that the procedural sorts of consensus building 
characteristic of national parliamentary political systems would be expanded to the 
supranational level and thereby displace the international state system’s power based 
relations was attacked as naïvely idealistic. Against the neo-functionalist thesis it was 
argued that the relevance of states and their long-established sovereign power in a largely 
anarchic international system would not be diminished by the limited consensus occurring 
between states in Western Europe, which would itself eventually breakdown and thereby 
demonstrate once more the efficacy of the nation-state as the best tool for cultivating and 
maximizing liberal values and freedoms.382
The recovery of neofunctionalism from its reputation as a failed academic 
experiment is rather more than an exercise in academic excavation. The fact that it 
was buried in the first place is indicative of a tendency within the present scholarly 
community to produce narratives of the field’s history that draw robust boundaries 
between past errors and present rigor. In the wrong hands this can induce all 
 
Regarding Haas’ late (2004) defense of neo-functionalism and his assertion that it 
was no longer obsolescent, Rosamund remarked that: 
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manner of closures and the establishment of claims that effectively outlaw 
particular kinds of work. Beyond its (recovered) analytical salience, 
neofunctionalism was/is a remarkably open-minded intellectual project that drew 
sustenance from across the spectrum of the social sciences.383 
 
This states a limitation of the field that originates in the prevailing conception of truth and 
the best means of deducing it. The straight-jacketing of possible trajectories for theoretical 
investigation can only impair the field further. 
 
Transactionalism 
Through the 1950s and early 1960s an alternative theory to the then dominant 
functionalist and neo-functionalist schools of international integration was being 
developed by Karl Deutsch and his peers. Dubbed “transactionalism” for what he 
identified as a key dimension in processes of international integration, it became 
influential within the field in the mid-1960s. The behavioralist emphasis on “testing 
theoretical conjectures against empirical data” that intensified the discourses of scientism 
and the positivist orientation it conferred on and the social studies. Nonetheless this very 
much appealed to Deutsch, whose works, “assembled and analyzed a large amount of 
statistical data on population movements, language assimilation and the flow of 
international transactions such as trade and mail.”384
In three of his major works, Nationalism and Social Communication (1953, 
reissued in 1966), and Political Community in the North Atlantic Area (1957), 
Communication Theory and Political Integration (1964), Deutsch examined nationalism, 
and its complex relationship to social learning, more broadly. He did so in order to 
explicate it as a determining factor in integrative developments between sovereign 
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communities. Key to the largely positive communal ethos created by nationalism was a 
more or less shared mental state reinforced by we-feelings and intentions at once 
productive of and naturalized by a shared language and worldview (Weltanschauung). 
Enhancing the frequency and effectiveness of communication between states was 
critical for Deutsch. “The guiding hypothesis of transactionalist work on integration was 
that a sense of community among states would be a function of the level of 
communication between states.”385 The ways in which nationalism was formative of the 
bonds unifying a community and how such a powerful force could be constructively 
managed so as to facilitate—rather than inhibit—the formation of multi-national polities 
to mitigate the chances of warfare between countries were motivating concerns for 
Deutsch. Therefore one of his primary concerns was explicating NATO in terms of how it, 
along with other institutions and geo-political dynamics was giving rise to a “transatlantic 
‘security community’ rather than on European integration, per se.”386  
According to Deutsch the character of security communities differed according to 
two major types: the pluralistic and amalgamated. The former he considered to have 
arisen from formal agreements between states short of creating any supranational 
institutional authority “to produce a ‘sense of security’ among the relevant populations, 
whereby the resolution of conflicts through violent means would be replaced by mutually 
acceptable methods for their peaceful settlement.”387 According to Rosamund:  
Pluralistic communities required only three conditions to exist: compatibility of 
major values among the units, a capacity for politically relevant groups to respond 
to each other’s stimuli without violence and a ‘mutual predictability of the relevant 
aspects of one another’s political, economic and social behavior’.388 
 
As all of these conditions were present throughout the hyper-decadent, ultra-liberal- 
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-modern, transatlantic region in the post-war era, such a pluralistic community—however 
cynically rationalized and/or maintained—was imminently attainable.  
In addition to theorizing how the generation and fulfillment of expectations 
between diverse communities corresponded with the regularization of value norms and 
functional practices Deutsch attempted to demonstrate how, via such reciprocal 
affectivity, this would create the predictability and trust necessary for the development of 
an actual ‘sociopsychological community’.389 One positive and predictable result of 
increasing transactions of a certain sort would be a palpable change in the disposition 
among the respective publics of the communities toward one another. Deutsch called this 
“social learning” and considered it crucial in the formation of a larger people—a 
propaedeutic stage conditioning the possibility of a multi-cultural, transnational society or 
pluralistic community.390 Over a long period fundamental changes in popular attitudes and 
prejudices would occur through gradual social learning to foster, over generations, 
increasingly friendly relations between former rival states.391
The creation of common frameworks for institutional cooperation (like NATO) 
between separate nation-states was a necessary condition for the sorts of interaction 
Deutsch thought productive of greater comity between peoples. Preliminary to this “a 
process of social integration [which] lead[s] to the formation of ‘pluralistic’ security 
communities,” must occur, which upon further development via a “community of social 
communication” leads “to amalgamation.”
  
392 As Chryssochoou states, “community 
feelings, and the emergence over time of a ‘community of values’ at the larger level of 
aggregation, were seen [by Deutsch] as the result, rather than the cause, of closer links 
among participating units.”393 
 234 
Deutsch cites fourteen conditions of varying importance for both pluralistic and 
amalgamated security communities. The essential factors as he lists them are: 
“compatibility of major values” and “mutual responsiveness” between prospectively 
amalgamating units. Non-essential factors include: a distinctive way of life, a 
complementarity between “core areas and their capabilities”, at least one core area of 
which needed to exhibit “superior economic growth”, and between whose members there 
exist “expectation[s] of joint economic reward”. In this general setting Deutsch would 
expect to find (in no particular order) a “wide[ning] range of mutual transactions” 
facilitated by “unbroken links of social communication” fostering the “greater mobility of 
persons” and resulting in a discernable “broadening of elites”. Furthermore, Deutsch 
believes it helpful but nonessential that states forming such communities become 
“reluctant to wage ‘fratricidal’ war”, a condition he thought natural to the increased 
civility between them. The presence of an “outside military threat” could provide a strong 
incentive for forging a security community, as could pre-existing “strong economic ties” 
and “ethnic and linguistic assimilation”, but these latter conditions weren’t necessary for 
integrative processes to occur (as the recent break up Serbia and Montenegro into separate 
states served to demonstrate).394
 
 
Deutsch asserted that the greater amity arising between peoples in security 
communities would increase reasonableness in problem solving by fostering an instinctive 
preference for mutually agreeable outcomes between them. In the beneficial conditions 
encouraged by improved and regularized transactions within a security community, social 
challenges and political problems (potential sources of conflict) would automatically be  
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dealt with in a calmer manner. 
“The resolution of conflicts through violent means would be replaced by mutually 
acceptable methods for their peaceful settlement. [T]he particular attitudes of the 
actors involved… would create a certain culture of cooperation which, through the 
forging of further and closer communicative links among them, would make resort 
to war highly unlikely.”395 
 
Within the expanded, neoteric community, the mentality of its constituent peoples toward 
the utility of violence as a means for problem-solving and the uses of force more 
generally, would themselves be transformed. An effectively functioning security 
community would pacify its public, making it largely averse to inter-communal 
fighting.396
Yet another effect of transformed expectations due to social learning among the 
member-states of pluralistic security communities is the modification of the norms and 
practices of states outside the community. As the disposition of nations within a pluralistic 
community undergoes transformation, their methods of engagement with states on the 
outside of their community change as well. A transference of values gradually occurs 
thereby that infect and ways of interacting, conditioning the possibility for future inclusion 
of new members within the community and greater pluralism. This communication of 
norms and practices takes passive and active forms. On a social level it happens passively, 
through human mimesis resulting through myriad forms of contact. In the economic arena 
it occurs actively through the regularization of trade and standardization of production. So 
too its transmission is active in the political realm, as transformed expectations concerning 
the conduct of international affairs change the behavior of states. The communicable sense 
of mutual sympathy and trust arising from pluralistic security communities spreads 
 Views from within the community toward nations outside of it are a different 
matter. 
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between peoples as nations “inoculate” themselves with the attitudes of their neighbors 
through ever closer contact. This “contagious” effect is plainly evident from the EU’s 
recent expansions and palpable among the societies at its penumbra today.397  
In a logic related to that of Mitrany’s functionalist thesis, Deutsch believed that, 
“once pluralistic community formation [had] taken place, political elites [might] opt to 
build common supranational institutions, thereby producing ‘amalgamated security 
communities’ (essentially federal unions)”.398 This sort of formal integration shared all the 
necessary sociopsychological features of a pluralistic security community. But the 
amalgamated security community represented a much deeper degree of integration. As 
such it was dependent: 
in considerable part upon the relationship of two rates of change: the growing rate 
of claims and burdens upon central governments as against the growing –in some 
instances, the insufficiently growing—level of capabilities of the governmental 
institutions of the amalgamated political community.399
Rosamund notes Deutsch’s identification of six, those being “increased military 
burdens, …rapid increases in social mobilization and political participation within the 
component units, …shifts in social differentiation, a decline in administrative capabilities, 
a closure of political elites and a dissonance between government action and societal 
expectations.”
  
 
As such, “amalgamated communities were vulnerable to a number of potential 
destabilizing factors.”  
400 In other words, Deutsch anticipated that the efficaciousness of an 
amalgamating community could be undermined by the inability of the existing institutions 
of a component unit to adequately respond to or contend with rapid changes in the 
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prevailing attitudes and behavioral expectations of a component unit’s (member-state’s) 
constituents. 
In the view of German sociologist Ferdinand Tönnies, an important distinction 
needs to be made with relevance to Deutsch’s idea of the “more advanced form” of polity 
attained through the creation of a “living and organic collective entity… whose ‘norms of 
order’ are based upon ‘concord’” and the “rational coming together of ends that remain 
individual.” This qualitatively distinguishes the amalgamated security community from its 
weaker counterpart—the form of society attained in a pluralistic security community. The 
amalgamated form is better understood via the notion of a Gemeinschaft, a 
sociopsychological community comprising a “stable form of association… that rests on 
the concept of ‘one people’”. Conversely, the pluralistic security community is more 
easily achievable, as it consists of the co-existence of formally separate units—or states—
in limited society with one another. As a Gesellschaft, or conventionally agreed society it 
“rests on the concept of contract.”401
As Gesellschaft was simpler to attain, and increased familiarity between 
cooperating units, it was also likely to increase trust over time. As trust increased the 
“network of mutual transactions” occurring between the units involved would grow 
commensurately. Rosamund observes that “Deutsch was interested in Gemeinschaft as a 
condition of integration. The end point of integration, from this perspective, is a sense of 
community – a qualitative leap from pacts, treaties and alliances among states.”
 Whereas Gemeinschaft results from mutual 
convictions that unite people, Gesellschaft comes about in order to fulfill instrumental 
aims.  
402 For that 
leap to occur however, interactions would have to foster a high degree of responsiveness 
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corresponding with the respective capabilities of the units. As noted above, as transactions 
increase, attitudes and behavioral expectations are transformed as actors become 
comfortable with one another. The ‘we-feelings’ and we-intentions of their merging 
mindsets can accelerate demands that outpace the capabilities of the units – that is, exceed 
their responsiveness – and potentially frustrate the integration progress thereby. In order 
for an authentic Gemeinschaft to succeed these crucial “cognitive shifts” would have to be 
managed so as not to exceed the capacity of amalgamating units—states—to cope with 
them.403     
Aware of the possible utility of functionalist methods of integration toward the 
ultimate attainment of an amalgamated security community, Deutsch observes that: 
Functionalism, it appears, is a device that has been widely used both in successful 
and in unsuccessful movements toward amalgamation, somewhat a functional 
devolution and decentralization have been used in successful and in unsuccessful 
attempts at secession. The outcome in all such situations seems mostly to have 
been the result of other conditions and other processes—depending largely on 
whether functionalism mainly was associated with experiences of joint rewards or 
of joint deprivations—with functionalism in itself doing little to help or to harm.404
Chryssochoou observes that, “Deutsch was not particularly concerned with the 
institutional configuration that the integration process would bring about, or for that 
matter with processes of formal institutional change.”
  
He concludes with some ambivalence that functionalism would neither hinder nor 
necessarily facilitate the development of more comprehensive amalgamation between 
states. Because conditions and circumstances vary so widely between units (states) and 
across time, Deutsch largely avoids specific prescriptive criteria for the institutionalized 
integration of communities.  
405 More important than the sort of 
formal arrangements that engendered necessary trust, was the actual development of a 
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shared sense of security between peoples toward a similar mindset that would, in turn, 
foster common interests and analogous we-feelings and intentions between them to aid the 
desired integration of their communities. Deutsch’s “emphasis is on a different level of 
analysis: the development of a sense of community at the popular level.”406 
Out of his ostensible faith in science however, Deutsch maintained the dubious 
belief that the particular degree of integration between states could be determined by 
measuring “the volume, context, and scope of international transactions over multiple 
ranges of social, economic, cultural and political areas.” Moreover, he thought the rate of 
communication between units in these broad areas could be used via a “statistical tool 
called the ‘index of relative acceptance’,” to measure:  
the ratio of extra-regional relative to intra-regional communication and 
transactions. Integration is indicated by a higher volume and range of 
communications between community members than between members and 
outsiders. The more varied and numerous the transactions among a group of states, 
the more pronounced and solid the international community is likely to be.407
Of course all criteria for adducing such ratios would of necessity be determined arbitrarily 
and any meaning attached to them would be the subjective product of those decisions. 
Additionally, the impossibility of ever attaining an intrinsically objective stance on the 
matter in question, through some measure in the ratios of “communication and 
transactions” must be acknowledged and regarded as dubious—even to the extent they 
result in truth-apt claims about the world. As all estimations of the affective power of the 
communications and transactions in question, their respective ratios to one another and 
their resulting effectiveness are ultimately a product of the observer’s imagination, they 
would produce inherently relativistic, or intrinsically biased, results. It is highly likely that 
no scientifically neutral perspective on the activity in question is possible.  
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This critique stems from Nietzsche’s (Heraclitean) view that there are no static 
phenomena in the world. The dynamism of human activity and the continually 
propagating nature of communication make its effects enormously difficult to accurately 
quantify, to derive complete date from or generate firm conclusions about. One might 
draw general conclusions about past occurrences, but attempts to extrapolate on the basis 
of such a broad survey for predictive purposes would be in vain, for one could not 
confidently assert anything on such a contestable foundation.  
Yet, with regard to ascertaining truths about reality—the world as it actually is—
that vanity symptomatizes the conceits propagated by the conventional discourses of 
scientism, which are loathe to admit that the fetish they make of science (in the Western 
Socratic tradition emphasizing the attainment of knowledge) is a strategy to deny that 
what they create—every result they produce—is art. In creating their world, be it an 
integrated Europe or some other socio-political arrangement on the continent, they get no 
closer to possessing any intrinsically objective truth.408
In the early 1970s Donald Puchala presented a critique of the emerging narrative 
of integration via a new perspective on the problem of theorizing it. Dubbed the 
‘concordance systems’ model of analysis, Puchala proposed it both to account for the 
deficiencies he identified in the theoretical approaches that had preceded it, and to account 
for the best insights of each. He strove to do so in a way that synthesized some key aspects 
of contradictory viewpoints on the “different parts, dimensions or manifestations of the 
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phenomenon” according to an innovative perspective. In explaining his motivations he 
observed that: 
More than fifteen years of defining, redefining, refining, modeling and theorizing 
have failed to generate satisfactory conceptualizations of exactly what it is we are 
talking about when we refer to ‘international integration’ and exactly what it is we 
are trying to learn when we study this phenomenon.409 
 
Puchala proposed a theoretical stance to mitigate the conceptual confusion he believed to 
be plaguing the field. By doing so he hoped to provide a definition of the integration 
process itself as well as the task of examining international integration. 
Toward that “new conceptualization” he adopted a pluralist, quasi-perspectivalist, 
critical stance in tackling this objective, arguing that: 
…conventional frameworks have clouded more than they have illuminated our 
understanding of international integration. No model describes the integration 
phenomena with complete accuracy because all the models present images of what 
integration could be or should be rather than what it is [or what is occurring] here 
and now.410
Concerned with whether theorist’s European integration were merely entertaining 
themselves with intellectual fashions or attaining substantive knowledge of their subject of 
inquiry, Puchala endeavored to advance an explanatory theoretical framework for better 
comprehending Europe’s integration. His ‘concordance system’ approach comprised a 
 
  
Of course, “theorizing” what is, meaning present discernable existents, or the transitory 
being of an entity or phenomenon’s becoming, is impossible to do in isolation from 
broader contexts in which it exists, i.e.: what actually happens in the world. This 
underscores the fact that dynamic social processes are, arguably, impossible to reduce to a 
parsimonious explanatory model. Nevertheless, Puchala endeavored to provide a simple, 
if conceptually rich and pioneering model. 
 242 
sort of analytical pastiche, which conceived the developing community in terms of a new 
kind of political arrangement in which political activity was best understood as occurring 
at various levels of society specific to the spatial-temporal relevance of diverse issue areas 
affecting each particular level. This occurred in accordance with the differing degrees of 
involvement among respective actors at and/or between those levels and depended upon 
the continually varying influence capability of actors at any one level within “a particular 
kind of attitudinal environment”.411 These levels were defined along state-centric lines, in 
terms of their activity in relation to the nation-state. His notion thereby underscored the 
continuing primacy of the nation-state in the complex entity emerging through the 
“concordance system”.412
The reality of the nation-state’s predominance in the existing international system 
and its primary role in bringing into being anything new (such as a supranational 
community in Europe) constrains what can be conceived with regard to what political or 
economic integration is producing in either normative or theoretical / conceptual terms. 
The desire to keep his analysis to the normative dimension and largely eschew the 
theoretical (which he believed had muddied previous analyses) clearly limited Puchala’s 
willingness to extrapolate about how changes in the interdependence of autonomous states 
would alter notions of state-sovereignty, territorial integrity and understandings of 
citizenship, belonging and community, as well as concepts of self and otherness, the 
 The main levels of activity Puchala identified were the sub-
national, national, transnational and supranational, wherein modes of cooperation enabled 
positive-sum interactions between actors toward pragmatic policy convergence and 
authentic consensus between states and peoples.  
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justice (or just-ness) of these conventional forms of inclusion and exclusion, and what 
changes such altered views might generate. Recognizing that integration theorists had to: 
…stop testing the present in terms of progress toward or regression from 
hypothetical futures, since [there is] no way of knowing where or how 
contemporary international integration is going to end up, 
  
Puchala went a long way in suggesting the positive explanatory potential of the 
concordance system he had theorized, asserting that the ‘distinctive attitudinal 
environment’ cultivated by a long period of growth in mutual understanding among the 
members of a concordance system working for same shared desires so as to enjoy 
communal rewards was bound to have transformative effects on the nation-state itself.413
Puchala’s theory provides a pragmatic framework for conflict resolution and 
problem solving, as he maintains that the exclusion of coercion or unilateral demands 
between actors describes the pattern of customary behavior that concordance systems 
engender. That ‘exclusion of coercion’ would seem to edge toward the idealistic if it were 
not narrowly referring to the threatened use of instruments of war; otherwise it does not 
  
This implied an inexorable process of change to the primacy of nation-states in the 
concordance system and by extension its conceptualization and understanding of 
international politics. Though he doubted that integration via increased interdependence 
would result in the radical assimilation of diverse peoples as many of his contemporaries 
hoped, he did anticipate that significant changes would occur in the relationship between 
peoples and their governments. Among these, the semi-autonomous and interdependent 
actors at various levels were seen to employ bargaining techniques predicated on full 
disclosure of pertinent information to attain mutually reinforcing outcomes, either 
between peoples and their governments or between nations.  
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ignore the real differences in power between states that structure their relations, especially 
their interdependence and cooperation. For instance, France and Germany will always, 
and, many would argue, rightly should have more influence upon EU affairs than 
microstates such as Malta or Cyprus.  
It is obvious however that the former great powers do dictate to and/or coerce the 
latter members of the community through diplomatic means, manipulation of institutional 
arrangements and the disproportionate force of their influence over the community; they 
regularly do employ tactics to achieve their desired objectives. Nevertheless, the 
populous, powerful states must compromise to varying degrees with their weaker co-
members in the Union and have structured the democratic, agonistic process of legislative 
approval on qualified majority voting as well as establishing other institutional checks and 
balances to ensure continued concordance. Less powerful member-states are thereby 
assured of not being overrun or ignored by larger states when the stakes are especially 
high. The insights of ‘concordance system’ theory therefore continue to provide powerful 
analytic tools for comprehending the activities and development of the EU. 
Puchala’s somewhat strange adherence/devotion to the primacy of the nation-state 
(as a desire to preserve?) raises interesting questions about the theory and his agenda in 
positing it: namely, why does the prospect of nations of people assimilating in certain 
conceptual realms and the nation-states’ increasing obsolescence trouble him so? As 
Chryssochoou observes, Puchala refuses to allow that the consequences of his own theory 
might be “the negation of the nation-state.”  
Rather [Puchala states], ‘nation-states can be preserved as distinct entities only 
through the international pooling of resources to confront problems that challenge 
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their separate existence.’ Likewise, Puchala explicitly states that ‘mass populations 
within the concordance system need not be assimilated into a supranationality’.414
Such a privileging of the nation-state form and the global community of sovereign 
nations its universal imposition from the early 16th to the mid-20th centuries brought 
about, has normalized a thoroughly entrenched international system of theoretically 
autonomous and equal states that holds its own standardized practices and legal norms as 
intrinsically good. Through a self-justifying logic it systematically excludes and/or 
forcibly homogenizes difference and (consistent with its tradition) seeks power over 
others in the name of security. In so doing it simultaneously validates and enforces the 
perception that the nation-state is the highest, most legitimate and most desirable 
formalized institutional structure for the organization, maintenance and preservation of 
community that a people can aspire to attain. This perception reveals the pre-ontological 
foundations of the contemporary (European) nation-state system. By extension it also 
 
 
But it is unclear either that states can only be preserved in this way or that populations 
need not be assimilated. Neither possibility is necessarily so, and the latter could be 
desirable.  
Puchala’s partisan, ideologically driven prejudice for preserving the state is 
evident here – as with nearly every theorist of European integration – and reveals certain 
fears of change that hint at reaction: Puchala does not want the process of integration, 
which he has persuasively explicated and thinks mainly positive, to run away with itself 
and become threatening to his perception of the best sort of (status quo) political 
organization or the ontological features of the nation-state upon which he feels 
existentially dependent. 
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illuminates certain causes of the existential angst that arises among its most ardent 
ideological proponents in response to the problem of failed states as well as the frequently 
disastrous consequences that result when a state breaks up in a disorderly, contested 
fashion, as in the former Yugoslavia, among other places.415
This majoritarian form of desiring is sustained by a will to truth symptomatized by 
the hegemonic statist logic that has been universalized over the previous century via the 
nationalization of the world. This European cultural form (the nation-state) produces 
conflicting conceptions of selfhood and group belonging via modes of exclusion that 
result in violence. The reactive need to define oneself and ones’ community against an 
outside other ossifies antagonistic stances between groups, both within and between 
disparate polities. This is the primary challenge to be overcome in the present stage of the 
political development of humankind—one Nietzsche associated with the aim of great 
culture—and the most constructive and hopeful aspects of the European unification 
process and its potential. Good Europeans are advanced in their achievement of this aim 
  
The rigidity of attitudes and reactive dispositions generated by identic affiliation 
with the nation-state (through discourses of patriotism, etc.) compel by necessity the 
defense of the reactive principles subtending the nation-state. This is analogous to 
Deleuze’s notion of dual capture, in which the state form re-territorializes (i.e.: coercively 
interpolates to repress) all acts of becoming-other; confining and dissipating active forces 
for which its own complex incongruities are always-already conditioning the possibility. 
When effective these homogenizing reactive forces operate so automatically that desiring 
is contained within the acceptable parameters of  a stultifying condition of becoming 
same.  
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by their recognition that, “There is no unified essence in the light of which we might be 
tempted or prompted to sum people up, close the books on them or presume to measure 
them in any fundamental way.”416
The EU itself exemplifies the contradictions ineluctably generated by statist logic. 
It attempts to diffuse the worst potential consequences of this in advance through a 
number of mechanisms. For example, it has systematically created a legally binding 
 
Examples of this include occasions when a sub-national minority group within a 
multi-ethnic, multi-national state demands greater political autonomy or outright 
independence. Such factional challenges call into question the territorial-based political 
legitimacy (sovereignty) of the state, according to the very same statist logic that 
maintains it. This brings the existential basis of the state into dispute. In so far as the 
disgruntled faction defies the privileged prerogatives of the state’s sovereign legal 
authority, it is not by any means a necessarily authentic or innovative minoritarian 
movement characterized by active force in a positive will to creative destruction as 
generative power.  
Rather, it is nearly always the opposite: a desire originating in ressentiment and 
expressed through reactive forces that re-affirm the statist logic with which it coheres. 
This is to say that such pseudo-revolutionary secessionist movements occur according to 
the same logic of particularistic ethno-national identic affiliation that serves to legitimate 
the territorially defined nation-state form, and its notionally coextending sovereignty as 
recognized in international law. Therefore almost without exception, autonomy seeking 
separatist movements always already replicate the very forces which they believe to be 
“oppressing” them.  
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citizenship status for all individuals rightfully residing within the community that provides 
them with guaranteed political, social, economic and cultural rights and strives to foster 
“affectio societatis—a feeling of identification with the Union as a whole rather than 
simply with the member states”. Notably, it does so while simultaneously, and somewhat 
schizophrenically, trying to ensure the inviolable sovereignty of its member-states.417
It is the authentic overcoming of the debilitating, exclusionary logic of the nation-
state form through creative experimentation and disruptions that corresponds with 
Nietzsche’s praise of thymotic non-conformism and associated ‘good Europeanism’. The 
experiments of Nietzschean attempters are most likely to succeed when they disrupt the 
ability of the state to interpolate, or make majoritarian, all desiring or potential becoming-
other. The authentic transmutation of reactive values through metamorphosing active 
 
Despite the implicit suggestion that EU citizenship subordinates or makes redundant the 
conventional citizenship conferred upon its member-states’ residents by their respective 
national governments, the EU continues to guarantee specific protections for regional and 
cultural minorities within those sovereign nations, again replicating the logic of 
particularism and suggesting that national citizenship is in certain instances problematic 
for certain classes or groups of individuals. The most efficacious and prosperous nation-
states (the preeminent polity) in the world today are those capable of co-opting the 
disparate interests of their constituent peoples or minority factions. The EU does so 
consistently, if haltingly; in Deleuze’s helpfully innovative language, by generating 
another set of striations across the varied social spaces of Europe that function to delimit 
and re-capture differences capable of endangering the project and homogenize the 
increasingly quiescent area it describes. 
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forces, in its genuinely de-centering radicality, goes unrecognized as a challenge to the 
established order and its reigning ascetic-consumerist priests of ressentiment. This is 
because the latter comprehends power only in terms of overt domination over others and 
coercive means of control, as ways of limiting the irrepressible growth of human life. It 
cannot countenance an effective exteriorizing of a smooth, heterogeneous space conducive 
to free play and becoming-other across a genuinely dynamic social field. 
Despite Puchala’s insight into the relatively dynamic functioning of conventional 
states and the inter-relating of actors within concordance systems, his concern for 
preserving the nation-state, expressed in the form of an objection to other possibilities, is 
resonant with archaic, essentialist reifications of identity rooted in geographic, historical, 
linguistic, ethnic, nationalist, religious, particularism that almost invariably has all-too-
human affects. It privileges what is out of a fear of the unsettling change necessary to 
create a natural and life-affirming polity. Though Nietzsche recognized each of these 
common identifiers as important to, even constitutive of, individuals and communities, he 
saw that they must be understood (that is affirmed) in their proper context and ultimately 
overcome as the defining attributes of a wholly formed person, or higher type. The statist 
logic of the concordance of the system Puchala describes belies his acquiescence to it. 
Puchala’s reiteration of the primacy of the state tells of the anxiety that integration 
processes were then generating (as they continue to do), anxiety aroused by change 
potentially challenging to established traditions including that of the nation-state as the 
preeminent form of political community. The tradition of nation-state supremacy in the 
international political life of humankind was reinforced by the regime’s ability to 
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ontologically presence the values of liberal modernity and coherently ground the 
autonomous rationality enabled thereby.  
Like other theorists of European integration who “fall back” on the comforts 
provided by the existent state system, Puchala was unable to identify a similarly rational 
basis for political authority in the hypothetical absence of the state, or in the empirical 
facts integration was producing on the ground (which pointed to the ultimate obsolescence 
of the state) reactively diverted attention from the potentially nobler objective of 
integrating the continent according to a meaningful, overarching idea of Europe based on 
the rarer noble traits, shared aspirations and willingness of its exemplars. These include 
the accommodation of authentic difference within the context of a naturalistic, materialist 
ethos that increases the pathos of difference within themselves and between types. 
Later, “Puchala conceived of the EC as a ‘multi-layered political system’, which 
governs the behavior of political actors across local, national and regional levels.”418 The 
success of it as a system depended upon agreement on those levels and the mandate of 
higher political authorities. The community’s effective functioning required “joint 
decision-making at the regional level but also on the subsequent ability of national 
governments to implement those decisions in the face of resistance from domestic polities 
and societies.”419
As a developing political system originating in mutual compromises between 
sovereign states, the EC comprised a set of supranational institutions with very limited 
autonomy. Yet although based on intergovernmental cooperation, their logic suggested to 
many that they would continue to develop along increasingly supranational lines. The 
 Puchala identified the significance of contrasting methods of persuasion 
and accord to the expansion, deepening and viability of that process.  
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debate between over this issue eventually took the form of opposing disciplinary camps 
and became a central issue within the field in the late 1980s and early 1990s, and 
continues to the present. Puchala’s conception of the EC as a concordance system wherein 
interactions are comprised at various levels by distinct measures of autonomy and overlap 
tended toward the latter. His conception of the EC as a system of governance anticipated 
important comparativists and governance approaches to integration in the middle and late 
1990s. 
The horizon of possibilities for conceptualizing European integration was revealed 
by Puchala’s work to be more expansive than it had previously been thought by arbiters of 
integration. His ‘concordance system’ analysis arguably disclosed the complex multilevel 
activities occurring through and constitutive of integration processes. His framework also 
anticipated many theoretical insights to come, particularly those interdependence and 
multi-level governance theories. Perhaps most indicative of its wide influence, it would be 
used by partisan exponents of both state-centric approaches and advocates of 
supranationalism. 
  
An early intergovernmentalist perspective 
Stanley Hoffmann was among the first to offer a sustained critique of the neo-
functionalist thesis through a neo-realist theory of high and low politics comprising an 
intergovernmentalist perspective. His was another of the critical voices to effectively cast 
doubt on the depth and extent to which integration would really transform the fundamental 
ways in which European states interacted. Responding in part to the ‘Luxembourg 
Compromise’ of 1966, which brought France back to full participation in Community 
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affairs after a period of calculated distance instigated by De Gaulle’s reinvigoration of 
French nationalism, Hoffmann interrogated neofunctionalist arguments that understood 
cooperative processes to gradually foster greater trust, collaboration and unity.  
Hoffmann was pessimistic regarding the prospects for political integration twenty 
years after the end of World War Two, observing: 
The nation-state is still here, and the new Jerusalem has been postponed because 
the nations in Western Europe have not been able to stop time and to fragment 
space. Political unification could have succeeded if, on the one hand, these nations 
had not been caught in the whirlpool of different concerns, as a result both of 
profoundly different internal circumstances and of outside legacies, and if, on the 
other hand, they had been able or obliged to concentrate on ‘community-building’ 
to the exclusion of all problems situated either outside their area or within each 
one of them.420
Hoffmann went on to show how the more sanguine neo-functionalists neglected 
crucial historical context that just as plausibly demonstrated the opposite, concluding that 
“post-war Western Europe was grappling with the contradictory logics of integration and 
diversity.” The principle of national self-determination, it seemed to Hoffmann, would 
inhibit the depth of unity any member state of the community could tolerate. By 
 
 
This set of observed facts was largely accurate when published in 1966, but it would 
require some modification just twenty years later, when the Single Europe Act was being 
negotiated. The ineluctability of time that European nations’ could not stop would itself 
prove aspects of Hoffmann’s pessimistic observation faulty. For while states must 
obviously contend with the prevailing circumstances of the present (time) and their 
situatedness in space, the impossibility of stopping time or escaping “the whirlpool of 
different concerns” does not totally inhibit them from engaging in some degree of 
community-building, either.  
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“repudiating the central idea of a continuum from economics to politics,” the “teleological 
confidence” of neofunctionalism appeared to overlook the primacy of particular domestic 
interests (understood according to politics traditionally conceived rather than in 
technocratic terms) in forming the impetus for integration.421
The suggestion that efforts toward greater cooperation between states would 
produce additional obstacles to the integration of the continent challenged the presumption 
that functional spillover would automatically occur between the institutional entities and 
bureaucratic divisions of disparate state governments. Hoffmann’s analysis of these 
inherent tensions led to his distinction between “high” and “low” politics, for which his 
work of the 1960s was notable. By ‘high politics’ he referred to the areas of foreign policy 
and strategically important trade policy determinations sacrosanct to national elites. In the 
realm of ‘high politics’ progress on policy reforms (political cooperation, trade 
liberalization, etc.) were likely to be difficult and decision-making protracted as states 
would be unwilling to make concessions or to compromise where preserving the status 
quo served the power and prosperity of a society’s ruling class.  
  
His recognition of the extent to which domestic and global pressures contribute to 
centrifugal tendencies rather than encourage a convergence of interests led to his ‘logic of 
diversity’ thesis, which stressed the international system’s tendency to produce diversity 
rather than synthesis among its units. International cooperation expanded the range of 
diversity and complicated the interests of actors, hindering the synthesis of policy and 
impeding integration. Hoffmann sought to explain why in certain areas integration could 
occur without much controversy whilst in other issue areas integration threatened the 
autonomy of governments and would be determinedly resisted.  
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‘Low politics’ by contrast referred to those areas of policy wherein compromise 
was more easily achievable. For instance, in the sphere of trade liberalization the easing of 
tariffs and lifting of other protectionist barriers could be accommodated in ways (e.g.: by 
eliminating import quotas and deregulating sectors of production, etc.) that opened 
markets without jeopardizing elite perceptions of theirs or the nation’s vital interests. The 
realm of “low politics” was where Hoffmann believed change was most likely to occur, 
“because it was a way of retaining control over areas where intersocietal (as opposed to 
interstate) transaction was becoming the norm.”422  
Rosamund states that it was, at least in part, against the neofunctionalist’s 
assertion that supranational institutions would transform the consciousnesses of peoples 
and thereby generate enthusiasm for integration on an ever greater or expanding scale so 
as to displace historical national allegiances. In so far as Hoffman’s logic of diversity is 
concerned, he argues that: 
[T]he Monnett-Haas logic would only work where integration could guarantee 
perpetual positive sum outcomes or, to use neofunctionalist terminology, where 
interests could be upgraded in common for perpetuity. Permanent gains over losses 
might work in the arena of economic integration, but Hoffmann maintained that it 
could never prevail for political integration.423
Put differently, Hoffman identified the instinctive spirit of revenge, or instrumental 
reason, operative among the ascetic–consumerist priests of ressentiment who, having 
arrogated to themselves the power to rule, would authorize the implementation of such 
  
 
Hoffman, as Rosamund observes, recognized that national elites, operating according to 
long-established norms governing both the interstate and intersocietal dimensions of 
European society, would encourage only limited transaction—or degrees of incremental 
integration.  
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change. Each hesitant step toward integration would come via and simultaneously indicate 
a subtle transformation in the bio-power-knowledge regime, whose function is the 
disciplining of the community’s economic life.  
Conceived through the narrow rationality of perpetual positive sum gains (which 
likely guaranteed little else but continued insecurity and fear of the other), the logic of 
integration paradoxically inhibited its extent. These arbiters of the status quo imposed 
strict constraints on the process of change so that any changes would be gradual, lest they 
stimulate becomings that could not be contained by the molar, governing complex they 
oversaw. That sort of loss of control would not be a positive sum outcome. At the level of 
“low politics” some policy adjustment for increased openness was desirable, as it enabled 
national elites to maintain and (I would argue, following the premise of Hardt and Negri’s 
thesis of Empire developed more than three decades later) to strengthen their control over 
areas of life where international cooperation was increasing. 
Hoffmann’s prolific contributions on Europe’s integration evolved perceptible 
over the next three and a half decades. In views published with Robert Keohane in 1990, 
his conception of the European community was that of a developing confederation (a 
proper sympolity), as exhibited in the intergovernmental character of its institutions whose 
emphasis, they in part argued, ought to be placed upon the creation of a common 
framework for cooperation rather than community-wide regulations.424 On Hoffmann’s 
part this constituted an acknowledgement of Europe’s transformed condition that 
maintained much of the spirit of his mid-1960s skepticism on the prospects for genuine 
supranational community. At that time he had pessimistically observed an intrinsic 
dilemma in the crucial process of legitimating such a new, unifying polity; that between 
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the impossibility of forcibly imposing new political arrangements and the inevitable 
disagreements that would arise over conflicting self-assessments of national interest: 
The “New Europe” dreamed of by the Europeans could not be established by 
force. Left to the wills and calculations of its members, the new formula did not 
jell because Europeans could not agree on their role in the world. The failure of an 
experiment made under apparently ideal conditions tells us a great deal for it 
shows that a unification movement can fail not only when a surge of nationalism 
occurs in one important part but also when differences in how the national interest 
is assessed rule out agreement on the shape and propose of the new supranational 
whole.425 
 
However correct his identification of the difficulties entailed by efforts to meld the 
disparate conceptions of national interest among European states and simultaneously 
manage the dangers of nationalism to political unification between sovereign nation-
states, it prematurely declared a decisive end (“failure”) to the project (“experiment”). It 
also wrongly assumed that disagreement over “the shape and purpose of [a] new 
supranational whole” could not be overcome through decades of collaboration and 
incremental compromise, or at least subordinated to greater national self-interests.  
Yet the (then) EC’s uncertain if persistent integration prompted Hoffmann to assert 
its increasing resemblance to an imperfect confederation between “bruised nations, [who] 
have traded visible and distinctive power for diffuse collective influence”. By the early 
1990s the EC’s development, as a set of economic and bureaucratic arrangements, 
convinced him that “the policy of European integration will [not] be abandoned: there is 
no turning back.”426
The incremental and limited sort of integration to which the EU’s members have 
been willing to agree, as Hoffmann and Keohane identified, given rise to a school of 
European integration theory dubbed the confederalist model, which as included notable 
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scholars such as D. J. Elazar. Elazar dubs his own notion a theory of “postmodern 
confederation”. Chryssochoou finds Elazar’s notion of confederation, “a new style 
confederation of old states” particularly apropos on some levels.427 However, it is difficult 
to disregard the curious prefix ‘postmodern’ as the EU is an apodictically modern affair, 
but given the enormous complexity of the EU this phrase would provide a largely accurate 
and concise characterization of the organization’s possible trajectory. Yet Elazar’s 
conception of ‘postmodern confederalism’ was not hypothetical or futural.428 The term 
“postmodern” in this context is unlikely to persuade those who understand the EU—
accurately I think—to be comprehensively modern, or that anything more than a super-
state can deliberately result from the EU’s current trajectory, as it does not transmute 
either the modern presuppositions of the nation-state model or its privileging within the 
existing (state-centric) international system. If anything it ramifies the (un-Nietzschean) 
reification of identic particularisms upon which the state idol is based.429
In all probability there is no way to neatly define the integration process. As noted 
above, the problematic nature of conceiving parsimonious definitions of Europe or 
differing aspects of its complex integration processes is not merely conceptually 
problematic, but symptomatic of a reactive desire (will-to-truth) expressed via the 
(ant)agonistic endeavor to assert a unified comprehension of the EU—to achieve (i.e. 
impose) agreement around one common understanding. (The desire for parsimony in 
defining as complex entity as Europe is at odds with Nietzsche’s general perspectivalist 
epistemological stance as well as his quasi-cosmopolitan idea of Europe, which is 
inclusive of the continent’s diversity and the inherent difficulty of defining it.) 
 Nevertheless, the 
innovative contributions of post-modern scholars to integration theory are taken up below. 
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Since Hoffmann and Keohane advanced their confederal thesis (well before the 
Treaty on European Union in 1992), the regulatory provisions of EU law, via the Acquis, 
have grown exponentially. This has occurred in response to an identified need for greater 
codification of rules and norms, to specify consistent Union-wide procedures and to 
nuance policy implementation, but it has grown unwieldy according to many critics. 
Despite recent popular opposition to the Constitution (an unfortunate product of precisely 
the sort of populist misapprehension to which I refer above), it now appears that 
something more supranational in character than a confederacy is developing in Europe, 
even if classical realism better captures aspects of the power politics that continue to 
determine its integration than either the neofunctionalist or supranational-institutionalist 
theses have done. 
 
Haas’ Theoretical Reassessment of the mid-1970s;  
A particularly important development in the unfolding of European integration 
theory—and one with great salience to my argument—was Haas’s mid-70s recognition of 
‘the obsolescence of integration theory’. In his article of the same name Haas recognized 
the limitations of neofunctionalism, particularly with regard to its limited applicability to 
cases outside Europe, which as a culturally and historically related agglomeration of 
highly developed industrial societies had certain unique features distinguishing it from 
other regions and cultural realms. These include its intellectual, scientific and legal 
traditions, its capitalist, socialist and communist economic systems, democratic traditions 
and its emerging cosmopolitan, pluralistic ethos. More importantly for theorizing 
generally, Haas cited the inability of European integration theorists to specify a dependent 
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variable and by extension to ascertain what an accurate prediction might be, as the 
terminal conditions advanced by scholars of European integration could at best be 
speculative ideal types.  
As Rosamund elaborates, they were attempting “to explain something that did not 
yet exist and whose existence could only be postulated.” This was not to assert the 
irrelevance of integration studies or to dismiss the explanatory power of some of its 
various schools’ core theoretical concepts, but was meant to signal “a turning point in the 
way [such] phenomena should be conceptualized.” Haas’s awareness of emergent, guiding 
logics to the EC’s development compelled a transformed understanding of the complex 
political system it comprised within a developing global order that it was dynamically 
affecting. Actual events in the world had continually undermined confidence in theorized, 
putatively “deliberate attempt[s] to bring about regional economic (and thus political) 
enmeshment among a group of West European countries.” 430
This revelation on the part of one of the most influential and brilliant international 
politics theorists constituted a profound acknowledgement of the limitations of such 
theorizing that was extraordinarily brave in an academic field devoted to the project that 
activity comprised and which the project in turn legitimated. It also represented a quite 
significant hermeneutical shift as well, in so far as it recognized the ultimately subjective 
position from which all such perspectives on the truth of the matter (European integration) 
originated, not just Haas’s own neofunctionalism per se, but the very endeavor of 
abstractly theorizing integration according to a universal, final form in general. The 
perspective Haas advanced by way of this critique provided a disconcerting and untimely 
heuristic device with which his contemporaries would thereafter have to contend. 
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Intentionally or not, it exposed a danger inherent to the desire for truth, which is 
that the underlying will it symptomatizes is often so strong—a commitment to it at any 
price—that it blinds its seekers to the complexly situated contingency of their pursuit of it. 
Noting the innate drive to grow in power through discovery, Babich asserts that “Science, 
as the embodiment of the Will to Truth at all costs is itself an expression of the Will to 
Life at any price. As such it opposes what is changeable in life in its search for the 
ultimate truth of thing.”431 This insight is particularly applicable to the social sciences, 
especially when they are dominated by the objectivist stance of positivism, which forgets 
its own starting point in an unconscious striving “to gain power over nature… and the 
‘wild animal’” man.432
Salient to a critical understanding of theories of European integration as well as to 
the work of Haas is a conclusion of Nietzsche’s, aptly summarized by Babich: “truth is an 
error—or better, a species of errors—and knowledge a fictionalization of the world.”
 
433 If 
the goal of his earlier neo-functionalism and the project of theorizing of European 
integration more generally had been to postulate a parsimonious theoretical explanation of 
why sovereign states within a certain region integrate their economies and political 
institutions, Haas now saw this intellectual aim as unattainable in objective terms, be they 
defining the motivations for it (i.e.: shared security interests, geographical features or 
cultural traits), or the ultimate aim of the integrative process. Although Haas likely would 
not have taken his own conclusions so far, they point toward Nietzsche’s sense that 
“science cannot tell us why scientific knowledge is worth knowing; the activity of science 
presupposes the value of truth.”434 And what truth, or truths, per se, do theorists of 
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European integration affirm and/or strive to illuminate? It is quite likely that ideology 
more effectively explains this than any objective scientific inquiry. 
In some way underscoring the difficulties inherent to the inquiry, Haas later 
asserted that the phenomenon of social complexity generates what he dubbed turbulence. 
This refers to the instability and uncertainty which occurs among actors in compound 
networks wherein competition and interdependency in various ratios confuse actors’ 
pursuits of objectives, and muddle the sort of discussion and negotiation that facilitate 
mutually desired cooperation. It is fairly easy to see how such a notion of turbulence could 
by extended to aptly describe the problematic activity of theorizing European integration 
itself. The assumptions of social-science theorists never quite capture the dynamic 
processes under their consideration, and with every modification to their precepts “reality” 
as they have created it, is revealed to be insufficient explanatorily.  
There is an element Dionysian tragedy in their inevitable failure to discover any 
‘Truth’ to vindicate their passion; an inquisitive desire to know the world as it is prompts 
them to continually start again, as it were, and reformulate their principles in order to 
make another attempt. The most Dionysian among them know all the while that dynamic 
human activity proceeds of it own accord and the world moves on, compounding a 
complexity always already beyond the horizon of our comprehension, which it is their 
hope to expand so as to see into a barely imaginable distance. 
Haas’s “commitment to truthfulness” enables him to act, wittingly or not, as an 
“agent of the self-overcoming of the ascetic ideal” that underlies many of the aims and 
purposes of European integration theory.435 His mid-career critique of the inquiry and his 
own former stance constitutes a positive will to creative destruction as generative power, 
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the active force in which distinguishes him from many of his colleagues. As Rosamund 
observes, just as the EC could be depicted as a ‘coping strategy’ for contending with 
different levels of turbulence (inter-governmental, etc.), Haas’s expanded perspective and 
the heuristic capacity it supplied (by aiding the discovery of truths about our interpretive 
activity – the hermeneutics of desire – and the actual problem solving that enables or 
impedes) functioned as a coping strategy for those theorists seeking truths about the 
complicated phenomena of integration.436
Social and political processes are ultimately too dynamic to be comprehensively 
described by the theories upon which we rely; major schools of thought such as those 
 
Crucial aspects of conventional theorizing were then and still remain inherently 
reactive, constituting an all-too-human attempt to limit the emergence of existents – that 
is, to restrict what can be, either in thought or practice – by, in the case of theories of 
European integration, (re-)fitting the continuously evolving reality of integration to a 
preconceived notion of “what it is”, or how or what it ought to be, regardless of whether it 
in fact was or is so. This by extension problematizes whether or to what degree actual 
events can ever be said to be outcomes predicted by a particular theory. The difficulty lies 
in how, if at all, the “success” of a prediction can be adduced with any certainty given the 
inevitable disputes that arise over fundamental matters such as concept formation and 
historical analysis, as well as more mundane dilemmas such as the methodological basis 
and veracity of particular data sets, their relevancy and/or applicability to a certain 
problem or issue, and a researcher or theorists’ choice of independent and dependent 
variables, all of which bear upon our estimation of the predictive power of a theoretical 
approach.  
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examined here succeed in being persuasive by providing a story or explanation of the 
world that seems to correspond with what we identify as reality. They achieve legitimacy 
by arising through and continually re-situating themselves within a web of discourses—
“the literature”—that attains authoritative hegemony. Qua academic discipline a collective 
constraint largely determines the development of the knowledge to which its respective 
schools are devoted thereafter. An obvious paradox to this is that it is the desire (of 
political scientists and international relations scholars) to illuminate (in this case social) 
reality that constitutes their sustaining passion (eros) and spurs their inquiry. The conceit 
common to all of the sciences lies in the presumption of their arbiters to present a true 
picture of the processes they analyze.  
Moreover, such conventional theorizing can be said to be reactive in terms of what 
it “allows” for, or does not, as the case may be.437 This related concern regards what kinds 
of knowledge a theoretical perspective, and the discipline of which it is a part, permits and 
in the case of theories of European integration, what sort of socio-cultural and political 
forms of life it takes Europe’s integration to be, and to rightly be capable of, producing. 
This is to recognize the conceptual blinders on any perspective and problematize the way 
it (a theory) unwittingly describes its own notional limits of permissibility. In the case of 
theories of European integration it is in the multiplicity of types, the plurality of 
communities and forms of governance to which integration could give rise, over and/or 
between member-states, their national institutions and their respective populaces, that 
was/is ultimately unpredictable (as it was/is an incomplete and constantly complexifying 
process). 
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Many of these problems are inherent to any effort at theorizing, particularly in the 
social sciences, as what is studied is never static and therefore never entirely predictable. 
But by the mid-70s it had become evident that too many facts integration contradicted the 
theories, which were themselves discovered to be symptomatic of the ambition to contain 
becoming and limit – in the guise of authoritative, ostensibly “predictive” modeling – the 
possible futures of integration thereby. The familiarity, security and seeming rationality 
provided by traditional nation-state politics, understood conventionally as contending 
power relationships along conceptual binaries such as self and other, the inside (one’s 
community) and the outside (the foreign or other), etc., conditioned ways of interpreting; 
they also structured the variety of hermeneutically “viable” stances – the desire for certain 
forms of integration – one could entertain, describing EIT’s horizon of legitimacy. But 
this self-imposed conceptual frontier put the authority of European integration theory (as a 
nascent power-knowledge regime) and, by extension, the arbiters of integration itself 
somewhat outside of what was really happening. At the numerous levels of integration, 
the mentality of citizens toward their community and the collective attitudes of diverging 
and converging communities toward the political organization that sought to reorganize 
their economic and political management were becoming thoroughly transformed in 
unanticipated and unmanageable ways. 
Also in the mid-1970s, as Haas was arguing that integration processes should be 
properly understood in the broader context of regional and international politics, 
interdependence emerged as an important theory of within the field. Earlier 
behavioralistic portrayals of Europe’s integration as a predictable process were gradually 
modified to admit of relations within the international system that fomented change to it 
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and compelled adaptation among myriad political actors to those transformations. There 
was a growing awareness that the functionalist and neofunctionalist linear images of 
integration couldn’t account for some of the challenges the European process Europe 
faced. These compelled modifications of the dominant discourse through which the 
process was retrospectively comprehended, presently understood and futurally conceived.  
 
A note on Interdependence Theory  
Two of the primary exponents of the interdependency concept were Robert 
Keohane and Joseph Nye, who sought through three collaborative works across the 
decade, “to challenge the dominant state-centric image of realism by presenting a picture 
of a diffuse global order characterized by multiple actors among whom states were 
important, but not alone.”438
The phenomena of interdependence could be discerned between all political actors 
and at every level of political life and its theorists tried to understand the dynamical 
complexity of myriad competing interests in the global political economy. Specifically, 
they wanted to adduce the ways in which interdependence facilitated or hindered 
integration. The term itself conveyed the perception “that ‘integration’ had lost its 
meaning as a guiding concept” and suggested an effort to set new priorities for solving 
collective-action problems.
 
439 By not taking for granted any particular telos or end for 
integrative developments the emerging school of Interdependence theory drew 
comparativists of other regions and integration processes. It shifted “the emphasis from 
questions of formal institution-building and constitutional engineering to those concerning 
the management of pressing realities as a response to the rapidly changing conditions of 
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market forces and the global economy.”440 Unlike neofunctionalism, “which had been too 
tightly associated with the Community model and method,” interdependence theory had 
no normative link with any international institution that might have distorted the 
perspective of intergovernmental exchange it presented.441  
In Power and Interdependence Keohane and Nye assert that state’s would have to 
continually redefine their national interest due to increasing interdependence between 
them and that this, combined with the influence of international institutions already 
facilitating greater cooperation, would encourage the growth of common regimes and 
formal institutions between nations. This is aptly summarized as “the practice of 
mutualism in the management of complex relations that result in a policy mix.”442 That 
this observation struck students of integration as insightful may seem curious now, but it 
indicates the intellectual rigidity in mainstream thinking about the issues of states’ 
determination and pursuit of their (so-called and highly problematic) national interests 
within political science generally, preceding the early 1970s. Yet by examining ‘the multi-
actor complexity of the system’ interdependency theory bodied forth a much needed 
critique of realism, challenging the latter’s pathological emphases on crude power and 
force toward the achievement of security in an international environment whose 
ineliminable political context is anarchy.443
Interdependence does not ignore the importance of the principle of national 
sovereignty or resulting practices of autonomy between national political authorities, but 
comprehends them in terms of how structural or systemic properties of the international 
arena condition the sort of interactions states have as well as the kinds of cooperation that 
may arise through their lively and varied relations (supranational, transnational, etc.). 
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Chryssochoou states that although interdependence theory “claims to offer a pragmatic, 
ideologically free alternative to the study of the politics and economy of the Community 
regime,” it has received “a fair amount of criticism” centered on its depiction of ‘the basic 
political properties of the Community system’. Specifically, this included its emphasis on 
the role and influence of supranational institutions, which would prompt much debate and 
controversy in so far as it arguably (as was argued) serves certain ideological tenets and / 
or objectives of the advocates of the particular form of political integration now occurring. 
 
The Contemporary Debate 
Since the early 1990s two major strains of thought concerning European 
integration have been persuasively reinterpreted. Drawing upon Stanley Hoffmann’s logic 
of diversity with the ethos of the school of realism in international politics theory, Andrew 
Moravcsik has created a niche for himself and become a major figure in his own right as 
the most prominent (and some allege, only) arbiter of the liberal intergovernmentalist 
approach within the sub-discipline of European integration theory. Moravcsik is primarily 
concerned with developing causal explanations of national preference formation and inter-
state bargaining objectives. Thus his objectives, as with those of all the major theorists 
covered in this section, entail an interesting embrace and employment of the faith in 
science (which I maintain becomes particularly dubious when methodologically translated 
into “empirical” analyses of a subject by the social sciences) that Nietzsche found 
hermeneutically problematical and epistemologically naïve. As will become clear, 
Moravcsik’s major works body forth a will-to-truth symptomatic of a will to power that 
however consciously, elides the heuristic objections that might be raised against it.  
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The second strain of thought to which I referred above is the school of 
supranational institutionalism, led in part through the collaborative efforts and individual 
works of Alec Stonesweet and Wayne Sandholz. Together these scholars attempt to 
demonstrate the empirical veracity of their thesis that liberal intergovernmental 
compromise and cooperation are crucial but preliminary processes in the EU’s 
development. What they believe to be more significant to and fundamentally altering of 
the political landscape of the continent is the emergence of a supranational layer of 
authority in Brussels and Strasbourg to which the governments of the sovereign nation-
state members are duty bound and subordinate. They contend that the formally 
institutionalized power structures of the continent are changing authorial relations 
between national governments and their citizen-constituents, between European states and 
between Europe vis-à-vis the EU, and the rest of the world in ways that challenge 
traditional notions of sovereignty and possibly even nation-statehood.  
A debate about the nature of the EU’s development, outward expansion and inner-
consolidation; the character, functioning and authority of its institutions and of various 
tensions underlying the project animates many of the differences between these two 
schools of thought. I begin first with an overview and critique of Moravcsik’s analysis of 
European unification as best characterized as a liberal, intergovernmental process. As 
Schimmelfennig observes, liberal intergovernmentalism “is a ‘grand theory’ seeking to 
explain the ‘major steps toward European integration’ in a multi-causal,” and 
parsimonious theoretical framework.444 As such it reinforces the positivist orientation 
conferred by the discourses of scientism on the study of social processes, furthering the 
will-to-truth that reifies reason and excessive explanatory economy in an effort to make 
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the “truth plain” and the world (in this case, of human activity) appear more orderly and 
neat than it is. 
In ‘The Choice for Europe’ Andrew Moravcsik set forth a clear articulation of an 
analytical approach to European integration. He theorizes that integration is occurring 
primarily through intergovernmental cooperation and compromise, a gradual pooling of 
sovereignty that has given rise to the EU in its contemporary form. According to this 
view, integration is a state-driven process, in which the resulting supranational institutions 
are wholly dependent on the sanction of member-states for their existence and efficacy. 
The constituent member-states of any such body may, according to his theory, reverse 
their imprimatur at any time and withdraw themselves from the organization. The nation-
state retains its primacy (approaching the status of a fetish) despite the appearance of an 
ever more integrated and integrating world.  
Rosamund notes that “Moravcsik sees himself working in the liberal tradition”, on 
“three core assumptions” about international politics. These, paraphrasing Moravcsik, 
include the existence of self-interested, risk-averse rational actors (autonomous 
individuals or groups); governments comprised of subsets of domestic interest groups 
agonistically striving to achieve different aims, which constrains the abilities of states 
internationally; and the behavior of states (their patterns of conflict and cooperation) 
reflect their interests.445
Moravcsik’s analysis shares important features with the realist school of 
international politics, including an emphasis on state actors and their putative rationality. 
 This is apt, as these three assumptions express dominant concepts 
within international politics theory more generally, as they convey key tenets of the liberal 
notions from which they arose. 
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It relies on the influential two-level game model developed by Robert Putnam to describe 
the relationship between domestic politics, or national preference formation and relations 
between states at the regional level, or strategic bargaining.446 In the tradition of 
rationalist-institutionalism, it employs bargaining theory and a functionalist account “to 
explain the establishment and design of international institutions,” in terms of how they 
manage and overcome the first- and second-order problems of international 
cooperation”.447  
Liberal intergovernmentalism attempts to clarify both the link connecting national 
preference formation, inter-state bargaining and the cooperative conduct that results and 
the relations between states and the international organizations of which they are a part.448 
Toward that end the framework Moravcsik developed allows him to examine dynamic 
practices and integrative outcomes in terms of a supply and demand process. As 
Rosamund summarizes it, the supply side refers to the domain of interstate bargaining 
while the demand side consists of national preferences for interstate cooperation. This 
perspective on dynamic inter-state cooperation has interesting implications for the liberal 
intergovernmentalist critique (or minimization) of the role supranational institutions play. 
Specific to the European scene, Rosamund asserts that: 
[L]iberal intergovernmentalism… assign[s] an important role to institutions as 
facilitators of positive sum bargaining. States benefit from and use the institutional 
environment of the EU for purposes of domestic legitimation and the pursuit of 
preferences. This seemingly applies to supranational institutions such as the 
Commission, the European Parliament and the Court of Justice … [which] tend to 
operate within the boundaries set by member-state preferences, although the 
exploitation of differences between member-states provides a definite opportunity 
for entrepreneurial supranational activity.449 
 
The subtle exploitation of differences between member-states is one way supranational  
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institutions might act beyond the designated mandate of their member-states, such as 
when an institutional body’s rules compel certain initiatives or build a certain logic that 
gradually conducts the preference formation and policy-agendas of the member-states. 
The three EU institutions Rosamund cites above are prime examples of where this has 
occurred both as forces for the centrifugal building of the community and a cohesion 
policy to make that effective. Indeed, the Commission, Parliament and Court have 
transformed the way EU member-states interact (the international or multi-national level 
of governance within the community) and the way they separately conduct their domestic 
affairs.450 
Moravcsik expanded on the classic intergovernmentalist view that “national 
interest[s arise] in the context of [a] sovereign state’s relative position in the states 
system”, to emphasize the agonistic give and take at the domestic level, between state and 
disparate elements of society, through which the national interest is actually generated.451 
“Liberal intergovernmentalism treat[s] the state as a unitary actor according to the IR 
tradition because it assumes that national governments develop a consistent preference 
order as a result of domestic political bargaining and that domestic actors do not play a 
significant independent role in negotiations beyond the state.”452 However, in the case of 
the EU particularly, the cultural, social and civil rights’ protections guaranteed to 
autonomous regions, distinct minority groups and individual citizens provide any group or 
private person so defined legal recourse through the Court of Justice against his or her 
government. This is just one factor casting the traditional treatment of the state as a 
unitary actor in doubt.   
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Chryssochoou argues that the liberal intergovernmentalist vision differs from 
earlier state-centric accounts of European integration by virtue of the fact that it “enlarges 
the range of intellectual opportunities for going beyond ‘unicausal theorizing’ by 
integrating… [elements of] regime analysis, negotiation theory and 
intergovernmentalism.”453 It combined central concepts of these schools of thought to 
establish that the process through which the national interest of a state actor comes to be 
identified is more complicated than had been previously recognized, demonstrating the 
significance of competition between disparate interest groups, political parties, and 
various constituencies at the domestic level. It is this knotty process that provides the 
background of each state actor’s respective strategic interactions with other states in the 
regional community. He states: 
The underlying demand for cooperation, not the entrepreneurial supply of 
information, imposes a binding constraint on [inter-state] negotiations. Efficiency 
is relatively unproblematic because interested governments are able to act as their 
own political entrepreneurs. Instead negotiators focus primarily on the distribution 
of [anticipated domestic] benefits [between the respective bargaining states], 
which are decisively shaped by the relative power of national governments, 
understood in terms of asymmetrical policy interdependence.454 
 
In other words individual governments and their leaders cannot, at the “supranational” 
level of the international organization, effectively pressure other state actors or “impose 
binding constraints on negotiations” between them.455
Naturally the respective interests subtending the individual aims and agendas of 
each state actor and sub-state actors within them, in the complex process of inter-state 
bargaining differ. The presentation of their interests (the exposure of differences) is 
moderated by the larger intergovernmental framework that restrains agonistic engagement 
in the interests of cooperation, as well as self-interest in such an institutional setting which 
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compels them to posture and bargain according to how they estimate of the strength of 
their positions as compared to that of their respective negotiating partners.  
While cooperation is the common objective among members of a regional 
community, the definition of a successful outcome and the means of achieving it depend 
on state actors’ relative influence and dependency therein. So too, the decision process 
over whether to air a difference and how to do so is largely determined by complex 
decision-making procedures A range of factors determines whether that divergent agenda 
may become an issue. In addition, the form of presentation a differing or contrary 
perspective takes partially determines the character of the debate that follows, as well as 
the durability of it as such: be it a long-term source of contention (such as the CAP), a 
briefly bracketed matter that a state actor may return to at a more propitious moment, or 
one that evaporates from the memory of the state that sets it aside. The point is that the 
autonomy of states in regional communities with supranational institutions is often 
constrained by the supervening authority of those institutions. This can be constructive or 
frustrating depending on the agenda pursued.  
However, this truism is somewhat at odds with an aforementioned principle tenet 
of liberal intergovernmentalism. As Moravcsik asserts: 
Strong supranational institutions are often seen as the antithesis of 
intergovernmentalism. Wrongly so. …In the intergovernmentalist view, the unique 
institutional structure of the EC is acceptable to national governments only insofar 
as it strengthens, rather than weakens, their control over domestic affairs, 
permitting them to attain goals otherwise unachievable.456
This underscores the intergovernmentalist account of the existence of supranational 
institutions, even in light of the enhanced mechanisms for subsidiarity between the 
national parliaments and the EU as provided by the Lisbon Treaty.  
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Yet, in Heideggerian terms, Moravcsik here takes an appearance (the purported 
acceptance of national governments which announces itself without authentically showing 
itself) for apodictical fact (reality). While it is true that national governments would be 
loathe accepting institutional structures certain to weaken their control, the EU clearly 
does ultimately have precisely that effect, whether as a result of rulings by the Court or 
legislation passed by the Commission. In many ways the EU seems (in the Heideggerian 
sense) to accommodate itself to its member-state’s governments. However, the suggestion 
that membership may only strengthen a state’s national authority ignores a wealth of 
contradictory indications.457
An analogy to intergovernmentalism can be drawn to the establishment of 
sovereign political institutions in the US. Intergovernmentalism is what the US envisaged 
for itself through the Articles of Confederation, which proved dysfunctional and were 
replaced by the federal Constitution in 1787, which affirmed the federal government’s 
supreme authority over the laws of all the republics’ constituent states. Supranational 
institutions such as those comprising the EU differ in a significant sense, from 
intergovernmental ones. Yet the EU acts as a supranational authority over its member-
states in much the same way as the federal government of the US does over the states – 
which also enjoy equal status, representation and a degree of autonomy within the union. 
 It also, perplexingly, implies that aspirant states do not 
recognize that important aspects of their national sovereignty will be subordinated to EU 
institutions upon their accession—or that current member-states do not. The requirement 
of meeting the Copenhagen criteria and prerequisite preparations for implementing the 
dictates of the Acquis (upon accession) effectively compels a degree of compliance and 
subordination of national prerogative. 
 275 
The fact remains that once a state accedes to community membership it cannot 
remain unaffected by community decisions thereafter. Its choice of adopting community 
provisions, which many states neighboring the union have done of necessity, particularly 
with regard to trade policy (e.g.: Norway, Switzerland, Iceland, Croatia, Turkey, etc.) is 
effectively eliminated. Member-states are legally obliged to accept the decisions and 
rulings of the community’s institutions; neighboring states are compelled by self-interest 
to accommodate them. Although any member of the EU could in theory withdraw from 
the community, no formal mechanism yet exists to accommodate such a move.458 
Intergovernmentalists downplay the significance of supranational institutions and 
forces to assign them a more limited performative role than most integration theorists or 
schools of European integration theory believe they actually play. In so doing Moravcsik 
emphasizes the “link between domestic and regional politics… [that connects] 
intergovernmental theory with domestic sources of legitimacy.”459
Moravcsik contends that this enhances ability of national governments (state 
actors) to satisfy domestic demands through intergovernmental (inter-state) bargaining. 
He explains how member-nations in a loosely confederated or cooperative unions—
namely the EU—conceive, pursue and attain their goals. Relative differences of power 
between state actors across various matrixes of common concern constitute a key affective 
determinant of their relevant interests. The vectors (relative magnitudes and directions) of 
 As an actor of his own 
ideals whose stage, as it were, is scholarship, Moravcsik’s well argued views probably 
help to legitimate the EU among some “Euroskeptics” within the community. They may 
also serve to facilitate its expansion by easing the reluctance of those who oppose it on 
nationalistic grounds. 
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their compound interests and the conventional power they may expend to attain policy 
goals are loosely coordinated by broad frameworks for compromise and cooperation. 
Asymmetrical interdependence is the central structural dynamic within the EU, 
conditioning the institutional environment. Key features and means for managing 
asymmetrical interdependence include: 
treaty-amending negotiations [that] take place within a noncoercive system, 
transaction costs of generating information and ideas are low relative to the 
benefits of interstate cooperation [and] the distribution of benefits reflects relative 
bargaining power [so that] the power of each government is inversely proportional 
to the relative value that it places on an agreement compared to the outcome of its 
best alternative policy—its ‘preference intensity’.460 
 
He maintains that on this basis negotiated outcomes are:  
likely to reflect three specific factors: (1) the value of unilateral policy alternatives 
relative to the status quo, which underlies credible threats to veto; (2) the value of 
alternative coalitions, which underlies credible threats to exclude; and (3) the 
opportunities for issue linkage of side-payments, which underlie ‘package 
deals’.461 
 
As long as member-states benefit from cooperation, according to logic of 
intergovernmentalism, actors will accept occasional setbacks to their prerogatives and 
forego solutions outside the institutional framework comprising their interdependent 
condition. It also suggests however, that states will entertain unilateral policy alternatives, 
alternative coalitions and package deals to achieve their aims if the stakes are high enough 
to them or they are persistently blocked due to asymmetries of power that frustrate their 
ability to attain desired outcomes.462
Differences of power between actors are a significant determinant of outcomes in 
inter-state bargaining within a highly regulated cooperative institutional framework such 
as the EU, and this, somewhat paradoxically suggests that self-generated institutional 
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constraints (anticipated or otherwise) inhibit defections, radical change to the existing 
framework  that compels acceptance of the instrumentality and ultra-liberal-modern 
reification of reason that co-extends with the statist logic of the intergovernmentalist 
perspective. 
Intergovernmentalists (assuming there is more than one) recognize that 
membership in regionally integrating bodies and/or international organizations results in 
quantifiable benefits that actually increase domestic perceptions of legitimacy within 
states and internationally as members of those regional communities and organizations to 
which they belong.463 This is a persuasive argument that Moravcsik supports with 
compelling evidence from specific cases in which smaller, poorer countries within the EU 
negotiated their policy preferences against more powerful member-states.464
However, Rosamund notes that there is “a deeper issue concern[ing] the normative 
status of intergovernmentalism or state-centric forms of analysis. Theories can be 
construed as rather more than heuristic constructions through which academics order the 
world. They can also be seen [understood] as forces in the world that they describe.”
 That 
associations such as (or particularly) the EU strengthen their members relative to the 
position they would hold outside of the integrating regional community entails a logic of 
reliance at odds with certain intergovernmentalist claims, however. For it is an 
acknowledgement that makes his opposition to the contentions of the supranational 
institutionalist perspective somewhat curious, as over time the obligations of membership 
come to supersede a state-actors’ full autonomy, as innumerable examples from the 
contemporary EU and its 60 year history demonstrate. 
465 
This—as I have maintained throughout—is a common danger to European integration 
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theorizing (and in the social sciences more generally), one in which the advocates of a 
theoretical perspective believed to possess objective empirical veridicality unwittingly act 
as its ideological proponents. Rosamund affirms this central contention of my Nietzschean 
critique when he asserts, in the context of intergovernmentalism, that theories come to 
reflect “a political preference held by a range of actors within the EU… [and develop into] 
a set of propositions that help to provide rationalizations for what particular actors do.”466 
This corroborates my contention that theorists of European integration are neither 
objective about the empirical facts they bring together to substantiate their arguments nor 
intellectually dispassionate in making their respective analyses. The dominant positivist 
orientation of the political science discipline prevents many of them from recognizing the 
virtual impossibility of doing so. Additionally, their lack of detachment from the subject 
of analysis further jeopardizes their claims of approaching it in an objectively neutral 
spirit of scientific inquiry. These conundrums inhibit their recognition of the complex 
ways in which their own political views are implicated in the perspectives they adopt and 
the positions they advocate. Their ideological indoctrination within the very same (or 
discursively synonymous) socio-political milieu they study and their personal investment 
and/or stakes in the knowledge–power regime in which they participate as scholars makes 
them apt to act—if only unconsciously—as partisan devotees of a particular, highly 
disciplinary will to truth that closely corresponds with the metanarrative and 
corresponding value structure of the EU.467
This is an actuality Nietzsche identified when he noted what “every great 
philosophy so far has been: a confession of faith on the part of its author, and a type of 
involuntary and unself-conscious memoir”, suggesting that there is no objective 
  
 279 
perspective on the world capable of capturing the capital “T” truth, only the drive for 
knowledge craving mastery over its subject.468 The precise nature of Europe’s integration, 
its institutional development, the functioning and character of those bodies, the 
tremendously complex roles of member state governments, regional and local authorities, 
etc., is best discerned through a broad survey of numerous perspectives on the topic, a 
critical examination of their shared background assumptions (e.g.: the tenets comprising 
the metadiscourse of ultra-liberal-modernity) toward a view of the will to truth they 
advance and a careful combination of their finest insights. 
 
Supranational institutionalism  
Moravcsik’s intergovernmentalist theory persuaded many that the neo-
functionalist analysis was beset by theoretical weaknesses, but it also prompted a 
response, in part intended to defend and bolster the veracity of certain neo-functionalist 
insights and to account for perceived flaws in Moravcsik’s own theory.  Known 
informally as the “supranational institutionalist” theory of European integration, the 
approach is indebted to the fields’ neo-functionalist predecessors. 
In assessing the importance of supranational institutions to Europe’s present order 
under the aegis of the EU and its integration processes, Chryssochoou observes that they 
have had a discernable: 
an impact on the behavior of national governing elites and domestic policy actors, 
while at the same time becoming important venues for the resolution of conflicts… 
[they] can play a meaningful autonomous role in the European policy process, 
albeit periodically, in furthering the scope of the common functional arrangements 
and imposing constraints on rule-based state behavior… [and] they possess 
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agenda-setting powers that limit the capacity of states to exercise formal political 
control, collectively or individually, over integration outcomes.469 
 
In addition, the history of the Commission, and arguably the European Parliament (with 
the eventual ratification of the Lisbon Treaty), demonstrate that supranational institutions 
accrue authority as the integrating community that produced them (in this case the EU) 
expands. 
Alec Stone Sweet and Wayne Sandholz are perhaps the most prominent exemplars 
of this perspective. Together they published an article in 1997 challenging the veracity of 
Moravcsik’s ‘liberal inter-governmental’ thesis entitled European integration and 
supranational governance in the Journal of European Public Policy. It is important to 
note that they are not uncritical of neofunctionalist approaches either, which lends 
additional force to their arguments. They “problematize the notion, strongly implied by 
neo-functionalist theories, that integration is the process by which the EC gradually but 
comprehensively replaces the nation state in all its functions.” In so doing they also sought 
to “reject the comparative statics of intergovernmentalists as a mode of analysis incapable 
of capturing crucial temporal elements of European integration.”470 Their broad critical 
framework allows them to synthesize various insights from different perspectives and to 
posit thereby a more nuanced explanation of integrative processes. Among their primary 
concerns however, is that “the exclusive focus on grand intergovernmental bargains can 
lead to serious distortions of the historical record,” citing examples of how “integration 
always proceeded… despite the Luxembourg compromise [or] the divergence of state 
preferences.”471 
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Chryssochoou asserts that “the post-SEA era [has been] marked by renewed 
institutional dynamism, [which has] prompt[ed] contemporary scholarship to cast doubt 
on realist state-centric claims for viewing institutions as ‘passive, transaction-cost 
reducing sets of rules’ designed to facilitate intergovernmental bargains.”472 Confirming 
this, Rosamund notes how “[Stone Sweet and Sandholtz] pitch their framework as a less 
state-centric and more supranational alternative …deploy[ing] the image of demand and 
supply sides to integration.” Rather than disputing the significance of transaction costs 
they argue that “the role of transnational exchange is central to generating demands for 
regulation and governance capacity at the European level. Supranational institutions work 
to supply those things.”473 
Against Moravcsik’s challenge to the neo-functionalist school, they do not think 
“intergovernmentalism displaces neo-functionalism, but rather relies on a causal argument 
developed by the neo-functionalists”.474 They argue persuasively that “empirical research 
supports the transactions-driven theory of European integration” they propose, one in 
which “the term ‘intergovernmental’ is useful as a description of a specific mode of 
decision-making within the EC policy process…[b]ut which does not require [them] to 
adopt or accept of ‘intergovernmentalism-as-theory’.”475
Transactions become institutionalized according to how “demands generated in the 
transnational domain stimulate a response from the decision-making institutions.”
 
476 As 
the degree and kind of transactions occurring differs between sectors of activity and 
disparate national economies, determines how they will be coordinated. “Variability in 
levels of transborder transaction and intra-EU exchange,”477 understood through Stone 
Sweet and Sandholtz’s  supranational perspective, as a “transaction-based theory”, 
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coherently explains why “integration proceeds faster and farther in some policy areas that 
in others.”478  
Moreover, they state that their theory “also explain[s] the general direction of 
integration in the common market, [and] account[s] for the decisively neoliberal (pro-
market) character of recent events like the 1992 program and the Maastricht provisions on 
economic and monetary union.”479 According to Rosamund they reread “Haasian 
functionalism… as a form of institutionalist analysis.” In the analysis, “institutions acquire 
legitimacy through both their own efforts to promote supranational norms and the 
lobbying activities of interests that seek access to public officials in pursuit of their 
goals.”480
The central argument of Sandholtz and Stone Sweet’s thesis was that “once 
movement toward the supranational pole [along the continuum they describe between 
intergovernmental bargaining and the emergence of supranational institutions] begins, 
European rules generate a dynamic of their own, which we call institutionalization.”
  
481 
The transformation undergone by institutions through processes of intergovernmental 
bargaining are central to their understanding of the emergence of supranational dynamics 
that condition states’ desires for deeper cooperation, and further supranationally driven 
integration. They acknowledge that “actors behave in self-interested ways”, but take as 
given that “both the interests and the behaviors [of state actors] take form in a social 
setting defined by rules”. This is not to deny the agonistic way in which institutions as 
systems of rules arise, however, for they recognize that “new kinds of transactions or 
behaviors, disagree[ment] as to what rules require, and dispute resolution processes 
compel their “constant evolution”.482  
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It is this on-going process of institutionalization at a level at once between and 
above state actors that compels and deepens involvement. Thus it is in part through 
“institutionalization [that] EC policy domains can become more supranational without 
some, or at times a majority of, governments wanting it or being able to reverse it.”483 
This logic of institutionalization is, they assert, “crucial to understanding integration as a 
process …for as European rules emerge and are clarified and as European organizations 
become arenas for politics, what is specifically supranational shapes the context for 
subsequent interactions.”484 This presents a major challenge to the intergovernmentalists’ 
logic, which has difficultly accounting for the dynamic process by which state interests 
are conditioned by the politics generated within the supranational institutions of which 
they are a part.   
Stone Sweet and Sandholtz consider the role of treaty-based policy domains in 
terms of how they advance supranational governance, asserting that they originate with 
the “advantage of [having] a legal basis in the Union’s fundamental rules”. But integration 
processes outside formal policy domains also increase the authority of Europe’s 
supranational institutions, as their impetus stimulates the latter to expand their formal 
spheres of influence. In fact, the EU continually re-negotiates aspects of its treaty-based 
policy domains to deepen and refine the political striations of its homogenizing space. In 
doing so it seeks to anticipate, capture and channel differing forces in a relatively uniform, 
specified direction. Stone Sweet and Sandholtz refer to article 236, which authorizes the 
EU to “establish supranational governance to achieve the general objectives of the 
Community.”485  
 284 
In other words the EU not only generates affects that always-already concur with 
and advance its aims, but its creators explicitly sanctioned the interpolation of forces, 
potential events of becoming-other, that differed from the plain objectives of the 
community. This indicates the ways in which the EU was, by over-lapping institutional 
and legal means, created to normalize developments. It normalizes both conceptual and 
corporeal developments, limiting them (in the name of enhancing diversity!) to a 
becoming-same inside its territorially defined area, which is comprised of a conceptually 
delimiting sovereignty that physically defines belonging in accordance with the 
geographical limits of its member-states. In addition it conditions culturally enforced 
values and corresponding idealized subjectivities—compelling conformity—outside of its 
borders. The latter entails a systematic interiorization of the EU’s outside (particularly 
those nations geographically abutting it) that has been crucial to conditioning the 
possibility of the EU’s formal expansion.486 It does so according to the quasi-imperialist 
statist logic and legal mechanisms of which it may credibly be understood as the highest 
realization.487
Rule following and treaty compliance constrain member-state governments, which 
exert limited influence over their production—influence declining as the union expands its 
membership.
 
488 The Commission and the Court (ECJ) can make decisions that member-
states are obliged to implement. “National courts, guided by ECJ decisions, can compel 
their governments to comply with EC rules they have opposed… [and this] rule-centered 
logic of institutionalization …suggests why it is difficult, and sometimes impossible, for 
governments to reverse shifts toward supranational governance that have occurred.”489 
According to the theory these shifts inevitably occur as a product of intergovernmental 
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bargaining and cooperation (transactions) where the formal integration of key economic 
and political functions is systematically pursued. Rosamund further affirms this point by 
stating, “transnational activity is the generator of spillovers because the growth of 
supranational rules and the increased responsiveness of central institutions of governance 
reduces the costs of transactions. Moreover, the existence of particular patterns of rules 
and rule-making creates a strong institutional logic for persistence of those patterns.”490 
Interestingly, Stone Sweet and Sandholtz consider the relevance of two 
“languages” that captures how “new transactions entrench interests”.491 The first of these 
is the notion of path dependency, which helps explain part of the dynamic behind 
institutional change. On this they concur with Paul Pierson, who argues that institutional 
change is a “‘path-dependent’ process”, explaining that, 
Once institutional and policy changes are in place, social actors adapt to those 
changes, frequently making substantial investments in the process. A policy 
turnabout [thereafter] would entail the loss of these sunk costs, thus raising the 
costs for governments seeking to unwind supranational governance. 
 
The very process of adaptation entails a transformation of norms and practices that 
gradually gain the acceptance of their practitioners. Reversing this transformation of 
attitudes and expectations is equally significant to the costs of administrative changes. 
These transformations gradually strengthen supranational institutions. 
Chryssochoou writes that  
European integration has often led to unintended consequences’ regarding the 
growth, influence, and competence acquisition of supranational agencies, largely 
at the expense of national executives which can no longer act as gatekeepers.492
However, the extent of such unintended consequences is not limited to supranational 
agencies or national governments, but induces affective changes throughout integrating 
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societies. Stone Sweet and Sandholtz consider this dynamic in even more abstract terms, 
observing that “the process of adaptation to change in complex social settings also 
produces unintended consequences that are difficult to unwind. Thus institutional and 
policy outcomes become ‘locked in,’ channeling politics down specific paths and closing 
previously plausible alternatives.”493
The perceived erosion of national authority – which in many domestic political 
milieus is translated into the frequently incoherent rhetoric of “diminished state 
sovereignty” – generates a great deal of anxiety in certain (mainly conservative and/or 
nationalist) circles. While it is true that “[t]he European policy-making arena increasingly 
relies on a distinctive set of collective policy norms and everyday regulatory practices”, 
the member-states—particularly those twelve who joined the EC before the SEA (1986)—
have been intimately involved in the construction of that area.
  
494 Member-states who 
joined in 1995, 2004 and 2007 willingly undertook the domestic institutional reforms 
required to accede to the union and accepted any consequent erosion of their state 
sovereignty in so doing. With a few exceptions in some policy areas, the previous 
member-states had already made concessions to EU precedence via treaty agreements.495 
So while it is the case that a highly complex transference of authority has and is occurring 
between the member-state governments and the EU institutions (said by many to comprise 
a supranational level), it has been conducted through consultative processes or occurred as 
a consequence of such processes. For the foreseeable future the controversy may be 
irresolvable, as it is not merely an empirical question, but lies in determining which 
direction the transfer has tended to go, and whether and to what extent it constitutes a 
transformation of the nation-state system in Europe.  
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Critics have noted that gaps in the control exercised by state authorities over EU 
bodies could be problematic both for the member-states’ and the EU’s perceived 
legitimacy. In his historical institutionalist critique Pierson “focuses on factors that are 
likely to create considerable gaps in member-state control [over European institutions]. 
Four are of fundamental importance: the autonomous actions of European institutional 
actors, the restricted time horizons of decision makers, the large potential for unintended 
consequences, and the likelihood of changes in COG [Chiefs of Government] preferences 
over time.”496
The second “language” Stone Sweet and Sandholtz consider in assessing how 
member-states may contend with the power of supranational authorities, is the principle-
agent metaphor employed by Mark Pollack, which shows how “the administrative and 
oversight mechanisms [that] principals (member governments) use to rein in agents (the 
Commission) can be costly and of limited effectiveness. Furthermore, agents can exploit 
divergent preferences among multiple principles, especially under more demanding 
decision rules, like unanimity.
 However, each of these aspects of change in institutional competence and 
preference ordering is very likely to give rise to negotiated responses and political action 
in an agonistic process that frequently succeeds in modifying their more undesired effects. 
Although this usually amounts to buffing down the rough edges as it were, given the 
adaptations that growth in the influence of EU institutions compels, myopically 
nationalistic or state-centric thinkers still resent the allegedly “foreign” imposition of 
change on their communities. 
497 Stone Sweet and Sandholtz assert that “the path-
dependence and principle-agent logics reinforce [their] argument that institutionalization 
in the EC is not reducible to the preferences of, or bargaining among, member 
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governments. The expansion of transnational society pushes for supranational governance, 
which is exercised to facilitate and regulate that society. Once in place, supranational rules 
alter the context for subsequent transactions and policy-making.”498 Stone Sweet and 
Sandholtz’s thesis also provides an interesting means of comprehending dynamical 
aspects of globalization, particularly as it relates to institutional cooperation, overlap and 
collaboration.499 
 
New Institutionalism and Multi-Level Governance 
From the late-1980s to the present decade a number of theoretical challenges to the 
received understandings of the dynamic processes of European integration have been 
postulated by scholars dissatisfied by the dominant discourse. As Eilstrup-Sangiovanni 
notes, “[t]he dispute between supranationalists and intergovernmentalists over the role and 
impact of regional institutions is no longer the only fault line in European integration 
debates. During the past 15 years, a number of rival perspectives have emerged which 
challenge established integration theories.”500
Among the more influential schools of thought within this unconventional camp 
are a group of perspectives generally placed together under the heading new 
institutionalism. Although linked through some essentially similar concerns they consist 
of quite diverse historical, rational-choice and sociological strands. Chryssochoou 
 These schools have sought to challenge all 
the presuppositions of conventional integration theories, going so far as to expose as 
bogus the metaphysical fictions that serve as their bases. They have largely drawn upon 
philosophical methods developed outside of the disciplinary confines of political science. 
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summarizes the divisions of theorizing within the influential new institutionalist 
movement succinctly: 
Historical institutionalism treats institutions as instances of both formal and 
informal interaction and as ‘systems of norms, including conventions, codes of 
behavior and standard constraints upon behavior”; rational choice institutionalism 
tends to define institutions as formal legalistic entities and sets of decision rules 
that impose obligations upon self-interested actors’; sociological institutionalism 
emphasizes the cognitive properties of institutions, that is, the way in which 
institutions influence behavior, whilst stressing, the mutual constitution of 
institutions and actors.501 
 
A general emphasis on the role and significance of institutions for shaping the 
developments of polities is the unifying theme between them. However, given their 
“diverse disciplinary starting points,” Rosamund thinks it may be somewhat disingenuous 
to speak of new institutionalism as a as a distinct movement, and notes that each 
subdivision provides a quite different explanation for how institutions matter.502
In evaluating and working within the broader context of new-institutionalism, 
Mark A. Pollack has done work on important issues. Among these the principle-agent 
issue, as discussed above, and the subject of comitology as it pertains to new 
institutionalist approaches, are prominent.
 
503 The former concerns the problem of 
escalating institutional authority and autonomy, and generates controversy according to 
how intergovernmentalists and neofunctionalists understand the motives driving 
integration and the often expanding role of the institutions it creates.504 The latter, 
comitology, he says it “emerges as a key area in which rationalist and constructivist 
theorists provide competing accounts and hypotheses on a common empirical terrain, 
which offers the unusual prospect of direct, competitive empirical testing… [that] requires 
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researches to deal with serious methodological challenges” of both definition and 
measurement.505 
Another recent theoretical approach is that of Multi-level governance (MLG). This 
examines the function of authority as it has been dispersed through the numerous 
institutions comprising the EU. It is concerned with how power operates “between levels 
of governance and amongst actors and where there are significant sectoral variations in 
governance patterns [European, national, regional and local].”506 Multi-level governance 
emphasizes the emergence of a complex Euro-polity in which diverse political agonisms 
in a cooperative framework determine policy outcomes. 
A central text in this strand of integration theory is Hooghe and Marks’ Multi-level 
Governance and European Integration (2001), in which they define their objective as 
adducing the significance of the immense increase in both “the scope and depth of policy 
making at the EU level”, for “the political architecture of Europe”. They are particularly 
interested in the kind of political order that this trend is creating and whether it will foster 
a consolidation of member-states or ultimately weaken them.507
Without rejecting the importance of national governments they contend that no one 
form of political entity “monopolizes European-level policy making or the aggregation of 
domestic interests”.
 Hooghe and Marks 
challenge state-centric understandings of integration, asserting that “the core presumption 
of state-centric governance is that European integration does not challenge the autonomy 
of national states.” They pose the “alternative view that European integration is a polity-
creating process in which authoritative and policy making influences are shared across 
multiple levels of government—subnational, national and supranational.”  
508 With a distinctive perspective on the interactions taking place 
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between European institutions and actors they envisage a unique polity taking shape on 
the continent. Hooghe and Marks recognize that “while national governments are 
formidable participants in EU policy making, control ahs slipped away from them to 
supranational institutions… Individual state sovereignty is diluted in the EU by collective 
decision making among national governments and by the autonomous role of [the EU’s 
primary institutions].”509 
Paraphrasing an assertion by Hooghe and Marks, Jachtenfuchs and Kohler-Koch 
write that “the intellectual challenge of the multi-level governance model is that it does 
not describe the dispersion of authoritative competence across territorial levels but draws 
attention to the interconnection of multiple political arenas in the process of 
governing.”510 Authoritative competence is a manifold, emergent product of numerous 
spheres of political activity interrelating with one another with relative autonomy, 
irrespective of their formal divisions or hierarchic standings within their respective 
member-state polities or the EU. Chryssochoou writes that: 
Although it is not claimed that supranational institutions will eventually supersede 
the member state executives, or that national governance arenas will be rendered 
obsolete by a process of “transnational interest mobilization” …multi-level 
governance amounts to a multi-layered polity, where there is no center of 
accumulated authority, but where changing combinations of government[al] level 
engage in collaboration.511
From the perspective of multi-level governance analysis, the EU is evolving into an 
potentially authentic ‘post-sovereign’ or post-modern polity in which rather than a new 
level of authority atop a modern hierarchical order usurping the authority of the state and 
roles of various governance structures within it, each level—from what conventionally 
would have been considered “lowest” to “highest”—interact separately. Conceptual and 
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formal political boundaries that previously defined relations of power are crossed and 
inter-penetrated in a process that diffuses political authority. Rosamund asserts that “MLG 
is about fluidity, the permanence of uncertainty and multiple modalities of authority – 
suggesting an association with postmodernity.”512 
Eilstrup-Sangiovanni observes the close similarities between the MLG “depiction 
of the task specific, overlapping and intersecting institutional jurisdictions” for contending 
with policy problems overarching policy networks with Mitrany’s functionalism, the goal 
of which “was to diffuse political power through delegation to non-majoritarian, single-
issue authorities or agencies, which would rely heavily upon technocratic expertise and in 
which ‘functional problem-solving rather than political bargaining would dominate.” She 
also offers an interesting criticism, asserting that MLG “suffers from many of the same 
weaknesses [that beset Mitrany’s functionalist approach].” In her estimation these 
problems include “administrative feasibility [due to] high transaction costs”; problems of 
“democratic legitimation [among institutions where] regulatory efficiency and functional 
problem solving capacity” are emphasized above all else.513
 
 
These may be quite valid concerns but I believe that by better contending with the 
complexity of the multifarious political processes generated through European unification 
the multi-level governance approach more effectively captures the character and 
dynamism of integrative processes than its rivals. It strikes me as a promising way 
forward that seems less colored by ideological advocacy than many of its competitor 
schools and therefore avoids much of the theoretical circulatory that has plagued much of 
European studies and theories of European integration as a field. 
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Consociationalism  
Chryssochoou (whose critical review of European integration theory I have 
utilized as a primary source in this work) is himself a prominent proponent of a strand of 
theory known as consociationalism, a conceptualization of political relations within and 
between states that has been employed to analyze the nature of group autonomy in terms 
of political rule-making, consent and legitimacy within multi-constituent or pluralistic 
democratic polities since the 1960s. Nugent describes it as a “variation of the core state-
centric model” of integration theory.514 “The idea of consociation grew out of political 
scientists’ concerns with how deeply divided societies could achieve governing 
stability.”515
Chryssochoou traces the term (consociatio, Latin for “associating together”) and 
concept back to the late 16th century in the works of Althusius and Bodin who debated in 
their works the principles of sovereignty and the proper organization of public life.
 The approach has recently been reinvigorated through its application to the 
institutional operation and political nature of the EU.  
516 
“Originally developed – notably by Arend Lijphart – to throw light on how some 
democratic states which are sharply divided internally are able to function in a relatively 
smooth and stable manner… consociational states are [typically] portrayed as feature[ing] 
societal segmentation …[with the segments] represented in decision-making forums on a 
proportional basis …[wherein] political elites dominate decision-making processes …[that 
are] taken on the basis of compromise and consensus… the rationale [of which] is the 
preservation of segmented autonomy within a cooperative system.” This set of 
assumptions is said to “provide valuable insights into central features of the functioning of 
the EU” by its proponents.”517 
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Chryssochoou defines consociationalism “as a strategy of cooperative conflict 
resolution, whereby the elites transcend intergroup fragmentation through negotiated 
agreements or settlements based on a politics of accommodation.”518 The framework takes 
elite decisions as primary and as the end of politics, and relegates citizen participation to a 
secondary consideration. Democracy is important for the legitimation of elite decisions, 
but in an effective consociational system it is strictly representative by design. The 
public’s enfranchisement and democratic processes cannot be permitted beyond a certain 
point, to obstruct the attainment of mutually beneficial outcomes. In a consociational 
system stability and enhanced collaboration between actors is a consequence of experts 
negotiating the details of agreements for further cooperation. Taylor sees the 
consociational model as useful for “explain[ing] the nature of the balance between 
fragmentation and cooperation/integration in the EU, the mutual dependence between the 
member states and the collectivity, and the ability – which does not imply inevitability – 
of the system as a whole both to advance and maintain stability.”519
Against neofunctionalist assertions about the erosion of the nation-state by a the 
power of broader, community-wide prerogatives, Chryssochoou describes the EU as a 
“confederal consociation, by which he means a system in which there is ‘the merging of 
distinct politically organized states in some form of union to further common ends without 
losing either national identity or resigning individual sovereignty.”
 
520 Chryssochoou 
himself explains that “[C]onsociational arrangements …require neither a ‘sense of 
community’, nor a popular affirmation of shared values, much less the existence of a 
single and undifferentiated demos united by the overarching power of a higher civic ‘we-
ness’.”521 
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“Lijphart’s model of consociational decision-making anticipate[d] government by 
‘grand coalition’ (rather than by majority) and the existence of veto powers for each of the 
constituent elites.” The four primary features of a consociational democracy he identified 
are the grand coalition, the mutual veto or ‘concurrent majority’ rule, ‘proportionality as 
the principle standard of majority rule and segmental autonomy in a federalist 
framework.522 He thought that for a consociational form of democracy and by extension, 
presumably, a consociated group of democratic states to function effectively, the political 
“society [they comprise] has to be divided, with minimal communication between 
separate segments.”523 Communication would therefore run vertically between the citizens 
of states and their respective elites along formalized hierarchical lines, and horizontally 
between the respective elites of the consociated units. Ultimately then “[t]he development 
of attitudes and values among the ‘decision-receivers’ [or citizen-constituents of a polity] 
is of lesser importance compared with developments at the level of the ‘decision-
makers’.”524
His theory of confederal–consociationalism can therefore be understood as an 
attempt to account for aspects of both the intergovernmental and, to a lesser extent, the 
supranational institutional takes on integration. It underscores the fact that states are far 
from disappearing as a result of their limited integration and increasing synonymy within 
 Chryssochoou illuminates the statist logic inherent to the consociational 
approach, in addition to its expansion of its hierarchical ethos. His perspective evinces the 
way in which the ultra-liberal-modern state form continuously machinates to protect its 
prerogatives by intensifying the authority of the power-knowledge regime constituting it 
and actualized through a coextending regime of violence regularized through an ever-
broadening and subtle array of affective forces.  
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the EU. However, Europe’s economic and political assimilation, under the aegis of the 
EU, clearly indicates an expanded form of statism that replicates on a much larger 
territorial / geographic scale, the metaphysical presuppositions of the state, as well as its 
anti-human identic and existential dualisms.525 This is not to assert that difference has 
disappeared entirely, but to say that the elements of authenticity constituting traditional 
differences are being systematically interpolated and diminished according to the 
metadiscourse of ultra-liberal-modernity. Its over-riding metanarrative—predicated on the 
logocentric imperative of radical equality—continues amalgamating the desires of ever-
less-disparate Europeans until all that remains of the continent’s traditional diversity of 
types are slightly varying simulacrums of difference mediated by the spectacles of 
consumerism which the EU arose in part to serve.526
Importantly for its application to the EU, particularly given the efforts by EU 
institutions since the early 1990s to foster a common European identity, is the fact that 
“the process of macro-level loyalty building’ should not be associated with the integration 
or amalgamation of the component publics into a common political form that overrides 
citizens’ ‘fixed primary loyalties’.”
 The EU can be expected to succeed 
so long as its over-arching simulacrum of meaning and purpose, sustained by the 
metadiscourse of ultra-liberal-modernity, continues to allay the existential ennui and 
nausea inducing bad faith that would otherwise attend the intensified nihilism of our 
hyper-decadent epoch. 
527 In other words, while the EU strives to generate the 
appearance of novel, shared characteristics between and a corresponding sense of 
belonging among the 500 million citizens in its 27 member states, it does so according to 
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the metanarrative of ultra-liberal-modernity, continually invoking its discourses to appeals 
to the vast majority of the population who have long been indoctrinated with its tenets.  
In doing so the EU re-describes the respective national histories and traditions of 
its member-states to portray them as always having corresponded with its ultra-liberal-
modern creed. It seeks thereby to incrementally replace such immutable conceptual 
edifices and the myopic worldviews they sustain with what the EU promotes as a more 
plastic and cosmopolitan notion of selfhood. This includes translating liberal ideals and 
modern expectations into practical norms by expanding notional awareness of the other, 
increasing the scope of responsibility and enhancing possibilities for becoming.528 The 
faith of Europhiles is that this will allow the cultural differences of disparate groups to 
flourish and even permit them a significant degree of self-rule via semi-autonomous 
authority structures, such as ethically distinct regions within multi-cultural nations such as 
Belgium or Spain. The federal dimensions of the confederal consociation provide a 
broader rubric of norms, rules and institutions within which a partially elected, partially 
elite coalition of representatives from every members-state can jointly govern the union as 
a whole.529
“What is absolutely essential to the functionality and policy responsiveness of the 
plural polity is a priori acceptance of the need for cooperative shared rule among the 
group leaders.”
  
530 For many critical theorists this “essential” condition fails to allay 
problems over the just legitimation of rule and the accountability of the decision-makers – 
the slave-moral impulse to assign blame rhetorically beautified as responsibility. This is 
particularly problematic when statist logic and ultra-liberal-modern values come to seem 
contradictory, in cases where the self-determination of a people is at odds with the 
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sovereignty and territorial integrity of a nation. However, some argue in response to such 
concerns that in a consociational system, “the faith of democracy lies more in a belief in 
the principle of compromise itself than in the principles of open and responsible 
government.”531 Such a belief has ameliorated political conflicts between disparate groups 
within multi-ethnic states, and between neighboring states with trans-national minority 
constituencies (e.g.: ethnic Albanians in Montenegro, Macedonia and Serbia [Kosovo]), 
so long as it was maintained.  
Yet many examples from recent history, including the breakup multi-ethnic nation-
states such as the former Yugoslavia and Czechoslovakia, (as well as ongoing conflicts in 
Sudan, Pakistan, India, etc.,) demonstrate that the confidence such a belief requires is 
difficult to instill in a multi-ethnic and multi-cultural polity, and nearly impossible to 
enforce once factionalism dominates.532 The multi-ethnic ideal is often an ideological 
fiction promoted to justify the dominance of a hegemonic group whose leaders who aim to 
maintain the prevailing statist order. And it is often challenged by opposing leaders 
pursuing the same statist logic, with conflict and gratuitous human misery, resulting. 
However, membership in the EU does not alter the formal sovereignty of its member-
states, who remain formally independent and largely autonomous in the conduct of their 
domestic affairs so long as the domestic legislations of member-state governments consist 
with EU norms. The EU has multiple institutional means of guaranteeing the rights, 
prerogatives and legal recourse of minority groups and individuals who believe their 
member-state government is abusing them.533
Such a view would resonate well with Nietzsche’s own political sentiments if he 
could be certain that the best, whose “freedom is a freedom for creative work and not 
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simply an unbridled satisfaction of desires”, were actually able to rule according to their 
eros.534
Nietzsche would have decisively rejected the prevailing hyper-decadent order and 
its ‘cynical, enlightened false-consciousness’—in which ascetic–consumerist priests of 
ressentiment arrogate to themselves the conceit that they are best qualified to rule—as 
antithetical to the aim of fostering the higher culture necessary for authentic human 
becoming and greatness.
 However, according to his vitalist politics he would perceive the contemporary 
political reality in the Western world, as conceived by consociationalists particularly, as 
another slightly innovative justification of existing anti-natural liberal democratic 
arrangements. The motivation for the consociationalist thesis would be to nuance 
rationales for modes of being / forms of life that already consist with the dominant ultra-
liberal-modern ideological apparatus.  
535 The reign of ascetic–consumerist priests of ressentiment 
always already consists with the ethos of slave psychology—providing a moral 
rationalization to the herd’s leveling of mountain and valley across the natural landscape 
of human types. The diversity of the species is diminished and its potential attenuated to 
achieve an ideological and political goal consistent with a morality of taming designed to 
emasculate would-be profligate geniuses likely to oppose such anti-natural aims. 
Historically, rulers have deemed some degree of social leveling necessary for the 
administration and governance of human masses, across diverse cultures and widely 
separated epochs. But in the 20th century the bureaucratic management of human societies 
has taken this apparently basic inclination to new levels of sophistication and given rise to 
correspondingly novel means of transgression. The defiance of stultifying socio-cultural 
norms and ossified political authority is urgently needed in a hyper-decadent age. 
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As a nuanced means of organizing social life and contending with the proliferating 
challenges of complexifying communities, “Consociationalism,” writes Chryssochoou, “is 
best captured by the term ‘consensus elite government’ – in systems of common 
management and joint decision-making operating within a multi-level political order as 
currently represented by the Union.”536 The “elite” to whom Chryssochoou refers, are of 
course, philistine economic optimists whose accord originates in their preoccupation with 
security and the prosperity of the crowd. According to the precepts of certain democratic 
theories the legitimacy of these sallow managers derives from the putative “justness” of 
the institutions they administer and their ability to respond to the multitude’s banausic 
demands and reduce its suffering (understood as “fairness”).537
In so far as the prevailing system of governance in the central organs of the 
globalization complex could be characterized as a confederal consociation of subtly 
differing but substantively similar (ideologically analogous) democracies, it would strike 
Nietzsche as among the very worst sorts of political organization for the realization of a 
natural socio-political order. He would see it as one that diminishes human potential by 
enforcing an enfeebling ideal of (ersatz) security to enable more consumption. This 
striving after security, the necessity to create a sense of shared wellbeing that never 
succeeds in overcoming (re: eliminating) authentic sources of insecurity, such as the 
conventional illusion between self and other and the metaphysical fictions perpetuated by 
the metadiscourse of ultra-liberal-modernity, sustains counter-productive sources of 
insecurity and accords with the simulated existential meaning and ontological purpose it 
circulates to naturalize its ultra-liberal-modern ideals. The anti-naturalism inherent in our 
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contemporary, dissipative values immiserates not only the healthy, but also needlessly 
exacerbates the suffering of the weak and botched—though they cannot know it. 
The depiction of European integration that develops out of the consociationalist 
perspective has it that the EU “is not about the subordination of the component states to a 
higher central authority, let alone a new regional state, but rather it is about the 
preservation of those state qualities that allow the subunits to survive as distinct 
collectivities, while engaging themselves in mutually rewarding interactions.”538 
Furthermore, it “claims to offer a linkage between the elite-led nature of European 
integration and the EU’s manifest lack of democratic character. The institutional and 
decision-making architecture of the EU has manipulated the integration process so that 
states continue to manage the processes of community building.”539 This is to say the 
consociational perspective, understood as advocacy, maintains something of the status-
quo vis state sovereignty, validates certain key insights of the liberal intergovernmentalist 
perspective on integration and naturalizes its—and the broader discipline’s—mania for 
rationalism. It illuminates dimensions of European integration that are antithetical to the 
ethos of Nietzsche’s ‘good Europeanism’, as “the pro-activity of [the EU’s] elites 
seriously inhibit the capacities of integration from below that could help create a European 
demos.”540
To the extent that this is true, it is clear from a Nietzschean perspective that the 
wrong elites are running the show. Moreover, consistent with Nietzsche’s intense aversion 
to liberal-modern democratic populism, these conventional elites are the so-called “higher 
men”, the self-described “libres penseurs” (free thinkers), who “to a man... still believe in 
the ‘ideal’”, like those whom he was so contemptuous of in the late 19th century. 
  
541 They 
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dominate politics in Europe today—as they have at least since the end of World War 
Two—out of a striving for conventional power that originates in a schizophrenic variety 
of ressentiment that exacerbates secularized slave-moral indignation.542 They believe in 
the democratic legitimation, by “appeal to the egoism of the masses”, of a technocratic 
bureaucracy that directs all the functional operations of everyday life toward the 
automaton-ization of the human herds they manage, to serve (as Nietzsche put it in an 
early essay) the interests “of a self-seeking, stateless money aristocracy”, to whom he later 
referred as ascetic priests of ressentiment.543
They may for religious reasons oppose what they perceive to be the EU’s 
secularizing effects, or, if xenophobic nationalists, for its liberal social and immigration 
policies; if socialists, its advocacy of trade liberalization; if neo-liberal economists, the 
farm subsidies provided by its Common Agricultural Policy, etc. The extent to which any 
of these groups’ respective assessments of the EU are accurate is debatable. As the views 
motivating much of this opposition tends to be a product of reaction (on top of the 
 
With 27 member-states the partisan divisions within the EU polity are exceedingly 
varied. A plethora of political parties vie to achieve their aims, from strictly national 
parties, to transnational ones that form coalitions to affect politics at both the national and 
supra-national levels of the Union. The so-called “Euroskeptics” and “Europhobes” come 
in many varieties and represent myriad factions within the continent’s disparate 
communities and cultures. But to generalize, they tend to perceive the EU as little more 
than an institutional and legal framework for the operation of an influential cartel of ruling 
elites (relatively defined) that legitimates its own machinations through its policies and 
dominance of EU institutions.  
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reaction that spurred the creation of the EU itself) that ramifies cynicism, the defensibility 
of their agendas as authentically agonistic life-affirming expressions of a positive will to 
creative destruction as generative power, is doubtful. 
However, it is true that its officials are subjected to ever-greater scrutiny as a result 
of demands for increased accountability among its constituent publics. The EU’s 
legislators and bureaucrats are governed by institutional rules and accountability 
procedures established by the EU’s Fraud Prevention Office as well as numerous 
management and regulatory committees, and agreed by treaty between member-state 
governments. Proposed changes to European institutions—particularly more recent efforts 
to increase democratic accountability and institute more direct citizen rule—threaten the 
elite-managed consociational order. In view of this it is unclear that the consociationalist 
view will persist in offering a compelling explanation for integration processes as this 
happens, as current trends suggest a normative momentum driving it toward making the 
EU more transparent and answerable for greater European civic responsibilities. 
 
Three recent theoretical approaches: Social Constructivism, Discourse Analysis and 
Post-modernism 
 
Lastly, I will mention three important and innovative perspectives that have 
emerged on the stage of European integration theory largely in the last two decades. These 
warrant attention because they have provided critical insights that have, with much-
debated efficacy, intervened upon the sequential accretion of knowledge resulting from 
and symptomatizing the will to truth distinctive of the mainstream field (as explicated 
above). In so doing they have disturbed the striated space of the epistemic community 
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comprising European Union studies and the major(itarian) theories of European 
integration, posing new challenges to its status as a normalizing research tradition. While 
not necessarily creating the smooth, heteronymous space across the territorialized social 
field most conducive to authentic becoming-other, these theoretical perspectives are 
shredding the veil that long shrouded the essentializing conceits of the mainstream while 
strongly resisting re-capture by conventional statist discourses of Europeanization. As a 
result they are arguably moving the field in exciting directions, making possible a deeper 
interrogation of the fundamental precepts of the discipline itself, its conceptual strengths 
and weaknesses and the ideological presuppositions of the EU project.  
The inter-related approaches of social constructivism, discourse analysis and post-
modernism developed in response to concerns raised by philosophers who were in part 
inspired by Nietzsche and/or responding to the critical tradition he instigated.544
The social constructivism school of integration theory, as Thomas Risse has noted, 
has been influenced by Foucault.
 These 
philosophers include Jacque Derrida, who deconstructed the function of language and the 
ineliminable metaphysical logos at its center; and Michel Foucault, who applied a 
Nietzschean notion of genealogy to the socio-political construction of the subject through 
disciplinary regimes of power and knowledge. Foucault’s work has been very influential, 
due largely to his overt concern with the nature of the political, which makes it more 
palatable to conventional political scientists (who still resist taking it seriously), whereas 
Derrida’s more philosophically challenging—and unsettling—insights have yet to make a 
similarly deep or broad impact on the field.  
545 He describes “constructivism as based on a social 
ontology which insists that human agents do not exist independently from their social 
 305 
environment and its collectively shared system of meanings (‘culture’ in a broad 
sense).”546  He goes on to assert that “social constructivism occupies a—sometimes 
uneasy—ontological middleground between individualism and structuralism by claiming 
that there are properties of structures and of agents that cannot be collapsed into each 
other.”547 While “the prevailing theories of European integration—whether 
neofunctionalism, liberal intergovernmentalism, or ‘multi-level governance’—are firmly 
committed to a rationalist ontology which is agency-centered by definition,” social 
constructivists examine how the illusion of such agency (which Nietzsche recognized as 
resting on metaphysical fictions) is sustained through the occluding of the material 
conditions of its own possibility.548  
The constructivist perspective “emphasiz[es] the interests of actors [which] cannot 
be treated as exogenously given or inferred from a given material structure. Rather, 
political culture, discourse and the social construction of interests and preferences 
matter.”549 Risse argues that social constructivist model provides insights and nuance to 
our understanding of the EU and integration processes, particularly with regard to the 
materialization and precise character of a European identity and the place of national 
identities in the context of an emerging ‘Europeanness’. He says: 
First, accepting the mutual constitutive-ness of agency and structure allows for a 
much deeper understanding of Europeanization including its impact on statehood 
in Europe. Second and related, emphasizing the constitutive effects of European 
law, rules and policies enables us to study how European integration shapes social 
identities and interests of actors. Third, focusing on communicative practices 
permits us to examine more closely how Europe and the EU a constructed 
discursively and how actors try to come to grips with the meaning of European 
integration.550 
 
Risse goes on to consider the role of culture and ideology in the development of social 
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identities as a basis for political community as well as their historical contingency and 
malleability, in ways quite analogous to what I have done here, albeit from a Nietzschean 
perspective. This leads Risse to take seriously the potential in disparate national cultures 
for a pan-European collective identity and he provides compelling examples to show that 
they exist.551
The power of the metadiscourse of ultra-liberal-modernity—the action of which 
has been the subject of critique throughout this work—is augmented socio-politically 
through the resonance of its egalitarian ethos with slave moral ressentiment. The 
ideological instantiation of its anti-natural ideals compels and simultaneously covers-up a 
culture of abjection and conformity that impairs genuine becoming (becoming–other). In 
hegemonic ideological form it has synthesized the post-Enlightenment and modern 
discourses of universalism, liberalism, secularism, progressivism, and rationalism, and 
serves to naturalize scientism’s privileging of mechanistic causality and the positivistic 
orientation it confers.  
 
Discourse analysis is another recent and especially promising development in 
integration studies. Ole Wæver is a notable proponent of this theoretical approach to the 
EU. It is primarily concerned with how discourses circulate, legitimate and naturalize 
meanings. This has to do with understanding how sets of fundamental value assumptions 
about the world, the transmission of which often occurs through acculturation and are 
implicitly understood and shared, are effectively realized through formal and informal 
institutions. Discourse normalizes individuals and enforces itself through systematic 
socio-political procedures to persecute and exclude difference. This can occur in a formal 
sense through legislation, and informally through the perpetuation of mores and taboos.  
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Wæver states, “discourse analysis looks for structures of meaning. ‘Things’ do not 
have meaning in and of themselves, they only become meaningful in discourse. As a 
consequence, it is problematic to ground one’s analysis in ‘given’ subjects or objects 
because both are constituted discursively, and one should therefore study this process of 
constitution first.”552 This insight productively problematizes conventional notions of 
agency. However, Wæver is careful not to reify discourse, noting that “discourses exist 
and are reproduced and transformed through practice”, they do “not stand apart from 
‘reality’, [but are] embedded in reality in the sense of actions, materiality, and 
institutions.”553 
Wæver recognizes the philosophical origins of discourse analysis in political 
theory as lying in the incomparable thought of Nietzsche via Derrida’s post-
structuralism.554
The play of signs is a process of an eternal referring back to still other signs. It is 
an asking “what does that mean”, ad infinitum. Derrida, following Nietzsche’s 
 It was Derrida (after Nietzsche, who demonstrated the self-referentiality 
of all so-called grounds) who recognized that in the course of structure, sign and play, the 
closure of meaning is ultimately impossible.” As Derrida recognized in his 
groundbreaking work ’Of Grammatology’, this is because systems of meaning are always 
already incomplete and unstable, for one sign refers to another until we, the examiners, 
reach an aporia that compels recognition of the absence of any foundation or logos is 
evident. This is quite analogous to Nietzsche’s (and Zarathustra’s) most abysmal thought 
concerning truth, an idea that prompted his radical examination of how truths, which are 
ultimately all subjective, function to create and sustain meanings that cover-up their own 
lack of foundations and the absence of any grounds for positing non-tautological truths.  
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unpublished 1872 essay ‘On Truth and Lies in an Extra-moral Sense’, (which he cites) 
reveals the ultimate absence of a grounding referent, with profound implications for 
epistemology, hermeneutics and ontology, among other things. 
The inherent limitations of language, and through its development, discourses, for 
creating meaning, leave interpretive gaps and conceptual spaces in which possibilities for 
transformation may occur. It is the function of discourse to sustain meanings, in 
disciplinary fashion, that inclines it to become ideologically coercive, but even at its most 
coercive it is intrinsically vulnerable. As Wæver notes, “partial fixations of political 
meaning are constantly attempted and make up much of the dynamics of politics, but any 
such attempt always has a loose end, an opening for a possible re-articulation.” He uses 
the concept of democracy as an example of the way in which “a surplus of meaning 
enables a competing articulation of democracy through a neo-liberal discourse.”555
Post-modern perspectives combine the insights of social constructivism and 
discourse analysis with a critical deconstruction “of meaning and the ontological 
constitution of selfhood”, alterity and otherness.
 The 
same applies however, for sacrosanct notions in international relations theory such as 
anarchy, sovereignty and self-determination.  
Discourse analysis is a powerful means of cutting into the ideological conceits of 
integration theory and deconstructing certain foreground assumptions of conventional 
political science. The implications of this are potentially radical in terms of the creative 
and productive challenges they make possible. It is the task of ‘good Europeans’ to exploit 
these gaps and openings, to develop the loose ends and surplus meanings as they realize 
their life-affirming idea of Europe. 
556 Post-modern critics are, after Jean-
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François Lyotard (a critic of modernity and advocate of postmodern conditions of 
knowledge557), incredulous toward meta-narratives (particularly hegemonic ones), such as 
the belief in emancipation via the democratic state form and prosperity through neo-liberal 
capital process; a story legitimated by the metadiscourse of ultra-liberal-modernity. Van 
Ham asserts that “postmodernism is both a condition of knowledge and the self-conscious 
stage in the evolution of modernity.”558 
Postmodernism, such as it is, problematizes the epistemological assumptions and 
methodological practices of scholarship by “bid[ding] farewell to the notion of 
comprehensive rational knowledge and continuous progress which formed the basis of the 
Enlightenment. …It is at dis-ease with the assumption that history is an unending and 
logical process toward industrialization, urbanization, rationalization, bureaucratization 
and the growth of individualism within the context of state formation [and rejects] the 
notion of history as a unitary process with the ‘West’ at the political center of gravity.”559 
Significantly, postmodernity challenges the conceits of scientism that dominate the 
generation and legitimation of cynical knowledge in our hyper-decadent era. “Postmodern 
science is postpositivist”, and anti-essentialist as it “heralds the death of foundationalism 
and instead proposes” relativism as a more accurate stance from which to evaluate 
culturally specific concepts, practices and desires, as well as with regard to efforts to 
understand morality and truth claims, i.e.: values.560
A century before “postmodernism” erupted onto the scene, Nietzsche had asserted 
that all truth is perspectivally contingent and historically situated, which is to say that 
truths are never objectively independent except from a subjective point of view. 
“Postmodernism” would likely have amused him, for even as many of his insights have 
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been applied to disparate aspects of the social world through it, its proponents often miss 
the crucial point that truths are essential for life. That said, it is in the main consistent with 
his over-arching skeptical endeavor; postmodernism does not seek to “advance” 
knowledge, per se, for as Nietzsche observed, “in the end one experiences only oneself (Z: 
III-1).” It seeks rather to better comprehend how knowledge arises and functions, without 
belief in any claims to transcendent truth. Nietzsche believed only the strongest could 
tolerate this terrible “truth”, and that the disposition it would likely foster among the weak 
would be especially ruinous, concurring with a thoroughly nihilistic worldview. Given the 
ethos of passive nihilism in this negative will-to-truth, our so-called postmodernism would 
likely have struck Nietzsche as epitomizing an age too dissipated and weak to posit 
values. He would have taken it as evidence of the ersatz enlightenment, or “happy false 
consciousness” typifying our hyper-decadent age.561
This condition—not to mention its likely political implications—would have 
struck Nietzsche as especially perilous, as the relativism it promotes further exposes the 
meaninglessness of existence to an already dissipated populace who need meaning 
 
The resignation of the hebetated automatons comprising the masses in the 
contemporary West belies the ever-quickening pace of life and irrational exuberance 
produced by the liberatory promise of science and economistic optimism. The insights of 
post-modernity have augmented alienation through massification and the devaluation of 
all values, intensifying the negative effects of modernity, rather than providing any 
practical means to move beyond it. From a critical Nietzschean standpoint, the alleged 
move to the postmodern is a misnomer and would have been more accurately described as 
an intensification of liberal-modern values, generating a “super-modern” condition.  
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provided for them to avoid suicidal (or homicidal) annihilation. Even if it is always 
already heteronymous and inauthentic in nature, the meaning and purpose provided by the 
media–consumer spectacles, simulated prosperity and simulacrums of equality of 
opportunity and enfranchisement provide a semblance of (hyper-decadent) stability. When 
the relativism generate by post-modernism “trickles down” into the collective 
consciousness of the all-too-many, it poses the danger of compounding the absurdity of 
the everyday, intensifying alienation and despondency. Nevertheless this cannot diminish 
existing resources (either individual or social) for authentic becoming, just make them 
inaccessible to the vast majority.562 
Many political theorists are now writing on international relations and Europe and 
its formal integration from a postmodern stance. Authors who have made significant 
contributions from this theoretical stance—or something approximating it—include 
William Connolly, James Der Derian, Zygmunt Bauman and Slavoj Žižek, to name a few.  
John Ruggie, who first conceived the notion of embedded liberalism as an 
explanatory framework for the post World War II Western-led capitalist economic system 
and democratic state order, has asserted that “the EU may constitute nothing less than the 
emergence of the first truly postmodern international political form.”563 Although not a 
dedicated postmodern himself, Ruggie has contributed some parallel insights and 
contributed to the engagement of international relations theory with postmodern thought. 
For instance he has observed, in Nietzschean fashion, that the EU is a “multi-perspectival 
polity”.564
R.B.J. Walker is among those theorists who have more explicitly affiliated his 
work with postmodernism. He has written about the metaphysical background 
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assumptions that unconsciously inform much of contemporary integration theory, 
asserting: 
[W]e have difficulty imagining politics in other terms than those given by Hobbes, 
by a metaphysics of horizontal and vertical lines, by the assumptions of a 
sovereignty we may all be ready to dismiss but which still authorizes our account 
of what and where politics must be. The very existence of a theory of international 
relations, as of the political theory to which it is counter-posed, depends precisely 
on this for its authorization. Europe presents a situation in which neither side of 
this spatial divide has very much to say, except to repeat the stories that have kept 
them apart. Theories of European integration are an effect of this divide. Many 
people still struggle to force Europe into the apolitical categories these theories 
have produced. This is an effect of an idealization of political life rooted in a 
misplaced claim to know where Europe is.565
Since the early 1990s it has been the case that more of the work done in theorizing 
European integration has had to contend with the insights and problems of postmodernism 
than the conventional, “mainstream” of the field would be pleased to admit. This suggests 
that the anti-foundationalist trend challenging the received wisdom of political science, 
specifically its dominant model for theoretical explanation consisting of “clear and 
testable distinctions between dependent and independent variables”, will continue to 
develop. As it does it will invariably continue to erode the grounds upon which confidence 
in impartial and unbiased “Truth” has rested by uncovering the lack of any fixed meaning 
to those grounds and their (somewhat fictive) stature. This has and will continue to 
 
 
The facts of Europe’s integration, particularly when taken in the broader context of 
globalization, confront us with the difficulty of comprehending a politics that has moved 
us beyond the classic metaphysical assumptions of political science (in the works of 
Hobbes, et. al.). We are, rather quixotically, already living in its midst yet unable to 
sufficiently image it. We do not yet adequately comprehend the new conditions of our 
social world—that is, our language is insufficient to explain it.  
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profoundly alter the discipline, including European integration theory.566 This 
development will compel a new shared awareness, or we-consciousness, about the 
reactive nature of the will to truth that formerly motivated the discovery and 
rationalization of political facts in knowledge discourses, as well as the task scholars 
ought, in the future, to perform.567 
 
Part Three: Conclusions 
The mainstream theorists of European integration, whose principal ideas are 
briefly summarized and critiqued above, are not accurately understood as performing 
customary science or philosophy. Rather, these scholars engage in knowledge creation of 
an important sort that “occurs” somewhere in-between the two and rarely avoids 
replicating the ideological precepts of the context in which it is generated. They should be 
considered a hybrid type; a scholarly sort of whom Nietzsche would have been distrustful 
and perceived as symptomatic of our ultra-liberal-modern epoch.568 
The persistence with which theorists of European integration try to explain and 
understand the EU is itself noteworthy. The determination to elucidate the complex and 
dynamical social, political and economic processes of European integration is itself 
symptomatic of a will-to-truth that enlists truth in the service of political ends and/or the 
advancement of a privileged ideology. It appeals to the authority of moral values operative 
within the macro-sphere of the political—the assumptions of ‘truthlikeness’ constitutive 
of the epistemic community and corresponding consciousness, of which their various 
schools are a part.569  
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Appeals to reason and objectivity in determining and evaluating evidentiary 
support enlisted to substantiate or prove theoretical claims often serve to mask other 
phenomena, such as the social–scientific setting in which truths are produced and what or 
whose interests they serve. Socially constructed knowledge is often self-replicating and 
redundant as “institutions influence behavior by providing cognitive scripts, categories 
and models that are indispensible for action, not least because without them the world and 
the behavior of others cannot be interpreted.570
Significantly (for anyone concerned with the possibility for veracity and 
objectivity in the social sciences) this makes it easy to overlook all the subtle ways in 
which a dominant paradigm or set of discourses serves to validate an ensemble of 
perspectives that similarly legitimate the same fundamentals—beliefs about the highest 
human goods, the best form of political organization, the rights of individuals, etc. The 
need for pragmatic agreement for the sake of regulating the social life of complex 
communities notwithstanding, it does so by determining in advance what counts as 
legitimate evidence and how the facts should be (correctly) interpreted in making the case 
it has itself framed.
 Existing practices and the consciousness 
they both reflect and transform—which comprise a broader sociogenic framework—raise 
questions that supporters of those practices answer by reference to the corresponding 
ideological presuppositions. The desire for answers that conform to and corroborate their 
consciousness (more often than not) results in explanans that function to perpetuate the 
practices (explicandum), etc.  
571 That doesn’t mean theorists engaged in examining the social world 
are unobjective per se, just that conscientious social scientists ought to remain cognizant 
that “institutions become the mechanisms through which the world is rendered meaningful 
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to social actors”; in other words what is ‘objectively’ comprehensible is always-already 
institutionally conditioned, their insights included.572  
The problematic nature of claims to veracity and objectivity (statements of truth) 
in evaluation is underappreciated in the social sciences. In fairness it would be difficult—
given the practical aim of understanding social phenomena—to proceed otherwise. 
Nevertheless, doing so often leaves explanatory lacunae, whether as a result of the use of 
empirical data or inadequate accounts of concept formation. This is, in part, where the 
problem of and/or need for establishing a specified, shared framework for analysis 
arises.573
Our new "infinite."— How far the perspectival character of existence extends, or 
indeed whether existence has any other character than this; whether existence 
without interpretation, without "sense," does not become "nonsense," whether, on 
the other hand, all existence is not essentially an interpreting existence—that 
cannot, as would be fair, be decided even by the most industrious and scrupulously 
conscientious analysis and self-examination of the intellect; for in the course of 
this analysis, the human intellect cannot avoid seeing itself in its own perspectival 
 Unacknowledged differences in linguistic usage (definitional disparities) and 
dissimilar heuristic frameworks (evidentiary criteria, the determination and interpretation 
of facts, etc.) may explain certain arguments between disparate theories of European 
integration. It is possible that many of the field’s ongoing arguments have resulted from 
contrasting methods of analysis, rather than empirical deficiencies, per se. Given the ready 
access every theorist has to empirical data, this possibility is compelling. However, 
“empirical data” can easily be challenged as well. 
Critical insights of this sort—the contingency of a perspective for knowledge (and 
life)—are not new in international relations or theories of European integration, but they 
vie for attention with the privileged empiricist prejudices of the ‘rational choice’ 
mainstream. Nietzsche made parallel—and still relevant—insights over a century ago:  
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forms, and solely in these. We cannot look around our own corner… But I think 
that today we are at least far away from the ridiculous immodesty of decreeing 
from our angle that perspectives are permitted only from this angle. Rather, the 
world has once again become "infinite" to us: insofar as we cannot reject the 
possibility that it includes infinite interpretations.574 
 
Mainstream political science (the highly influential aforementioned ‘rational choice’ 
school and that ilk) would have made Nietzsche less optimistic, however, as its 
proponents generally strive to demonstrate the apodicity of the ‘Truth’ they discern 
through the application of quantitative methodologies they often defend with dogmatic 
zeal. This brand of doctrinaire scientism inherently opposes Nietzsche’s insight that the 
world may include infinite interpretations in favor of a rigid and ossifying notion of 
‘Truth’. However, contemporary developments in the social sciences, including 
theoretical insights provided by ‘outliers’ to the political science discipline would, as 
noted at section two above, give him reason to hope that the knowledge creation in which 
the social sciences are engaged is developing in potentially life-enhancing ways.575
The perceived efficacy of mainstream theories of European integration has much 
to do with the authority of the discipline itself and its reception in that context. Its 
 
The un-waning desire to fully explicate the EU simultaneously risks limiting 
Europe’s becoming via the will-to-truth motivating it. Such a desire always-already 
corresponds with and so risks augmenting, what is. It may unintentionally reproduce 
institutional constraints on what the EU may (otherwise) become. This tendency is 
deflected, or covered-up, in integration theory via its self-serving presentation as objective 
scholarship and its self-justifying rhetoric of detached inquiry. Its largely positivistic 
orientation and correspondence with the discourse of scientism convinces many of the 
veracity of their work and perpetuates the discipline and expertise.  
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theoretical approaches persuade by conceptually narrowing perspectives on a given 
subject so as to obfuscate certain implications of their contingent (subjective) veracity, as 
well as the tautologous nature of their assertions of empirical fact. In the specific context 
of integration theory this would mean the facticity of the EU.576 Despite the evident 
deepening of the field that has occurred over the past six decades (as the genealogical 
doxography above critically explicated), developments in the mainstream schools of the 
field indicate a growing awareness of and discomfort with the uncertainty of its theoretical 
and heuristic precepts.577  
The genealogy of the major theories of European integration demonstrates the 
progressive emergence of dis-ease among its proponents, whose efforts to limn all aspects 
of integration lead further into self-referentiality and conceptual lacunae. This is evinced 
most clearly in the frequent suspicion they voice over their own inability to formulate 
comprehensive and / or predictive explanations of the dynamical processes of integration 
or to account for them in the positivistic terms set forth by their shared theoretical 
presuppositions.578
However, Nietzsche’s vitalist politics provides us with a unique perspective on the 
ongoing frustration, or dissatisfaction, among those at the leading edge of European 
integration theory. The problem, which is epistemological (in terms of how we interpret 
and understand the EU) and ontological (in so far as we confer certain sorts and degrees of 
agency on its institutions) and in large part a product of the inability of conventional 
theorists to effectively contend with the limitations imposed by state-centric concepts that 
have dominated traditional IP and mainstream European integration theory. These long-
privileged notions, which include sovereignty and anarchy, rights and duties, and self-
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determination, etc., are institutionally instantiated juridical concepts that through centuries 
of use have become realities of contemporary political life, the quasi-metaphysical “truth” 
of which is forgotten or ignored.  
Many conventional theorists fail to recognize these notional truths as part of the 
soil in which their interest in explaining and understanding the EU grows. As such they 
take the interpretive elements of transcendental truth associated with them for granted. 
The transcendental truth of these notions serves to naturalize and edify our collective 
notion of political legitimacy and in part as a result of this has come to be believed in 
dogmatic fashion by the ideological adherents of the state-centric worldview 
(Weltanschauung), which aptly applies to most mainstream political scientists. This faith 
that things are the way they are because there is a natural and as such inherently just basis 
for their being as they are – the state of the world as it seems to be – compels some form 
or degree of academic reiteration among them, and as it largely corresponds with political 
reality – the nature of organized political life – these iterations serve to re-legitimate 
reified discourses. 
This faith in the natural basis for and justice of the fundamental precepts of the 
international nation-state system (and supra-national communities of states such as the 
EU) gives rise to acceptance of it. By extension, most conventional integration theorizing 
unconsciously symptomatizes its author’s – and the field’s – decadence, as it advances 
representations of the phenomenon that always-already correspond with an ideologically 
privileged interpretation / explanation of it.579 Multiple, mutually validating simulacrums 
arise that reveal their own inability and/or unwillingness to think outside the theoretical 
(ideological) presuppositions that dominate the field. Among conventional theorists it also 
 319 
suggests their related inability to recognize the forces (volitional desire expressed in a will 
to power) they reactively contend with and involuntarily embody, making them complicit 
in the ongoing effort to (re-)naturalize hegemonic ascetic-consumerist ideals. This is 
reflected in the frequent insufficiency of the empirical evidence invoked to ground their 
theoretical contentions, which is anyway cited to buttress arguments that rationalize and 
perpetuate deeper (quasi-metaphysical) confusions of cause and effect.  
The philosophical equipollence of views—the thesius cum antithesi—produced by 
competing debates within the mainstream discourse of European integration, would 
prompt a thorough-going skeptic (or ‘good European’) to refrain from arguing for the 
superiority (i.e.: greater explanatory veracity or truthfulness) of any one among them. 
Such a stance is prerequisite to adopting and deploying the diagnostic method 
(perspectival framework) bodied forth by Nietzsche’s vitalist politics. A ‘good European’ 
would rank the perspectives that have emerged through the evolution of European 
integration theory, along with all alternatives – liberal or otherwise – according to their 
affective power and its enablement of an active being-towards authentic Dasein, that is to 
say, the salubriousness of the values the perspectives respectively symptomatize. They 
would adopt a critical stance from which to adduce the maximum utility of each 
perspective and selectively fuse the most efficacious features of them into an 
instrumentally practical appropriation according to how social conditions and historical 
circumstance may be exploited according to the affective power it contained / enabled. 
Their aim in so doing would be to utilize the effectiveness of such an amalgamation of 
perspectives as a tool for managing the masses and supplementing the forces of ascending 
life that it fostered for the best. 
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Like fun-house mirror images theories exaggerate certain features of the process 
while minimizing others, reflecting distortions of understanding in their analyses of 
European integration. In so far as they constitute a broader account-giving endeavor they 
alter perceptions of unification. The perspective they provide inevitably accords to a 
particular set of desires, and the dominant discourse—or will to truth—supplements the 
affective reactive force expressed in its negative will to nothingness as nihilistic power. 
‘Good Europeans’ would deem the whole range of mainstream scholarship theorizing 
European integration an ideational expression of Europe’s decrepit instinctual 
organization at the macro-level of the political, the compensatory action of which is the 
amalgamation of Europe’s nation-states and peoples. Both the EU’s establishment and the 
current moment in its development of internal consolidation and enlargement (deepening 
and widening) represent a reactive institutional instantiation of this more fundamental 
development in the politically-driven becoming-same of the species man.  
This reaction (supervised by contemporary ascetic-consumerist priests of 
ressentiment according to secularized slave-moral values) is not entirely negative or 
unproductive, as it serves to stimulate myriad informal under- or unregulated forms of 
integration some of which are likely to be uncontainable and actively transform the 
mentalities of certain exceptional Europeans in ways the EU’s formally laicized juridical, 
institutional and organizational value frameworks cannot hinder. It is in this changed 
mentality – and the creative, form-giving conative disposition it generates – that such rare 
individuals are becoming able to exploit abstract potentials of globality, providing them 
the resources to effectively cast doubt upon customary confidence in and reliance upon the 
traditional nation-state form of sovereign domestic authority, and other central tenets of 
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the hegemonic international order. It is through such changed ways of thinking that the 
reactive bases for (underlying metaphysical fictions of) the existing international order is 
likely to be overcome. 
When the dominant schools of integration theory are examined through 
Nietzsche’s perspectivalist hermeneutic (the means by which his vitalist politics and 
power ontology attain practical applicability), each of their respective theoretical postures 
are understood by ‘good Europeans’ as coextending with some partisan segment of, or 
sub-agenda within, the “standard” ultra-liberal-modern meta-narrative concerning the 
democratic state form vis the possibility of institutional integration.580 The 
Deconstructivist and Post-modern This preponderating discourse (and all the various 
iterations and complexifications of it echoed in European integration theories since the 
1950s) has for six decades guided the incremental economic, political and social 
integration of Europe’s institutions to decide and make sense of priorities, define the terms 
of the integration debate, confer and enforce its legitimacy, and establish the ideological 
framework around which the EU’s institutions have arisen, all the while habituating the 
European herd to the continent’s integration. Within this ultra-liberal-modern meta-
narrative, hyper-decadent political discourse (which gives voice to a ‘cynical, enlightened 
false-consciousness’), the spectrum of difference between unabashed support for 
integration and strident opposition to it has been deliberately exaggerated to maintain the 
simulated political agon crucial to the spectacle of the project’s democratic legitimacy.581
Organized political opposition to integration is systematically discredited across 
the continent by the EU itself. Some opponents to the EU, or advocates of enhanced 
national sovereignty, are marginalized as nationalistic throwbacks of a forgotten era 
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and/or outright xenophobic bigots. In fairness, some of them are anti-immigrant 
xenophobes and racist bigots, and irrational fears about the integration of the continent 
and the inclusion of peoples from outside their countries in an expanded European society 
seem threatening. Examples of this abound and the cases such as the nationalist parties of 
the UK (BNP), France’s National Front (FN), Holland’s Party for Freedom (PVV) and 
Austria’s Freedom Party (FPÖ) exemplify reaction on the far-right. However, more 
mainstream opposition to the expansion of EU powers is evident in the plebiscitary 
dramas of Denmark’s passage of Maastricht, Ireland’s ratification of Nice and Lisbon, and 
the French and Dutch rejection of the constitution in 2005 referenda, as noted above.  
The EU and sympathetic member-state political elites have so far managed to 
rebound following each “defeat”, usually by re-holding the referendum until they achieve 
the outcome they desire. Yet the forces opposing the quasi-federalist dream of a politically 
unified Europe continually adjust and find sustenance in an ability to exploit popular 
reaction to perceived threats emanating from as well as beyond the bureaucratic behemoth 
in Brussels. These include fundamentalist Islam, the supposed resistance of some 
immigrant communities to fully assimilate, the putative threat posed by non-European 
immigrants to European traditions and culture, the demographic risk of declining birth 
rates and anticipated dearth of workers posed to the future prosperity and security of the 
continent, etc. All of these are however fairly transparent pretexts for galvanizing support 
for strategies of reactive exclusions which rely upon and foster irrationality. Nevertheless 
they resonate with an increasing number of the parochial European herd for whom the 
benefits of the EU project seem too abstract and/or threatening. 
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At the level of the political micro-sphere, theories of European integration are 
mimetic performances of their scholar advocates’ desires and ambitions. These desires 
originate in and edify far-ranging political forces at the level of the macro-sphere and 
strengthen their facility to interpolate become all modes of being (a becoming-
comprehensive). In the specifically European context, this drive, expressed via abstract 
theorizing, is essential to realizing the “involuntary” aim (as a macro-level volitional 
urge), of the EU’s economic and now political and social integration of the continent. In 
addition, from an impartial perspective it can be said that to some extent – the degree of 
conscious complicity or willingness varying between individuals – those theorizing 
European integration have contributed to the anti-natural leveling of various human types. 
Their liberal ideals (like those subtending the EU) emphasize equality over difference so 
as to homogenize diverse modes of life and becoming, insofar as their work reinforces the 
logic of the project. The primary rationale for this is conflict avoidance (conflict being 
conceived as wholly negative) for the mitigation of suffering (a desired benefit). However, 
recent theorists have challenged the staid dichotomous interpretive framework contained 
in the overarching ideological discourse that had largely limited debate to the statist 
concepts within which the EU was conceived. This enables some transcendence of 
questions that long animated conventional argument about the veracity of contending 
accounts of the EU and debates over integration (e.g.: neo-functionalist versus realist, or 
intergovernmentalist versus supranationalist). 
Whether the project can transmute its ultra-liberal-modern original impulses and 
become a genuine and perhaps original example of post-modern nomothetic legislation, 
remains to be seen. By re-examining and re-conceiving key objectives and central identic 
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issue of the project of unifying the European continent some present researchers and 
future scholarly theorists may transform the epic political experiment in which their 
contemporary peers (or more conventional predecessors, as the case may be) served as 
ideological apologists.  
The EU is by any measure an impressive collaboration to determine the future of 
the continent and by extension, humankind. A compound power constellation, or 
polymeric community, its increasing power and influence is felt everywhere today. It 
functions as a specter in much of the world, its aura haunting the consciences of tyrants 
and stirring oppressed peoples yearning for greater freedom. It is beginning to be 
perceived as a paragon of rational governance to be emulated and is a desired destination 
of the subjugated and displaced – in much the same way as the US has been for the past 
two centuries. Recently it has challenged the US to uphold human rights throughout the 
world and to match it in its social welfare provisions. As the meta-discourse of ultra-
liberal-modernity is universalized via the globalization complex, the EU represents itself 
as a bastion of tolerance, cooperation and prosperity, as well as a counter-part to or 
substitute ideal for America. Yet this describes the reception of its sophisticated simulacra 
on its outside, its mystique. It is animated by entrenched forces of reaction attempting to 
perfect and disseminate neo-liberal capitalist process and a democratic political order. 
Whether it continues to be dominated by these anti-natural ideals and their arbiters or can 
be transformed from within to serve the development of authentic cultural forms and the 
aspirations of more cheerful and courageous individuals in Europe and throughout the 
world depends on good Europeans to revalue the decadent values on which it is based.  
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Nietzsche’s vitalist politics and general theory of decadence grew out of a 
deliberation over how we ought to live together. It should be relevant to anyone earnestly 
interested in adding to their perspective on the political, the project of political integration 
and the EU. Against those who would assert that it lacks the apodicity provided by an 
empirical foundation, I maintain that there is no more “objective” a reason to take the 
tenets of ultra-liberal-modernity as more credible or an  apodictically truer depiction of 
reality than Nietzsche’s vitalist notion of the political. And if one accepts Nietzsche’s 
critique of liberal-modernity and its moralization of life / construction of reality (as much 
of continental and American thought implicitly does), then a refusal to seriously consider 
the implications of his vitalist politics and power ontology would be, at the very least, 
anti-intellectual. Nietzsche’s perspectivalism would have inclined him to support the 
EU—despite its ineliminable decadence—in terms of its potential to unify Europe, 
whatever flaws or however reactive and all-too-human the EU may currently be. The EU 
too can be overcome but serve in the meantime as a stepping-stone to the post- or 
transhuman future. 
To return to the subject of how good Europeans might subvert and hijack the 
project to steer it toward their noble aims, Elbe remarks that the reactive will-to-truth 
bodied forth by the EU and codified in its Acquis Communitaire, according to its 
founders’ and contemporary arbiters’ designs, “would have to be firmly resisted” by ‘good 
Europeans’, as: 
…the functionalist wager on European integration has culminated in a European 
Union that can no longer be seen as the embodiment of ‘good Europeanism’ in the 
way Nietzsche understood it.582 
 
However, I think it implausible to assert (and do not believe) that “the functionalist wager 
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on European integration” ever embodied Nietzsche’s notion of ‘good Europeanism’. 
Rather, it employed similarly noble sounding rhetoric, which by the mid-1940s had 
become a part of the popular consciousness of a trans-national educated class of bourgeois 
Europeans (rightly) horrified by the destruction of the continent wrought by two major 
wars in little more than three decades.  
Such rhetoric and the “high-minded” ideals it was thereby meant to suggest, 
contrary to Nietzsche’s understanding, perfectly fit an ultra-liberal-modern agenda of 
promulgating a slavish project predicated on perfecting and universalizing a set of norms 
originating in a combination of post-Enlightenment, liberal Anglo–American and 
continental political traditions. These standards validate themselves through an ersatz 
discourse of inclusivity that functions to gradually homogenize and ultimately annihilate 
genuine difference. It has entailed creating a hegemonic “modern”, pseudo-cosmopolitan 
identity conducive to neo-liberal capitalism and representative democracy as practiced in 
the West (not, obviously the Soviet Union) before the war. 
But the EU, from its inception onward, has been something Nietzsche’s ‘good 
Europeans’ would instrumentally support as a vehicle for reaching their long-term 
objective of overcoming it. ‘Good Europeans’ would strive to perfect and refine the 
metadiscourse of ultra-liberal-modernity and the ongoing project of European integration 
which ideologically instantiates it, knowing that some future inheritors of their legacy 
would strive just as passionately to transfigure (re: creatively destroy) it in order to realize 
their own, even nobler idea of Europe. Each such development, the inventive annihilation 
of a declining order and establishment of a new, more vital political arrangement, 
exemplifies successive generations’ desire to realize their own self-perfection and thereby 
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augment the perfection of the species. No such achievement (or failure, as it inevitably 
shall be) ever completely embodies the highest ideals or creative capacity of superlative 
individuals, but this does not diminish the brilliance of their exploits. They would not 
naively expect the consummately cynical ascetic-consumerist priests of resentment typical 
of our hyper-decadent era to conceive a project to their sincere liking.  
Only recently has the EU come to resemble anything Nietzsche might have 
considered worthy of being reservedly hopeful about and then only for the direction its 
latest development suggests as a ‘molar aggregate’ (a superfluity of singular multiplicities: 
its citizens, local communities, regions, member-states, and all their varied activities, 
organizations and departments) striving to contain ‘virtual and diverse relations of alterity’ 
whose ‘machinic interfaces are engendering disparity’ that inevitably burst the parameters 
of its authority and subvert its mechanisms of control.583
Understood as a formatively critical instantiation of broader globalizing forces, EU 
expansion is an integral feature in the process of extending the geo-political imperatives of 
molar globalization through the deeper integration of territories and social unity of 
peoples – furthering unto perfection the agenda / logic of its liberal presuppositions. More 
conventionally, that the EU is frequently and somewhat accurately derided as “fortress 
Europe” to connote its original and ongoing efforts to protect its internal markets from 
 In its negotiated assertion of 
prerogative and precedence over above the member-states and their sovereign national 
right to exercise control over its organs, it is unwittingly cultivating a transformation of 
conscience and of the prevailing ethos among its multiple units, in addition to the sorts of 
resistances it is producing or may yet enable through the abstract potentials of globality.  
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outside competition (as for example through the Common Agricultural Policy, among 
other subsidies and import tariffs) does not conflict with but rather ramifies this thesis. 
The highly regulated inauthentic agonism fostered by the world-wide capitalist 
market584, as a fascist concretion, functions to automatically capture and interpolate any 
deviation from or defiance of its values and re-stratify every becoming-other according to 
its constitutive grid, thereby immunizing its ideological presuppositions from challenge. 
However, with the exponentially increased potentials for self-creation generated by 
globality the effectiveness of its operation is eroded, giving rise to escapes and 
corresponding possibilities that the best might exploit for their own (and humankind’s) 
perfection and going down. It may happen that their occasional successes will create new 
socio-political power-constellations that force the capitalist system to adapt itself to their 
creative acts, which gradually transform it if only by compelling it to interpolate a 
broadened spectrum of difference.585
This futural being-towards a transhuman condition—an ongoing process of 
becoming who it is they are—mediates between what they have been, what they can 
potentially be and what it is they envisage. The disposition it entails is elemental to good 
Europeanism. Its proponents simultaneously affirm their native volition (with varying 
degrees of authenticity correlating to their fearlessness) and attempt to direct some quanta 
of the force they discharge (with varying degrees of efficacy depending on their strength) 
in accordance with—and to a lesser extent, to realize—their passion. Only a few 
extraordinary exceptions or lucky strikes will ever seriously challenge the status quo. The 
passion of most healthy exemplars—arising within the predetermined terms of ultra-
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liberal-modernity’s broad ideological matrix—is likely to wane as they succumb to 
interpolation by reactive forces.  
Plucky individuals of great health may exploit the economic reality these ‘flies of 
the marketplace’ have created to profit monetarily in order to pursue higher purposes, 
feigning conformity to the prevailing ascetic ideals, and admiration of its nummamorous 
personifications.586 Opportunities to exploit the weaknesses of the meta-discourse of ultra-
liberal-modernity increase when those obsessed with earning and hoarding money through 
pecuniary mechanisms take the universality of their own nihilistic desires for granted. 
Those who succeed in infiltrating dominant institutions are more likely to subvert them. 
When the economic system falters, as in the economic bubbles of the past decade and the 
ongoing global financial crisis they produced—dissenters are empowered to exert 
influence for change.587  
Whether these courageous comedians of the ascetic ideals achieve conventional 
success or monetary wealth—the “financial independence” that comprises the highest 
ideal of freedom among contemporary slaves—or not, their radical experiments with and 
kynical mockery of the injurious norms, mores and conventions that dominate the 
contemporary life of their communities toward their own perfection are likely to stimulate 
others. As their eros (passion) and askesis (discipline) spurs others to undertake acts of 
self-creation, they legislate nomothetically. In affirming “the grand economy of life as it 
is, without subtraction or addition”, these “‘artists of the future’” may overcome the anti-
natural moral order that under the false agon of the conventional globalization complex  
which obtunds the instinct for strength.588 As Conway observes,  
 
Hence the central paradox of Nietzsche’s perfectionism: the enhancement of 
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humanity and the enrichment of ethical life are dependent upon the exploits of 
“immoral” exemplars who hold no conscious or intentional stake in the lives of 
those whom they succor and renew. In fact, he insists, these exotic specimens must 
be allowed (and indeed encouraged) to free themselves from the chains of 
conventional morality if they are to contribute to the permanent enhancement of 
humankind.589 
 
The EU, as a complex set of institutional arrangements and rules (a macro-political molar 
aggregate) that produce a tangible way of life with corporeal effects, may be usefully 
manipulated to comprise the broad cultural product of an aesthetic pursuit by a (relatively) 
small number, including activists, artists, philosophers, social-science theorists, other 
norm-entrepreneurs and perhaps even the odd statesmen, whose own self-perfection was 
and / or is dependent upon its realization.  
As the EU’s evolving social practices form and simultaneously symptomatize an 
emerging mode of life (however dissipative and exhausted), a few exceptions may realize 
new methods of human perfectibility through their play with and violations of the EU’s 
conceptual and customary boundaries and “remind some others of the powers and 
perfections resident within themselves” by so doing. (Nietzsche anticipated this, as the 
citation from HH: II–2, 292 above demonstrates.)590
“The philosopher,” as Conway elaborates, referring to Nietzsche’s highly qualified 
sense of the term, “involuntarily generates an excess of expendable affect … transgressing 
any conventional boundary between public and private domains.” But (the struggle 
involved in) self-overcoming for moral perfection “remains essentially ‘private,’ its 
sumptuary residue enters the public sphere as an invitation and temptation to others”, that 
“may eventually contribute to the founding of the positive law of a community, but only 
in the event that the recipients of this invitation endorse it as such.”
 
591 There is a very real 
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sense in which this is what social-science theorists do within the conceptual confines of 
their academic disciplines. Theorists of European integration actively contribute to the 
creation and development of the EU as they interrogate and give articulation to the 
process of European unification. As ideologically biased soothsayers, “scribbling slaves of 
the democratic spirit and its modern ideas”, they are at once historical and scientific 
fictionalists whose interpretations of events simultaneously affect our comprehension of 
the past, our emplacement in the present (ubiety) and are formative of reality to come.592 
They are militant ascetic–consumerist priests of ressentiment  
For example, Moravcsik’s highly influential work ‘The Choice for Europe’ may 
have provided compelling evidence to take seriously his use of the liberal 
intergovernmentalist approach “to explain the ‘grand bargains’ that have punctuated the 
EU’s evolution”.593
Such an objective begs many questions about the priorities of the theorist, such as 
why an “objective” analysis wouldn’t first attempt to unpack the agreement concerning 
the community’s past or interrogate the ideological assumptions subtending it.
 Yet despite utilizing a non-comparativist method of analysis, 
Moravcsik arguably entrenched long-operative understandings of Europe’s integration 
process, in an attempt to rely “on the Community’s past to predict the Union’s future”. 
594 
Nietzsche’s perspectivalist stance would suggest that such a task would require an 
unimaginably complex formula. Any genuinely comprehensive attempt would quickly 
become too freighted with variables and known unknowns to be considered practically 
complete. It is no apocalyptic insight that social science, like its “hard science” cousin, 
always deals in vagueness and truthlikeness. For a “thorough” understanding of the 
political what are needed are unconventional artist–philosophers capable of genealogically 
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examining the subject, such as the good Europeans Nietzsche hailed. Given their 
indoctrination into the cult of scientism, mainstream theorists of European integration are 
quite unlikely to become good Europeans in the Nietzschean sense.  
Given the ideological prejudices that prevail within the academic discipline of 
political science, international relations and European studies (and which correspond with 
and actualize the assumptions of ultra-liberal modernity) and the normal form of academic 
incest characteristic of the average-everyday activities of those fields, progress is likely to 
be very slow. Against the strong resistance of the prevailing statist, liberal ideology and 
corresponding mindset of conventional practitioners, it is probable that salubrious 
theoretical innovations capable of generating significantly transformative concepts and 
practices will result in the not-so-distant future. The Nietzsche-indebted “post-modern” 
approaches explicated above suggest as much. Such a development is arguably more 
likely than it was twenty years ago.  
Due to their propensity to adhere to professional convention and to fall back into 
the inauthenticity of easy dogmatism, Nietzsche did not think scholars imbricated in an 
academic culture of conformity would be likely to transform the world in salubrious 
ways.595 He thought they were particularly incapable of overcoming the decadence within 
themselves, a necessary precondition to revaluing the reigning ascetic-consumerist ideals 
of our day. As Conway notes (citing GM: III – 23): 
‘Men of science’ are not the free spirits [Nietzsche] seeks, for their signature faith 
in truth bears witness to their underlying belief that truth alone can redeem the 
human condition. This belief in turn betrays the conviction that the human 
condition stands in need of redemption, a conviction symptomatic of decadence.  
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…A genuine alternative to the ascetic ideal must neither promise nor anticipate the 
redemption of the human condition.596 
 
The desire to realize abstract potentials of globality in order to augment the fullest 
flourishing of humankind’s healthiest specimens is not making such a redemptive promise 
but arises as a consequence of the effort to cultivate the proper conative disposition 
necessary for the ultimate attainment of a higher (re: more natural) condition of culture for 
the authentic—non-linear—becoming of every individual.  
However, I maintain that the discourse analysis and constructivist critiques of 
integration theory and European unification suggest that their authors might become good 
Europeans, that is kynical ironists. They are subverting the mainstream hegemony of the 
rational institutionalism and may well emerge as schismatic dissenters from the doctrines 
of ultra-liberal-modernity in time. Whether the academics currently working at the edge of 
the field do or not, their exciting insights point the way toward future challenges to the 
relative ideological uniformity that has characterized much of the mainstream discipline. 
A nervy theorist of European integration—or handful of them—may someday soon 
succeed in ablating certain conceptual conceits that presently dominate its conventional 
discourses.597
Authentic becoming, as a process of self-emancipation from “inhibitory 
metabeliefs” is a practical aspiration actively pursued by the strongest, as opposed to a 
salvific program of “liberation” in which the all-too-many may participate, for it is 
dependent upon the necessary sort of striving enabled by the correct—if rare—instinctual 
organization of drives and impulses enjoyed by the healthiest individuals.
 
598 It is the 
comprehensive decadence of the weak majority inclines their “leaders” to propose 
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redemptive ideals, prompts the herd to have faith in such anti-natural promises and 
simultaneously prevents all of them from ever being so “redeemed,” as it were. 
With regard to the question of “whether Nietzsche’s idea of the ‘good European’ 
simply take[s] us back to a metaphysics of immanence”, albeit one opposed to the post-
Enlightenment liberal-modern metaphysical realism predicating the statist logic of 
Europe’s integration, Elbe observes that: 
Although Nietzsche does not offer his readers a new ‘meaning’ of the European 
idea along traditional lines, he does provide them with a vision of the ‘good 
European’ that generates its meaning by experimentally putting the will to truth 
into question.599
At the macro-political level this endeavor, undertaken by the strong, seeks to 
create values and institutional mechanisms (norms and practices) that bestow meaning 
upon existence by enhancing our limited autonomy while binding us to a community. By 
extension, our sense of purpose is enhanced as such sociogenically coherent political 
arrangements enable greater authenticity. A profusion of types results from broadened 
 
 
That will to truth is realized via an ideologically enforced univocality of reason that 
prioritizes economistic concerns represented as emancipatory and programmatically 
fixated on the aim of ever-increasing material prosperity (re: consumption). Nietzsche’s 
idea enables us to deconstruct the current project of European unification and envisage 
alternative, genuinely life-affirming priorities. According to the conative disposition or 
anticipatory resoluteness of good Europeans those alternatives naturally concern 
enhancing the agonistic project of self-overcoming and self-perfection; the becoming-
authentic through yes-saying to life with a good conscience (which entails Dionysian 
acceptance of suffering and the cruelty inherent to valuing).  
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opportunities for becoming. This in turn maximizes the elevation of the best—those 
capable of truly prospering.  
This political schema differs radically from the false-emancipation promised by 
ultra-liberal-modern discourses of freedom (the free-willing, independent, self-ruling 
subject) and egalitarianism (predicated on the notion of universal equality), which tempt 
the all-too-many to passively succumb to decadence and serve as lures to self-
zombification.600 Nietzsche doesn’t desire the complete elimination of avenues for 
resignation unto self-destruction of the botched and the failures, just the creation of 
additional socio-political means by which the healthy may thrive. 
However, in our superficially prosperous yet increasingly abject, hyper-decadent 
age, it is the multi-party, putatively representative, constitutional democracies ensconced 
in the neoliberal, “free-market” capitalist order (i.e.: Empire) that collectively constitutes 
the hegemonic globalization-complex, and the EU as a major instantiation and arbiter of 
its prerogatives. It is this supremely cynical regime which kynical good Europeans—as 
healthy individuals—seek to transmute. In doing so they may attain their highest potential 
while re-naturalizing the political by making it authentically agonistic.601 Inevitably 
unpopular among the ironically impaired and the all-too-many apologists for the status 
quo, they are unlikely to attain high office. Yet this aim—and their buffoonery—
corresponds with their own and their community’s becoming–authentic, and by extension, 
their and its moral and political perfection.602 
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BOOK THREE 
A Nietzschean Perspective on Globalization and Globality 
 
Introduction: The utility of Nietzsche’s vitalist critique to an analysis of 
globalization 
 
Nietzsche’s critique of liberal-modernity provides a framework for deconstructing 
the axiomatic narratives of our era. Applying it thusly reveals the overt and subtle ways 
in which the technology, trade and communication driven action of contemporary 
globalization systematically universalizes the nihilistic values of ultra-liberal-modernity, 
the hegemonic meta-discourse of our age. “Globalization” is a general—even vague—
term for a broad array of affective forces and interrelated power assemblages that defy 
parsimonious explanation. Hence there is much—and from a Nietzschean perspective 
often redundant—debate about what precisely it is. Throughout this work I specify and 
analyze the ideological basis for its governing precepts. The phenomenon of globalization 
refers to a polycentric power constellation comprised of diverse institutions, processes 
and forces that emerged from and extend Western practices. In its operations it appeals to 
Western rationalism for validation, and is presencing the West’s decadence around the 
world.603
In this book I examine its specific manifestations and affects on life, then 
explicate globality—the changed consciousness or mentality to which globalization has 
given rise—and its transformative potential. What the various, though similarly reactive, 
 I therefore refer not to globalization, but to ‘the globalization complex’, so as to 
avoid essentializing one dimension of it or reifying the phenomenon.  
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forces of globalization fundamentally have in common is a shared will-to-power 
originating in a slave-moral axiomatic. It has advanced a certain mode of capital process 
(the neo-liberal variety favored by the ‘Washington Consensus’), privileging free-market 
democracy, and transmits Western attitudes and modes of being. The globalization 
complex initially accrued disproportionate material wealth and benefits to the West— 
affluent developed nations of the industrialized and post-industrialized north—whence it 
originated. However, its effects now threaten the economic “prosperity” of the West itself 
through deindustrialization and structurally generated insecurity in the financial and 
banking sectors of the global market.  
In transmitting decadent (secularized Christian–Platonic) Western values, often 
by coercive means, the globalization complex generates various political effects across 
multiple dimensions of socio-political life.604 Its institutions, forces and processes value 
in ways that invariably disrupt the practices and subvert the moral standards of 
autochthonous cultures in non-Western regions of the world. As indigenous knowledges 
are disturbed the forms of life they sustain are irrecuperably altered and made susceptible 
to annihilation.605 However, its valuations also inhibit the creative becoming of 
individuals already living in its primary loci (the West), while representing their 
operation as providing the most effective means for the attainment and maximization of 
individual freedom.606 Its sublimated violences preclude the possibility of effectively 
challenging the ultra-liberal-modern axiomatique subtending it.607 This puts certain of its 
main practices at odds with the axiomatique from which they derive validation, a 
contradiction always-already overcome by (primarily material) enticements to nihilistic 
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resignation—a passive acquiescence that over time develops into craven complacency 
and stupefying contentment with the status-quo.608
A principle aim of Nietzsche’s philosophical project was that of illuminating the 
way in which values facilitate or impede life’s flourishing. His chief political concern 
was that of the fundamental question of “what ought humankind to become?”
 
The globalization complex ideologically interpolates any resistance to its 
prerogatives in fulfilling its purpose: the lucripetous quest for lucre. However, through its 
worldwide propagation of the metadiscourse of ultra-liberal-modernity, uneven 
intensification of its leveling ethos and halting transformation (exclusionary othering) of 
traditional forms of life, the institutions, processes and forces of globalization 
continuously give rise to unanticipated abstract potentials of globality. These are 
possibilities for the creative destruction of stultifying and politically disempowering 
normalization which is achieved through social indoctrination (public education, 
churches, the military, etc.) via narratives of equality and opportunity (which cover-up 
the cronyism and privilege that keeps the worst mob factions in charge of government), 
simulated enfranchisement and spectacles of ersatz-freedom through consumption that 
are circulated by the globalization complex.  
609 
Responding to the diminution of culture and life in Wilhelmine Germany—and Europe 
more generally—he considered how authentically agonistic forms of socio-political 
organization may invigorate life for the attainment of an ennobling culture.610 Toward 
this end he sought to inspire his readers to become good Europeans. As such they would 
be better able to contend with the degeneration of life brought about by the anti-natural 
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values of our hyper-decadent age. This task required a complete revaluation of the 
liberal-modern values that were debilitating Europe.611
Consistent with Nietzsche’s vitalist critique is his radical philosophical 
assessment of traditional Western notions of subjectivity and agency, particularly as these 
notions are informed by conventional assumptions about mechanistic causality. Nietzsche 
savages the metaphysical fictions that had been conceived to rationalize causality and 
reify agents as such.
  
The subversive capacities emergent in globality—a result of socio-political 
enhancements to the native volition or powers of loftier types—prompts imaginative 
forms of dissention from conventionality. Globality’s unlimited potentiality invariably 
complements the conative disposition or anticipatory resoluteness of humankind’s 
healthiest exemplars, providing a means for their authentic self-expression, re: the 
discharge of their vital force. It spurs inventive resistances realized in yes-saying kynical 
acts of radical self-creation through which the values rationalizing conventional 
globalization may be productively destabilized. Globality supplies a way for would-be 
comedians of the ruling ascetic-consumerist ideals of our age to become who it is they 
are. 
612 Nietzsche maintains the cause of an action is added after its 
occurrence, “a self-deception of vanity after the event”,613 and settles instead on the 
naturalistic view that “Individual human ‘agents’ are simply the embodied media through 
which the will to power amorally propagates itself.”614 What factual evidence could be 
cited as motivate for or sustain such a critique? As with all the great Western 
philosophers who posited an ultimate referent or logos before him, be it Plato’s forms, 
Leibniz’s monads or incomparable insight, Kant’s transcendental ego, Hegel’s world 
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spirit, etc., Nietzsche can provide no empirical proof of his thesis. Conway acknowledges 
that,  
His diagnosis of modernity may strike us as scintillating, provocative, even 
persuasive at times, but we have no epistemic warrant to following him in 
pronouncing it true.615
Nietzsche’s theory attains a perspectivally credible “objectivity” inside the critical 
philosophical framework in which it arose, and which explains why the aforementioned 
metaphysical fictions are less efficacious for comprehending the world than is his vitalist 
understanding (symptomatology) of the affects. Nietzsche was concerned with 
illuminating how “a moral judgment is illusory insofar as it erroneously identifies 
individual ‘subjects’ as the source or cause of the agency they involuntarily 
propagate.”
  
 
It was his persuasive and arguably accurate assessment of his and Europe’s historical 
situation which provides his wary judgment and corresponding technique of evaluation 
with credibility.  
Nietzsche’s identification of the great potential and distinctive brand of turmoil 
typical of his age are themselves symptoms of his own besetting decadence, as Conway 
also observes. However, they provide a useful framework for thinking about political life 
that ultimately affirms largely desirable objectives for humankind, whatever the self-
implicating paradoxes its flawed author indeliberately bodied forth by them. This is 
particularly salient in the present age of globalization, both for evaluating and 
transforming the affective force of the decadent Western (European) values the 
globalization complex disseminates universally. 
616 By extension he sought to establish the irreversibility of the decadence 
particular to European life in his lifetime, the era of late-modernity, a fact attributable to 
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the affective power of the nihilistic forces dominant then and which he predicted would 
intensify until they culminated in a worldwide calamity in the next (twentieth) century.  
This aim had the practical utility of conveying the urgency of a comprehensive 
revaluation of all values (Umwerthung aller Werthe) and spurring those capable of 
implementing it into action. Nietzsche believed his particular nuanced variety of vitalism 
was capable of illuminating these phenomena and providing as objective a basis as could 
be conceived for a fundamental revaluation of our epoch’s dominant, anti-natural values. 
According to his vitalism—and corresponding politics—the virtues of an era indicate its 
ascending or declining life and the condition of its health: 
In its measure of strength every age also possesses a measure for what virtues are 
permitted and forbidden to it. Either it has the virtues of ascending life: then it 
will resist from the profoundest depths the virtues of declining life. Or the age 
itself represents declining life: then it also requires the virtues of decline, then it 
hates everything that justifies itself solely out of abundance, out of the 
overflowing riches of strength.617
The core of this philosophical framework lies in his genealogical critique of 
morality, originating in a psychological theory of the unconscious instincts and drives, 
their correspondence to human strengths and weaknesses, and role in generating the 
ressentiment and bad-conscience which largely characterize the politics of Western 
civilization. The highly original effort he provided in his mature work toward a 
genealogy of morality captures the “essence” of his view of moral systems: that they are 
created, evolve, get overthrown and indicate the relative health of the society that 
spawned them. If we accept his total rejection of all “universal values” and “transcendent 
 
 
By these criteria he determines the health of modernity, a brief overview of his critique of 
which is necessary to establish primary points of his conception of the political and its 
applicability to EU expansion in the context of globalization. 
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truths,” ancient idols he demonstrates the hollowness of by striking with a hammer of 
skeptical criticism, then the salience of genealogy to any serious inquiry into values is 
clear. A comprehension of how and for what reasons certain values evolved, including 
the interests they serve, is crucial to adducing their significance for life.  
The revaluation he desired (which would reinstate healthy quasi-pagan virtues 
usurped in the West by decadent Judeo-Christian morality and Platonist metaphysics) and 
explication of the Judeo-Christian inversion of good and bad, from which Europe’s 
present anti-natural state arose, produced the famous distinction of master and slave 
moralities that later evolved into a healthy / decadent dichotomy. Nietzsche advocated 
reversing the Christian–Platonic order (which in secularized form served as the 
ideological basis of globalization) to restore the natural hierarchy between individuals 
and the hierarchy of moralities it had eliminated. He grasped the opposition this objective 
or counter-ideal would encounter due to the entrenched decadence and slave morality of 
modern Western society. Furthermore he recognized the violence of thought as action, 
against the “conscience-vivisection” that contributed to the decrepitude of our age, 
achieving it would require.618  
In ‘On the thousand and one goals’, Zarathustra asserts the link between 
esteeming the world, an indispensable human action that imbues existence with meaning, 
and the simultaneous creation of values. Furthermore he elaborates on the violence 
invariably entailed by changes of values: 
Only man placed values in things to preserve himself – he alone created meaning 
for things, a human meaning.  Therefore he calls himself ‘man,’ which means: the 
esteemer. To esteem is to create: hear this you creators! …Through esteeming  
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alone is there value. Change of values – that is a change of creators.  Whoever 
must be a creator always annihilates.619 
 
Zarathustra would overturn the prevailing moral order to emancipate individuals from 
their subjugation to the morality of the weak, confer upon the ego its rightful good 
conscience and put it to productive use:   
The delight in the herd is more ancient than the delight in the ego; and as long as 
the good conscience is identified with the herd, only the bad-conscience says: I.620  
 
Such facultative individuals would “go under” to create virtues in which “the fire of love 
and the fire of wrath” would glow, thereby setting a goal for humanity to provide it 
purpose. From Nietzsche’s meta-ethical theory of morality his critique of modernity 
emerges. According to Nietzsche the last spiritually healthy, culturally generative epoch 
in Europe was the Renaissance, exemplified by the proliferation of arts he takes as 
symptomatic of the invigorated human spirit characteristic of the period. Nietzsche 
contrasts this with the reactive, anti-natural forces that produced Luther and the 
Reformation and conditioned European culture for the Enlightenment.621
Nietzsche identified modernity as an epoch characterized by increasing decadence 
and decline; hence everyone born into the era was, to some varying degree, certain to 
exhibit symptoms of these unhealthy defining characteristics. No one could completely 
escape modernity’s degenerative effects, and Nietzsche recognized his own 
contamination by them, a dynamic Conway documents and interrogates in his work 
Nietzsche’s Dangerous Game. Liberal-modernity is in large part a product of the slave 
moral revolution in values against masterly instincts. Nietzsche famously explicated slave 
morality’s role in naturalizing ressentiment (as the “spirit of revenge”) and the bad-
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conscience (through guilt), its cultivation of herd instincts, subjugation of humanity and 
exclusion of the strongest individuals in society from governing institutions.622  
On the development of herd instincts in men and the simultaneous growth and 
role within communities of an essential morality for the maintenance of order and 
continued prosperity, Nietzsche observed: 
By morality the individual is taught to become a function of the herd, and to 
ascribe to himself value only as a function. As the conditions for the maintenance 
of one community have been very different from those of another community, 
there have been very different moralities; and in respect to the future essential 
transformations of herds and communities, states and societies, one can prophesy 
that there will still be very divergent moralities. Morality is the herd-instinct in the 
individual.623 
 
The herd instinct is not necessarily slavish in its character, however, but lends itself to the 
emergence of such a morality when the mediocre majority adopts anti-natural ascetic 
ideals and corresponding values and succeeds in imposing them on its betters. 
Every morality describes a set of (disciplinary) values particular to a people (and 
integral with its culture) and delimits social relations among its members accordingly: 
Wherever we meet with a morality we find a valuation and order of rank of the 
human impulses and activities. These valuations and orders of rank are always the 
expression of the needs of a community or herd: that which is in the first place to 
its advantage - and in the second place and third place - is also the authoritative 
standard for the worth of every individual.624 
 
Autochthonous moralities, the ethos and nomos native to a social organism, (as opposed 
to those imposed from outside) symptomatize a mode of life felicitous to the greatest 
becoming of each within the natural rank order of types (Rangordnung) a moral system 
generates. That culturally specific rank order of types enforces and thereby legitimates 
the moral order necessary for a coherent social entity.  
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Moral systems develop out of the instinctual arrangement of impulses and drives 
at the macro-level of the community. By instantiating a rank order of values a morality 
gives expression to the shared native volition that, so affirmed, unites individuals in 
community. It also ensures that future members of the community feel an inborn duty to 
preserve the morality that serves as its basis.  
The moral systems of indigenous peoples everywhere outside the Anglo-
European “West” are threatened by the narratives propagated by the meta-discourse of 
ultra-liberal-modernity via the institutions, forces and processes of the globalization 
complex, which coerces the adoption of its principles. That reactive power-
constellation—predicated on anti-natural and quasi-imperialistic, decadent Western 
values of secularized Christian-Platonic morality—make its tenets axiomatic by 
interpolating the norms and subverting the mores of autochthonous cultures.625
From this vitalist perspective the willful adherence of a community’s members to 
its/their prevailing moral strictures serves to indicate the health of the society more 
generally. At the micropolitical or individual level, an autochthonous morality determines 
the worth of a person according to how effectively he can conform to its behavioral 
strictures and carry out its regulations (here Nietzsche anticipates what Foucault would 
label disciplinary regimes). “[D]epending on the agents in question, all ascetic techniques 
are potentially both coercive and empowering.”
 
626 In a naturally ordered polis an agent’s 
performative enactment of his community’s morality code determines his success within 
it and, to a certain extent, the likelihood of his attaining his own moral perfection. 
Collectively, a culturally cohesive populace strives for political perfection through its 
performative enforcement of its morality’s instinctual organization of social drives and 
 346 
impulses. These are expressed via (exclusionary) ascetic ideals that valorize the 
community’s political preferences.627 
These conclusions were enunciated throughout Nietzsche’s condemnation of 
liberal Enlightenment values that emphasized equality and rights. He took the disposition 
underlying such values for the secular rationalization of a creeping slave morality 
designed to ingratiate the ressentiment of the many, and beyond this to recognize the 
futility of the “redemptive measures designed to cure the ills of modernity” he had 
previously prescribed. Conway states that in his post-Zarathustran writings Nietzsche 
“…acknowledges that the institutions of modern Europe are simply too corrupt to serve 
in the macropolitical capacity he had mistakenly reserved for them [in his earlier works] 
…that, independent of the macropolitical resources at his disposal, he is in no position to 
orchestrate the redemption of modernity.”628
Nietzsche anticipated the further degeneration of socio-political life in the West, 
which he believed would have to completely exhaust itself before a new regenerative 
 
Nietzsche did not distinguish between varieties of liberalism, which strikes some 
contemporary political scientists as problematically unnuanced. However, it should be 
understood that he generalized about liberalism not to elide the existence of differences 
between various factions of liberals in his own era (the range and diversity of which has 
only increased in the century following his death), but to speak of those broad traits he 
identified as characteristic of all varieties of liberalism and its particular, unifying ethos. 
Nietzsche believed modernity’s dissipative affects would compel the most decadent (or 
radical) socialistic consequences of the liberal ideology and diminish future European life 
thereby. 
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order might be founded. Albrow acknowledges that, “He recognized the crisis of the 
modern and foretold what has become the postmodern.”629 His thought, a diagnosis of the 
destructive course the nihilism of his age had set mankind upon, bode ominous portent in 
the prognosis Nietzsche described for Europe in the centuries to come. But it also hinted 
at the ongoing struggle that could evolve more of the strong, ‘good Europeans’ he 
envisaged. Their efforts at self-overcoming would remain at the micropolitical, or 
individual level. Conway states:  
In a strong age overflowing with vital energy, externalized in the institutions and 
festivals of a healthy people, lawgivers would have neither the need nor the 
inclination to restrict their legislations to the political microsphere. But in a 
decadent age unable to sustain the vitality of a people’s signature institutions, 
lawgivers have no choice but to legislate from within the political microsphere.630 
 
Struggling to legislate to the greatest extent possible the inner, instinctual ordering of 
their impulses and drives through regimens of self-overcoming (willfully self-prescribed 
askesis), their experiments and prankish acts may serve to augment the overcoming of the 
decadence of their age even as they only strive to perfect themselves. “In some 
extraordinary cases ascetic disciplines will have a fortifying, fructifying effect on agents, 
inadvertently endowing them with unanticipated freedoms and affording them greater 
political latitude.”631
 
 These strong exceptions abide by the instinctual ordering of the 
drives and impulses comprising their native volitions (and expand the pathos of distance 
within themselves and between themselves and others) to preserve and enliven what is 
noble in themselves and their community as well as their progeny (literal or otherwise). 
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Part One: Globalization and Its Unanticipated Production of Globality 
 
Globalization is a widely, and some would argue loosely, applied term. The 
significance and historical distinctiveness of the set of inter-related economic, social and 
political developments comprising the phenomenon to which the word is applied have 
been much-debated. It remains contested and difficult to succinctly define, for there is 
little agreement about the precise character of the norms, practices and trends it describes 
or—if they even exist—the extent of their influence. Definitional disagreement is 
particularly evident between disciplines concerned with the phenomenon, especially the 
fields of economics, political science and sociology. So while most political scientists, 
economists, sociologist, government officials, business leaders, investors and technophiles 
acknowledge that it is occurring there are diverging conceptions of what it is and 
explanations for what drives it. What globalization means, how it should be defined and 
how accurately the term, so defined, can be applied in a particular context are questions of 
interest across academic disciplines. What they broadly share, despite their diversity, is a 
set of assumptions that point to the operation of certain hegemonic discourses and power-
knowledge regimes informed by the ultra-liberal-modern metanarrative of our hyper-
decadent epoch.  
As defining globalization is such a complex and controversial task, I combine 
multiple perspectives here to describe the phenomena from a Nietzschean stance, while 
striving to avoid reductionist, economistic explanations. I think the dangers of such 
generalizing are likely to be less problematic than those of more conventional attempts to 
precisely define the “truth” of this exceptionally complex phenomenon which refers to our 
continually changing, increasingly dynamic and inter-connected world. Van Ham asserts 
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that “there is an analytical parallel to be drawn between the processes of globalization and 
European integration, each following the fundamental, unwritten but clearly understood 
laws of late capitalism.”632 He further argues that Europeanization can in part be 
understood as a response to globalization, “that the process of European integration is to 
be understood as globalization on a regional scale, as well as a defensive response to the 
world-wide trend of growing economic interdependence”.633 I argue here that the latter 
(European integration) augments the forces, processes and institutional development of 
the former (“world-wide” globalization), bearing in mind that “[t]urning globalism into 
the deus ex machina for European integration would be too shallow and naïve an 
analysis”.634
It is because of such complexities that the term ‘globalization’, which is so much 
in vogue today, has to be used with caution. When viewed historically, it appears 
that globalization is a contradictory process of international economic integration 
   
The correspondence between varying interpretations, explanations, and definitions 
of globalization broadly lies in their common recognition of a cognitive transformation 
among individuals within those societies where the related phenomena are occurring. The 
history of Western economic expansion and commensurately increasing global trade is 
often, and correctly, taken as a starting point for analyzing the phenomena. Haider Khan, 
writing from a critical political-economist’s standpoint, considers the dynamic processes 
encompassing globalization and the variety of forms they take in disparate national 
contexts to be generating new instabilities within developing—and by extension—
developed—economies. In a fairly lengthy remark worth citing in full, Khan recognizes 
the problematic nature of defining the phenomenon in a way that adequately situates it in 
its proper historical context, asserting that: 
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that was severely interrupted by the First World War, the interwar depression, and 
the Second World War. The emergence of the Bretton Woods framework can be 
seen as a way to integrate the world with respect to trade while controlling with 
flow of private capital. The demise of Breton Woods has set in motion forces of 
capital account liberalization that are often the most visible aspects of 
‘globalization’. However, even this process is fraught with new instabilities […] as 
evidenced by the Mexican and – more recently and even more dramatically – by 
the Asian financial crisis.635 
 
Capital account liberalization, which typifies the economic dimension of globalization, 
has been a mixed-blessing for developing economies and has for the past twenty years at 
least, challenged the ability of the major international economic institutions to contend 
with its effects.636
Globalization has empirically demonstrable effects on institutional practices 
ranging from trade and finance to political cooperation and conflict where its influences 
are readily seen and commonly scrutinized. The liberalizing processes it signifies 
affectively condition the expectations of governments, corporations and individuals, from 
 
Khan refers to two major financial crises of the 1990s that resulted from growing 
instabilities generated by increased capital flows. Similar predicaments arising from 
certain contradictions and inherent vulnerabilities exacerbated by processes of 
liberalization (in the form of debt securitization and other financial instruments) now 
threaten to undo some of the practices driving economic globalization itself. The risk of 
economic turmoil resulting from liberalized practices in international finance led to the 
ongoing US sub-prime mortgage and global financial crisis, as dubious home loans were 
bundled together by the thousands, rated as relatively secure, and passed up through the 
international banking system, causing turmoil, in Europe particularly, when they proved to 
be under-capitalized as their holders defaulted en masse. 
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investors to consumers, as they ramify the ideological meta-discourse of ultra-liberal-
modernity and its associated narratives. Furthermore, a plethora of evidence substantiates 
its ramifications on social order, cultural transformation and group and individual identity. 
At some discernable level this now includes nearly every human community.637 
Although the meaning of globalization is contentious it is generally agreed to be a 
set of phenomena originally instigated by European exploration of the world and 
perpetuated by the forces, institutions and processes this intercourse spawned. Following 
Khan, I take its current manifestation as having originated in Anglo-European imperial 
colonization, the prerogatives of which were gradually sublimated and formally 
transformed via the creation of a post-war international order at Bretton Woods, San 
Francisco and Potsdam.  
The character of contemporary globalization was further modified by de-
colonization, a process in which direct control over the domestic affairs of numerous 
African and Asian peoples was previously exerted by Europeans was ceded to newly 
independent authorities of sovereign states. However, these new nations remained heavily 
reliant in most cases on their former imperial overlords, and this relationship of relative 
dependency also colored the forces, institutions and processes of globalization. Many 
former European colonies have remained on the periphery of the globalization complex, 
as mere cites of resource extraction. This has left many of the nation-states created in the 
wake of de-colonization in deeper poverty than they endured under European rule and 
persistent political instability that casts doubt on the West’s commitment to the ultra-
liberal-modern values it espouses and its advocacy of universal human rights.  
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Khan is critical of overly enthusiastic portrayals of globalization. And it is 
certainly true that the Western media disseminate a generally unnuanced and valorized 
impression of the phenomena, ideological function of which I address below. As Khan 
noted in the citation above, the economic dimensions of globalization have produced some 
contradictory effects with self-defeating built-in potential. He explains that: 
It is necessary to treat the rhetoric of globalization with caution. At best, we are 
experiencing a ‘fractured’ globalization. Integration of financial markets, for 
example, can lead to great benefits for all in a truly liberal world of equal actors. 
However, in a world of unevenness the evolutionary paths may lead to crisis 
unless institutions are designed properly. Leaving everything to the markets may 
produce the supreme irony of ultimately leading to crises which prevent some very 
important capital and commodity markets from functioning.638 
 
This notion of a “fractured globalization” is quite apt, both with regard to the unintended 
consequences of unrestrained market logic and to the effects of globalization on 
developing – non-Western – societies.  
While the reception of globalizing institutions, forces and processes is certainly 
not uniform between the nations and cultures it transforms, the economic impetus of 
globalization in summa aims for homogenization in production and uniformity in market 
openness. This, as I will argue further below, has the effect of fracturing autochthonous 
communities by introducing foreign values and practices.639
What is less controversial about globalization is that it entails the forced adoption 
of certain economic and political practices toward their universal hegemony, and the 
 Significantly, this includes 
the rupturing of the authentic relation between individuals and their cultural practices (and 
its indigenously mediated evolution) by interposing new spectacularized forms of ultra-
liberal-modern desire that circulate and validate simulacrums of existential meaning and 
simulations of ontological purpose. 
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imposition of a corresponding socio-cultural form of life that profoundly alters 
autochthonous values and knowledge. Forced may at first seem too strong a word, but the 
incentives to comply virtually compel states wanting to engage in international trade and 
exchange to tow the line, as it were. This adoption of Anglo-European practices tends to 
commence rather informally, with the hybridization of cultural forms and organization. By 
the estimates of some this amounts to “undeveloped” poor nations conceding much of 
their power of self-determination to the aforementioned hegemonic economic and political 
forms, a process which culminates in the significant transformation of indigenous cultural 
norms and even the annihilation of distinctive national characteristics.  
This occurs through a multitude of seemingly innocuous and even banal everyday 
activities, the variety and frequency of which are constantly increasing. Some obvious 
examples include international travel, borderless communication, liberalized financial and 
monetary flows, increasingly freer trade and commerce, and the commensurately 
increasing global commonality – one might even assert, ubiquity – of corresponding 
Anglo-European nihilism. The very reactive forms of desire and inauthentic modes of 
being that gave rise to the forces, institutions and processes comprising the contemporary 
globalization complex disseminate the ethos of Western decadence worldwide.  
The affective forces of globalization vary and its effects are uneven across 
cultures. On close examination it is clear that a wide variety of responses to the 
prerogatives of globalization distinguishes its reception in disparate places and at different 
times. Also varying widely are the culturally specific means of their implementation 
which are determined by locale, climate, level of existing infrastructure and numerous 
other factors. Yet as a city, region or nation become more “globalized”, or thoroughly 
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integrated into the conventional globalization complex, its peoples’ desires, expectations 
and ways and means of fulfilling them come to resemble those of peoples in every other 
place so integrated. Hence, despite its enormous complexity globalization is a powerful 
force for standardization in the world. Part of the reason it is such a contentious issue and 
faces organized opposition is that it systematically homogenizes practices and 
expectations in a development that invariably eliminates differences and annihilates 
meanings, reducing many aspects of human experience to a cold cash nexus (to borrow 
the apt Marxian phrase) and advancing one-dimensionality. Through the adoption of ultra-
liberal-modern values globalization cultivates the baneful, hyper-decadent ethos that is 
diminishing the West.  
Globalization is frequently misconstrued as “Americanization” due to the 
considerable role the US plays in the dissemination of its ultra-liberal-modern values. The 
US has also enjoyed its place at the center of the complex (the aforementioned 
constellation of institutions, processes and forces) and has arguably been the key nation in 
propagating it commensurate with its active support of greater European integration. The 
conflation of America with globalization originates in a dual sense of envy and desire for 
things American, especially its culture of affluence, individual freedom, and readily 
available consumables. The seemingly pervasive influence and presence of the US 
following World War Two and its perceived hubris as the world’s only super-power 
following the collapse of the Soviet Union and end of the cold war, produced a great deal 
of reaction and antipathy towards it and its values, as well. Globalization it is frequently 
and correctly equated with and/or indicated by relative degrees of “Westernization”, but it 
is always far more complex than this oversimplification conveys. What is meant here is 
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that any adequate understanding of the phenomenon must account for its molar 
development as an integrative process, one that has an array of effects on the lives of 
individuals, communities, international politics and nascent global society. Furthermore, 
as individuals and communities undergo the adaptations it necessitates unexpected 
possibilities, means of subversion and rhizomatic opportunities for becoming-other arise 
in what I have introduced above as the abstract potentials of globality. 
The initial impetus prompting globalization was synchronically emergent from the 
hierarchically relational nation-state order and the formally distinct, competing socio-
cultural milieus comprising it. The intra-ordinal nature of the nation-state system and 
character of its development had largely determined the general disposition of the future 
globalization complex (i.e.: its forces, processes and institutions), long before they were 
realized in their present form. Globalization, therefore, should not be conceived of as a 
transordinally determined unfolding of a diachronic set of relations, as it is not generating 
the higher-level properties distinct from those upon which it is based, which one would 
expect of such a process. In so far as it indicates a horizontal development across time, its 
conventional growth primarily consists of innovation to generate greater momentum 
toward the fulfillment of its overarching aims (laissez faire free-trade and 
democratization) and to enhance the efficiency of processes already long underway.  
These practical innovations, their operations and their admittedly interesting 
history should not distract us from their place in the larger historical narrative; their 
common feature is their utility in augmenting the prerogatives of globalization, namely the 
dissemination of ultra-liberal-modern values. From a macro-level perspective therefore, 
globalization exemplifies the amplification of a technological rationality that 
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operationalizes the fetishized liberal state, putting into practice—disparately and badly—
the philosophical ideals of emancipatory metaphysical realism that ground it. The 
ideological juggernaut of globalization fosters the “becoming-same” of individuals and 
societies, banalizing alterity and encouraging the passive acceptance of semblance through 
(paradoxically) frenetic activity (i.e.: economic production). Its central aim is to 
perpetually increase levels of consumption, a reactive drive symptomatic of underlying 
forces implemented via the negative will to nothingness as nihilistic power of the 
dominant ascetic-consumerist priests of ressentiment. In Freudian terms it is an obvious, if 
no less remarkably feverish enactment of Thanatos, the death instinct, and realizes a self-
destructive form of wish-fulfillment; in Heideggerian terms it is an enhancement of and 
further temptation to fallenness and inauthenticity.  
Insofar as globalization represents the enforcement of convention and the 
continual standardization of all material production in accordance with the herd value of 
leveling (which it extends and compels universally), it develops through specified 
international treaties and contracts that determine with a high degree of specification the 
permissibility of acts. These agreed conventions also provide for regulatory norms that 
compel self-scrutiny through negative incentives in addition to formal policing. Therefore 
the conventional globalization complex represents the vertical, molar expansion (the 
perfection, if you will) of an existing system of order. Events within and between its 
numerous formal and informal entities are related through an intra-ordinal regulatory 
framework, which connects various aggregates (international organizations such as the 
UN, OSCE, and WTO), supranational polities such as the EU and traditional nation-states) 
of socio-political aggregates (nation-states, sub-national regions and localities), and 
 357 
economic and business units (TNCs and MNCs, etc.) that seeks to instantiate a universal 
order through legal regimes established on the foundational precepts of international law 
such as sovereignty.640 
The EU is synchronically homologous and intraordinally supervenient to the 
globalization complex that aforementioned impetus produced, all of whose subsidiary 
elements and parts are conditioned by axiomatically related laws, norms, customs and 
international institutions.641
The globalization complex itself is primarily comprised of (and entirely driven by) 
nation-state actors, international organizations, transnational and multinational 
corporations, regulatory agencies and a plethora of corresponding social norms, customs, 
law and institutional regimes, all of which originated in the ultra-liberal-modern values of 
the West. It seems to enhance human activity by facilitating certain kinds of technical 
expertise and practical capacities that contribute to particular actions and enhance its 
prerogatives, actions mechanistically performed in unison, choreographing human activity 
into a machinic dance which it rewards. This seeming is a simulation of the enhancement 
of the type man through the veneration of the herd animal’s ever-increasing labor, a 
“progressive” focus on material (pecuniary) wealth that enforces anti-natural ideals 
 In short, despite a fair degree of relative variation among its 
disparate features, the EU, like the institutions, forces and processes of globalization with 
which it consists, corresponds with the ultra-liberal-modern impetus that subtends them 
all. To correctly identify the nature of the globalization complex and the character of its 
innumerable machinations is to recognize the diversity of interactions among 
multiplicities of multiplicities of multiplicities, which give rise to transordinal potentials 
of globality. 
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consistent with a rejection of suffering and cruelty and the illusion of an other-worldly 
supersensible beyond that denies the tragic, Dionysian dimension of life. Globalization’s 
simulation of empowerment via increased activity understood as production which it 
compels by inculcating desire and proportionally increasing his activity is thus self-
validating. It rewards the productivity it praises, but its empowerment is bogus. It is the 
ersatz freedom of falling back into the Publicness (the tranquilization, idleness and 
inauthenticity) of ‘the They’.  
The conventional globalization complex is the most comprehensive and far-
reaching instantiation of the slave-moral leveling impulse yet. It is (re-)making the world-
structure of lived experience, the distinct elements of which—irrespective of various 
differences of place, time or culture where they are superimposed—hang-together with 
seeming coherence. Through the intertwined ideological discourses of modernity and 
liberalism—its primary components—it seeks to universalize equality (through the 
enforcement of legal rights, property, civil and human, and the elimination of disparities—
reconceived as inequities—of wealth) and the abolition of suffering (emancipation from 
oppression, etc.), all from pity (development discourses, etc.).  
As a radical extension of the average-everydayness of the Western herd-man it is 
the historicality of ‘the They’, universalized. The freedoms its spectacular appearances 
make ready-to-hand (capacities it enhances or enables) paradoxically announce the 
hidden-ness of that which its discourses cover-up, i.e.: modes of being and forms of life 
that have been buried either through active suppression or their own obscurity. Its putative 
freedoms consist with the technological rationality (a mimicking of mathematical logic) it 
reifies; the appearance of which announces that authentic freedom is precisely what is 
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lacking. The absence of genuine freedom is the main impulsion or incitement to the 
simulacrums it generates and which are crucial to its preservation—the continual 
validation and extension of the values upon which it developed. In summa, it constitutes a 
macro-level intraordinal and synchronic framework that effectively constrains individual, 
micro-level, becomings.  
However, it is (un-paradoxically) also this very set of relatively repressive 
conditions which stoke the form giving fire expressed in that inventive and defiant 
disposition characteristic of the positive will to creative destruction as generative power 
enacted by the strongest. It is indeliberately giving rise to re-conceptualizations of the 
agon by the healthiest exemplars of our age that are likely to challenge, co-opt and 
redirect it in unforeseeable and authentically life-affirming ways. This is where potential 
for a genuinely transordinal condition lies; it is the real possibility of generating 
diachronic, abstract potentials of globality, the realization of which will transmute the 
hyper-decadent values of our ultra-liberal-modern, manic age. It is this prospect for self-
overcoming to become what one is, an ongoing process of becoming-other, or authentic 
Being towards ones ownmost potentiality-for-Being, that I will examine later. 
Three primary aspects of globalization may be distinguished which together 
comprise a complex. These have profound ramifications for economic, political and 
cultural life wherever globalization’s numerous and superficially incongruent but deeply 
unified and mutually reinforcing discourses extend their reach. In so doing I generally, 
albeit critically, adhere to aspects of both the post-modern and strong globalization theses. 
Globalization is therefore understood as both symptomatic of the perverse desire for a 
universal containment of becoming-other (an anti-natural restriction of Being-in-the-world 
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for a Dasein) and its enactment through the worldwide extension of a set of bracketing 
categories that delimit norms of sameness and construct and codify the familiar through 
reactive co-optations of difference, interpolations upon / into alterity and the enclosure of 
all otherness that could hypothetically threaten the predominance of its (globalization’s) 
hermeneutic of desire. 
First among these are globalizing processes. These include innovations in science, 
communication, transport and technology that transform human life in varied from myriad 
and occasionally profound ways ranging from the instantaneous exchange and 
dissemination of ideas (ideology) through the “global media”,642 to the transformation of 
proximities and corresponding banalization of distance brought about by the advent of 
mass international travel,643 and the ability to observe events in near real time from 
anywhere in the world. The emergence and proliferation of webcams and digital and 
wireless networks and the resulting realm of cyberspace is significantly altering human 
relations, comprising an additional conceptual and experiential dimension of 
globalization. This includes our growing comprehension of human physiology and health 
needs, the global environment and efforts toward its regulation / preservation,644 and the 
even extends to the cosmos we inhabit via satellite surveillance and the militarization of 
outer space. Significantly, all of these characteristic processes of globalization change 
individual expectations of the future, the way people conceive of themselves, their 
opportunities (for education, employment, accumulation, etc.) and their place in the 
world.645
An emergent global culture is seen by many to be transforming local, regional and 
national identities where peoples both adapt to and resist transformations in global 
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relations.646 Importantly, processes of globalization include evolving informal norms and 
practices generated in response to global connectivity as well as opposition to the 
perceived threats it presents. Bleiker refers optimistically  to the “discursive dimension of 
social change”, occurring “in the fusion of the local and the global” (in assessing the fall 
of the Berlin Wall and collapse of communism), however, the ultra-liberal-modern 
globalization complex more frequently instigates the fragmentation of traditional 
community, homogenization of cultures and the intensifying hegemony of a quasi-
imperialistic Western order, operations it hides both by its narrative of liberation and its 
shameless triumphalism.647 
Globalizing institutions refer specifically to formal organizations and actors in the 
international realm such as the UN, etc., and less formal norms and practices. Subsets of 
such institutions include those directly establishing and/or policing international 
governance and order, such as the UN, its agencies and the controversial ICC. Regional 
security organizations whose ideological thrust coextends with the globalization complex 
and human rights regime include NATO, the WEU and SEATO. These link the defenses 
of their member states in formal alliances. In addition to binding them in reciprocal 
obligations they (deliberately or not) make coherent aspects of their foreign policies to 
increase reliance and assure security. Direct military cooperation occurs through joint 
strategic planning, regular combined training exercises and deployments to conflict zones 
or interventions.648
Various IGOs such as the OSCE, the Commonwealth and the COE are equally 
overt globalizing institutions, and play an important role as they coerce adherence to 
democratic values, enforce human rights norms and impose (substantive and/or moral) 
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punitive sanctions for violations of them. They thus perform the role of ordering socio-
cultural, economic and political norms to increase familiarity and deepen mutual 
confidence. Importantly, these include human rights, which are often said to provide a 
moral warrant for the imposition of Western values, in addition to providing an additional 
layer of authority to the developing international system and future basis for expanded and 
deepened supra-national governance. There is great overlap between these globalizing 
processes and institutions. This is particularly evident in the simultaneous (and largely 
unpredictable) ways they affect everyday-life of individuals through the changes and 
innovations they propagate globally.  
Forces of globalization refer to the less certain consequences of the latter two in 
combination with one another, and the effects generated by them as a distinct phenomena. 
This includes transformed normative practices and informal cultural trends, taboos, mores 
and conceptions of justice, etc., and especially refers to the complex ways they indicate an 
altered consciousness which itself becomes a dynamic of globalization.649 Forces of 
globalization also illustrate (and the term should convey) that these collective phenomena 
produce a momentum that may accelerate, moderate, or occasionally obstruct the 
prerogatives of more “formal” globalizing institutions and processes. These forces, 
indicative of the ongoing, if largely molar growth of human consciousness, are mainly 
reactive, concentrating the prerogatives of liberalism. Against this trend, “globality 
restores the boundlessness of culture and promotes the endless renewability and 
diversification of cultural expression rather than homogenization or hybridization.650  By 
enabling perceptive individuals to occasionally illuminate previously unnoticed adjacent 
possibilities, abstract potentials of globality indirectly produce opportunities for active 
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becomings. Thus forces of globalization inadvertently give rise to new and unimagined 
possibilities and potentials for human becoming, the nisus of globality, and ultimately 
transform the institutions and processes that originally produced them.   
The aforementioned aspects of globalization primarily result from human action 
(whether deliberate or otherwise) understood as originating in the fear, guilt and pity 
advanced by reactive forces that retard human life and more broadly characterize our 
distorted contemporary agon. As it exemplifies the unifying institutions of contemporary 
Europe, in some measure the EU suggests the negative potential of the burgeoning 
supranational state form to become an ultra-powerful “new idol.” In part a consequence of 
the general inability to value decisively or effectively, the decadence and resignation of 
globalization’s relativism simultaneously rouses and hastens both standardization and 
unification without regard for political borders or geographic location. Though this gives 
rise to numerous resistances, the majority of are reactive and ultimately futile in the larger 
scheme of change the globalization complex compels.651
The globalizing process creates fleeting mirages of diversification and 
fragmentation which incline some scholars to see in globalization itself plainly positive 
potentials, but such naïve (or nefarious) optimism furthers ideological ruses that serve to 
abolish authentic diversity. The globalization complex validates itself by reference to the 
notions of equality and fairness that are central to the narratives comprising the meta-
discourse of ultra-liberal-modernity. These narratives serve to placate indigenous 
populations whose traditional forms of life and autochthonous culture are imperiled by 
globalization. Rationalizing an anti-natural axiomatique, the precepts of ultra-liberal-
modernity immunize the globalization complex fairly well from accountability for its 
 
 364 
deleterious effects, by extension. Though as the liberal-modern ethos which it spreads 
deepens within a population, the complex must work harder to maintain its state of 
exception.652 
In examining the “political foundations of the global [human rights] regime”, 
Donnelly observes that it is “composed of widely accepted substantive norms, largely 
internationalized standard-setting procedures, and some general promotional activity, but 
very limited international implementation, which rarely goes beyond information 
exchange and voluntary accepted international assistance for the national implementation 
of international norms.” He attributes the lack of international enforcement to “conscious 
political decisions.” These decisions preserve the statist logic of the international system, 
ensuring that the global human rights regime is characterized by “normative strength and 
procedural weakness”.653 The substantive norms comprising the regime instantiate post-
Enlightenment ideals (“a conception of human beings viewed as free, autonomous persons 
entitled to equal concern and respect”), and the metadiscourse of ultra-liberal-
modernity.654
 
  
The emerging global human rights regime described by Donnelly has powerfully 
transformed (and continues to alter) the expectations and attitudes of peoples outside the 
Anglo-European cultural realm. Sometimes in contention with other, non-Western 
conceptions of rights, it has raised demands for rights and/or easing the reception of 
economic and political reforms in ways that do not always consist with the conventional 
prerogatives of the institutions, processes and forces of the globalization complex. Yet it 
is, as Donnelly accepts, liberal-modernity and the technological society to which it gave  
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rise that simultaneously generated the “need” for human rights, as such. 
[P]rior to the creation of capitalist market economies and modern nation states, the 
problems that human rights seek to address, the particular violations of human 
dignity that they seek to prevent, either did not exist or were not widely perceived 
to be central social problems.655 
 
Somewhat ironically, markets and states are today the primary violators of human dignity, 
the contemporary notion of which developed in large part as a response to the political 
excesses, gratuitous violence and caprice of European monarchical regimes that preceded 
the nation-state as the dominant form of polity in Europe.  
The quintessentially modern concept of “inalienable rights” emerged almost 
simultaneously with the precepts of the secular democratic state as an alternative to erratic 
monarchical rule, beginning in the 17th century.656
Donnelly acknowledges that the notions of “equality, autonomy, and equal 
concern and respect” which the global human rights regime seeks to fulfill and preserve 
“are very abstract values that can be realized in a great variety of ways”. As noted above, 
they arose in response to the “major perceived threats to human dignity”, and have 
transformed our understanding of human dignity as they have evolved. To good 
Europeans the developments that gave rise to the need for dignity and corresponding 
rights to preserve it indicate the irreparable decadence of the presently unifying European 
civilization(s). This was also indicated by the inability of European traditions to sustain 
 Today the global human rights regime 
and the globalization complex are effectively indistinguishable in some important ways, 
as the former serves as a philosophical foundation and justificatory basis for certain 
practices of the latter (e.g.: the promised prosperity of economic liberalization and 
enhanced freedom of formal political enfranchisement, democratization, etc.). 
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themselves, as the Enlightenment and proto-modern revolutions in America and France 
demonstrated. However, as contemporary “human rights emerge[d] out of the political 
struggle for human dignity and indicate the principle directions of [that] struggle,” which 
“is but one more side of the interaction between moral ideal and political reality that lies 
at the heart of the practice of human rights,” there is no reason to think that a free spirited 
good European couldn’t adopt these ideas to their own project of revaluing the ultra-
liberal-modern values of which they are presently a part.657 While uncomfortable with the 
presumption of these related concepts of dignity and rights—the putative basis for each of 
which implicitly casts doubt on the basis and/or viability of the other—they nevertheless 
must contend with their powerful effects on contemporary reality.658 
This “new type of philosopher and commander” could employ a minimal threshold 
of duties understood as comprising a new Apollonian ideal, a restorative, post-modern 
mythos for our nihilistic age. This could be predicated on a popular recognition of the 
qualia distinctive of human-being; characteristics inhering to every person considered—
however fictively—as an individual, irrespective of how noble or base, healthy or ill. 
Authentically agonistic socio-political institutions and economic processes could then be 
evolved to instantiate genuinely meritocratic results—in which the best attain the highest 
rank—through more or less democratic practices.659
This might serve as a means of “teaching humanity its future as its will,” one 
“dependent on a human will, to prepare [humankind] for the great risk and wholesale 
attempt at breeding and cultivation”, prevenient to the overcoming of the species man.
  
660 
There is no reason that such a conception should forever continue leveling mountain and 
valley, i.e.: eliminating the natural hierarchy of types, or subordinating the greatness of the 
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rarest, noblest blooms of human potential to the herd’s “deadly hatred against suffering in 
general,” a hatred that shows itself “in their faith in the morality of communal pity”.661 
In accordance with the metadiscourse of ultra-liberal-modernity662 and the related, 
positivistic orientation conferred by scientism with which they ideologically correspond, 
the globalization complex and human rights regime have, apodictically, eliminated much 
of the material deprivation and scarcity that has inhibited human development and 
flourishing throughout the course of recorded human history. The paradox of this 
development, which I have cited throughout this work, is that it has—as morality—
occurred through a negative will to nothingness as nihilistic power; the native volition of  
“the weaker, more delicate, intermediate existences [who] need to take sides against that 
gloriousness of life and strength”, that results in diminution of the type man.663 
Nevertheless, this spiritual dwarfing of humankind via the elimination of authentic 
difference – or molarization of becoming-same – and the loss of meaningfulness bestowed 
by suffering through relative economic prosperity provides a space for the exceptional 
type, who may come to recognize that “the continued existence of the [anti-natural, 
dissipative] rule is the precondition for the value of the exception [re: themselves].”664
The EU, an IGO conceived as single-market economic bloc, has evolved into a 
multi-level supra-national organization for the socio-political unification of its member 
nation-states through the broadening and deepening of ultra-liberal-modern ideals. 
Regional blocs with similar origins and parallel aspirations, such as the Association of 
South East Asian Nations (ASEAN), are now striving to develop in a similar direction, 
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despite a reluctance to fully embrace “Western” standards of democratization and human 
rights.665 From a liberal-optimist perspective this provides further evidence that a 
fundamental transformation of the nation-state and international relations via regional 
integration stimulated by the forces of globalization, as “part of the dialectic of historical 
transformation” is underway.666
Inter-governmental organizations such as the Organization for European Economic 
Cooperation, which became the Organization for Economic Cooperation and 
Development in 1961, played an important role in the reconstruction of post-war Western 
Europe by supervising the distribution and management of Marshall Aid Funds. This 
established the basis of Western Europe’s economic prosperity. Other IGOs to play major 
roles in Europe’s post-war development and the concurrent emergence of the late-20th 
century’s globalizing processes and forces were the European Bank for Reconstruction 
and Development (EBRD), the World Bank, the IMF, and the WTO which oversees the 
workings of the General Agreement in Tariffs and Trade (GATT). These institutions have 
dominated post-war attempts to compose and stabilize the European continent and the 
  
Another major, regionally oriented IGO, The Organization of American States 
(OAS), has faced the challenge of combining the disparate wills of quite weak nation-
states in a group inherently dominated by the “hyper-power” of the United States, wherein 
a residue of the Monroe doctrine continues to prejudice the policy views of the 
organization’s most powerful member toward the rest of the region. The recently 
established African Union (AU) is attempting similar economic policy coordination 
between its member-states and even envisages the distant possibility of the beleaguered 
and chronically impoverished continent’s political integration. 
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world economy, by promoting free trade and encouraging particular forms of 
development. The association of globalization with the U.S. arises from the neo-liberal 
model imposed worldwide via the so-called “Washington consensus”. This refers to the 
agreement among a group of influencial Western exponents of conventional economic 
liberalization strategies and development policy. It is associated with “market 
fundamentalists”, the ideologists of neo-liberal economic theory.667
The period saw the creation of Organization of African Unity (OAU) in 1963, 
which morphed into the AU in 2002; the Association of South-East Asian Nations 
(ASEAN) in 1967, the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), a regional body of Persian / 
Arabian Gulf emirates and states launched in 1981, NAFTA (1993), the Indian Ocean Rim 
Association for Regional Cooperation (IOR-ARC) in 1997, and FTAA (ongoing), the G-8, 
G-10 and G-20, among others. Each of these attempt more or less effectively, to spur and 
coordinate free-market growth by agreeing on and implementing frameworks for regional 
and multi-lateral cooperation and legislating multilateral economic rules on a plethora of 
issues that, their advocates have it, foster greater and fairer exchange. Increasing 
 
Following the Second World War, globalizing institutions and the processes they 
promoted and supervised systematically transformed the diverse yet interconnected realms 
of international finance, trade, production, and labor and development practices. In 
Europe, where post-war reconstruction in the West had, with American encouragement 
driven cooperation and, arguably, integration, the European Monetary System was created 
in 1979 to further enhance the coordination of economic policy and augment the EC’s 
self-determination. Such cooperative inter-governmental institutions proliferated 
throughout the world in the decades following the Second World War.  
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familiarity and transparency make for more regular and calm political dialogue, which it is 
argued, improves trust and increases security. 
Worldwide economic growth—which among many of the globalizing processes 
occurring in the world today is the principle dimension these institutions were conceived 
to advance and manage—occurred so rapidly in the decades following the war that many 
of the aforementioned institutions have been challenged to adapt to the pace of 
development and the increasingly sophisticated instruments of finance and exchange, sets 
of interrelated processes which they were conceived to regulate and further but which 
have become somewhat inscrutable due to the instantaneity of exchange in contemporary 
trading. The accelerating speed of activity in international trade and finance and the 
changes generated there from increased exponentially in the decade following the collapse 
of the Soviet Union, with unprecedented economic growth occurring simultaneously in 
the developing nations of South-East Asia. 
The overheated, poorly regulated and relatively corrupt economies of South-East 
Asia, dubbed “tigers” by the international media, were, by the late 1990s, due for a 
correction. This came in the unfortunate form of a severe financial crisis that dented the 
region’s developing economies. It was brought on by currency speculation and the 
panicked outflow of foreign capital from markets in Jakarta, Bangkok as well as through 
trading on the Singapore bourse, beginning in mid-1997. Its effects would last until 
approximately 2002. This crisis, whose cause was complex and truly global in origin, was 
a serious setback for the economies of Indonesia, Thailand and South Korea, forcing them 
to turn to international creditors and among the IGOs mentioned above, the IMF, to assist 
their recovery. This meant submitting to the terms and conditions demanded by the IMF, a 
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source of contention in the domestic politics of each state that compounded the serious 
political turmoil across the region. As anger intensified, coming to border on open 
revolution in Indonesia, the Asian masses demonstrated almost as vehemently against the 
economic stipulations of the IMF, which were perceived by critics and many on the street 
as callous and laden with risk—namely the potential to deepen the region’s financial 
hardships.  
In Malaysia the government under then Prime Minister Mahathir Mohamad 
responded by deliberately ignoring the advise of the IGOs and “Washington consensus”. 
Rather, he introduced a controversial program designed by his finance minister that 
imposed strict capital controls on Malaysia’s markets and trading of its currency (the 
Ringgit) as it pegged the nation’s exchange rate to the US dollar. Though condemned by 
free market partisans, this action successfully shielded Malaysia’s domestic economy 
from further pressures from foreign exchange markets, the volatility of which would likely 
have inhibited economic recovery or even aggravated Malaysia’s woes by raising its 
interest rates (Hashim). The measures—which went against the orthodox 
recommendations for managing fiscal crises and the IMF’s own conditions for assistance 
to nation’s in debt default—were based on the very principles of Keynesian economic 
theory that, in part, served as a foundation for the initial post-war international economic 
order. Such a strategy is now seen by some as a plausible alternative to the conventional 
advice dispensed by bureaucrats of the IMF (Khor).668
This international economic crisis of the late 1990s would lead to currency 
devaluations and the specter of debt default in Russia and Brazil, as well. In the early part 
of this decade (2001) Argentina, among other nations, would experience similar shocks 
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due to debt default. The hyper-inflation that resulted fomented a dramatic increase in 
poverty that led to social unrest and political turmoil. The IMF responded as it always had 
in such crises, by offering more loans which were the original cause of the problem, and 
correctly or not came to be blamed both by the leaderships and publics of the affected 
countries. A result of these tumultuous events the aforementioned IGOs, particularly the 
IMF, faced intense criticism on many fronts. To longtime critics of its structural 
adjustment programs in the development field and those who thought its lending practices 
to nations in financial trouble counter-productive a consensus emerged. As a result the 
prestige, effectiveness and relevance of both the IMF and Washington consensus have 
arguably been diminished. The skepticism originates in a perception that they are largely 
ineffectual both at anticipating crises and dealing with the exigencies of them when they 
do occur.669
Opposition to the thrust and hegemony of neo-liberal capitalism and myriad other 
prerogatives of globalization has coalesced in non-governmental organizations such as the 
World Trade Forum, first convened in Porto Alegre, Brazil in January 2001. The 
disruptive ramifications of free trade, unregulated portfolio investment and other foreign 
direct investment (FDI) practices for fiscal stability and monetary policy, as unpredictable 
fluctuations in exchange values and interest rates prompted by speculation in currencies 
and/or derivatives threaten economies, social cohesion and political stability have 
intensified contemporary controversies over the (in)justice of unbridled markets as 
globalization—and the anti-essentialist mindset generated by globality—initiates what 
may be a new stage of capitalism.
  
670 In response, some critics suggest and/or refer to 
possible alternatives to the “dominant paradigm that theoretically and ideologically 
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underpins contemporary globalization.”671 From the perspective of Nietzsche’s vitalist 
critique of the political and power ontology, these trends, debates and proposed policy 
alternatives are shown to be deflections from how they actually compound and amplify 
decadence, adding to the problems that they mis-identify. 
Myriad rules, norms and agreements overlap the competencies and jurisdictions of 
the major globalizing institutions and interconnect through universalized legal regimes 
(free capital flows, air transport, shipping, etc.), free trade agreements like NAFTA, 
protocols of international diplomacy, and the widely perceived need for international 
cooperation. Other globalizing institutions determining the course of planetary 
transformation include MNCs and TNCs. Corporations operating internationally exploit 
processes of globalization (such as technological innovation, advancements in 
communication, legal regimes and disparate national health care and labor standards, etc.), 
to disseminate and standardize practices and norms wherever they engage in business. 
Moreover, they surreptitiously conduct surveillance on their employees to enforce 
compliance.672 The largest TNCs have the power to influence significant concessions 
from the governments of states in which they do business. They can even pressurize 
political change in heavily indebted poor counties due to the latter’s corresponding 
vulnerability and desperation,673 yet most capital investment continues to be directed 
toward highly industrialized economies as global hierarchies of production materialize.674
Global media and communication transforms world politics, increasing some of 
the most reactive affects of globalization by introducing the values associated with 
Western notions of rights, enfranchisement and consumption.
  
675 Increased contact and 
trade is facilitated by formal treaty negotiations between states at the international level 
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(e.g.: NAFTA, the G-8, WTO, etc.) and between private corporations, producing mergers, 
etc. Governments (singly and in cooperation with one another), international 
organizations, global corporations and the coextending culture industry continuously 
engage in numerous forms of propaganda or marketing to universalize their moribund 
values which they mask with ideologically interpolating, molar discourses of productivity 
and growth. Their campaigns serve both to inculcate perceptions of need and reify values 
that challenge indigenous belief and exchange systems, anesthetize any alternative senses 
of significance and eliminate autochthonous wisdom. This entails the “dissolution” of 
traditional identities in a process of “cultural fragmentation” that even threatens political 
allegiances—particularly to the nation-state—within the primary loci of the globalization 
complex.676  
Globalizing institutions and related processes enforce a “culture ideology of 
consumerism” that disseminates, through “imperialist media” (advertising and popular 
culture mediums such as music, film and fashion), homogenizing forms of desire, beauty 
and conceptions of the good across cultures.677 It simultaneously dominates information 
flows (and thus attitude formation) through ideologically corresponding and virtually 
uniform television news broadcasts that present selective representations of political 
dialogue and violence.678 Alternative perspectives struggle to effectively challenge 
hegemonic views and attitudes, though efforts are made.679
As an expansion of the nation-state, as “coldest of all cold monsters,” globalization 
is “essentially” a difference eliminating machine. Its complexity (an infinite, fractal 
micro-dialectics sustained by and sustaining a decadent order) at once intensifies 
simulacrums of genuinely agonistic relations while compelling collaboration in its project 
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and general acquiescence to its prerogatives. While problematically describing it as 
“Empire”, Hardt and Negri have correctly observed that the globalization complex strives 
to be totalizing. But the active collaboration and acquiescence it demands of ordinary 
individuals becomes more difficult to achieve as its own complexity (and by extension the 
actual rather than simulated conflict it generates) increases. The becomings it compels, 
however dissipative and reactive it may be, then give rise to a dilemma wherein malaise 
and nostalgia for status quo being (such as the ideals of liberal modernity) intensify 
nihilistic resignation, a circumstance induced by the contradiction between the 
globalization complex’s false appearances and reality.  
The globalization complex gets ensnared in its own affective cultivation of 
Publicness and the absorption of individuals in ‘the They’, alienating those conscious 
enough to perceive Being-in-itself (understood as Being towards ones ownmost 
potentiality for being) as presently there. Although most resignedly accept, that is fall 
back into their reduced condition, a few rebel. Among these latter few are ‘good 
Europeans’, whose very skeptical, inquiring disposition inclines them to rouse against 
uncritical group think. Through the totality of their involvements in the globalization 
complex they gain awareness of their ‘Being towards’ the thing that has itself been 
uncovered thereby: their own subversive capacity vis-à-vis the juggernaut of hyper-
decadent, ultra-liberal-modern values that is imposed universally by the globalization 
complex. This significantly, entails the means (which were always ready to hand) for 
acting on it, via their realization of abstract potentials of globality: affirmations of 
difference through the cultivation of change. Enactments of globality require ones’ 
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particular temporal engagement as a Dasein in the world by way of futural projections of 
the possibilities one finds present and to which this engagement gives rise. 
As Nietzsche anticipated, such extreme nihilism could lead to the self-destruction 
of humankind if forceful iconoclasts do not transfigure globalization’s ultra-liberal-
modern meta-discourse to initiate a new, anti-dialectical epoch of authentically agonistic 
“grand politics”.680
  
  
 
Part Two: The systematic universalization of European decadence via the 
globalization complex  
In order to better comprehend the salience of Nietzsche’s vitalist conception of 
the political to an analysis of the EU in the broader context of globalization and the 
potentials for individuals within and outside the EU to become ‘good Europeans’ through 
the abstract potentials of globality, it is necessary to examine the ways in which 
Nietzsche’s general theory of decadence and of its expression in late-modern Europe 
illuminate the dynamics of dissipation in our age of ultra-liberal-modernity and the subtle 
ways in which it anticipated the all-too-human intensification of nihilism by conventional 
globalization.  
Nietzsche variously supported aspects of 19th century European colonialism and 
criticized imperialist quests for booty.681 In the latter case he perceived colonial 
competition as a nationalistic strategy devised by ascetic priests as a means of distracting 
an enervated herd and to “profit” on the increasing malaise weakening European 
society.682 Democratization represented a relinquishing of master’s prerogatives and a 
pandering to ever more impudent masses across the continent. It was symptomatic of the 
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same “sickness of will distributed over Europe” that found different expression in 
military adventures abroad. The 19th century bane of decadence invariably led to a 
nihilism that would require: 
“not only wars in India and Asian involvements to relieve Europe of the greatest 
danger facing it, but also internal eruptions, the explosion of empires into small 
fragments, and above all the introduction of the parliamentary imbecility, 
including the obligation upon everyone to read his newspaper at breakfast.”683 
 
In this passage Nietzsche is at once serious and sarcastic, suggesting the course such 
terrible shepherds unwittingly pursue and its inevitable “resolution” in destruction. 
Undisciplined by the strongest, who are also afflicted with the herd’s decadence and thus 
prevented from fully actuating their strength, their solutions only compound their 
problems before the crises they cause are relieved by cathartic catastrophes. Ambitions of 
national greatness utilized the herd’s addiction to ressentiment and bad-conscience to 
bolster the authority of ascetic-priests by inducing in them euphoric hallucinations of 
emancipation through the increased (conventional) power and wealth to be gained from 
Empire. Nietzsche himself acknowledged a propensity to such reactive sentiments among 
the best: 
We ‘‘good Europeans’’: we too have our hours when we permit ourselves a 
warm-hearted patriotism, a lapse and regression into old loves and narrownesses – 
I have just given an example of it – hours of national ebullition, of patriotic 
palpitations and floods of various outmoded feelings.684 
 
It cannot be entirely surprising that national identity will continue to play an occasionally, 
sentimentally significant part in the lives of ‘good Europeans’. They would not, however, 
fail to understand these emotions outside their correct, encompassing context: that of the 
shared ethos and nomostic cultural traditions (law, custom, norm and habit) that 
undeniably connect them to their fellow Europeans.   
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Similar relapses into counter-productive foreign policy objectives afflict states 
both weak and strong in our post-modern era, but globalization’s simulation of natural 
competition results in a hyper-real simulacrum of agonistic order that has succeeded in 
attenuating the most deleterious consequence, namely global conflagrations. Leaders of 
the herd685 corrupt the social domain of struggle and rivalry that would naturally reveal 
superior individuals, but the active forces globality generates exploit their machinations, 
deluding them as well. Inherently weak and only capable of inferior (reactive-contingent) 
freedom, the herd is provided an anti-natural, hyper-decadent simulation of existential 
meaning and ontological purpose that re-presents their slavery as “freedom”.   
On freedom and equality, it must be recalled that Nietzsche rejects the liberal 
principle of the innate equality of human beings as an example of secular slave morality’s 
tendency to “level mountain and valley”, but promoted a nuanced variety of elitism 
contingent on the merit of individuals. On freedom he asserts, “each considers himself 
most free where his feeling of living is greatest; in passion, in duty, in knowledge, in 
mischievousness respectively. The theory of freedom of will is an invention of ruling 
classes” (our contemporary ascetic—consumerist priests and herd leaders).686
They would like with all their might to strive after happiness, I mean after 
comfort and fashion (and, at the highest level, for a seat in Parliament), which is 
at the same time the true path of [their] virtue. Not one of all these ponderous herd 
animals with their uneasy conscience (who undertake to advocate the cause of 
egoism as the cause of the general welfare – ) wants to know or scent that the 
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contempt of ruling classes includes the “elites” of his own era – Europe’s pusillanimous 
monarchs and contented bourgeois; utterly vapid and incurably decadent pseudo-leaders. 
The mob (rich and poor alike) wants itself considered equal to the best, as Nietzsche 
observes in criticizing Utilitarian ethics: 
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‘general welfare’ is not an ideal, or a goal, or a concept that can be grasped at all, 
but only an emetic – that what is right for one cannot by any means therefore by 
right for another, that the demand for one morality for all is detrimental to 
precisely the higher men, in short that there exists an order of rank between man 
and man, consequently also between morality and morality.”687  
 
The order of rank that separates man from man had itself come to seem unnatural to the 
libertine European elites of “la belle epoche”, as a thoroughly romantic notion of the 
general welfare had come to provide a malignant preoccupation with and raison d'être for 
the perilous revolutionary politics of the day.  
In his rejection of the “general welfare” Nietzsche none-too-subtly impugns the 
theoretical contrivance central to the works of Rousseau, for whom he occasionally 
expresses contempt.688 Nevertheless, according to Nietzsche’s (possible mis-
)understanding, he held that notion to be spurious, inextricably linked as it was with a so-
called “general will” the consistent enactment of which Rousseau did allege was essential 
to the former condition’s maintenance, responsible for inflaming the radicalism that had 
proven ruinous to Europe after Napoleon’s defeat.689
Predisposed to decadence by their innate weakness, the masses oppose any natural 
order of rank from instinctual ressentiment and a corresponding, culturally naturalized 
bad-conscience, which they strive to institutionally instantiate into law. They pursue this 
objective to reverse nature’s hierarchy to overwhelm and keep themselves in command of 
the strong, healthy individuals to whom they are otherwise vulnerable and forcibly 
subordinated. Furthermore they seek to codify equal rights into law, a program to which 
 It also alludes to the contempt 
Nietzsche had for the later utilitarianism of J.S. Mill, who shared with Rousseau a strong 
interest in eliminating suffering as equated in the slave moral sense with intolerable 
injustice. 
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they confer the imprimatur of modern science so as to bolster and ensure its 
injunctions.690 Their goal can only be accomplished when decline has sufficiently 
weakened the strong: 
Our virtues are conditional on, are provoked by, our weaknesses. “Equality,” as a 
certain factual increase in similarity, which merely finds expression in the theory 
of “equal rights,” is an essential feature of decline. 
 
The notion of equality and discourse of equal rights is expressive of declining vitality 
because it can only emerge in an age when the strongest are so dissipated that they can no 
longer impose their prerogatives to maintain a natural rank order of types (Rangordnung).  
The same forces determine the character of the political realm: 
All our political theories and constitutions – and the “German Reich” is by no 
means an exception – are consequences, necessary consequences, of decline; the 
unconscious effect of decadence has assumed mastery even over the ideals of 
some of the sciences. … The decline of life, the decrease in the power to organize, 
that is, to separate, tear open clefts, subordinate and super-ordinate – all this has 
been formulated as the ideal in contemporary sociology. Our socialists are 
decadents, but Mr. Herbert Spencer is a decadent too: he considers the triumph of 
altruism desirable.691
Until the slave revolt in morals overturned the natural order (which was largely 
effectuated in the West when Rome officially adopted Christianity in c. e. 312) the most 
independent ruled over society. Lacking the instinct for self-determination, the herd was 
forcibly made obedient by “the artful hammer blows of conquerors”. In considering the 
  
 
Nietzsche’s contempt for the secularized Christian virtue of altruism (which comprised a 
central feature of Spencer’s ethics) was consistent with his vitalist analysis of the political 
and power ontology. He saw altruism as constituting a long perfected mask or strategy of 
re-presenting the slave’s spirit of revenge and desire for equality, a sentiment in vogue in 
England in the mid- and late 19th century. 
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violent origins of the state Nietzsche asserts that it was masters organized for war who 
unhesitatingly lay their “terrible claws upon a populace perhaps tremendously superior in 
numbers but still formless and nomad.” Long after these civilization-founding acts, the 
slaves usurped authority, taking the decline in instincts that enabled their victory as a 
rational and/or divine basis for their rule that reflected social progress toward an 
improved moral order:   
The decrease in instincts which are hostile and arouse mistrust – and that is all our 
“progress” amounts to – represents but one of the consequences attending the 
general decrease in vitality: it requires a hundred times more trouble and caution 
to make so conditional and late an existence prevail.  Hence each helps the other; 
hence everyone is to a certain extent sick, and everyone is a nurse for the sick.  
And that is called “virtue.”  Among men who still knew life differently – it would 
have been called by another name: “cowardice” perhaps, “wretchedness,” old 
ladies’ morality.692 
 
Here Nietzsche articulates his despair via contempt for the general pacification of man 
that accompanied the democratization of society and politics. The consequent malaise 
that had overtaken European society was an expression of the enervating values that 
naturalized the atrophy of healthy instincts. The strength of will and independence of 
hardy individuals’, demonstrated through their instinct for freedom, was diminished and 
repressed, incarcerated within them until it was only able to discharge itself inwardly, 
that is, upon itself: that, and that alone, is what the bad conscience is in its beginnings.693 
Despite his romantic hyperbole, Nietzsche fierce rejection of pacifism, much like 
Machiavelli’s, rejects gratuitous violence but entails a cognizance of the utility of limited 
violence through strategic application.694
The evil of the strong. – The act of violence as a consequence of the passion, of 
anger for example, is to be understood physiologically as an attempt to prevent a 
 Occurrences of violence are primarily 
considered in terms of the spirit from which they arise: 
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threatening attack of suffocation. Countless acts of arrogance vented on other 
people have been diversions of a sudden rush of blood through a vigorous action 
of the muscles: and perhaps the whole phenomena of the ‘evil of the strong’ 
belongs in this domain. (The evil of the strong harms others without giving 
thought to it–it has to discharge itself; the evil of the weak wants to harm others 
and to see the signs of the suffering it has caused.)695 
 
Although Machiavelli’s Prince would deliberately employ violence to achieve a desired 
end (the pacification of a principality, for instance) the suffering it causes is not done so 
for its own sake but to achieve a higher end. According to Nietzsche, the truly effective 
Prince would discharge his will involuntarily. One in possession of the instincts 
subtending such a native volition would have no need of a guide book such as 
Machiavelli’s! And as for those who would benefit from such advice? They would likely 
fall into the category of the weakling who harms others to see what suffering he can 
cause. 
The notion of an unconscious discharge of strength would seem to be at odds with 
a “strategic application” of violence; in healthy society’s the strong unconsciously focus 
their strength into endeavors that increase their power, but in decadent societies they must 
consciously direct this will into acts that achieve this via a strategic utilization of 
predominant reactive milieu. They strive to make their actions active by overcoming that 
which marks them with the degenerative qualities characteristic of their era.696 
Nietzsche’s politics emphasizes that order must be imposed to prevent anarchy and to 
structure a society from a formless mass.  
The only curtailment of “freedom” this entails occurs among those who naturally 
possess a strong will when they are prevented from exercising it. Nearly two millennia of  
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herd (mis)rule had thoroughly naturalized this state of affairs by Nietzsche’s lifetime: 
A morality of the (naturally qualified) rulers is, however, most alien and painful 
to contemporary taste in the severity of its principle that one has duties only 
towards one’s equals; that towards beings of a lower rank, towards everything 
alien, one may act as one wishes or ‘as the heart dictates’ and in any case ‘beyond 
good and evil – : it is here that pity and the like can have a place.697
Contemporary European society (to include, via a geographically extended 
cultural realm, Anglo-European North-America, Australia and New Zealand, etc.), in 
which ascetic-consumerist priests rule out of the spirit of revenge, are the cumulative 
product of the reversal of values that privileged slave morality over natural order. This 
gradually induced the schizophrenic “recognition” of the desirability for the best to 
command and simultaneous disdain for any hierarchizing authority, with the result that 
the worst govern a coarsening society characterized by an ever increasingly boorish 
culture that panders to the lowest common denominator (an ochlocratic kakistocracy, that 
 
  
The inculcation of desire for “freedom” among the herd only produces slave dreams of 
liberty.  
The prerogative of determining the social order “justly”—which is to say, 
naturally—belongs to the healthiest, because they have the will (strength for freedom; not 
the “freedom” per se) to do so, and because their instinct for self-determination entails a 
comprehension of the ultimate significance and desirability for mankind in their doing so. 
It is this latter understanding (which resonates with oft chided patriarchal and hierarchical 
forms of authority) which is absent from the herd’s misguided desire for freedom: as it 
lacks any awareness of its own disposition, the herd’s desire for freedom leads to 
debilitating chaos and explains their coexisting need for subjugation and demand for 
leaders to rule them.  
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is: rule by the worst mob factions). The analogy of mental illness is appropriate. In our 
ultra-liberal-modern era the unmitigated simulacrum is a hallucination symptomatic of 
collective psychosis. While striving to overcome themselves to become who it is they are, 
the objective of healthier, more fortunate specimens in globality must be to medicate the 
herd with a modified variation of the simulacrum to counterbalance dangerous swings 
between delusive mania and paralyzing depression that squander society’s energies and 
prevent its effective ordering.   
Nietzsche considered efforts to raise the mob’s awareness of its own 
wretchedness or to “expose” them to the reality of their miserable (and allegedly 
repressed) condition at once counterproductively cruel and stupid. He therefore despised 
formulators of fictive, dialectically self-validating emancipatory programs that incited the 
masses to rebel against their putative “oppressors”. Nietzsche describes as “cursed 
seducers” and “scholarly oxen,” those such as (Plato’s) Socrates, St. Paul, Martin Luther, 
Kant, Mill, as well as all 19th century dialecticians and socialists, as having galvanized 
the herd’s spirit of revenge through work’s that resonated as expressions of the negative 
will to nothingness as nihilistic power, and thereby validated the impulse to ressentiment 
and / or (re-)dedicated the masses to slave-morality.   
In a natural order the strongest provide the masses outlets for the expression of 
positive forces in ennobling cultural projects through which they may emulate their 
highest exemplars. Through a sublimation and contortion of entropic reactive forces in 
our ultra-liberal-modern era multiple simulacrums normalize perceptions of happiness 
through acts of consumption, so that the herd finds pleasure in striving for material 
rewards. Numerous, overlapping and ever-intensifying neo-liberal practices distract, 
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absorb and counter-intuitively enable them, across socio-economic and class divisions, to 
satisfy desires originating in and circulated by increasingly more sophisticated spectacles 
of desire.698 Established on a foundational narrative consisting of principles of legal 
equality and inalienable, universal human rights, the hegemonic simulacrums of capital 
process decrease the instinctual fear and timidity of the herd to provide them with an 
ersatz, albeit productive, sense of power as well as a schizophrenic sense of anxiety (to 
keep them working) coupled with a narcotic feeling of security699
Nietzsche’s futural vitalist politics aims to cultivate conditions for maximal 
functioning of a pan-European society through the ethos of ‘good Europeanism’, which 
must be understood as both a psychological temperament and corporeal abode hospitable 
to the development of the noblest faculties of every authentic individual—the ethos 
propaedeutic to ‘good Europeanism’. He likens the ideal conditions for the breeding of 
free spirits to “a tropical region” or a hothouse conducive to the development of “strange 
and choice plants”.
. As a result even those 
with the healthiest constitutions, the strongest individuals, presently succumb to 
prevailing slave-moral herd values that are antithetical to their native volitions. These 
would-be exceptions are left wracked with a bad-conscience in the midst of the crowd 
which coerces conformity with its values. But it also makes them timid and 
unthreatening, perceptions that can be used, given the right conditions and opportunities, 
to mask their innate power.  
700 The necessary environment for their flourishing would in a real 
sense arise spontaneously wherever the Übermenschen happened to meet. Recognizing 
one another’s “free conscience in those things that today are most undervalued and 
prohibited,” they spur one another to greater feats of self-perfection in brief instants and 
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chance encounters. Or they might break their solitude to seek longer moments of 
mutually fortifying companionship in prearranged meetings or even communal 
arrangements of more extended duration. In whatever form they develop communities 
“with [their] own sphere of life”.701 
Whatever the interval of their enlivening encounters, the event of their meeting 
would always conduce—in ways however unexpected or seemingly insignificant—with 
the eventual emergence of an authentic philosophical camaraderie capable of sustaining a 
higher culture for the fullest flourishing of humankind’s most vigorous specimens. These 
are the “masters of the earth” of whom Nietzsche speaks (and about whose character and 
purpose Hitler and the National Socialists fundamentally misunderstood / misconstrued), 
as Dionysian artists and philosophers; a “race” to whom all free spirits belong, defined as 
a type by the similar instinctual organization of their drives and impulses symptomatized 
by their individual, native volitions—the distinctive and rare conative disposition or 
anticipatory resoluteness that confers “an excess of strength for beauty, bravery, culture, 
manners to the highest peak of the spirit” and enables them to go “beyond good and 
evil”.702 
This would (as Nietzsche suggests and Heidegger, in a different albeit related 
context makes explicit), require the creation of a particular mode of dwelling in the 
world—a spiritually mature consciousness of their distinctive emplacement and shared 
experience of ubiety as ‘good Europeans’—that would foster the lived-environment and 
care-structure necessary for overcoming the hegemonic, all-too-human discourses 
enforced by the globalization complex—the unnatural ascetic values of our day.703 
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As artist-warriors who battle apathy and resignation—the resistance they need to 
overcome to become who it is they are—they have the will to take responsibility for 
themselves, and in so doing they attract like types whilst repelling the weak, to create an 
environment for the breeding of a higher species man. The war they wage is what teaches 
them to be free (to paraphrase Nietzsche: TI: IX-38). It is through the struggle of that 
combat that their inherent, covalent bonds ineluctably, magnetically, draw them, the 
rarest exceptions, together. Through their recognition and development of the qualities 
and proximal conditions most conducive to the formation of the healthiest types, they 
attain value by exploiting those they are able to dominate and honoring the victor.  
Becoming indifferent to hardship, cruelty, deprivation, even to life… The peoples 
with any value at all became valuable, and not through liberal institutions: great 
danger made them into something deserving of respect, the danger that first made 
us know our resources, or virtue, our arms and weapons, our spirit, – the danger 
that forces us to be strong … First principle: you must need to be strong, or else 
you will never become it.704
In the ideal community envisaged by ‘good Europeans’, one in which the 
independence of each is guaranteed by the shared and respected need for an authentically 
agonistic setting for the egoistic maximization of self by all, the best might realize their 
 
 
In our era it is from the universal imposition of a European cultural residue, the decadent 
anti-natural slave-morality that sustains the herd’s ressentiment and bad-conscience that 
those whose native volition imbue them with healthy instincts find themselves needful of 
strength. The strength they must develop by actualizing the full complement of their 
instinct, drives and impulses, is ultimately the will to resist—to gird themselves against—
the liberal institutions that impair culture’s proper life-affirming function and squander 
the potentials of nascent, more authentic modes of life. 
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extraordinary potential relatively unmolested by ascetic-consumerist priests of 
ressentiment so as to emerge from their practicum invulnerable; capable of resisting and 
simultaneously defusing the dangers posed to their nascent greatness by the leveling 
conformity imposed by the herd.705
Class distinctions in our ultra-liberal-modern world ramify its pervasive 
decadence, frustrating the best individuals’ will to power and condemning them to the 
predilections of the mediocrity-loving herd. The inversion of the natural order of rank 
(that otherwise might have enabled them to reach a healthy, authentically agonistic 
society’s top echelons) stymies the dynamism these individuals, turning their strength in 
on themselves. Incapable of resignation and uninterested in the crowd’s approval they are 
  
As aforementioned, Nietzsche maintains that since the Christian-Platonic (slave-
moral) inversion of classical Greek, pagan virtues, widespread decadence has 
handicapped the rare, healthy exceptions that do occur, whether within or outside of the 
mob. The class structures of the contemporary world that have resulted from the anti-
natural values perpetuated by the Christian-Platonic will-to-truth continually deprive 
those endowed by nature with a superior instinctual organization of productive outlets for 
expending their force. Quite opposite the caste distinctions required in the Law of Manu, 
which Nietzsche praised for their hygienic discipline and cultivation of particular cultural 
forms of life, our modern categories of class comprehensively corrupt and/or retard the 
becoming of the best types; whether poor or rich, provided a top-flight, mediocre or 
inadequate education, or whatever level of income attained, our modern class categories 
thwart the potential greatness of would-be free spirits.  
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especially vulnerable to being afflicted with ennui.706 They may despair or rage, become 
anti-social, be condemned as criminal or deemed insane.  
Unironically, these outcomes intensify decadence throughout society and amplify 
its reactive force in myriad expressions of negative will to nothingness as nihilistic 
power, furthering the perverse ultra-liberal-modern “cause” of ascetic-consumerist priests 
of ressentiment. This all-too-human agenda endeavors to realize the radical equality of all 
human beings, or the elimination of meaningful differences, through technological 
rationality and the standardization of all desire. This also entails a selective equivocation 
of rank and natural distinctions, a process operationalized and perpetuated through a web 
of popular discourses, which combine to exercise discernable affects on the political 
organization and functioning of Anglo-European societies, as Nietzsche notes: 
‘Equality’ (a certain factual increase in similarity that the theory of ‘equal rights’ 
only gives expression to) essentially belongs to decline: the rift between peoples, 
between classes, the myriad number of types, the will to be yourself, to stand out, 
what I call the pathos of distance, is characteristic of every strong age. The 
tension, the expanse between the extremes is getting smaller and smaller these 
days – the extremes themselves are ultimately being blurred into similarity … All 
of our political theories and constitutions (very much including the ‘Reich’) are 
consequences, necessary results of the decline; the unconscious effects of 
decadence have even come to dominate the ideals of some of the sciences.707
Nietzsche goes on to volunteer a scathing criticism of the discipline of sociology, 
socialists and Herbert Spencer himself for the uses they respectively made of their own 
instincts of decay. The social sciences, as they would come to be known, were emergent 
in late-19th century academe and exemplified the nihilistic will-to-truth already evident to 
Nietzsche through discourses of scientism (what today might be referred to as physics-
envy), with its emphasis on empiricism, its conference of a positivistic disposition on 
scholars and its initially distinctive statist logic (a logic that arguably persists in the 
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disciplines of political science and international studies). Nietzsche thought harmful this 
will-to-truth, especially when enforced through broader sets of norms, or universalized as 
a foundation for sociological value judgments. Furthermore, the statist logic that came to 
prevail globally through the (post-1945) San Francisco – Bretton Woods international 
system was counter-productive to the development of the quasi-cosmopolitan ethos 
characteristic of his ‘good Europeanism’. 
Nietzsche repeatedly suggests that whenever a society degenerates sufficiently a 
very real danger exists that strong individuals with damaged instinctual urges validated 
by a culture of decadence might succeed in gaining power. Familiar with the rabid anti-
Semitic proto-fascists of his day, this is likely how Nietzsche would have understood the 
rise to power of the Nazis in Germany. In circumstances such as those present in a 
dissipated post-war Germany, where bitterness arose over the crippling terms of peace 
imposed by the Versailles treaty, tyrants may exercise their strength nefariously, 
intensifying a nihilistic order by focusing the volitional resources of the herd on enemies 
either within or outside of their society. Nietzsche anticipated the dangers posed to the 
future of Europe from the symptoms of decadence in his era: 
Today, when the herd animal alone obtains and bestows honors in Europe, when 
‘equality of rights’ could all too easily change into equality in wrongdoing: I 
mean into a general war on everything rare, strange, privileged, the higher man, 
the higher soul, the higher duty, the higher responsibility, creative fullness of 
power and mastery…708
The extremism of the Nazi annihilating will-to-level equaled that of the Soviets, though 
toward putatively differing ends. Scholars of the Frankfurt School of Critical Theory, 
Max Horkheimer and Theodor Adorno recognized these two contending ideological 
movements as not entirely antithetical extremes of the same liberal project, but, also after 
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Nietzsche, saw that the advanced capitalist, post-industrial societies of the West, and in 
particular the United States (a realm that now includes the European Union and the 
highly developed economies of the Asian Pacific rim and which comprises the centers of 
the globalization complex), though an arguably more moderate instantiation of the same 
liberal-modern phenomenon, posed a potentially equal danger to the noblest potential of 
mankind precisely through its facades of self-imposed, institutionalized restraint. 
Nietzsche realized that the preeminence of the herd’s negative will to nothingness 
as nihilistic power, as symptomatized in widespread social decadence, has historically 
preceded paroxysms of violence in which a corrupt slave-leader can become capable of 
taking over, and inevitably in such cases, of driving the lemming society he commands 
over a cliff edge of self-destruction (as in Nazi Germany or Stalinist Russia).709 Although 
Nietzsche recognized that the conquering exploits of an ascendant people enjoying 
superlative health can be productive and salubrious (even, counter-intuitively, for those 
over whom they triumph), these spasms of suicidal violence are nearly always ruinous to 
the higher culture sustained by the society which they destroy from within. In the spirit of 
the anti-essentialist, quasi-cosmopolitan ‘good Europeanism’ he envisaged for the future 
of mankind, Nietzsche stridently opposed the most pernicious chauvinisms of his era, 
asserting: 
We who are homeless [i.e.: ‘we who belong to no particular nation’] are too 
manifold and mixed racially and in our descent, being “modern men” and 
consequently do not feel tempted to participate in the mendacious racial self-
admiration and racial indecency that parades in Germany today as a sign of a 
German way of thinking and that is doubly false and obscene among the people of 
the “historical sense”. We are – and let this be our word of honor – ‘good  
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Europeans’, the heirs of Europe, the rich, oversupplied, but also overly obligated 
heirs of thousands of years of European spirit. 710
The obligations of such free spirits include maintaining the values and ideals of 
their noble idea of Europe—an idea more broadly comprehensible as a view to the 
possible future of mankind—through its continual, agonistically achieved reinvigoration, 
so to perpetuate it into the future and ensure its perduration. As orchestrators of 
contestation and revealers of latent human potentials as well as undiscovered avenues to 
possible perfections they exert a will to power capable of radically altering familiar 
political concepts and the geographies which they entrench, generating new sovereign 
spaces and socio-political realities. Their willing produces an aesthetic perspective on life 
and corresponding disposition that challenges enfeebling, media-generated simulacrums 
   
 
After discrediting the irrational prejudices subtending the conventional values of the 
disparate herds of Europe, such ‘good Europeans’ resolve to live with conditions of 
uncertainty (which is to say that they recognize that there is no other choice, if they are to 
live authentically) and posit a non-essentialist, anti-reductionistic account of human 
existence that is not specifically attributable to any conventional state of being, but which 
must be cultivated through disciplinary regimes of self creation and experimentation 
(auto-poiesis) that facilitate the maximal passion (eros) of every individual toward their 
ultimate, individual excellence (arête). Itinerant wanderers who freely traverse unfamiliar 
locales, cross socio-political frontiers and transit conceptual borders to chart surprising 
physical, psychological and conceptual topographies of their own creation, Nietzsche 
hoped that his intrepid ‘good Europeans’ would thereby disseminate their continually 
interrogated values in opposition to moralizations of life that tend to petrify into 
dissipative convictions. 
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of the present via new re-presentations—novel political myths—to rejuvenate authentic 
health and affirm difference (becoming-other). They enhance their own type and 
condition the possibility of a sustained higher culture from which emergent geniuses 
capable of augmenting the maximal thriving of the species man might draw succor and 
cultivate an agonistic milieu for its best (strongest) members. 
‘Good Europeans’ thus become artists who envisage the future and act to realize it 
through their creative labors. Through the abstract potentials of globality they develop a 
shared sense of confraternity (Verbruderung), with like-minded individuals who they 
come to recognize and appreciate. They may or may not share their own particular ubiety 
with all these individuals, but are affirmed by the differences they discover as a 
revelation of the variety of alternate possibilities for existence. These are interrelated 
aspects of a mentality actualized through their corporealization (embodiment) of the 
higher culture they seek to personify; itself the spiritualization of a broader societal 
acculturation initiated by their transformed corporeality.711
According to the values of ‘good Europeanism’, the juridical state of exception 
would disappear as those who sought to universalize their own tyrannical will-to-truth 
were made to persuade their peers of its preeminent worthiness. At the highest levels of 
society, where a radical skepticism toward all truth claims would intuitively prevail, they 
would invariably fail. None would be afflicted with ressentiment in the sense in which 
the all-too-many are today. Therefore none would seriously advocate anti-natural 
hierarchies or employ a corrupt state apparatus to advance their own narrow, egoistic 
agenda while insulating it from challenges, holding outside agonistic engagement through 
a systematic exclusion of healthier challenges—brought by their would-be betters. By 
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applying some (presently impracticable?) variety of the state of exception consisting of 
the exclusion of any exclusionary practice likely to inhibit salubrious and authentic 
becoming-other, no individual would be unrecognized by or held outside the law, per se.  
Those who would corrupt the authentic agonistic order by imposing an unnatural, 
notional foundation for truth would simply be powerless and likely be deemed delusional. 
Those moved to argue that such exclusionary practices paradoxically entail their own 
forms of cruelty and constitute a “tyrannical” will-to-truth (the intrinsic dilemma of all 
forms of political organization that strive to maximize liberty), would always be welcome 
to advocate alternatives, consistent with the agonistic ethos of the invigorated polity. In 
this way Nietzsche’s aristocratic elitism can be seen to conduce with a thoroughly 
agonistic political organization (such as a radical democracy), as Hatab so brilliantly 
elaborated. 
In the futural politics of Nietzsche’s ‘good Europeans’ the state of exception 
applies equally to those who employ irrational chauvinisms to define themselves in 
opposition to others in purely negative, exclusionary terms, as it does to those who take a 
wholly ironic stance toward themselves. The former fall under the state of exception 
because they embrace the cruelty of valuing unproductively, in that their valuations do 
not serve the purpose of self-examination and are therefore nihilistic; the latter for 
threatening the condition of possibility for positing values of any sort (often out of an 
unwillingness to be so cruel).  
The persecution of difference (the political problem of otherness), as the most 
intractable vestige of reactive force expressed via a negative will to nothingness as 
nihilistic power, is at last to be overcome at both the micropolitical (individual) and 
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macropolitical (community) levels through broadly inclusive and constructive principles 
whose shared aim is the combination of the best traits exhibited in myriad 
personifications of difference that evolve through continual agonistic challenges. 
Nietzsche’s European spirit identifies such a pluralistic objective and translates it back 
into philosophically materialist and naturalistic terms that reject anti-natural liberal 
ideals.    
Globality, a product of reaction to the imperatives of globalization, generates 
active forces and potentials that globalizing institutions and processes seek to co-opt, and 
whose demands they act to fulfill, if lately and imperfectly. As globalization’s 
institutions, processes and forces are compelled to enact and exemplify the liberal values 
with which they represent and insinuate themselves and from which they derive their 
legitimacy, they are continually retranslated through numerous mimetic acts. In this way 
the globalization complex’s regulative values, methods of production and means of self-
legitimation may be co-opted through their own process of transmission and applied to 
unexpected innovations and uses. A positive perspective suggests that the at once easily 
universalized and subtly coercive organizing principles of globalization may be made 
inclusive of every racial, ethnic and cultural realm and may produce truly great 
individuals from any of them. The simulacra they sustain coercively direct the attention 
and energies of the herd into productive activities that create positive means and 
opportunities for empowerment that the strongest may exploit. Thus the healthiest may 
actively realize their potential even as all boats, as it were, rise. As the generative power 
of the EU, a locus of globalization’s forces, naturalizes the ressentiment and bad 
conscience of the multitude, it simultaneously enables the possibility for self-overcoming 
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by the fiercest individuals.  But from a negative perspective, the abstract potentials of 
globality may also be put to nefarious uses, such as terrorist acts and other forms of 
violence that are then seized upon as legitimating pretexts for the reinforcement of 
globalization’s most all-too-human reactive prerogatives and the expansion of an 
Orwellian “big-brother” society of hyper-surveillance and control. 
Thus globalization’s profusion of simulacra provides a crucial template to account 
for the anti-natural liberal expectations of the herd (the ideological remainder of post-
enlightenment humanism) and empower the best to overcome and adjust its simulation of 
reality. In the post-modern age of globality the healthiest may thus become norm-
entrepreneurs capable of nomothetic (custom making) acts, of advancing culture as 
“artist-philosopher militants”712 and of breeding an invigorated species man to spur 
humanity to new heights as “warrior-genealogists”713. Conversely, the most reactive and 
nihilistic may also be empowered to commit heinous acts of indiscriminate barbarity. 
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Section Two: Globality and the Revaluation of Declining Values 
Part One: Globality 
An unanticipated product of globalization is the aforementioned condition of 
globality, a largely abstract phenomenon with concrete manifestations theorized by many 
prominent international relations and globalization scholars, including Martin Albrow, 
Roland Robertson, Ulrich Beck, Marc Augé and Martin Shaw, among others. I fuse 
significant elements of the most compelling definitions of globality in the context of 
Nietzsche’s analytical framework detailed above to demonstrate how his good Europeans 
might identify and exploit the abstract potentials it presents and transmute the reactive 
forces of the conventional globalization complex thereby. Their aim is to hasten 
mankind’s self-overcoming toward a transhuman future, and globality, I seek to show, 
may be used as a means to achieve that.  
Also combined in my definition of globality is an appurtenance of certain of 
Gilles Deleuze’s (Nietzschean) conceptual innovations, specifically the event, the 
haecceity and multiplicity. Not a simple paraphrase of discarded base / superstructure 
arguments such as those advanced by structuralist critical theorists of political economy, 
the distinction I describe between globalization (and the complex of forces, institutions 
and processes sustaining and perpetuating it) and the abstract potentials comprising the 
condition of globality is a thoroughly Nietzschean one.  
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In this section I review prominent conceptions of globality to situate my own 
amalgamated notion of it and demonstrate its relevance as a means for subverting 
conventional globalization and its salience to the project, broadly conceived, that 
Nietzsche set for future wanderers and spiritual nomads. I do so to establish how the 
dynamic potential of globality should be understood from a Nietzschean perspective 
(according to his vitalist politics and power ontology) as ramifying the active forces 
expressed through a positive will to creative destruction as generative power by present-
day good Europeans. I shall then explicate how Nietzsche’s good Europeans—where ever 
they happen to be physically located in the world—might identify and exploit those 
potentials through regimes of self-discipline (askesis) that spur others, according to their 
disparate capacities and enthusiasms (eros), to engage in similar nomothetic acts of self-
creation (auto-poiesis).    
To reiterate, globality is the unanticipated potential arising as a consequence of 
globalization’s organization of human bodies and their myriad activities in and as they 
are constructive of a hyper-decadent, ultra-liberal-modern world. Globality can in part be 
conceived of as consisting of spaces created inadvertently through conventional 
globalization, the latent capabilities of which go largely unrecognized. These unutilized 
spaces or capacities are the spandrels of globalization’s architecture, a byproduct of its 
construction of international life.  
On a global scale traces of it are evident in multiple, dynamic interactions spurred 
by the ideals and corresponding form of life the globalization complex universally 
imposes. It consists of subtle and overt resistances, creative appropriations, subversive 
inversions and the adoption of camouflage to defy the prerogatives of globalization. It is 
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symptomatized by a positive, radically life-affirming world-view (or Weltanschauung) 
typified by active celebration and encouragement of difference. It is detectable if looked 
for, but requires certain conceptual corrections of what passes for “reality” in order to be 
properly understood, like dark matter, the presence of which can only be discerned by its 
bending of the light of distant objects that passes through it.  
The growing relevance of globality and its affective power as an emerging 
disposition of new modes of being in the world is confirmed by Albrow, who writes that 
globality, 
brings human endeavors into relation with the extent and materiality of the globe 
as a whole. Political and economic activity calculate on global scope and 
consequence, which the global forces released by the aggregate impact of human 
activity on the environment react back on that very activity. Globalism becomes a 
main aspect of the meaning of human life.714 
 
Globality arises via interactive, concernful engagements with difference and the 
becoming-other that is making possible new meanings, kinds of play and forms of 
expression as power. It, as well as the global age whose advent it signals, is largely 
analogous to the creative self-overcoming pursued by Nietzsche’s free spirits or ‘good 
Europeans’. Albrow himself goes on to acknowledge Nietzsche’s anticipation of critical 
aspects of its prevailing ethos, stating: 
Nietzsche had intimations of it [the Global Age] in speaking of an ‘age of 
comparison’ where various views of the world, customs and cultures can be 
compared and experienced simultaneously [Albrow refers here to HH: I-23]. He 
suggested moreover that there would be no need for everyone to think alike in the 
manner of Kant’s universal morality. He seemed to intimate that both the nation-
state and universal order, point counterpoint of modernity, would be 
surpassed.”715
By referencing Nietzsche’s critique of Kant’s categorical imperative and desire to 
philosophize for a future ‘beyond good and evil’, Albrow hints at the even deeper 
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significance of globality as the prevailing—and distinctly Nietzschean—ethos of an 
emerging global age. Amenableness to difference and an apposite ability to productively 
contend with the challenges it poses conditions the particular temperament necessary to 
recognize and exploit abstract potentials of globality. By extension, the outlook conferred 
by it aptly captures the conative disposition or anticipatory resoluteness of good 
Europeanism—the greatest hope of our age. 
Further connections to Nietzsche’s prescient anticipation of what are arguably the 
most radical features and emancipatory potentials of contemporary life under the 
dissipative, hegemonic globalization complex, are explicated by Ulrich Beck. Beck 
writes of Nietzsche’s identification of it as an intrinsically agonistic, historically 
incremental process, a development of natural capacities through the broadening and 
amassment of human experience. He states, “the globality that Nietzsche sees before his 
eyes does not suddenly arise all at once, but includes centuries of living with and against 
one another.”716  
The ethos of contemporary globality, according to Beck, is indicated by 
Nietzsche’s project of destroying the prevailing decadent values of late-modernity via 
their comprehensive revaluation. Beck therefore asserts that: 
[F]or Nietzsche, the destruction of values is evidently not an end in itself; it is 
supposed to create the space for rejoicing and laughing together [Mit-Lachen] in a 
process of cross-cultural (and ‘cross-truth’) dialogue – through others whose 
masks one has pulled on, through the masks one has oneself become and sees 
with the eyes of others… so that there is space for a simultaneous reduction and 
expansion of moral standards and demands… tolerance radically reconceived and 
practiced in two directions at once: reduction of one’s own sovereign moral 
territory in order to seek cross-cultural dialogue with others and others’ truths... 
opens up the opportunity for a global morality of tolerance. For Nietzsche… that  
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contact with the certainties of others can take place in an experimental sphere of 
experience and action.717
On the positive side of the evaluative ledger suggested by Nietzsche’s vitalist 
politics, the aforementioned creative co-optations by the strong instill a new appreciation 
of difference (if even primarily of their own), corresponding with the ethos of Nietzsche’s 
‘good Europeanism’. On the negative side it may generate reactive responses that exclude 
the other by way of an intensification of globalization’s conferral of European nihilism. 
 
 
That experimental sphere correlates directly, in Beck’s estimation, with the ever-
diversifying abstract potentials of globality.  
It is a realm in which Nietzsche’s free spirits, wherever located, become who it is 
there are. This requires them to inhabit an originally European conceptual framework, for 
which the manifold discourses operationalized by the globalization complex serves as 
point of entry. It is one descended from that within which Nietzsche’s critique of 
liberalism and late-modernity, the Christian–Platonic will to truth and European 
decadence occurred.  From this conceptual vantage point healthy ‘spiritual nomads’ may 
interrogate, assimilate, disrupt and subvert those essentialist discourses whilst 
simultaneously challenging the dominance of the globalization complex’s institutions, 
forces and processes. They thereby subject it to hybridic alterations through myriad 
engagements with difference, productively othering—or destroying—it in multiple, 
transcultural and ultimately life-affirming ways. Across disparate settings such 
individuals produce new forms of life through the creative destruction of their former 
values (values discredited by the globalization complex), as well as those Euro-centric, 
universalizing values imposed from the outside.  
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This Falling back into the Publicness of the They (to put it in Heideggerian parlance), is 
symptomatic of weakness—the ill-constituted instinctual organization common to 
declining forms of life (typified by human herds and their slave moral values systems, 
e.g.: the Abrahamic and Buddhist traditions), and results in the petrification of types 
according to essentializing (and always-already anti-natural) ideals. Such responses risk 
fomenting ideological extremism and hostility to all difference as evidenced by formerly 
common and arguably still latent Euro-centric colonialist prejudices of superiority and 
the agendas of some contemporary terrorist groups. 
However, the positive, life-affirming response to the reactive pathos of the 
globalization complex requires exceptional health, the conative disposition or 
anticipatory resoluteness involuntarily expressed in the native volition of free spirits. It is 
only possible through rigorous self-examination, exceptionally broad experience of the 
world (experience that may be brought to the most isolated places through globalization) 
and an inter-active appraisal of and engagement with it. The unpredictable, syncretic 
fusing and/or disruption of disparate traditions and worldviews constitute actualizations 
of the abstract potentials of globality, which are latent in the encounters between the 
Euro-centric globalization complex and its outside.  
Beck further suggests that Nietzsche believed productive cross-cultural criticism 
to be essential because “[o]nly self-legislation and self-questioning can together open us 
up and strengthen us for the challenges of international life.”718 Nietzsche, who lived and 
worked between four European countries, certainly appreciated the expanded and 
enriched perspective on the world and humankind’s diverse condition attained through 
the living of an international life. His vitalist politics and perspectivalist epistemology 
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developed directly out of this broad experience and enabled him to partially foresee the 
dynamic Bildung and corresponding openness of the Weltanschauung characteristic of 
contemporary globality. 
Martin Shaw defines globality similarly, but with a more specific concern with 
globalization’s creation of the global, a futural condition that he sees actively 
transforming everyday socio-economic and political life in quantifiable and qualitatively 
demonstrable ways.  
New relations of politics, economics and society, as well as of the national and 
international aspects of all these relations … [have] begun to be seen as a new 
principle or structure of social relations, increasingly actual as well as practical. 
Globality… is the condition or state in which things are global. The idea of 
globality represents the global as something increasingly achieved, real and 
manifest, globality represents not just certain trends within the modern world, but 
a new condition or age in which the latter is brought into question. Globality 
represents a sufficiently fundamental shift in the very principles on which modern 
social organization is built for us to question the continuation of modernity. 
Globality does not just dissolve, but supplants the classic modern framework. 
Globality is not merely a late – or disintegrative – form of modernity but a new 
structure of society and thought.719
The amalgamic notion of globality I employ substantially draws from Beck’s,  
Albrow’s and Shaw’s conceptions respectively, but takes it as a continuously changing 
set of hybridizing, manifold potentials and creative opportunities that give rise to a 
transformed conative and cognitive disposition. The new condition Shaw describes is 
 
 
Although globality may have the potential to supplant the classic modern framework and 
arguably is doing so, it undeniably has a very long way to go. This is largely because it 
evolved out of the ultra-liberal-modern tenets of globalization, and each innovation and 
transmutation of reactive globalizing forces and processes is gradually re-territorialized 
or co-opted by the institutional framework describing the globalization matrix.  
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developing as a set of qualia transforming attitudes around the world. It is empirically 
demonstrable through some of its effects, but outward signs of changed expectations over 
the last few decades do not entirely corroborate the claims of a thoroughly transformed 
mentality postulated by certain over-excited exponents of technological innovation and 
ever-increasing speed. The most “globalized” citizens of the world are likely to be 
automaton herd creatures of bad-conscience emulating the ascetic-consumerist priests of 
ressentiment they idolize. They are afflicted with a “dishonest mendacity” vis-à-vis the 
values they enact; they are the good people whose success justifies what they do, and so 
they are wholly uninterested in shifting “the very principles on which modern social 
organization is built.”720
 
  
It is usually the case that in order to achieve conventional success within the 
machinations of the globalization complex its guiding principles have to be uncritically 
towed. Questioning the foundational tenets of the discourse is the first step to ostracism 
and “failure” in the conventional sense. Rejecting the value-terms of globalization 
automatically disqualifies one for participation; “team-players” are what are needed in 
the global marketplace. Individuals are made into cogs in a much bigger machine, which 
for the all-too-many is a sufficient basis for the one-dimensional meaning and purpose 
they require. However, for the more sensitive exceptions, free spirits and good 
Europeans, it is likely ruinous. In our thoroughly democratic, ultra-liberal-modern age the 
globalized citizen-zombies would likely support any measures, however anti-natural, to 
preserve their comfortable, if insensitive, existence.    
In considering the notion of the “globalized locality,” Martin Albrow sees  
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globality as a condition in which: 
Images, information and commodities from any part of the earth may be available 
anywhere and anytime for ever-increasing numbers of people world-wide, while 
the consequences of world-wide forces and events impinge on local lives at any 
time (‘globality’).721 
 
While “Albrow is skeptical of postmodern deconstructions of the social change wrought 
by globalization,” he considers the role it has played in replacing modernity with a new 
supranational, or “universal” discourse. This seems curious as universalism is one of the 
five principle doctrines (along with modernism) of post-Enlightenment liberalism.  
Eade, et. al., describe exciting phenomena that would seem at odds with classical 
modernity and its significance, but as the last decade and a half have demonstrated, 
largely reassert those meanings in little altered form. In that globalization is ushering in a 
truly ‘global age’ they assert it entails:  
The deterritorialization of traditional concepts, their disaggregation and 
resynthesis, their extension ‘to embrace new realities’ and their global 
operationalization as well as ‘the generalization of local concepts to the level of 
global relations and their assimilation into a transnational discourse.722
The reactive impetus of globalization processes—which symptomizes the 
negative will to nothingness as nihilistic power of the ascetic- consumerist priests of 
ressentiment—does lead to deterritorialization of autochthonous cultures and traditions 
and their resynthesis with ‘Western’ modes of production and consumption. Although 
this has quantifiably disruptive effects and fosters qualitatively measurable reaction, it 
also intensifies agonism in those cultures and encourages redefining identic categories 
 
 
Of course, conventional globalization perfectly consists with the Enlightenment tenet of 
universalism, which typifies and constitutes a fundamental aspect of the ideology of 
liberal modernity.  
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and notions of selfhood in both positive and negative ways. In the long term this 
externally imposed negotiation of values should prove fructifying. But what the positive, 
futural dimension of this in fact describes is the abstract potentials of globality not a 
significant transformation of the all-too-modern globalization complex. Similarly, for 
Ulrich Beck, “[g]lobality means that we [are] living …in a world society in the sense that 
the notion of closed spaces has become illusory. No country or group can shut itself off 
from others. Various economic, cultural and political forms therefore collide with one 
another, and thing that used to be taken for granted (including in the Western model) will 
have to be justified anew.”723  
Roland Robertson focuses on how globality deepens “the scope and depth of 
consciousness of the world as a single place,” which is positively demonstrated by greater 
physical connectivity and communication that shrinks geographical proximity, spatial 
relations and time differences between persons, groups and events. It also inverts and/or 
(re)combines traditionally global, regional and local realms to diversify the socio-
cultural-political roles individuals may inhabit. The case for globality is fortified at the 
subjective level by evidence of parallel transformations of attitudes toward the “foreign,” 
enlarged contexts for understanding difference and the variety of responses to cultural 
forces each reciprocally generates within the other. “Globality …is modernity on a global 
scale”, the discourse of which “consists largely in the shifting and contested terms in 
which the world as a whole is defined.”724
Robertson theorizes the production of “glocalities.” These arise from converging 
‘flows of information and ideas’ that create transformative possibilities through 
conceptual innovations of the practical dimensions of life. Proof of the cognitive change 
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that results exists in the growth of collective consciousnesses that link / familiarize 
individuals from disparate regions of the world in innumerably diverse assemblages of 
shared ambitions, desires and concerns. Such changes in knowledge / awareness lead to 
further changes in consciousness, and potentially, expansions of the possible.  
‘Glocalization,’ is the term Robertson employs to describe the relationship 
between the macro and micro levels of human community in globalization, taken as the 
“simultaneity and the interpenetration of what are conventionally called the global and 
the local, or – in more abstract vein – the universal and the particular.”725 Robertson 
considers how the interpenetrating forces of globalization encourage a “universalization 
of the particular and particularization of universalism,” that transforms the politics of 
culture, especially in terms of contentious debates over globalization’s cultural 
homogenization.726
The shared presuppositions that inform such a “transnational discourse” or notion 
of “world society” lie in (and are symptomatic of) the reactive (ultra-liberal) ideology of 
globalization, which it extends universally and imposes across cultures, rather than in 
 These issues are of particular importance to my Nietzschean analysis. 
Difference, or the elimination of it, leading to what as a result of globalization and 
globality, is the crucial question here. As the culture of globalization diffuses 
particularisms, identities are destabilized. Individuals discombobulated by the shattering 
of their illusions of identic permanence then seek compensation for their sense of ennui 
and nausea in spectacles of meaning and simulated purpose. These are readily provided in 
the form of mediated desires fulfilled through the consumption of products. A renewed 
sense of security—and ersatz identity—can be found in the corresponding cultural of 
conformity supplied by the very capital processes imposed by the globalization complex. 
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globality, per se. A thoroughly post-modern conception, globality is “concretely” 
understood as a phenomenological transmutation of the cognitive capacity developed 
through Enlightenment liberalism in the era of ultra-liberal-modernity (culminating in 
globalization discourse), and as such is an ideologically neutral conceptual paradigm and 
opportunity for becoming-other that multiplies comprehension(s) of our varied, “shared” 
realities. Distinguished by its plasticity (an affirmation of the relativity of all “truth” that 
enables the fruitful suspension of certainty and conviction; an eruption of 
consciousnesses; mutating understandings of the fragmentariness of “subjective” identity; 
creative exploitations of the compression / “transcendence” of spatio-temporal relations), 
it rejects any semblance of “progress,” allowing instead more definite opportunities for 
growth than the injurious values of our epoch’s ultra-liberal-modernity.  
Globality is a new condition for and great stimulus to life. Among the conceptual 
characteristics salient to its transformative affectivity, globality changes individual 
experiences of haecceity. In a related context Deleuze invokes the notion of the 
haecceity, which he in part derived from Duns Scotus’ notion referring to the “this-ness” 
or unique quality of an entity or object that distinguished it from others of a type. 
Deleuze’s idea bears upon the way in which latent globality inheres to conventional 
processes and forces of globalization, specifically the subjective ways in which they are 
experienced by individuals. Through it we may understand that in striving to realize a 
Nietzschean idea of Europe (an “order” conducive to transitioning humankind to a post-
human future), good Europeans must first achieve an enhanced awareness of the dynamic 
ways in they are acted upon by globality (via the notion of haecceity or event) through 
their emplacement in the world, or ubiety, and the significance of it as constructive of 
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their identity, worldview (Weltanschauung) and prospects for becoming. “However much 
Nietzsche acknowledges the power of physical geography, he does not endorse any form 
of geographical reductionism or determinism.”727 In asserting that globality constitutes an 
emerging form of shared consciousness, I do not mean to argue that it is a reified form of 
nous (mind), but that it exists through an increasingly dynamical shared awareness 
manifested in enactments of the potentialities to which it gives rise.728 
Globality’s development corresponds with the experience of untimeliness in 
Nietzsche’s thought – the abstract potentials of globality describes a haecceity of certain 
spontaneous transfiguring cognitive and emotive capacities that arise within globalizing 
practices, and are realized and acted upon in / as moments of untimeliness. Deleuze’s re-
conceptualization of haecceity helps elucidate globality’s somewhat intangible basis and 
character. It should be understood as “a mode of individuation distinct from that of a 
thing or subject,” synonymous with both “a plane of content and a plane of 
expression.”729
This evolving culture and aesthetic of globality amplifies the nisus (native 
volition or striving of an entity to expend its force and become other) of that which – and 
 Globality (as a complex haecceity) facilitates productive networks of 
forces that in turn give rise to events – affective capacities, incorporeal and bodily effects, 
actions, instants of becoming, etc. – that is, the exercise of will to power in its totality. It 
comprises a framework for the metamorphosis of things and subjects, allowing for 
“diverse assemblages” of active forces that proliferate “multiplicities” and abet 
becoming. As globality enables the transmutation of globalization’s deleterious 
(enslaving, subjugating) complexes, the latter’s ability to control becomings and 
constrain difference is diminished.  
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some of those whom – globalization’s tyrannical signifying and ordering inhibits, limits 
and weakens. In the contemporary European context this energizes the creative pursuit of 
change and augments the generation of ‘qualitatively new emergents’. It develops the 
sense of “world-historical irony” essential for would-be comedians of the prevailing 
ascetic-consumer ideals to prankishly lampoon and seriously challenge the negative 
characteristics of conventional European integration and EU expansion as instantiations 
of the reactive globalization complex.730 As an exponentially enhanced set of capacities 
for becoming, the abstract potentials of globality symptomatize the nisus of free 
spiritedness characteristic of good Europeanism.731 
Against the perception that Nietzsche was uncritical of the ethnocentric biases 
informing the imperialistic European worldview which prevailed during his lifetime, 
Shapiro asserts that Nietzsche: 
[Q]uestions the primacy of the European historical approach, with its ethnocentric 
emphasis on development (made into explicit philosophical method in Hegelian 
thought): the latter is a recipe for failing to understand the multiplicity of peoples, 
the diversity of philosophies and the art and culture of the globe.732
Globality creates opportunities for the most inexorable individuals (those capable 
of making innovative use of globalization’s justificatory metanarratives) to restore 
humankind to great health. Experimenting with its potential they may realize 
unforeseeable expansions of diversity, interconnections between people, and surprising 
 
  
Not to be misconstrued as a meta-narrative replacement for modernity, globality’s 
abstract potentials are at once a catalyst for and means of overcoming it, to be realized by 
individuals whose enhanced affective capacity can transform and/or rearrange and/or 
destroy the processes, institutions and forces of globalization. 
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combinations of active forces. However, the probability that the positive effects of 
globality will be seized upon and realized more broadly to bring about new civic duties, 
responsibilities and cultural norms as a basis for the reorganization of macro-political 
community is always already partially contingent upon the quanta of force other less-
healthy individuals are capable of expending, both for the resistance they may exert to 
block change as well as their inability to effectively contend with (discharge) the new 
forces generated by the actions of innovators. The very existence of the weak – as 
inefficient capacitors – is endangered by the force of dramatic social change.  
The prospects that such commanders of new values may successfully transfigure 
our era’s suicidal nihilism improve in proportion to the increased cognizance of globality 
their creative acts and greater force of will produce, which gradually enables the weak to 
discharge their vitality positively. While it is the objective of mankind’s exemplars to 
actively combat ascetic priests of ressentiment (who are instinctively threatened by 
globality), passivity, impotence and resignation make the herd-masses they lead largely 
irrelevant in a number of regards. As, according to Nietzsche’s understanding, the most 
salubrious developments are involuntarily performed and transmitted by erotic 
individuals, who thereby stimulate and encourage other exceptionally robust types, a few 
generations will be required for the re-ordering of life required to instigate an age of 
“great politics.” In the present globality is energizing the most resilient, unsubdued types, 
providing them with a contextual setting in which they may effectually utilize their 
immense volitional resources to create new values and inspire others to join them.   
While globalization propagates societal infirmity, debilitating even the hardiest 
human specimens, it counter-intuitively gives rise to globality and enables, as a 
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consequence of chance, the nimblest geniuses to transfigure our global cultural crisis and 
the individual malady globalization signifies. Over time the self-overcoming / becoming 
(value creation) of these pioneers will stir (the meager eros of) less healthy individuals as 
well, those more incapacitated, timid types whose vitality is more effectively frustrated 
by the hyper-decadence of globalization. The personal, local, national, international and 
global struggles of brave “cultural physicians” comprise the foundational acts of a new 
harmonious culture. As weaker types are inspired to follow, the “fight” against decadence 
is ramified and grows in strength.  
The community resulting from the legislations of great artist-philosophers will, as 
its power grows, transition mankind into a dynamic future era upon which we are at the 
cusp. In the meantime, the efficient self-regulation and surveillance of disciplinary 
regimes and punitive methods of carceral control exercised by existing institutions, 
combined with simulated political enfranchisement and simulacrums of existential and 
ontological fulfillment (all symptomatic of the ressentiment and bad-conscience of our 
hyper-decadent epoch the exemplars described above combat), will suffice to subdue and 
satisfy the vast, dissipative “majority.” This is necessary to avoid dangerous 
revolutionary excesses in the present, so that the herd, by whose own self-directed 
violences (indifference, delusions of contentment, resignation, etc.) might implode in 
suicidal paroxysms of unrestrained self-loathing, if prematurely challenged by the best.  
The transfiguration of the herd’s sustaining meanings and its illusory horizon 
must include the illusion of their preservation, which is the maintenance of the status-quo 
until the point that the multitude accepts the instigation of a system of natural instincts 
and drives corresponding to a set of customs and norms generated by the new cultural 
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realm. The feckless masses may then fulfill their function: to work (if unwittingly) at 
bettering the species by collectively contributing to the production of geniuses. 
Albrow, Robertson and Shaw’s related notions of globality provide a means of 
conceptualizing the ethos of our transitioning, ultra-liberal-modern era. Refracted through 
the lens of Nietzsche’s vitalism, it is abstract potential characterized by an ascending 
trajectory of dynamic forces expressed as positive will to power. Globality is 
synonymous with the unbounded nisus of human becoming, the volitional resources in 
human capabilities and re-cognition of how they may be actualized. It finds expression in 
Nietzsche’s own prescribed ascetic practices (solitude; agonistic friendships; writing and 
reading the self; attention to one’s environment and nutrition; and dancing, as expounded 
by Hutter) – techniques that enable acts of self-creation (auto-poiesis) which are 
inherently defiant of slave-moral ascetic-consumerist values as positive becomings that 
enhance Being-toward-ones-ownmost-self. Practices that conduce with realizing 
globality’s transformational potentials, they also comprise a technique for comically 
mocking and thereby discrediting the anti-natural ideals of globalization.  
Though it is impossible to anticipate the affective force of ones’ speech or actions, 
or to precisely calculate the effects they may have in the world, the driving eros of 
creative acts invariably arouses the passion of others, ramifying the volitional resources 
required for the founding of a new epoch. Our evolving estimations, which in periods of 
great cultural vitality derive from the acts of esteeming that arise from that mode of being 
toward ones very ownness adopted by the strongest, are ultimately a consequence of their 
epiphantic experiences (such as realizations of globality’s abstract potentials in our own 
era). Their estimations generate and confer values and meanings.  
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These estimations convey the struggle (or suffering) and inequality (pathos of 
distance) inherent to the effort of becoming authentically beautiful (the maximization of 
vitalizing force that emanate from healthy life-forms spontaneously), – that which 
corresponds with the dynamic passions, augments the positive will to creative destruction 
as generative power, and by extension the “agency”, as it were, of courageous iconoclasts 
to whom weaker types are instinctively drawn. Our esteeming of the beautiful—an effort 
to vivify existence against the constraints imposed on becoming by the ascetic-
consumerist herd values that are enforced by the globalization complex—constitutes the 
formative basis of self-creation in what ‘good Europeans’ of the present hope is the 
dawning age of globality.  
These dynamics appear via the impetus to self-overcoming and the pathos of 
distance within extraordinary individuals (the political microsphere) through their 
distinguishing conative disposition and society (the political macrosphere) via the 
transformed ethos, shared expectations and mentality that follows. The momentum ‘good 
Europeanism’ and its consequent globality generates through its spreading conative 
disposition describes an emergent mode of being and new aim for the political: the 
ongoing, agonistic striving to become-authentic as one’s ownmost self, that is (a 
Heideggerian echo of Nietzsche’s call to) an increasing desire among the best to become 
who it is they are.  
Such an ennobling effort is distinctly opposed to resigned acceptance of ones 
average-everydayness in the dissipative, difference annihilating environment of 
globalization. It is through the continuous renewal of eros and awestruck wonder with the 
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world by “adventurous Gewaltmenschen” that the transversally graspable ethos of ‘good 
Europeanism’ as globality—as a futural condition of humankind—arises.733
Our reduction to a “self” and others to like singularities confounds our 
appreciation and comprehension of the complexity each of us contains. This exposes 
another cruelty of existence: we are compelled to generalize about ourselves according to 
dominant characteristics and traits, which thereby inflict an identity that ignores the 
diversity comprising every person. At the macro-political level of (communal) life the 
same over-simplification applies in essentializations based on ethnicity, gender or 
cultural characteristics or political party affiliation or the reification of the nation-state. 
 
The empirically demonstrable results of globality (in innumerable micro-level 
acts of creation, defiance and subversion that reciprocally condition the changing ethos 
and opportunity structure at the macro-level) lead me to optimistically posit a pragmatic 
strategy for overcoming and transmuting globalization’s destructive (all-too-human) 
effects. This comprises a Nietzschean praxis that utilizes classical skeptic philosophical 
thought and Foucault’s Nietzschean notion of ‘techniques of the self.’   
Nietzsche resuscitates and engages arguments on being and non-being, that in 
textual form date back at least as far as Plato’s dialogue ‘The Sophist’, to challenge the 
more recent Western concept of the “individual” in ways that assist a nuanced 
comprehension of the role he sees single persons (as complex and conflicted unities) 
playing at the micro-political level of (social) life. No person is wholly sovereign or 
“individual,” rather we are each a “dividuum,” that is, a multifarious and complex entity. 
It would be more accurate and truthful to write individual to connote a Nietzschean 
comprehension of the composite entity of a person.  
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Analogous to the illusion of the individual in possession of a distinct identity or “soul” 
culminating in anthropomorphizations of nations (as a personification of collective will 
which Hegel argued had evolved to such a stage through different modes over millennia 
via the zeitgeist or “world-spirit”) and the similarly reactive effort to forge a new 
common identity of a “European.”  
This effort is seen by contemporary ascetic-priests as advantageous to the 
promulgation of the bureaucratic, commercial and popular culture being devised to create 
new bonds capable of supplanting the respective national identities of the EU’s member 
states that, it is argued, have long impeded the integration and unification of the 
continent. Following Richardson, vis-à-vis Nietzsche’s conception of “persons and 
societies as synthetic wills,” I assert that just as individuals struggle to master their own 
disparate wills (to “unify” the drives and impulses through a regulatory instinctual 
framework,) by developing them into a synthetic will at the micro-political level, a 
striving at the macro-political level occurs as communities struggle to achieve a synthetic 
will of their individual members, giving rise to politics and political life.  
In the case of the EU, the ways in which its advocates contend with the tension 
between wanting the EU’s “citizen–constituents” to internalize a reductively “unifying” 
identity across national borders and its concurrent institutional effort to devise 
mechanisms of inclusion to account for the broad spectrum of difference throughout the 
EU’s member states often mirrors the dilemma with which (so-called) “individuals” in 
Europe must contend in reconciling themselves to their own reductive, imposed forms of 
being. It also exposes a fundamental paradox – or hypocrisy – of liberalism, which 
sustains the faulty philosophical presuppositions and logic “grounding” these 
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existentially reductive and divisive notions of selfhood and agency while maintaining the 
putative equality of all. The tenets of liberal modernism prevent persons, conceived as 
individuals, from giving a coherent account of themselves as members of disparate 
communities; they also, arguably, prevent persons from authentically experiencing 
themselves by cultivating a lived denial of their own intrinsic complexity as well as that 
of others. 
The bad-conscience and ressentiment this inauthenticity aggravates is 
exponentially magnified at the level of EU institutions (as a multifarious, albeit molar, 
macro-political organism) inducing schizophrenic behavior at numerous levels of the 
micro- and macro-political spheres of life within the emergent European polity. These 
must be alleviated through a revaluation of all values (Umwerthung aller Werthe) 
instigated by vigorous good Europeans who, empowered by globality are capable of 
instantiating a naturalized political order for the highest flourishing of culture. 
The good Europeans envisaged by Nietzsche could only achieve this by 
exploiting the simulated existential meanings and ontological purposes the EU provides 
its citizen-constituents through spectacles of prosperity that seemingly validate the 
foundational ideals intrinsic to its legitimacy. Its institutions—bureaucratic instantiations 
of instrumentalized reactive force sustaining a spirit of revenge symptomatic of decline—
function as macro-generators of ressentiment and bad-conscience. The conventional 
globalization complex, as a myriad of institutions, processes and forces disseminating, 
naturalizing and enforcing hyper-decadent, ultra-liberal-modern values, is typified by 
such characteristics. Yet, although it is an essentially all-too-human process, it also gives 
rise to opposite, form-creating potentials that, properly seized upon, encourage 
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transmutations of globalization’s deleterious effects. A radical result of the critical 
engagement with and the rethinking of Empire (by those with the strength for it) is a 
cognitive transformation that stimulates experimentation to produce qualitatively new 
emergents, globality’s life-affirming amplification of striving, impetus and desire 
suggests an optimistic “Nietzschean” strategy for overcoming the enervation of ascetic-
consumerist values in our era. 
As aforementioned, globalization is widely deployed term that comprises a set of 
inter-related phenomenon. There is much disagreement over the nature of the distinct 
aspects of it, its separately complex economic, political and social dimensions, and these 
are collectively even more difficult to define. Minimally agreeing that it names a 
discernable and ongoing worldwide happening at least, it is necessary to conceive it in 
general and particular terms corresponding with its features and there effects at the 
global, regional, national and local levels, respectively. Processes of globalization occur 
and globalizing institutions operate without regard for political, geographic, cultural or 
temporal boundaries. Myriad competing power constellations strive to realize themselves 
and their motivating ideal with little regard for traditional socio-political structures. These 
agglomerations of interests (transnational movements, corporations, non-governmental 
organizations, citizen activists, professional societies, etc.) vie for dominance within and 
outside of sovereign nation-states simultaneously. They are giving rise to new, largely 
unmapped and unregulated spaces for becoming thereby. 
According to Nietzsche’s vitalism, globalization is properly understood as a 
complex (abstract body) of socio-cultural events generated and maintained by the 
dissipative instinctual system that governs the weakened drives and impulses of our 
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hyper-decadent age. As Appadurai asserts, its varied phenomena consist of ideologically 
reinforcing institutions, processes and forces that in innumerable combinations stimulate 
and comprise emerging planetary ideoscapes, ethnoscapes and technoscapes.734 These 
constitute flows that overrun former conduits of power and channel their force into new 
forms of life. These emerging global social, political and cultural phenomena challenge 
existing forms of order, which struggle to interpolate and systematize them. But with 
their capacity for ordering exceeded by new practices, the existing conventional power 
structures fail to adequately contend with or impede their transformation of reality (a 
gamut of sometimes interrelated and sometimes disparate realities).  
Complicating things further, the varied prerogatives of these continually evolving 
power constellations may concurrently reinforce, contradict and conflict with one 
another.735 The major globalizing institutions have compelled a transformation in 
relations between states through their facilitation of cooperation across a diverse range of 
issues.736 Yet the ethos of their practices remains very much the same. In the areas of 
business, trade and finance, the interests of myriad international, national and 
nongovernmental organizations including MNCs and TNCs have promulgated a universal 
post-Fordist/Taylorist, or late neo-liberal economic model.737
Expressed through both institutions and processes of globalization are 
international regimes, constituted by normalizing practices instantiated through formal 
treaties and informal agreements. These include air, postal and shipping conventions that 
establish regimes of conduct to normalize universal standards.
 The prerogatives of this 
regime shaped trading rules and policy to determine the course of economic globalization 
– the imposition and hegemony of ultra-liberal-modern values.  
738 Specific to processes of 
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globalization are technological developments such as the internet, mass air travel and 
communication capabilities that dramatically reduce geographical distance and temporal 
space. A ubiquitous mass media disseminates interconnected narratives that privilege and 
reinforce Western values.  
Global social, environmental and dissident movements are also identified as 
globalizing processes—if of an alternative “counter-hegemonic” variety. Finally, forces 
of globalization describe the values and ideals, expectations, norms and attitudes aroused 
by the aforementioned institutions and processes of globalization. These correspond with 
numerous spectacles of identity, freedom and empowerment through representation, 
mimesis and consumption, the decadent means by which Empire provides simulacrums 
of existential meaning and simulated ontological purpose to the masses.739
Globalization in its present form is the culmination of an exponentially 
accelerating development over the past four centuries. It has occurred in conjunction with 
an aggregation of the macro-level drives and impulses characteristic of post-
Enlightenment liberal-modernity that universalized the state form.
  
740 Originating in 
diverse components of the Western European cultural realm, the assemblage of forces 
that would engender in the forces, processes and institutions of globalization ineluctably 
extended into and transformed all areas and regions of human life. Much of the increased 
velocity of change propelled by globalization has occurred across the past two centuries. 
This has had the noted effect of compressing time, both as it is subjectively experienced 
and as it objectively reduces production time, distribution time, and the wait for 
information. The dramatic shrinking of geographical distances and the conceptual space 
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separating people through innovations in transportation and communications coincided 
with and ramified these developments.  
These developments constitute measurable improvements in the everyday 
material conditions of human life, including advances across numerous indices measuring 
aspects of human welfare. In Nietzschean terms the institutions, processes and forces of 
globalization are logical extensions of the enlightenment pathos for rationalism and 
“certainty” expressed via a will-to-truth. The consequences of this will-to-truth have not 
been entirely negative, but through disciplinary regimes for organizing life—and 
sophisticated forms of akrasia that naturalize inauthenticity—they exercise a bio-power 
over individuals by sublimating the ressentiment and bad-conscience their subjects 
performatively enact. From this perspective, globalization is an assemblage of 
interrelated, fundamentally negative developments that continuously naturalize and 
spread dissipative nihilism via the doctrine of neo-liberal consumerism. Similarly 
ingravescent conditions hastened the decline of Europe’s vitality through the early 
twentieth century, as signs of the same dissipation appeared outside the continent and its 
cultural realm.741
However, an unanticipated development from out of experiences with 
globalization (innumerable continuous negotiations, resistances and modifications of the 
norms, practices and understandings of everyday life) is the abstract potentials of 
globality. Irrespective of national origin or location, those who may enact and expend the 
 In our own age the globalization complex (or “Empire”) represents the 
latest mutation/intensification of the syndrome, a diversely symptomatized infection that 
now afflicts disparate cultural traditions outside Europe and debilitates ascending forms 
of life with the contagion of (essentially European) decadence.  
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superior forces necessary to maintain a tragic, Dionysian worldview (tragic 
Weltanschauung), may (consciously or not) realize abstract, positive potentials of 
globality through their experience of immersion in the decadent environment of 
globalization. As both a new perspective on contemporary life and a practical strategy for 
contending with globalization’s deleterious consequences, globality arises not in 
dialectical tension with the globalization complex, but rather as a conceptual entry point 
to a new, successor epoch to modernity.742
Awareness of this altered/altering consciousness has prompted political scientists 
to distinguish between globality as a phenomenon related to but different from 
globalization. As aforementioned, Shaw defines globality in the context of globalization’s 
creation of the “global,” in which an altered mentality generated by “new relations of 
politics, economics and society,” gives rise to changed—and potentially enhanced 
affective capacities. Shaw’s notion of transformed structures of social relations and 
relations across diverse realms of human activity suggests the abstract potentials, changed 
mentalities and enhanced conative disposition or anticipatory resoluteness to which (and 
as I have asserted) the state of globality gives rise. It is a condition actively transforming 
social life in the present.
 It is symptomatized by a transformed 
consciousness produced through recognition of the accelerating interconnectedness of 
contemporary life (and its concurrent transfiguration of Empire).  
743 Among the capable few, globality confers a comprehension 
of the how a fundamental shift in the dominant principles of and constitution of the world 
may be affected. These individuals may enact those potentials to ultimately produce new 
social forms and modes of being that foster creative conceptions of becoming that are 
either active or reactive.  
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Examples of the former, instances of reactive force expressed in a positive will to 
creative destruction as generative power, might include the application of information 
technologies to subvert conventional power structures by undermining confidence in 
them, or to organize and enhance education, alternative forms of trade circumventing 
regulated capital process and to disseminate ideas. Conversely, globality’s abstract 
potential may be seized upon to intensify reaction. Examples abound of globality’s 
escalation of the negative will to nothingness as nihilistic power among diseased types. It 
is exemplified in the manner religious and political militants manipulate the same 
networks and information technologies to carry out terrorist attacks. Still others 
appropriate it to engage in computer hacking and identity theft – activity which the very 
networks that give rise to globality enable and which is not dependent on the social 
position or geographic location of the individual, as it is to a far more significant degree 
in the organization of conventional (reactive) globalization. 
However they utilize the potentials of globality that they identify, they are not 
limited to their specific emplacement in the world, but can transcend their ubiety and in a 
digitized sense, actually become ubiquitous—exercising their power everywhere 
simultaneously. In explicating his related notion of the “globalized locality,” Martin 
Albrow asserts that globality: 
involves a new kind of connectedness, where events can have simultaneous 
effects anywhere on the globe, in which immediate response to a message can be 
given and obtained irrespective of distance, in which products and services are the 
outcome of a global division of labor, where identical products and services may 
be obtained anywhere in the world, or where images and icons receive recognition 
worldwide.744 
 
This remark acknowledges the materialist conception of economic connectedness in the 
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world that is essentialized as the objective of globality, particularly by neo-liberal 
ascetic—consumerist priests of ressentiment who reify the expanded marketplace as the 
font of all that is positive in the recent development of mankind.  
However, such an exponential and on-going increase in the global exchange of 
goods and services, while positive from the standpoint of consumption and corresponding 
improvement in living standards through the fulfillment of human nutritional 
requirements, etc. is but a precondition for the actualization of globality’s transformative 
potential. The awareness of increased connectedness Albrow sites is significant as such a 
precondition and ramifies the identic transformation achieved by increased familiarity 
with foreign cultures, customs and perspectives. At the most rudimentary level, what an 
individual with the native vitality to imagine alternative becomings for him or herself 
may glean from such superficially mundane or even trite experiences as an exotic 
restaurant meal or a television news report from an obscure corner of the world cannot be 
anticipated. The usually unrecognized task is to extract the eudemonic significance 
inherent in ordinary experiences so to construct meaning and purpose for ones’ life from 
them.  
Even if, following Baudrillard’s thesis in Simulacra and Simulation, the “reality” 
we are presented with is an intensely mediated series of representations, or copies of 
copies, and our understanding of it and sense of ourselves in relation to it is hyperreal, for 
better or worse a certain enrichment of life, nolens volens, also occurs despite whatever 
dissatisfactions many will read into such a state of affairs.745 The ideas and 
understandings that might arise from the act of reading a fictional story set abroad or the 
experience of befriending an exchange student in ones’ community or traveling abroad 
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are entirely contingent and ultimately unpredictable, but the likelihood that novel 
alternative becomings might emerge from out of such experiences among healthy 
individuals (whose health is indicated in part by both their eagerness for such 
diversifying experiences and their receptivity to them) is decidedly greater as a result of 
the possibility for increased perspective provided by such latently broadening 
experiences.  
The hyperreal representation of reality also multiplies by many times our 
opportunities for (re)conceiving the world; and even if at many removes from its source 
in life, there is no obviously greater reason to fear we know less about “reality” as such 
because our impressions of may be grounded on representation, as reality is always 
already a partly unique and partly shared product of our individual and collective 
interpretive engagement with the world. These experiences, moreover, in both their 
number and variety, are indisputably facilitated by greater material exchange. They are, 
one can quite easily argue, positive effects of neo-liberal capitalism, or conventional 
globalization and its recently hegemonic, yet evolving, political rationality for the 
organization of life—the ‘bio-power’ of the globalization complex.  
Albrow references the massification (a social phenomenon first theorized by the 
critical theorists of the Frankfurt School) that has simultaneously subverted opportunities 
for authentic individuality and banalized difference, as well as the normalization achieved 
by imposed universal standards and the regularity of production and consumption that 
equates the desires and, by extension, experiences of people in disparate parts of the 
world. Though the deleterious effects of such transformative events may be exaggerated 
by critics whose alarm is heightened by romanticized views of indigenous cultures and a 
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desire to preserve certain lifestyles that the inhabitants of said cultures will not or cannot 
maintain, the modus operandi of neo-liberal processes (as with its historical precedents) 
is impulsive and inconsiderate of that which may impede it in pursuing its objective, 
namely monetary profit.  
Against the myriad damaging effects of neo-liberal capitalism,746 whose 
simulated existential meanings and ontological purposes desensitize individuals to their 
authentic desires and divert them from acting according to their genuine instincts and 
potentials for becoming, and which inculcate the majority with the coarse 
ascetic/materialist herd values of Empire, opportunities for realizing globality’s potential 
are presented when an experience of difference runs across, or intersects with the 
anticipated line of our becoming’s trajectory, that is, the expectations we have for 
ourselves in a given moment. This provokes a transversal engagement within the 
individual with that experience of otherness that imparts something unique and prompts 
change within and outside her.747
An example of identic transformation cultivated by the EU lies in the multiple and 
varied sense of identity many Europeans (“good” in the Nietzschean sense or otherwise) 
feel vis-à-vis the political project of Europe.  They have, in large numbers (larger than 
ever before), come to recognize themselves as at once being citizens of a local 
 However, the significance of the specific outcome of 
such an encounter – if one could conceive of any finality to such engagements – cannot, 
in most instances, be quantitatively or qualitatively measured or evaluated in an objective 
sense. Occasionally the result of such an engagement, of what may be envisaged as a 
result of it, and what might be achieved or realized out of it will be stupendous – a truly 
transformative event with ramifications for the macro-political, or global, level.    
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community (say Edinburgh), a region (Scotland), a nation (the United Kingdom), and a 
civilizational / supranational polity (Europe) in the broader world (globality). It is the 
capacity to cognitively occupy each of the roles these identities confers simultaneously, 
without essentializing oneself according to any one among them that distinguishes the 
‘good European’ from the average member of the crowd, whose xenophobic chauvinisms 
and patriotic affiliations impede the fullest realization of potential becomings these 
identic categories enable. The latter are even less able to transcend these identic 
categories in their narrower sense, and overcome themselves thereby, which is the 
objective of ‘good Europeans’ via the means provided in the abstract potentials of 
globality. 
Albrow theorizes globality as a new supranational, pluralistic discourse that 
incorporates the beneficial results of globalization while dis- and/or re-placing modernity 
to segue the world into a new epoch. The advent of the “global age” he discerns is 
prompted by rethinking the most significant questions to communal life: 
The recurrence of ideas like ‘society’, ‘state’, ‘community’, welfare’, ‘justice’ 
suggests that they are not merely modern fixes, because they never acquire a final 
meaning. It is a mark of epochal change that they are called in for fundamental 
reappraisal.748 
 
He considers the role globality has played in replacing modernity as a break with the past. 
In that globalization (as a complex of processes) suggests just another stage of modern 
history, globality, as a transformed conceptual framework, takes the globe as its reference 
point to engender a corresponding phenomenological understanding that simultaneously 
closes the modern epoch and ushers mankind into a ‘global age’.749  
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Albrow also thinks “we are on much safer ground with [the notion of] ‘globality’ 
since it carries no connotation of necessary outcomes, for by “putting an end to totalizing 
discourses,” globality allows for a broader spectrum of difference and affirms alterity 
while remaining indeterminate with regard to the direction of mankind’s future 
development750. Through globality the dawning ‘global age’ “involves the supplanting of 
modernity with globality,” a state in which ‘world society’ is better understood as a 
‘multiplicity without unity.’ This is symptomatized—to paraphrase John Eade (full 
citation above at pp 70)—by the ‘deterritorialization of traditional concepts’, which are 
rhizomatically disaggregated from their indigenous contexts and ‘resynthesized’ in 
unanticipated ways that make them globally efficacious among types of people and 
groups with certain shared interests.751 For Ulrich Beck: 
‘Globality’ refers to awareness of the fact that we are increasingly living in a 
‘world society’ in the sense that the notion of closed spaces has become illusory 
…from now on nothing which happens on our planet is only a limited or local 
event.752
The change they seek to compel is of the sort that fosters productive agonisms. 
Through an authentic agon that fortifies challenges, which themselves build on and 
evolve the (presently pseudo-) competitive ethos of capital process, they may cultivate an 
 
 
The simultaneous and unlimited extension, revision and combining of disparate modes of 
thought (or perspectives) to embrace new affective realities are a manifestly Nietzschean 
activity. ‘good Europeans’ of the early twenty-first century, spurred by their good-
conscience, recognize the dependence of human communities upon regulative ideals, so 
engage in globally transformative creative acts of self-overcoming for the naturalization 
of mankind as ethical improvement.  
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acceptance of suffering that strengthens man. As the affective power of local concepts 
and forms of life impact global relations and the global is ever more relevant to everyday 
life at the (increasingly relevant) ‘local’ level, the conceptual dyad disappears, deepening 
knowledge expands human capacities exponentially, and the assimilative dynamic 
contributes to new complexes constitutive of the transnational potentials of globality.  
From a similar perspective, Roland Robertson has theorized “glocalization” as a 
new framework for comprehending how place is reconceived and physically transformed 
in globality. Robertson focuses on how globality deepens “the scope and depth of 
consciousness of the world as a single place,” which is “objectively demonstrated by 
greater physical connectivity and communication that shrinks geographical proximity, 
spatial relations and time differences between persons, groups and events.”753 By 
drawing eclectically from each of these related perspectives and synthesizing aspects of 
their respective understandings we may arrive at a syncretic and quite Nietzschean notion 
of globality. Shaw’s further contention that the relations and forms comprising globality 
body forth a unique framework from “the global as a common consciousness of human 
society on a world scale: an increasing awareness of the totality of human social relations 
as the largest constitutive framework of all relations,”754
An inadvertent product of globalization itself, globality suggests a new practical, 
perspectivalist rationality for our caring engagement with the world. As an altered state of 
consciousness that may enable a transmutation of the hegemonic reactive values enforced 
by Empire, it evinces a new mentality among those whose perceptive and cognitive 
 may be expanded upon by 
combining his notions of the global (as an ongoing conceptual transformation) and 
globality (as a cognitive framework for re-conceiving our integrating world).  
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faculties have been similarly altered by their active, critical engagement with the 
emerging global reality. It can be more abstractly, although no less usefully, understood 
as symptomatic of an interassemblage haecceity (mood or atmosphere of the speeds and 
affects generated) of the dawning epoch.755 The disposition generated by globality 
announces the Dasein (as unity in the becoming of their being in the world) of 
contemporary Übermensch, and anticipates future forms of man, the becoming-other of 
the species, about whose possibilities—and probable appearance—we are increasingly 
aware.756
Globality galvanizes stalwart iconoclasts to demonstrate the contingency of all 
values and corresponding identities, in order to sensitize others to the anti-natural order 
enforced by the prevailing system of ascetic-consumerist values. This decadent order is 
predicated on and reinforced internationally by the state form, that “coldest of all cold 
  
Globality conditions the possibility for myriad salubrious, authenticating 
developments and affirmative acts. These occur, like those who enact them, largely by 
chance, as unanticipated affective capacities that propagate active forces and enhance 
their flow (expenditure) can only in the most limited sense, and only by extraordinary 
individuals, be directed. But the disposition conferred by globality incites those capable 
of aggressively exploiting its abstract potential to further pursue higher (nobler) goods 
such as the interrogation of all received opinion as well as the basis in reality of those 
evaluations that emanate from themselves. This includes revaluing the common 
privileging of parochial national identities and territorial borders that naturalize the state 
form’s illusory sense of static being in the political realm at both the domestic and 
international levels, both within Europe and outside it.  
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monsters.”757 Recognition of the contingency of all values via globality orients us to the 
ineluctability of the state-form’s demise as the globalization complex is undermined. 
With their prodigious energies augmented by realizations of globality’s abstract 
potentials, ‘good Europeans’ are transmuting the nihilistic values of our age via 
dangerous experiments aimed at making a shibboleth of ultra-liberal-modernity.  
Believing “neither in the ‘ideals’ nor in the ‘realities’ of their decaying time,”758 
they are especially well suited for this task and the exploitation of globality that enables 
it. For they count themselves “[a]mong the Europeans of today… who have the right to 
call themselves homeless in a distinctive sense… for their lot is hard, their hope 
uncertain.” Nietzsche recognizes the enormous complexity of the challenge facing them, 
but also that it is at once generated and met by their unique existence, “we children of the 
future, how can we be home in this present?” They find themselves: 
…ill at ease in an age which loves to busy itself with honor and consider itself to 
be the most humane, mild, and righteous age that the sun has ever seen. It is bad 
enough that just these beautiful words inspire us with the ugliest thoughts, that in 
them we see only the expression of deep enfeeblement, of fatigue, of age of 
decreasing energy.759 
 
A revivifying effect of their creative (and inherently defiant) acts is a stimulated desire 
for the sort of political education advocated by Nietzsche, among weaker individuals, 
who may improve themselves thereby.760
Nietzsche anticipated the potential for transvaluations of secular slave-morality by 
the enhanced perspective likely to result from an increasingly broad experience of 
 By tuning people in to their traditions and 
orienting them to their historicity, globality enables a few, irrespective of culture or 
locale, to become other within the expanded (perspectivalist-hermeneutical) horizon of 
possibility it provides.  
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difference and culture (global life) from the beginning of his middle period. He may not 
have appreciated that these acts (exemplified in the comparisons he describes in the 
passage cited below) would occur within and describe a continued period of steep 
“decline” and worsening crisis. Integral to undoing the millennial domination of Europe 
by ascetic and materialist priests of ressentiment, the major developments of the 
twentieth century761 were essential acts in the long, historical agonistic process of 
overcoming the ‘human-all-too-human’. The kind of experiences and values sought by 
‘good Europeans’ were facilitated by the proto-globalization occurring in the age of late-
modernity; those befitting both their task, the pathos it requires, and their involuntary 
pursuit of it, is suggested in a 1878 passage: 
Age of Comparison. The less men are bound by tradition, the greater is the 
fermentation of motivations within them, and the greater in consequence their 
outward restlessness, their mingling together with one another, the polyphony of 
their endeavors. Who is there who now still feels a strong compulsion to attach 
himself and his posterity to a particular place? Who is there who still feels any 
strong attachment at all? Just as in the arts all the genres are imitated side-by-side, 
so are all the stages and genres of morality, custom, culture. – Such an age 
acquires its significance through the fact that in it the various different 
philosophies of life, customs, cultures can be compared and experienced side by 
side; which in earlier ages, when, just as all artistic genres were attached to a 
particular place and time, so every culture still enjoyed only a localized 
domination, was not possible.762
The mingling of peoples and ideas and the tendency of this to foster dis-
attachment to place (their transformed ubiety or sense of “where-ness”) via a compulsion 
 
 
Although not explicit, Nietzsche here observes in a positive light the enhanced 
opportunities many had acquired by the late 19th century for traveling, studying and 
experiencing foreign values originating outside the geographical confines of their 
birthplace, nation and even continent.  
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to compare all aspects of life with varieties of living and viewing the world outside ones 
own native communities is here suggested to be a defining characteristic of the age in 
which Nietzsche lived. It was one of proto-globalization, which he took as positively 
enhancing the prospect of a revaluation of values signaling the dawn of a new age. The 
passage continues:  
Now an enhanced aesthetic sensibility will come to a definitive decision between 
all these forms offering themselves for comparison: most of them—namely all 
those rejected by this sensibility—it will allow them to die out. There is likewise 
now taking place a selecting out among the forms and customs of higher morality 
whose objective can only be the elimination of lower moralities. This is the age of 
comparison! It is the source of its pride—but, as is only reasonable, also of its 
suffering. Let us not be afraid of this suffering! Let us rather confront the task 
which the age sets us as boldly as we can: and then posterity will bless us for it—
a posterity that will know itself to be as much beyond the self-enclosed original 
national cultures as it is beyond the culture of comparison, but will look back 
upon both species of culture as upon venerable antiquities.763
This important passage conveys Nietzsche’s recognition that the task of the age is a 
hybridizing and re-synthesis of the best traits and features among disparate cultural forms 
and value systems toward unforeseeable ways of valuing and organizing social life. This 
Nietzschean variety of hybridization occurs as an outcome of contending forces in which 
the healthier one prevails, incorporating the most salubrious aspects of the weaker one 
into the stronger, thereby increasing its vitality. In the early 21st century it is the abstract, 
positive potentials of globality latent in the reactive institutions, processes and forces of 
globalization, which are likely to achieve this noble successor age beyond the one of 
comparison that we still inhabit. The only futural certainty ‘good Europeans’ can have is 
that steadily transforming the world will involve untold suffering – suffering that must be 
joyfully embraced by those capable of bearing it and hastening us toward a transhuman 
condition. 
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The passage suggests that broad inter-cultural comparison is cognitively 
transforming. The act of it inherently compels a personal interrogation of the ways 
tradition “grounds” individuals and by extension the societies of which they are a part 
through its generation of a putatively autonomous rationality that serves as a basis for 
naturalistic action. Such comparison de-naturalizes customary action and leads to the 
cognitive dis-attachment from and overcoming of one’s original place (the conceptual 
transformation of one’s ubiety); at least among those individuals capable of arriving at 
the conclusions it induces. Upon further self-scrutiny, and in light of their expanded sense 
of awareness, it compels a questioning unto the abandonment of convictions and values 
that their native rationality previously legitimated. Being grounded in tradition is 
inherently limiting, hence the positive yet dangerous dimension of value comparison. 
Nietzsche, a child of the age of comparison, clearly anticipated the demise of the 
prevailing Western tradition, modernity being an incoherent pastiche of disparate 
elements drawn from various earlier traditions which Nietzsche – anticipating some of 
MacIntyre’s insights – was among the first to scrutinize, and the sort of radical – and, to 
many, frightening – possibilities this would present for basing an invigorated future 
European culture upon.764
The passage also proclaims the positive effects such comparison spawns, 
intimating the abstract potentials enabled by enlarged perspectives, the beneficial result 
of critical reflection on and challenges to ones’ entrenched beliefs (the conventional 
Christian-Platonic will-to-truth’s moralizations of reality) that encounters with difference 
enables – all of which are amplified in our age of globalization by increased international 
contact, communications and awareness. Even if the goal of the intensified level of 
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comparison in our age of globalization is the reactive banalization of difference, trite 
encounters with difference are still more potentially productive than none at all; hence the 
inherent value of trying to educate the progeny of even the coarsest vulgarians – their 
individual responses to such opportunities are what may crucially distinguish them from 
the herd and single them out as potential or nascent exemplars. Nietzsche hints at the 
limitless possibilities such experience would create for further “selecting out,” and acts of 
world-transformation they had yet to inflame.  
 
Part Two: US–EU Cooperation: the Western Loci of the Globalization Complex 
 
Predicated on the tenets of multi-party democracy and a competitive free market, 
the nations of Western Europe arose phoenix-like from the rubble of war through 
multiple frameworks for cooperation. Within Europe itself, multiple elite driven 
collaborative initiatives in the realm of economics served the purpose of creating mutual 
reliance and an enhanced position vis-à-vis international trade. This included a customs 
union and common tariff between the Benelux countries as early as 1947. Further 
schemes were implemented via the Brussels Treaty of 1948 (between the Benelux states, 
France and the UK), which facilitated cooperation in economic matters and a broad range 
of related affairs as well as specifically advancing its members’ common defense.  
Sixteen European states agreed shortly thereafter to found the Organization for 
European Economic Cooperation (OEEC), an institution that fostered intra-European 
trade and assisted in the implementation of the European Recovery Program. This 
augmented Washington’s effort to distribute assistance through its Marshall Plan aid 
program, which the OEEC facilitated through its efforts to ease distribution of aid to its 
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intended beneficiaries, alleviate problems in the exchange of the various currencies in 
circulation and work toward an eventual customs union. The American role in the initial 
steps toward European integration was significant. The Bretton-Woods accords 
established a firm basis for a new global economic system and the Marshall Plan’s 
centralized bureaucracy for aid distribution imposed cooperative orientation toward its 
end of furthering Europe’s formal integration. Later twelve nations would link 
themselves defensively through the NATO treaty in Washington.  
The ethos of these moves, if not mainly American in origin (it arguably was) was 
largely supplemented through American support—crucial backing that would condition 
the possibility for and culminate in the EU. Europe’s economic vitality was important to 
the US, which needed stable trading partners. Therefore the elimination of certain trade 
barriers and tariffs between European states served its own self-interests. The 
establishment of the ECSC and EURATOM (predecessors as noted above) conduced 
with this objective. Intra-European trade was liberalized at a fairly steadily pace for the 
next few decades, notably with the Treaty of Rome, which set up the European Economic 
Community (EEC) and the separate European Free Trade Association (EFTA), 
established in 1960. Economic cooperation provided a relatively easy way of agreeing to 
integrative policies between sovereign European states by appealing to the self-interests 
of each, political cooperation was an immediate and direct consequence.  
Although some countries were more reluctant than others (France under de Gaulle 
being a familiar example for the impasse he created in mid-1965) to concede features of 
their political autonomy to overarching supranational authorities arising through 
economic cooperation, the momentum and logic of cooperation veritably compelled it. In 
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specific issue areas concessions made according to each nation’s self-interest created 
spill-over, which frequently necessitated future concessions in others. Broader political 
and social integration was therefore an unavoidable consequence of increasing economic 
cooperation. Without denying the considerable difficulty—if not improbability—of the 
integration process (it was never certain or by any means ineluctable) it can be fairly 
asserted that however taboo a subject it may have been, the integration of the continent 
was underway well before many member state government officials or bureaucrats in 
Brussels were comfortable admitting it.  
The effects of the Luxemburg Compromise notwithstanding, developments 
toward ever-closer union continued apace (as evinced by the steady accession of new 
members, the expansion and deepening of oversight authorities across broad issue areas 
and certain developmental landmarks such as the Paris summit of 1974, the Single 
Europe Act of 1986, and the Treaty on European Union—Maastricht—of 1993, to name 
a few), even if the rhetoric of national sovereignty is occasionally rehearsed among 
domestic constituencies for partisan domestic political consumption. Overcoming this—
occasionally exaggerated—discomfort remains a challenge to the logic of integration 
even today. It is symptomatic of the still significant state-centric orientation to political 
life that has defined intra-European and international affairs for centuries. It also 
indicates the persistence of the mentality that fostered the nationalistic impulses 
particular to each nation and contributed to cultural prejudices and historical hostilities 
between neighboring countries that constrained their relations and retarded mutual 
development.  
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Europe’s integration has in no small part been a process of dispensing with 
simplistic binaries that previously constructed and limited the identities of its various 
peoples. These include notions of the self and other and the inside and outside that 
traditionally defined belonging in a community and circumscribed opportunities for 
becoming. It is this widespread idiocy, as Nietzsche saw it, that his idea of Europe and 
the ‘good Europeanism’ presupposed by it were in large part conceived to overcome. 
This twentieth century effort to construct European institutions capable of 
managing its trade, fiscal policy and infrastructure so as to regenerate the continent’s 
vitality corresponded with the greater project of reordering the international system. This 
broader project entailed extending a mixture of European laws and values universally 
through the institutional apparati of the UN, the IMF, the World Bank and other 
international organizations. Post-war American and Western European collaboration in 
the construction of this new international order was and remains so significant to any 
comprehension of the macro-level, institution-led processes of globalization and the 
paradigm of globality emergent from them that it may accurately and usefully be 
described as a complex at the heart of globalizing processes. This is empirically 
demonstrated by (among many other things) the very high degree of policy 
interdependence between the two powers and the shared ultra-liberal-modern values they 
cooperatively seek to universalize as global norms. Thus I refer to it as the US – EU 
ideological power aggregate within which a transatlantic ruling class emerged determined 
to achieve a unified Europe, and from which it has developed and will continue to define 
itself.765  
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The US–EU ideological power aggregate arose through the creation of post-war 
international institutions and within a broader trilateral commercial-trading conglomerate 
that, by the mid to late 1960s fully included Japan. It presently exists inside an expanded, 
multi-lateral set of international institutions comprising a web of states outside the US 
and EU, as well as prominent IGOs and, arguably, many NGOs. Numerous corporate 
entities act synchronously with it, their success in no small part a result of the globalizing 
institutions, processes and forces the post-war international order (dominated—by 
design—by the US and major European, now principal EU states) was in part created to 
realize.  
Another important historical context for comprehending the development of the 
EU and its simultaneous role in the creation of the contemporary globalization complex is 
the fact that the EU emerged within and was ideologically and existentially contingent 
upon the East–West Cold-war and the transatlantic alliance. The security challenge 
presented by the confrontation of opposing ideological blocs that divided the continent 
defined a critical role for the US in European defense and political cooperation, both in 
leading NATO and in support of the development of unifying economic structures. 
Victory over a common ideological enemy eliminated a primary impediment to 
economic unification, nascent processes of globalization and embryonic globality, 
removing a set of possible complications that could have hampered the birth of the new 
paradigm gestating in Western institutions and practices. At the end of the Cold war 
Western Europe’s shared institutions were consolidating at a rapid pace. Due to its 
disproportionate endowment of wealth and military might and its global reach, the U.S. 
was better positioned in Europe to exploit the opportunities presented by Communism’s 
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collapse, stirring some anxiety and animosity in Western Europe as its corporations had 
to compete with each other as well as US firms for investment opportunities and new 
contracts. Moreover, European firms had higher operating costs within Europe due to its 
complicated tax schemes and the expense of currency conversion.   
The commonly shared sentiment between US and European elites vis-à-vis CEE 
was an undisguised triumphalism. A spirit of schadenfreude accompanied the vigorous, 
competitive efforts to incorporate CEE into the Western fold. Today, the EU’s eastward 
expansion represents a logical extension of this process of incorporation. It not only 
underscores the momentum of globalization in the region, it physically extends the 
jurisdiction of EU institutions and assimilates millions of people as new citizen-
constituents.   
With the expiration of communism in Europe after a forty-year, largely rhetorical 
challenge to the prerogatives and momentum of the Western globalization complex,766
In a development that good Europeans would—for highly qualified reasons—
endorse, its institutions are creating a federally governed polity, whose supranational 
authority is transforming a set of traditional, reactive norms grouped under the general 
 
the institutions of neo-liberal capitalism and representative democracy were positioned to 
fully absorb the former Soviet-bloc states and newly independent republics of the former 
Soviet Union into their increasingly internationalized apparatus. Communism’s collapse 
in 1989 and 1991 freed the EEC from certain conceptual constraints to consolidate itself 
economically and politically. Having done so throughout the 1990s, it is now proceeding 
to expand eastward across the continent in its mission to “unify” Europe, bringing its 
disparate parts together as a whole, according to its idea of one Europe.  
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heading of national sovereignty. This, according to Nietzsche’s vitalist understanding, 
expands possibilities for human flourishing or the spectrum of its capacities within the 
institutional order the globalization complex inadvertently enables. Furthermore, it 
increases the capacity of exceptional agents within those institutions to direct and exploit 
the potentials of globality.  
Despite the inauthentic agonistic socio-political milieu through which EU 
expansion is occurring, Nietzschean critique makes evident the fact that along with the 
preponderant reactive forces (bodied forth as a negative will to nothingness as nihilistic 
power) formative of the EU’s becoming, contending active forces (expressed as a 
positive will to creative destruction as generative power) however minute, simultaneously 
affects its development. Relatively healthier individuals are able to actively hijack and 
redirect some of the negative tendencies driving integration and augment others so as to 
hasten the EU’s eventual going down and overcoming. The origin of these decisive forces 
of our decadent epoch lies in reservoir of depleted volitional resources that might yet 
sustain an active dynamic. However infinitesimally small, this power—augmented by 
abstract potentials of globality—could serve as a match to set alight a renewed future. 
The EU’s internal process of consolidation, and its incorporation of other states has 
exacerbated reaction, resentment and bad-consciousness, yet this antagonism generates 
unanticipated affects with surprising trajectories; lines of flight that are ascending, 
healthy and generative.  
For instance, as an ultra-liberal-modern institutional structure, the EU functions 
both to stabilize the continent and serve as an influential source and promulgator of 
institutional mechanisms upon which the emerging international order is predicated.767 
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Though this strives to regulate life and mediate disparate forces of globalization, each 
generates gaps between that which is conventionally considered impermissible and the 
officially sanctioned, through entrepreneurial, technological and intellectual innovations 
that race ahead of any authority’s competence, challenging its jurisdiction and mutating 
both practices and culture ahead of law. As such “advances” accelerate change, 
opportunity, creation and novelty proliferates in ways difficult to effectively restrain by 
even the most flexible governing institutions or legal codes.  
Despite its remarkable power of interpolation the globalization complex is 
incapable of recognizing every instance of its own regulative impotence and these blind 
spots represent opportunities for exceptional individuals (‘outliers’ both for their insight 
and dumb luck768
To control or delimit such potentially destabilizing developments, elements of the 
preexisting order of formal, regulative institutions (national governments, religious 
authorities, etc.) attempt to reinforce and bolster their authority by rearticulating their 
codified injunctions and reified “essential aspects.” Their masochistic desire to maintain 
the forms of life the reigning order supports and which enervate them, expresses itself in 
an effort to define evaluative parameters of acceptable change, a threshold level of 
tolerance for dissention from and challenges to orthodox beliefs and norms which rapidly 
) to exploit. As a burgeoning juridical–political institutional structure it 
nevertheless comprises an increasingly ubiquitous and reactive network enacting ever 
subtler and comprehensive methods of discipline, surveillance and control over life; 
augmenting what international order does exist. But it constantly lags behind the ongoing 
innovations emergently challenging it which are posed by the abstract potentials of 
globality it unintentionally generates.  
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emerging forms globality present. In so doing they become reactive and inflexible, 
perceiving their security as contingent on an already obsolescent international order that 
is passing into history.  
Hegemonic institutions whose authority is waning are frequently incapable of 
recognizing that the form of their existence must change via adaptation or risk extinction. 
In our era of globalization, challenges posed to the prevailing international order (which 
the globalization complex constitutes) continually provokes disciplinary responses from 
constituent elements within it that seek to preserve their efficacy. The interpolating force 
of the globalization complex is one of its most distinctive properties. Institutional 
responses of this sort can have both invigorating and enfeebling consequences for human 
life. In the transitional age of globalization the result of such reaction depends upon how 
it ramifies the affective capacity of those few who are capable of realizing opportunities 
generated by globality, those strong enough to enact or conduct the forces needed to 
condition possibilities for further positive becomings.  
Globality therefore suggests the dawn of an ascending epoch in maturation of the 
human species as such, for it follows that as its abstract potentials are realized an 
exponential increase of such positive forces can be expected and further abstract 
potentials generated. This should gradually overcome and thereby transmute many of the 
reactive institutions, processes and forces of globalization. The successor era to 
modernity, which we are far from achieving—whatever the assertions of certain literary 
theorists—will be one that conducts the human species toward its eventual overcoming 
and a post- or transhuman condition. 
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In response to the many objections raised against their further extension of the 
forces of globalization a dual dynamic arises from the hegemonic institutions of 
globalization (the circular compounding of reaction). One response to moralizing 
protestations against globalizing processes, typified by the social activism of alarm prone 
“liberal post-moderns” and other altruists, consists in the deeper sublimation of liberal 
discourses into the ideational objectives of globalization. This necessitates the 
concealment of the globalization complex’s violences—which bring it into contradiction 
with the values legitimating it—to placate the herds at its primary loci. Examples of its 
deceptive tactics include, for instance, the advocacy of so-called “fair trade” practices (in 
commodities such as coffee), campaigns for higher wages and improved working 
conditions in the developing world’s “sweatshops”, and the political rights (conceived in 
ultra-liberal-modern terms) of repressed or disenfranchised peoples (e.g.: the Tibetans or 
Burmese).769
The other, co-extending dynamic, consists of the ongoing effort by the reigning 
political institutions of our day (states, IGOs, etc.) to continually affirm their legitimacy 
and maintain order through ever-more sophisticated simulations of ultra-liberal-modern 
values. For skeptical ironists these efforts merely reveal their waning authority. The 
pathetic attempts by governments to justify themselves frequently result in the 
construction of supposedly threatening “others”.
  
770 They serve to fortify the subjective-
valuations-cum-ordering-principles of ultra-liberal-modernity via simulacrums of 
individual autonomy (free will), as well as legal equality and political enfranchisement – 
either as already attained or universally desired – and the duty of “the just” to disseminate 
via the exportation of liberal-democracy, at both the micro- and macro-political levels.  
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This dual dynamic describes the intensification of a perverse effort to impose a 
slave-moral will-to-truth through a particular ethos of promise-making and account-
giving toward the rationalization of imposed responsibility for the purpose of ascribing 
blame. The incoherent relativism that results is indicated by the diffuse sense of 
entitlement characteristic of citizens in the ultra-liberal-modern societies at the center of 
the globalization complex. The mono-culture this produces is typified by easy 
consumption, indifference to the environmental human consequences of that consumption 
and which promotes a coarse familiarity resulting from the near total absence of any 
persuasive rank order of types and corresponding values (Rangordnung). In such a 
reactive, difference-annihilating culture, demands and promises are ever more casually 
made leading to a condition in which the legitimate assignment of responsibility becomes 
impracticable, the legal framework for adjudicating conflict and its imposition of 
sanctions becomes increasingly dubious and all authority comes to be viewed with 
cynical derision.  
In theorizing the Western state’s propagation of globalization, the inadvertent, 
generative basis of potentials of globality, Shaw observes that: 
The Western state has grown into a genuine power conglomerate precisely 
through the development of authoritative structures from their sovereign bases. It 
has evolved complex overlapping international institutions, from NATO and other 
military organizations through a wide range of political and economic bodies. 
Within Europe, it has developed an unprecedentedly deep economic (and 
increasingly political) union, with complex institutions, now directly as well as 
indirectly legitimated.771
The EU, as a macro-level conductor of globalizing forces, processes and institutions, is 
both a powerful arbiter of change to the norms and framework of international juridical 
order attempting to regulate globality and is symptomatic of them as well.   
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The US (as arguably the prototypical liberal-modern “European” polity) and 
EU—each an extremely large and complicated power constellation in its own right—
share and promote identical values and many of the same interests. In so doing they 
comprise a massive power constellation at the heart of the globalization complex. Yet the 
different emphasis which the EU places on certain values distinguishes it from the US in 
subtle but important ways.  Evidence of this lies in European attitudes toward capital 
punishment, social welfare, health care and access to affordable education. Through 
parallel institutions such as the OSCE772 and COE773 the EU is increasingly influential in 
determining the direction and character of globalization.  
These institutions, along with NATO and its Partnership for Peace have been 
preparing states on the EU’s periphery for eventual admission to the organization and 
otherwise habituating them to the expectations of the US–EU ideological power 
aggregate’s framework for international order. Given its advantageous geographical 
location and the appeal of its ethos (perceived, however accurately, as an alternative to 
the US) the EU is approaching parity with the US in its ability to determine the character 
and priorities of globalization. Within the US–EU ideological power aggregate Europe 
always shared a significant role in steering the expansion of the globalization complex. 
While the US remains the world’s sole remaining superpower774
Between the US and EU pronounced differences have arisen in the emphases 
given the forces of globalization, as well as in the determination of common objectives of 
its institutions and processes. This increase of diversity can be expected to augment 
 and exerts the single 
greatest influence on globalization’s unfolding, the EU is projected to become the 
world’s largest unified market in the next decade. 
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opportunities for the realization of globality’s intangible probabilities. Among the myriad 
challenges these differences of emphases pose to the US – EU ideological power 
aggregate, none are more glaring than the resurgence of religiosity in American society 
and the co-extending conservatism and residually militarist or quasi-imperialist vision of 
globalization it exudes through its foreign policy objectives. These three trends are 
opposite to the prevailing secular, pacifist ethos of globalization in Europe, the 
inclination of whose majority publics’ judging from their prevailing attitudes and views, 
seek to realize a much different form of international integration.  
However, differences between the Washington and Brussels should not be 
exaggerated, for European unification is itself symptomatic of the same globalizing 
forces and processes the US (with a few European allies) first exploited – processes that 
enabled America’s putative hegemony. No reactive government structure can effectively 
constrain or delimit the forces of globalization, and it would be incorrect to assume that 
temporary, largely partisan rivalries between administrations in the US and EU member 
state governments are profoundly distinguishing in the context of globalization’s broader 
paradigm. The self-perpetuating momentum of the phenomenon generates possibilities 
for becoming that may or may not be seized upon, but the US – EU ideological power 
aggregate’s ongoing collaboration in creating / maintaining the reactive international 
order does exist (and which it largely imposed) and its stake in extending and deepening 
it, fundamentally links American and European interests. The US – EU ideological power 
aggregate has developed into a mutual economic, political and cognitive reliance that 
neither can opt out of, and this practical reality will continue to have ramifications for life 
on both sides of the Atlantic and throughout the world.   
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From a Nietzschean perspective the tendency of its consequences are mainly 
positive due to its gradual fulfillment of the abstract potentials of globality. As reactive 
forces of globalization sustained by this complex perfect an integrated, transnational 
socio-cultural and politico-economic machine made rational, just and normal by the 
simulacrum, “a counter-movement is inevitable” which “aims to bring to light a stronger 
species”: 
Once we possess that common economic management of the earth that will soon 
be inevitable, mankind will be able to find its best meaning as a machine in the 
service of this economy – as a tremendous clockwork, composed of ever smaller 
ever more subtly “adapted” gears; as an ever-growing superfluity of all 
dominating and commanding elements; as a whole of tremendous force, whose 
individual factors represent minimal forces, minimal values. 
In opposition to this dwarfing and adaptation of man to a specialized utility, a 
reverse movement is needed – the production of a synthetic, summarizing, 
justifying man for whose existence this transformation of mankind into a machine 
is a precondition, as a base on which he can invent his higher form of being.   
 
Morally speaking, this overall machinery, this solidarity of all gears, represents a 
maximum in the exploitation of man; but it presupposes those on whose account 
this exploitation has meaning. Otherwise it would really be nothing but an overall 
diminution, a value diminution of the type man – a regressive phenomena in the 
grand style.775
The EU, as both an instantiation and promulgator of globalization, is a product of 
the twentieth century’s “tremendous socialist crises,”
 
 
As abstract potentials of globality are further realized they will collectively come to 
describe “a new aim for humanity,” and—if conducted according to the active force 
involuntarily driving the native volition characteristic of healthy individuals—provide 
renewed and more authentic meaning to the tremendous process of Europe’s integration, 
which the forces of globalization serve.  
776 and although its conceptualizers, 
instigators and present day arbiters (excepting an extraordinary few from among the pack 
of mediocrities) may remain unaware of its ultimate consequence for humanity, its 
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expansion draws open the curtain on a stage its development has set for the drama of 
breeding aristocratic masters capable of elevating humanity by augmenting and 
encouraging heroic endeavors. As Nietzsche writes, “This man of the future,” or ‘good 
European’:  
will redeem us not just from the ideal held up till now, but also from the things 
which will have to arise from it, from the great nausea, the will to nothingness, 
from nihilism, that stroke of midday and of great decision which makes the will 
free again, which gives earth its purpose and man his hope again, this Antichrist 
and anti-nihilist, this conqueror of God and nothingness – he must come one day 
…777
Despite Nietzsche’s angry outbursts against it, morality is an essential tool for 
Nietzschean “immoralists” for managing the masses in support of the production of 
higher culture. Again, it is upon the examples of classical Greece, the Renaissance and 
the Napoleonic wars that Nietzsche (somewhat romantically) suggests that, unless 
destroyed by the intense nihilism of our dissipated era uniquely characterized by the 
resignation and contentedness of the last-man, a future, revivified epoch will be achieved 
via the values nomothetically legislated by European society’s exemplars (e.g.: ‘good 
Europeans’). The volitionally propagated ideals enacted through such legislations will 
establish an authentically healthy, commanding system of ascetic-discipline for self-
training, cultivation and the instinctual guidance of the herd. They do so by instantiating a 
system of morality (value-norms, mores, taboos, etc.) to ramify and/or transform the 
affective capacities already operative within their society. If successful, this gradually 
 
  
Such declarations express Nietzsche’s hope and confident optimism in humankind’s 
ability to overcome itself, but are also suggestive of the messianic expectations implicit in 
his concept of the Übermensch.    
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cultivates a new rank order of types (Rangordnung) that arises naturally from the 
changed disposition (eros) and cultural practices (askesis and poiesis) of their society’s 
members. A relative degree of liberality ensures that the weak and the defective are 
allowed to destroy themselves through enfeebling self-indulgence. 
Although jarring and counter-intuitive to contemporary liberal sensibilities, such a 
form of social organization is most advantageous for the majority of individuals within 
society as it maximizes the potential becoming of each—to augment the flourishing of 
those who are capable—for the production of ever more energetic and impressive human 
specimens. It is not merely libertarian and certainly not utilitarian, ideological stratagems 
whose pure forms Nietzsche rejected, but combines insights critical of both, resembling, 
in ways that would likely have surprised Nietzsche himself, a radically agonistic 
democracy.778 Therefore, rather than feel “exploited” (particularly in a Marxian sense) 
the multitude gradually improves itself by means of such a disciplinary regime. The 
inculcation of the masses with such a value-system succeeds in constituting it through an 
exploitation of the pre-existing heteronomy of will, or “false consciousness” that 
corresponds with their need “to believe in [themselves as] a neutral independent ‘subject’ 
…that interprets [its own] weakness as freedom and [its] being thus-and-thus a merit”.779
Nietzsche’s recognition of the ordinary yearning among average human beings for 
a placid contentment in conditions of intensifying nihilism prompted his insight into how 
“the modern, noisy, time-consuming, self-satisfied, stupidly proud industriousness” of 
contemporary Western man could be utilized by future, cultural exemplars toward the 
production of higher—stronger, healthier—individuals.
 
780 The nihilism cultivated by 
modernity makes the majority indifferent to everything but quantifiable productivity, 
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largely out of the ascetic-consumerist desire to labor in order to conspicuously consume. 
This provides those whose naiveté lies in their liberal tolerance and who are convinced of 
their superiority over past ages and types (an illusion reinforced by modernity’s discourse 
of “progress”), validation of their own self-worth.  
In our own hyper-decadent age, the ethos of the prevailing technological 
rationality rewards displays of material prosperity by raising the stature of the industrious 
within our hedonistic community. “Success” within such an environment becomes a 
mask with which the inherently vulgar attempt to conceal their presumption as well as 
their rabble natures and origins. A cold cash nexus, as Marx and Engels aptly put it, 
functions as the sole determiner of beauty, justice and aptitude. The reinforcement and 
naturalization of such crudity through its constant, media-led celebration is orchestrated 
by ultra-liberal-modern arbiters of herd-values.  
But, as Nietzsche knew and has the extremity of contemporary popular examples 
makes apodictically clear, these fêted trendsetters and style gurus are fundamentally 
incapable of genuine spiritual development. By this Nietzsche meant the serious and 
difficult considerations of higher, subtler matters in which genuine ‘spiritual nomads’ 
must continually engage and pass through. Moreover, the all-too-many of our age, being 
incapable of authentic reverence of anything, are utterly uninterested in the limitations 
imposed by their congenital disability, and are incapable of undertaking what 
recuperative therapies might be available to them to overcome those limitations anyway.  
Nietzsche’s notion of a master morality of breeding was intended, in part, to 
prohibit the sort of promiscuous panmixis of types characteristic of liberal-modernity, but 
this wanton fraternization is not defined according to conventional reactive criteria (be 
 452 
they racist, sexist, classist or other forms of chauvinism, etc.) but rather according to the 
differing vitality of individuals. The best, who when allowed to thrive in a reinvigorated 
social order, irrepressibly distinguish themselves from among the many, would recognize 
one another by virtue of their corresponding desire and develop agonistic friendships to 
spur one another to ever-greater heights of creative self-overcoming. 
The conditions for such a political architecture at first sounds dangerously abusive 
or dubious to ears attuned to the liberal-democratic slave morality of taming, but they do 
not aim for a state of affairs too far removed from (or so perverse) the highest condition 
such mediocre specimens of the species are likely capable of achieving. The willingness 
of the many to toil, their eagerness to work, when harnessed to their plebian greed and/or 
a base desire for fame, would allow the best to cleverly deploy the herd’s energies to 
achieve the invigorated cultural greatness necessary to provide humanity’s existence with 
meaning.781
Just who again are these great exceptions—good Europeans or proto-
Übermenschen—among the throng of humanity? They are real, undoubtedly foibled 
persons who happen to enjoy a strong constitution. Not to be confused with the pale race 
of liberal-optimists the modern “improvers of mankind”, their healthier condition enables 
them to see a farther horizon. The efficacious instinctual ordering of their involuntary 
drives and impulses (the anorganic power surging through them as embodied capacitors 
of life-force) permits them to characteristically expend themselves toward the realization 
 This notion would seem to anticipate aspects of Leo Strauss’s mid-20th 
century thought, but Nietzsche’s vitalist politics crucially distinguishes his thought—in 
both its esoteric and exoteric meanings and intent—from that of Strauss, who was 
concerned with the maintenance of power over others, conventionally understood.  
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of their distinctive passions (eros) via law generating (nomothetic) acts. These acts result 
from self-imposed disciplinary regimes (askesis) of self-creation (auto-poiesis). In our 
decadent age their becoming authentic constitutes their going-down, but it incrementally 
transitions humankind toward its needed overcoming. 
They are difficult to identify, not least because the effects of a single individual’s 
accomplishments, the value of their lifetime achievement, can only be gauged 
posthumously. Good Europeans, like Nietzsche himself, are posthumous individuals. We 
must therefore look back at and survey the affective contributions of a person by 
discerning the symptoms of its significance to humankind’s destruction / overcoming. 
Conway defines Nietzsche’s notion of the higher man as follows: “the Übermensch is any 
human being who actually advances the frontier of human perfectibility.”782
The futural architecture of an ascending, life-affirming order may be drafted by 
good Europeans. Such proto-Übermenschen are creatively destroying decadent norms 
and practices through subversive revaluations of the governing axiomatique of our 
volitionally depleted age. By doing so they arouse ingenious alternatives to its nihilistic 
 That 
tremendous task—one the vast majority are too enervated to perform—amounts to the 
going-down of great creators. However, our age can only afford skeptical ironists who 
lampoon, and thereby subvert, the ascetic-consumerist ideals that have destroyed our 
capacity for culture and left us too exhausted to recognize the extent of our degeneracy. 
These are the good Europeans of our age, individuals enfeebled by decadence whose 
defiant expenditure may arouse and so strengthen others to perform similarly inspiring 
acts of authentic self-creation, and so on, acts that condition the possibility of future, law-
giving Übermenschen. 
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will to nothingness. They may put the spandrels in our dilapidated social structure to 
productive use through their critical identification of hitherto unrecognized lacunae in its 
institutional design. Not content to passively accept status-quo power relations, they 
experiment, utilizing unnoticed spaces in the design of the community they inhabit to 
create divergent possibilities from its political motifs. They seek to transform the function 
of the existing order and construct new forms from it. In so doing they may create spaces 
within which authentic becoming may be nurtured and a revitalized order favorable to the 
development of culture established. 
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BOOK FOUR 
Realizing Nietzsche’s Idea of Europe 
 
Section One 
Conditioning the Possibility for Good Europeanism 
 
Part One: Exploiting the abstract potentials of globality: Good Europeans as 
instigators of a successor era to modernity. 
 
It is somewhat ironic that contemporary European studies specialists, integration 
theorists and political philosophers take little note of Nietzsche, as his concerns for 
Europe entailed “many of those attributes that Europeanists are seeking to cultivate for 
the institutions of the European Union”.783
It is important to note that Nietzsche cannot be counted among the conventional 
“improvers of mankind”, the liberal-optimists whom he excoriated. While he believed 
that a certain degree of material prosperity is necessary for a stable social order and the 
 Nevertheless, while the concerns of 
contemporary Europeanists may resemble some of Nietzsche’s own, their respective 
objectives and his own are quite different. Throughout this work I have employed his 
vitalist political and power ontology to examine how the major theories of European 
integration, the EU and the globalization complex advance the metadiscourse of ultra-
liberal-modernity. In book four I examine opportunities for destabilizing its axiomatic 
narratives of democracy, political legitimacy and prosperity and suggest a kynical-ironist 
method for doing so that, based in ancient skeptical practices, corresponds with the ethos 
and should augment the virile drives of good Europeans.   
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generation of a higher culture through which the best might flourish, he rejected the 
acquisitiveness and all-consuming pursuit of lucre and security that occupied “the 
newspaper reading demi-monde of the spirit” who unwittingly spread ressentiment 
throughout European society, increasing nihilism thereby.784
The privileging of equality over identity and endeavor to eliminate suffering, as 
the primary aims of the political order the EU is creating, underlies this transformation 
and the ethos emerging from it. The values coextending with this objective have been 
thoroughly instantiated in socio-political structures that always already support neoliberal 
capital processes and populist democracy. The contradictions inherent to the former (e.g.: 
the generation of extraordinary wealth and grinding poverty rationalized via appeals to 
equality of opportunity, etc.) and the radical egalitarianism characteristic of the latter 
promote a becoming–ochlocratic, or massification of individuals and majority rule via the 
formation of mob factions, at both the level of socio-cultural life the political macro–
sphere and at the individual level, or political micro-sphere, in which coercive 
 
Yet (to reiterate), the policies and institutional preferences of the EU (predicated 
on a popular, largely un-philosophical emancipatory metaphysical and naïve realism), 
have consistently sought to realize overt forms of pity that function to cover-up 
sublimated envy and ressentiment. As prescriptive norms the worldview 
(Weltanschauung) they simultaneously construct and enforce has come to dominate, or 
even constitute, the ethos of the emerging European society comprised by all those 
member-states of the EU and its penumbra (Norway, Ukraine, Turkey, etc.), who have 
formally reformed their political institutions and practices, civil laws and social policies 
in order to conform with legislations from Brussels. 
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inducements to becoming-same overwhelm individuals, depriving them of the space and 
time for self-creation and the freedom for authenticity.  
This enforces the proto-fascist culture of conformity and abjection referenced 
throughout this dissertation. It is typified by the homogenizing capitalist democracy 
universally compelled by the conventional globalization complex.785
While demanding compliance such decadence punishes authentic difference and 
resists genuine creativity (which inherently challenge it), fostering a mentality of 
resignation and compliance essential to the maintenance of the ascetic-consumerist 
ideals, the absurdissimum of which is its simultaneous simulation of an openness to 
innovation that effectively encourages discovery within the parameters of its myopic 
standards. This culture of abject conformity is driven by a transnational, self described 
“creative class” of philistinic vulgarians whose secularized Christian–Platonic values 
continue “the one will alone [that] ruled over Europe for eighteen centuries [and is] set on 
making man into a sublime deformity.”
 Born of fear and the 
weakness of will trepidation produces, these philistinic tendencies are expressed in a set 
of social and economic violences that enforce obedience to its ideological prerogatives – 
the political status quo. As a decadent development globalization is analogous to a 
metastatic cancer within the social organisms it invades. While reproducing excessively, 
it frequently induces pluripotent cells capable of becoming anything to augment the 
ailment it represents. The latent capacity of those pluripotent cells is thereby wasted, 
further undermining the health of the body politic, rather than fortifying its health.  
786 Furthermore, this culture, disposition and will 
are inextricably intertwined with the metadiscourse of ultra-liberal-modernity to which 
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the EU appeals in its unremitting efforts to furnish itself with legitimate grounds for its 
existence and promote its development. 
As I have asserted throughout this work, the doctrines of free market neoliberal 
capitalism and populist democracy are mutually reinforcing modes of organization 
integral to its liberal–optimism and massifying technological rationality. What is made to 
seem morally gratifying through its evaluative lenses (earning ones’ own living, 
contributing to ones’ society, participating in the determination of the political course of 
ones’ nation, etc.) cannot be made to consist with their own “reasoned” conception of the 
self-interests of individuals in society, or with a coherent notion of society in which the 
theoretically equal members—irrespective of their diversity—constitute an organic whole 
defined by a common set of values.  
By providing spectacularized existential meanings and simulated ontological 
purposes to a thoroughly dissipated, nihilistic age, the dominant, globalizing ideology 
covers-up the contradictions it generates through procedures of consultation and “free” 
debate in an ostensibly authentic social commons legitimated by the participation of the 
all-too-many. This demonstration seems to validate its commitment to the ideals of 
individual enfranchisement and equality as the worst mob factions—ascetic–consumerist 
priests of ressentiment—determine the rules of the game.787
The similitude of the EU’s institutional organization, practices and stated 
objectives with ultra-liberal-modern ideals is epitomized by its re-creation at the 
supranational level of the originally Western European, liberal nation-state and its 
bureaucratic practices and institutional forms. These ideals are further exemplified by the 
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EU in its arbiter’s ceaseless endeavors to re-shape the world according to their ascetic-
consumerist values.788
To summarize a few salient points argued above, the EU has its origins in a 
reactive will to truth that seeks the attainment of security in a strategy to secure the 
energy and industrial sectors (coal and steel) of post-war Western Europe and ensure 
economic development toward material prosperity. Jealous of their own prerogatives, 
these objectives were partially sublimated into a broader, arguably nobler effort among 
the member states to give a collective account of themselves in the aftermath of World 
War Two, a debacle in which many of them tacitly cooperated with the Nazis and were 
complicit in their genocide of Jews, Gypsies and Homosexuals. In the wake of this 
  
In light of this, good Europeans would certainly be indisposed toward the reactive 
will-to-truth through which the EU has translated a pastiche ‘idea of Europe’ into the 
ideological agent of resignation to a consumerism. That nihilistic philistinism or culture 
of conformity banalizes everything refined, distinguished, sublime and magnificent in 
favor of mass-produced homogenizing commodities and vulgarizes everyone by 
encouraging an ethic of transparency that confuses endearing openness with shameless 
self-revelation and mistakes impudicity for sincerity. The consumption of material goods, 
necessary at the base level for life, has become the highest purpose and spiritual meaning 
of life imposed on “humanity” by the institutions, processes and forces of globalization—
understood as the contemporary ‘Europeanization’ of the world. Implicit in such a 
comprehension is the need to view with wry skepticism occasional attempts by the EU’s 
more reactionary advocates to define it as an endeavor conceived to protect Europe and 
its markets from the very globalization complex with which it largely corresponds.  
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complicity with horror, three generations of Europeans have now striven to set the 
continent on its liberal, integrating course. Doing so would necessarily entail asserting a 
will-to-truth that presupposed a superior knowledge of justice and the authority to pursue 
instituting it.  
While it would stretch credulity to argue that the ultra-liberal-modern course 
Europe has pursued by means of steady economic liberalization and political 
democratization and devolution has been worse than the pre-war (dis)order it replaced, its 
primary value at this juncture in European history lies in its unintentional conditioning of 
the possibility for overcoming its increasingly evident limitations as an ultimately 
reactive framework for modes of being and forms of life. This is to acknowledge that in 
some quasi-Hegelian sense Europe’s on-going ultra-liberal-modern phase of hyper-
decadence has been productive of future, truly salubrious potentials for the overcoming 
of humankind.  
However, effectively challenging the prevailing order always-already entails 
convincing its arbiters (the defenders of any existent socio-economic, political 
arrangements) that they do not in fact know best, so as to instigate change. The zealous 
ideological convictions of our sickened epoch’s ascetic–consumerist priests of 
ressentiment almost ensure the impossibility of this (a fact which serves to underscore 
another contradictions such as those referenced above). Due to the support they derive 
from the use of reason and the quasi-metaphysical faith in science, which they also 
cultivate, the ideals of our putatively secular age are believed in as fervently as the 
religious values defining any other.  
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The enduring conceit of conventional political authority is that it knows what is 
best for all. In our age of populist democracy, or (more precisely) kakistocratic 
ochlocracy – rule by the worst mob factions – this can be particularly dangerous. In this 
vein Hutter critically observes that: 
Politically, programs of action of the envious are often seen to be dictated by the 
requirements of security. One of the deepest lies in envious souls is the belief that 
they already know what is just; just are called those actions that bring relief, if 
only temporary, for feelings of displeasure about themselves.789
Through its treaty agreements, the Acquis Communitaire criteria for accession to 
the union, institutional organization and respective bodies’ protocols, and effort to 
promulgate a Constitution the EU engages in multi-dimensional acts of “self”-presenting 
and “self”-concealing simultaneously. The EU’s discursive concealments generate 
rhetorics and shape judgments about the need for and benefits of integration in addition to 
the functioning of the EU bureaucratic apparatus itself. Even when its acts of presenting 
constitute a Being toward the authentic possibility of realizing the EU’s ownness as it 
were, they are always already a product of the homogenization of different types and 
interpolation of a conflictual multiplicity of desires. The intrinsically coercive nature of 
this, feebly glossed over via democratic processes and corresponding appeals to popular 
 
 
As an outgrowth of the nihilism inherent to the secularized metaphysical realism and 
envy propagated by secular ascetic-consumerist priests, the EU contrives to re-create a 
new patriotism and corresponding identity as it usurps the function, importance and place 
of the nation-state and sublimates its incorporation of the increasing meaninglessness of 
the latter entity. In so doing its arbiters assuage their feelings of displeasure and 
rationalize their presumption. 
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legitimacy, makes the EU’s “self”-presenting acts somewhat dubious in that even those 
who believe in the authenticity toward which they point have a bad-conscience over the 
conditions which gave rise to their possibility. This, by extension, further sublimates the 
decadence whose ideational precursor Nietzsche saw as characteristic of and expressed in 
the nationalism that threatened in his lifetime.790 In Nietzsche’s view the EU would 
therefore have been likely understood as a crudely expanded form of the slave-moral 
construct of the nation-state, some twenty-seven putatively “sovereign” examples of 
which now comprise it. 
Conceived in response to the horrifying world wars in which the pernicious trend 
of nationalism culminated during the twentieth century, the EU has paradoxically 
intensified central aspects of the very forms of control it aspired to displace, and achieved 
the quintessentially liberal objective of abolishing certain, obvious forms of suffering in 
its aim to prevent war.791
The space for such widely divergent interpretations, as well as the hope that the 
EU might be made into a means of cultivating the authentically human and eventually, 
übermenschlich types, arises from the affects which it may have for culture. As an 
apparatus conceived according to the imperatives of the technological and actuarial 
rationality of positivists, rationalist and economists—“the flies of the marketplace”—its 
 In Nietzsche’s view it would simultaneously be an entity of 
diverse potentials: on the one hand it would likely strike him as a set of institutions of 
frightening bureaucratic proportions—a all-too-human monstrosity and/or difference 
annihilating machine. Yet, despite the culture of conformity he would suspect it of 
fostering he would also perceive it to be an apparatus with immense promise for those 
with the strength to exploit it.  
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unanticipated, emergent traits as an instrument for the invigoration of culture against 
those aforementioned reactive prerogatives provides us with a persuasive basis to expect 
that it may become something more truly life-affirming than its creators imagined or its 
administrators can envisage. This expectation is developed into practicable action 
through the conative disposition or anticipatory resoluteness characteristic of ‘good 
Europeanism’.792
This “independence” is not intrinsically threatening to the EU’s institutional 
legitimacy, however, as Brussels has codified guarantees of and the means for 
 
In many obvious ways the EU appears as a psychologically deepened and 
geographically expanded bastion for the “tarantulas” and “flies of the marketplace” 
Nietzsche described in Thus Spoke Zarathustra. Yet although it re-presents monolithic 
aspects of the traditional nation-state, that “coldest of cold monsters”, through its 
institutional arrangements and relentless efforts to acquire ever greater decision making 
powers over its member-states, as such it can also (undeniably) be seen as a driving force 
that actively serves the promotion of complexity and progress in the diverse, positive 
meanings it indeliberately generates as a hybrid form of governance. For, whatever 
degree of negotiated inter-state cooperation precedes its various treaties, legislative 
decisions and policy agendas, the EU is a supranational institutional arrangement arrived 
at through inter-state bargaining. As such it is correctly understood as a hybridized 
political formation of previously unaffiliated peoples whose relatively autonomy is 
increased in certain ways through the multiplication of affective capacities, many of 
which operate and are interconnected in a multitude of ways that lie outside the EU’s 
purview.  
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maintaining the appearance of self-determination at a number of socio-cultural and 
political levels.793 This method of accommodation and conservation constitutes an 
anticipatory means of accounting for the aforementioned affective capacities before they 
develop. Its method of multi-dimensional integration occurs between numerous 
institutions at various levels of political community and generates new relations between 
long affiliated authorities within European society. The increase in points of connectivity 
and greater cooperation and communication between formerly distinct entities via this 
hybridic supranational organization has endowed many of them both with greater purpose 
and self-sufficiency and reinvigorated their relevance, as devolution in the United 
Kingdom or the enhanced national autonomy of Catalonia and Wallonia demonstrates.  
Through these points of connection which are proliferating at multiple levels of 
institutional authority a dual sense of gratification and displeasure arises. The former 
perception develops out of enhanced security and a sense of belonging to a broader 
community from which a correspondingly strengthened sense of identity may arise. 
Conversely, the latter feeling emerges from a perception of the inauthenticity of this 
potential, an element of artificiality perceived in the unreal extension of community that 
includes peoples and cultures largely alien to oneself and one’s people. Furthermore, 
corporate media and business interests—the juggernaut of spectacularized technological 
society that quantifies everything and presumes to administer life via its own economistic 
rationality—are observably banalizing and actively homogenizing traditional differences 
through consumerist massification, which creates a feedback loop of supply and demand 
that provides it with its own rationale.  
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If not actually threatening traditional ways of life, some stipulations and mandates 
codified in EU law (the Common Agricultural Policy being a notable example) contribute 
to a perception that time-honored methods of production and by extension the 
authenticity of certain modes-of-being are being diminished through regulations 
determined without broad consultation with established producers. Moreover, organized 
interest groups are seen to be exerting undo influence over the EU’s priorities 
contributing to the perception of a democratic deficit, even as some allege this is 
precisely for whose needs the EU seems specifically designed to facilitate.794
 
  
The advocacy and deployment of the noble, inclusive-sounding rhetoric of 
“expanded community” with the aim of fostering a deepened sense of Europeanness is 
viewed with much distrust, as the underlying will-to-truth of the discourse of unity is 
perceived to be—and occasionally exposed as being—at odds with its purported ideals of 
enhanced pluralism and self-determination. That inauthenticity produces reaction as 
individuals reassert their identic allegiance to a locale, region, nation-state, etc., in what is 
often an effort to re-inhabit a nostalgic sense of authenticity that is, in actuality, no longer 
vital. In these moments the EU fails to provide its citizen-constituents with the existential 
meaning and ontological purpose it must supply if it is to be credible or its stated 
objectives supported. Rather, it indeliberately supplies them with further reasons for 
skepticism about EU institutions and their purposes, if not rationales for active cynicism 
as well as notional resources to determine their own meanings, the emergent affects of 
which cannot be anticipated.  
Elbe affirms the negative dimension of this, albeit without the caveats Nietzsche  
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would likely have included: 
Nietzsche’s ‘good European’ would view the growing convergence of state and 
business interests with considerable suspicion, because these actors were unlikely, 
in his view, to move the debate on the European idea beyond visions grounded on 
the will-to-truth, and would thus not be able to increase significantly the welfare 
of Europeans in terms of finding a way of rendering European existence 
meaningful.795 
 
In fact, from early on Nietzsche did view this modern convergence, or more accurately 
the domination of the state by business interests, with suspicion.796
Against and simultaneously through the molar forces of globalization, ‘good 
Europeans’, as artist-philosopher norm-entrepreneurs, may exploit the nisus of globality 
to hasten fortuitous becomings.
 Though it is doubtful 
that the change is as profound as Nietzsche makes it seem, for when in recorded history 
have rulers not united political considerations with, or themselves been dominated by, 
“business” interests? 
However, contra Elbe, ‘good Europeans’ would not merely be suspicious of such 
a convergence (as indeed Nietzsche was in his own lifetime, particularly as it functioned 
to usurp the role of culture); rather they would not leave the task of defining a meaningful 
existence for Europeans up to reactive state and business interests. Nor would their 
primary short term ambition or long term goal be a putative increase in the “welfare” of 
the many, so defined. For, as detailed above, in Nietzsche’s view the “welfare” of the 
masses only improves with the increased vitality of the best, their positive enhancement 
of cruelty and the pathos of distance to invigorate the culture; none of which tasks the 
innately vulgar crowd, whose ranks comprise those aforementioned sectors of every 
society, can undertake. 
797 According to Nietzsche’s vitalist understanding of life, 
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they will as an inevitable result of their conation; they are pre-reflectively compelled by 
innate volition that is symptomatized by their desires, to enact and maximize their 
overflowing forces; enactments of a positive will to creative destruction as generative 
power.798 However, their plight is tenuous, and their acts endangering. Distinguished 
from the profanum vulgus799 by their adaptive capacity (exhibited in youth as an 
“inability” to conform) and critical disposition, they are prone to being singled out for the 
concentrated attention as customary socialization or moral discipline, of ascetic-
consumerist priests of ressentiment.  
The persecution and revilement they are likely to incur / endure is necessary and 
even desirable for them so long as they are not destroyed by it.800 Those who possess 
native resources sufficient to bear the opprobrium their defiant temperaments arouse are 
likely to reendow suffering with meaning through their striving to become who they 
are.801
Among those extraordinary, pluripotent few with requisite strength, enactments of 
globality’s abstract potential (affirmations of difference through the cultivation of change 
and the aforementioned temporal engagement of oneself as a Dasein in the world via 
futural projections of the possibilities to which this engagement gives rise) serve as a 
 The challenges with which these “untimely others” confront the governing 
morality of taming constitute nomothetic acts that inspire emulation. As experimenters 
their ingenious subversion of the enforced nihilism of the prevailing ascetic order—
through self-legislating, kynical pranks lampooning the ressentiment and playful mockery 
of ascetic/materialist herd values—transmute reactive forces into active ones, provoking 
other, similar types by their passion (eros) to undertake disciplinary regimes (askesis) of 
self creation (autopoiesis) through the medium of globality.  
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rehabilitative therapy on the micro-political (individual) level to fortify their regnant 
system of instincts. This further invests them with the fortitude needed to resist 
resignation to globalization’s life-demeaning values (the temptation to fall back into 
inauthenticity) and the resilience to enact transfigurations of governing instincts at the 
level of the political macro-sphere through their nomothetic legislations.  
In the course of their political education such healthy types recognize that the EU 
(as a crucial instantiation and locus of globalization) re-presents an exhausted, reactive 
form of socio-economic and political organization.802 They thereby come to desire and 
are empowered to corroborate in its transfiguration. An increased pathos of distance 
develops between them and the contented masses. Nietzsche frequently describes the 
latter, ‘the herd,’ as placated and comforted (even as it is spiritually diminished) by the 
slave morality of taming. The ‘herd’s’ strength is derived from this moral system’s 
defense of “Truth,” which serves as a crutch for the weak—those who cannot endure the 
suffering caused by their existence. 
Life not an argument. – We have arranged for ourselves a world in which we are 
able to live – by positing bodies, lines, planes, causes and effects, motion and rest, 
form and content; without these articles of faith no one could endure living! But 
that does not prove them. Live is not an argument; the conditions of life might 
include error.803
There are at least three major aspects to the angst generated by the anguish 
intrinsic to human life worthy of consideration here: consciousness of one’s mortality; the 
“ability to imaginatively extend [oneself] beyond [one’s] own genesis” through 
 
 
This possibility: that the essential conditions of life might include the very errors that 
have unintentionally caused the dissipative hyper-decadence of our ultra-liberal-modern 
age, are only comprehensible to the freest spirits.  
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awareness of one’s place in a chain of being (cognizance of the past) and of the 
continuation of existence beyond their own death (looking forward into the future) 
wherein their legacy may be preserved through physical reproduction or great works; 
and, finally, one’s standing “in opposition to the determinative species of which one is a 
part,” which refers to the paradoxes of the principium individuationis, or self-
determination of man as an animate entity distinct from the whole; that is, the 
apprehension arising from ones’ separation from the life ground of Being.804  
The sick are too dissipated and/or cowardly to contend with the apparent 
purposelessness of life in a constructive manner. This prompts a dull resignation to an 
insurmountable sense of nothingness. Simultaneously the inevitability of their ultimate 
negation induces a hopeless impression that all human action is futile. It is this sense of 
void whose brink the weak were formerly able to skirt by virtue of the ontological 
certainty afforded by transcendental truths now widely recognized to be hollow.  
The trust in life is gone: life itself has become a problem. Yet one should not 
jump to the conclusion that this necessarily makes one sullen. Even love of life is 
still possible – only one loves differently.805 
 
Presently, this condition of ‘enlightened’, if quite ‘unhappy false consciousness’ is 
symptomatized by the prevailing, hyper-decadent cynicism that exacerbates and covers-
up its nihilism. Distrust in life and individual instincts is in large part due to the 
“misleading and parochial character of teleological philosophies of history (whether 
Hegelian or positivist),” a mixture of which is exemplified in the West’s ultra-liberal-
modern values systematically universalized via globalization.806
The challenge of affirming the present, of loving the world and humankind 
differently, requires the sort of transformed ubiety necessary for attaining the free 
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spiritedness (thymos), or sovereign individuality, of ‘good Europeanism’. It also ramifies 
the skeptical praxis for overcoming the hyper-decadent values of our ultra-liberal-modern 
age, which I explicate below. However, this eroded trust in the discredited illusions that 
sustained a groundless confidence in a particular interpretation of life has—as Nietzsche 
anticipated—given the hoi polloi new impetus for devaluing life and further empowered 
contemporary ascetic-consumerist priests of ressentiment thereby. In the self-
contradiction of the ascetic life: 
[S]atisfaction is looked for and found in failure, decay, pain, misfortune, ugliness, 
voluntary deprivation, destruction of selfhood, self-flagellation and self-sacrifice. 
This is all paradoxical in the extreme: we are faced with a dissidence which wills 
itself to be dissident, which relishes itself in this affliction and becomes more self-
assured and triumphant to the same degree as its own condition, the physiological 
capacity to live, decreases.807
The suicide by resignation and indifference happens to be the (in)authentic desire 
of our hyper-decadent age. That the herd—whose members taken individually are 
continuously and systematically deflected from themselves by the prevailing culture of 
conformity—does not possess either the insight to recognize this fact (low-level 
consciousness) or the resolve to execute the task of overcoming (weakness and mutually 
disabling affect of the collectivity) means there will invariably be occasional enactments 
of group annihilation. They are occurring all around us, in the form of systematic neglect 
of the incapacitated (the mentally ill, homeless and aged in America), school or 
 
 
The life-denying impulse of this nihilism is discordant with authentic becoming. It seeks 
ease, instinctively desiring the abolition of all suffering, but only intensifies suffering 
through a sublimation that leads it to wish for suicide.  
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workplace shootings, calculated acts of political terror, low level conflicts, and organized 
genocides.  
The all-too-many, as Nietzsche observed, prefer fantastic delusions of liberatory 
and salvific deliverance from there mis-identified afflictions (hence the philosophical 
appeal of liberal-modernity and the power of its discourses), placing unwarranted faith in 
spurious ideals and notions of an otherworldly, super-sensible beyond, as well as the co-
extending secular spectacles of democratic enfranchisement, ever-“advancing” 
technology and consumerism—liberal-modernity’s simulations of fictive equality and 
fulfillment. These self-deprecating and injurious figments are preferred to the tragic 
beauty that lies in the finitude of this-worldly existence and the life-enhancing challenge 
of affirming its affective power.808
It should be noted that this condition does not, in most cases, even constitute 
genuinely inauthentic belief. It amounts to pathetic resignation coupled with a dim hope. 
Nagging doubts that the religious beliefs, shopping trips, disapprobation and punishments 
of transgressors of social mores and values, etc., actually gratify with answers or imbue 
ones’ life with significance, are simply guarded against and, in jejune fashion, denied. 
The vast majority do so almost instinctively, lacking the critical thinking skills required 
to examine their own convictions. Bereft of the political education necessary to posit 
ascending valuations of existence or to judge with any acuity they fail to live pre-
ontologically and are therefore incapable of creating works of art that affirm our 
transitory condition within the ‘unified ground of being’
  
809 The herd’s members, taken 
individually, cultivate the very conditions within which they live largely standardized, 
unremarkable lives of self-induced intellectual and spiritual anesthetization. The inability 
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to recognize a persuasive meaning and believable purpose to existence leads them into an 
abyss of passive (suicidal) nihilism. So it is important that in his late period Nietzsche 
insists that life has no other “end” than itself, reiterating his recognition of life’s lack of 
any objective meaning in his early essay The Greek State.810  
The reduced life of herd members still remains artificially grounded on the fictive 
consolations of the “dignity of man” and the “dignity of labor” in our ultra-liberal-
modern age. This enables them to remain productive (an instrumentally essential 
condition to the eventual overcoming of the hyper-decadence of our present) whilst 
avoiding the terror any recognition of their solitary, unbounded existence would be likely 
to provoke.811 Their embrace of a diminished existence (as both symptom and effect of 
passive nihilism) inhibits their potential contribution to the advancement of the species 
insofar as they may inadvertently supplement the freedom of the rare genius capable of 
creating horizons to provide existence with (a sense of) purpose; of legislating values to 
create protracted cultural meanings.812
It is, in a specific sense, the aim of ascetic-consumerist priests of resentment, and 
the cultural philistines—or educated mob—they succor, to rationalize and habituate the 
herd to placating delusions.
  
813 According to Nietzsche’s genealogy of morality, the 
Judaeo-Christian tradition’s notion of equality of souls in the eyes of God was translated 
via Enlightenment ideals into the secular believe in the fundamental equality of men, 
which further devolved into the radical egalitarianism and enfranchisement of our 
present, hyper-decadent age.814 In political life this has is expressed through an 
ochlocratic demand for equality and a denial of the exception in favor of a leveling 
mediocrity. The result is a base culture that celebrates the lowest common denominator of 
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the most inferior types. With a discordant instinctual system governing their unhealthy 
drives and impulses, herd members, deluded into believing they inhabit the best of all 
possible worlds, are eventually prevented from effectively willing at all.  
Accustomed to this mis-representation of their weakness by secular slave 
morality, their antipathy for life becomes so banal that it eventually fails even to 
culminate in an urge to suicidal nihilism: they are too indifferent or sedated to 
contemplate self-destruction.815 Primary among the ambitions of ‘good Europeans’ is to 
provide those capable of rescuing themselves from such a numb condition with the tools 
to do so, while allowing the incurably sick to pursue their own demise.816 They would 
offer this for the future of the species, by adhering to the master morality of breeding.817 
While Nietzsche’s normative exhortations eschewed reliance on the confusion of cause 
and effect (his identification of which was a central feature of his epistemological critique 
of the Western philosophical tradition), the resilient ‘good Europeans’ he identified 
cultivate within themselves, through ongoing efforts at self-overcoming, an improved 
instinctual system for governing their native drives and impulses.818
 
 This effective self-
regulation affects macro-level improvements of the social order within the existing socio-
political milieu. Their courageous experiments on both themselves and the community 
into which they are thrown constitute a deliberate engagement with their fate in a 
collaborative creation of possibilities for their own becoming.  
Part Two: Good Europeans as instigators of a successor era to modernity 
 
As for achieving their shared ‘idea of Europe’ in the present, Nietzsche’s ‘good 
Europeans’ “as heirs of Europe, the rich but also excessively obligated heirs of millennia 
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of European spirit”819 reject any reactive, pseudo-revolutionary programs to replace 
globalization’s metanarratives with a salvific alternative—though they might strategically 
support aspects of them consistent with their “right” to tell a ‘noble lie.’ Rather, they 
recognize the EU’s utility as a mechanism for expanding the range of conventional 
political options through increased interconnectivity, multiplicity and institutional 
diversity and seek to hijack it, to transform its disposition and divert its course. They aim 
to gradually install an alternative, anti-Christian-Platonic (anti-liberal-modernist) ideal 
toward their ‘idea of Europe’ to cure the nihilism and treat the injurious effects of the 
hyper-decadence of their age. As artists whose medium is the political reorganization of 
dissipated life, they strive to give form to machinic instruments capable of assisting the 
achievement of their objective.  
There is another paradox entailed in this however, as Ansell-Pearson, reflecting 
on Nietzsche’s advocacy of such creative acts, of artifice, notes: 
Nietzsche’s demand for the philosophical legislation of a new politics of breeding 
and cultivation, which owns up to the artificial character of its own artful 
techniques of selection, reveals its own revenge against time, against the time of 
evolution, exposing a fear and loathing of contingency and the reign of chance 
hitherto.820
The all-too-human fear of our radical temporality and related loathing of contingency and 
chance often results in a propensity for other-worldly explanations of reality and salvific 
promises of redemption, all of which entail anti-natural acts of self-denial. Historically, 
mis-leaders have exploited the fear and insecurity that prompts this tendency and 
manipulated communities by means of the superstitious inclinations it generates for profit 
and/or political power. Mediocrity tends to predominate when humankind is left to the 
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devices of these agents of anti-naturalism, deniers of the body and weaklings, whose 
legislations retard the healthy development of the species thereby.821  
By implementing a politics of breeding legislated by the best the realization of an 
overhuman condition might be hastened in defiance of the passive nihilists’ resignation 
and the deterioration of certain capacities to act. By this I refer to the priorities given to 
the affective powers (dynamis) of an entity via enhancements of its functioning and 
actualization (energeia) – a relation inextricable from the conative disposition or 
anticipatory resoluteness referred to above. It is through the norms conferred by values 
particular to a cultural milieu and ones’ emplacement in the world that an individual’s 
corresponding stance toward the unfolding of time is conditioned. Values, or changes to 
them, therefore determine the interdependent relation of motion and time in the 
experience of the world particular to a people – a experience expressed as culture. 
As Conway makes clear, in the midst of a thoroughly exhausted age Nietzsche 
thought that even the most effective legislators (Gesetzgeber) could only stabilize the 
social organism (polity) until it was capable of undertaking a revitalization, i.e.: until 
conditions were conducive to its fuller rehabilitation. 
The lawgivers who preside over declining peoples and epochs are not the 
mythical creators of new values, but crafty bricoleurs of depleted, recycled and 
abandoned political resources. If ruled wisely, declining peoples can continue to 
thrive, through a strategic inhabitation of the traditions and institutions founded 
(and externalized) by their predecessors. But they can neither found new 
institutions and traditions of their own nor contribute to the objectified vitality of 
those they inherit.822
The EU, in the context of globalization, is such an innovative response to certain crises 
fomented by reactive trends and all-too-human preferences extending back into the late-
19th century.  
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The EU’s policies, enforcement of norms and instrumental role in distilling liberal 
values into contemporary human rights discourses (It’s arbiters’ tactical enactments of 
the customs established by their forbearers—as Conway describes in the citation above) 
have had the effect of insuring greater security and raising so-called “living standards” in 
all regions of the continent into which it has expanded, as well, quite discernibly, as the 
world beyond its borders. These achievements suggest at least the partial and on balance 
positive fulfillment of the EU’s original purpose, at least as defined by those who, as 
Nietzsche would likely have put it, suffer indigestion for having eaten badly. 
But are the EU’s arbiters merely managing a depleted set of institutions or are 
they creating conditions of possibility for a future nomothetic legislator? In the same 
passage Conway asserts that: 
The resourceful innovations of a plucky bricoleur may not be as impressive as the 
founding labors of a legislator of new values, but decadent peoples and ages 
simply cannot afford the luxury of a Promethean lawgiver.823
The selective tastes of those courageous experimenters willing to embrace chance 
and legislate nomothetically may unintentionally contribute to an enhancement of vitality 
 
 
In our dawning age of globality the most unexpected becomings are ever more likely, not 
as more of the becoming-same the contemporary hegemonic technological rationality 
propagated through the metadiscourse of ultra-liberal-modernity compels to present as 
innovation (the contemporary doctrine of “progress”) but in startling challenges to 
current convention. These genuinely radical transmutations of familiar forms of life are 
ever more unconstrained and ever more dangerous to the ascetic-consumerist priests 
whose loathing of the incalculable (of authentic becoming or life itself) serves as the 
basis of prevailing values in post-industrial society.  
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at the macro-level of the political sphere, and possibly found new institutions and 
traditions. Whether their pioneering acts or the nomothetic legislations of one promethean 
exception will be so profitable cannot be known except retrospectively. They are likely to 
occur as lucky accidents. But such fortunate occurrences are being made more probable 
through realizations of the abstract potentials of globality. The capacities they create are 
just as likely to be exponential as linear in their development. 
Anticipating essential elements of the globalization complex (what Hardt and 
Negri have dubbed Empire), ‘the common economic management of the earth,’ as an 
inevitable consequence of the reactive trends of his own age, as well as the positive 
potentials it would inadvertently create for the salubrious development and overcoming 
of humankind, Nietzsche wrote: 
…as the consumption of man and mankind becomes more and more economical 
and the “machinery” of interests and services is integrated ever more intricately, a 
counter-movement is inevitable. I designate this as the secretion of a luxury 
surplus of mankind: it aims to bring to light a stronger species, a higher type that 
arises and preserves itself under different conditions from those of the average 
man… Once we possess that common economic management of the earth that 
will soon be inevitable, mankind will be able to find its best meaning as a 
machine in the service of this economy—as a tremendous clockwork, composed 
of ever smaller, ever more subtly “adapted” gears; as an ever-growing superfluity 
of all dominating and commanding elements; as a whole of tremendous force, 
whose individual factors represent minimal forces, minimal values.   
In opposition to this dwarfing and adaptation of man to a specialized utility, a 
reverse movement is needed—the production of a synthetic, summarizing, 
justifying man [the “Übermensch”] for whose existence this transformation of 
mankind into a machine is a precondition, as a base on which he can invent his 
higher form of being… Otherwise it [the economic mechanization of man] would 
really be nothing but an overall diminution, a value diminution of the type man—
a regressive phenomena in the grand style… 824
Aside from demonstrating Nietzsche’s sensitivity to the conditions of life in Europe 
during his age and his inimitable foresight, the extent to which the section above 
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accurately characterizes contemporary life may be debatable, but it truly foreshadowed 
many contemporary critiques of everyday life (e.g.: the Frankfurt School, post-
structuralists, deconstructionists, post-modern and post-Marxian or “Marxis” analyses). 
The passage conveys his desire to see such potentially harmful trends, which for the 
prevailing decadence of the age were inexorably to worsen, used productively, by artist 
warriors or thymotic free spirits; that is, he hoped to spur certain of his readers to 
transfigure those trends through their machinic becomings and ultimately overcome 
them(selves) to realize a transhuman future. 
In a passage from the same period (1887—1888) Nietzsche hints at the force of 
will required to transfigure the conditions of life he anticipates in his “overall view of the 
future European”, by which he refers to the mediocre multitude: 
…the most intelligent slave animals, very industrious, fundamentally very 
modest, inquisitive to excess, multifarious, pampered, weak of will—a 
cosmopolitan chaos of affects and intelligence. How could a stronger species raise 
itself out of him? …To fight upward out of that chaos to this form [the 
übermenschlich striving for moral and political perfection]—requires a 
compulsion: one must be faced with the choice of perishing or prevailing. A 
dominating race can grow up only out of terrible and violent beginnings. 
…Obviously, they [übermenschlich] will come into view and consolidate 
themselves only after tremendous socialist crises—they will be the elements 
capable of the greatest severity toward themselves and able to guarantee the most 
enduring will.825  
 
It is upon this foundation – the toil of the many – that the healthiest individuals are 
relieved the burden of laboring for their survival, in order to pursue the greater project of 
their personal self-overcoming. Their severity toward themselves and the endurance of 
their will arouses the passion of others who are provoked to create for themselves and 
participate in the founding of culture.  
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Though it strikes us as cruel sounding, on this point Nietzsche, as Conway 
observes, is adamant, for suffering in unavoidable and can only be given meaning 
through the spiritualization of cruelty – the acceptance of suffering – “lest [by attempting 
to abolish suffering and refraining from all cruelty] we disable the engine of moral 
progress [and] indulge our pity ‘for “the creature in man,” for what must be formed, 
broken, forged, torn, burnt, made incandescent and purified—that which necessarily must 
and should suffer’”.826 Earlier in the same text, Conway reminds us that, with regard to 
the quest for perfection, “Nietzsche envision[ed] the completion (rather than the 
transcendence) of the all-too-human.”827 The terms of his perfectionism are not 
comprehensible to those incapable of no more than unconsciously reiterating the slave-
moral ascetic ideals and the decadence Nietzsche strove to overcome and in which, as a 
product of modernity, he himself was implicated. 
With regard to the prospects of forging, or inventing, a new, shared European 
awareness and sense of identity, Von Ham notes that, “[c]learly Europe can look back on 
a checkered past and the only way [to overcome the ressentiment this inflames is] to 
develop a ‘European consciousness’ [by] turn[ing] our backs on European history [so as 
to] develop as a community that is oriented toward the future.”828 In the same context he 
suggests that a disembedded identity forged out of a reversed identity politics capable of 
fostering a shared and intersubjective understanding of culture, and commensurate sense 
of solidarity may ultimately serve as a basis for a new form of community.829
Based upon Nietzsche’s quasi-prescriptive formula of self-overcoming through 
the experimental art (Versucherkunst)—regimes of self-discipline (askesis) and agonal 
acts of self-creation (auto-poiesis)—I suggest a six-fold strategy, or techne, based on key 
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classical, primarily skeptic principles, through which the “best-types” might co-opt the 
EU’s institutions from within to become good Europeans. By extension, they thereby 
realize ever-higher approximations of the moral and political perfection they seek at the 
macro-level as they actualize their idea of Europe. These philosophical principles, drawn 
from the ancient skeptical, stoic and cynic traditions, correspond directly with and 
presumably influenced many of Nietzsche’s own. They coextend with and support his 
appeal for the strongest to engage in regimes of voluntary discipline, including (as 
enumerated by Hutter, 2006) periods of recuperative solitude, the cultivation of agonistic 
friendships, the often excruciating exercise of writing and reading oneself, continual 
attention to and regulation of ones nutritional needs (physical, psychical and intellectual) 
and habitation, and the promotion of dance for the physical expression of spirit as well as 
laughter (Nietzsche’s “gay science”) whereby one says what is most serious through that 
which gives amusement.  
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Section Two: Nietzschean praxis 
Part One: A Six-Fold Skeptical Strategy to Foster Weltironie or ‘Good 
Europeanism’ 
 
A skeptical knowledge of reactive power’s deleterious affective capacities may 
provide Nietzsche’s thymotic sovereign individuals with the tools, power and capacity 
necessary to utilize it advantageously; not a doctrine (which would replicate dogmatisms 
or ascetic ideals it seeks to avoid), it comprises a set of yielding strategies for action and 
active coping with our hyper-decadent epoch. As Pappas notes, “[a]s a rule skepticism 
exacerbates the weakness of the average person. But a strong skepticism in the same 
culture… can turn the groundlessness of modern values into an occasion for new 
discoveries.” He cites BGE: 209, in which Nietzsche praises the kind of skepticism that 
fosters the world-historical irony, or Weltironie, required by would-be comedians of the 
ascetic-consumerist ideals that preponderate in our hyper-decadent age:  
This skepticism despises and nevertheless appropriates; it undermines and takes 
possession; it does not believe but does not die out on this account; it gives the 
spirit a dangerous freedom, but is severe on the heart.830 
 
It is an encouraging product of the same “immense physiological process …the process 
of increasing similarity [hybridization] between Europeans”, the leveling effects of which 
are more often than not negative, and thus an unanticipated affirmative result of 
“Europe’s democratic movement”.  
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As stated above, Nietzsche associates the atypical, positive consequences of this 
with the ethos of good Europeanism, “the intrepidity of the gaze, the courage and severity 
of the dissecting hand, or the tenacious will to dangerous voyages of discovery,” as 
against the dissipative, liberal sympathies of “warm-blooded and superficial 
humanitarians,” whom he criticizes as “gentle, good-hearted, weak-willed poetic 
fools.”831 Such unexpected outcomes, enactments of “their need to go further, with bold 
and painful experiments” through the exploitation of emergent potentials of globality, 
evince their conative disposition or anticipatory resoluteness. This distinguishing 
temperament and worldview co-extends both with their skepticism and the world-
historical irony that enables good Europeans to take a longer view with regard to the 
question of what humankind ought to become. Their Dionysian (tragic) understanding 
makes them capable of taking responsibility for themselves through disciplinary regimens 
(askesis) of self-creation (auto-poiesis) that become nomothetic legislations. Good 
Europeans will arouse the passions of other healthy individuals through the naturalizing 
effect of their eros. The future-shaping mimetic performances which are spurred by their 
agonal striving for self-perfection (active force or a positive will to creative destruction as 
generative power), will incrementally instantiate an alternative, natural, political order.832
For what should be obvious reasons, classical skeptics were generally wary of 
admitting certain guidelines or rules for behavior, though they did seek to advise their 
students on the necessity of cultivating a skeptics’ disposition, and these can persuasively 
be taken as stratagems for living that, when combined, loosely substantiate a doctrine. 
But this can be done so only with difficulty, and cannot be said to strictly consist with the 
radical, Pyrrhonic variety of skeptical thought. But it does consist closely enough with 
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varying articulations of skeptical thought from the Academic school typified by 
Arcesilaus and Carneades to post-Academic skepticism of Anesidemeus and Sextus 
Empiricus, and down through the challenges posed by doubters of the Middle Ages and 
Renaissance – thinkers such as Michel de Montaigne, Blaise Pascal (through his Jansenist 
wager) and his protestant contemporary, Pierre Bayle, to be consistent with the spirit of 
that influential philosophical school of thought. Since Descartes’ reinvigoration of 
skeptical thought, a skeptical approach has defined Western philosophy, culminating in 
Nietzsche’s startling critique of modernity. Today the post-Nietzschean skeptical 
tradition manifests itself in deconstructionist, post-modern and post-structuralist thought; 
contemporary expressions of a long, qualifiedly anti-rationalist intellectual tradition 
consistent with the authentic spirit of Western thought.833   
In the present, the healthiest and most clever individuals, whose joy in and desire 
for life best equips them to resist the poison-mixing ascetic-consumerist priests of 
ressentiment, may exploit the simulacrum generated by globalizing institutions and 
processes to overcome its addling effects. Each of these unique “lucky strikes” are likely 
to emerge from the multitude – would-be exemplars of some dimension of humankind’s 
potential advantageously gifted by fate with the capacity to implement the skeptical 
strategies and discipline for living necessary to co-opt the potentially totalizing control 
over reality exerted by the simulacrum.834 Opposed to nihilism, Nietzsche’s would-be 
heroic individuals seek, without nostalgia, to provide the multitude with hope through 
meaning, new meaning for life, even if all meaning is mortal.835
 
 Anticipating certain 
insights in the recent works of Foucault and Agemben (including such concepts as  
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“technologies of the self” and “bio-power”) that so excite students today, Nietzsche 
asserted: 
Truth has need of power. – In itself truth is no power at all – whatever its 
flatterers of the Enlightenment may be accustomed to say to the contrary! – It has, 
rather, to draw power over to its side, or go over to the side of power, or it will 
perish again and again!  This has been proved sufficiently and more than 
sufficiently!836  
 
And he also maintained that: 
Knowledge works as a tool of power. Hence it is plain that it increases with every 
increase of power… In order for a particular species to maintain itself and 
increase its power, its conception of reality must comprehend enough of the 
calculable and constant for it to base a scheme of behavior on it.837 
 
While based on the skeptical knowledge that its own “truth” corresponds with the power 
inherent to a superior spirit of will, it dares, if only as an expression of its own beautiful 
folly and willful (self-)delusion, to posit a “truth” for itself at least. This entails a double 
awareness that this will is truly reflective of the interests of the best, but not in and of 
itself universally true.  
To effectuate their objectives they must (as Conway suggests) become master 
rhetoricians and deploy related masks that persuasively convey both the esoteric meaning 
of their truths, to those capable of comprehending it, and their exoteric message, for those 
who cannot be changed but may nevertheless be persuaded to unwittingly further their 
political goals and thus be instrumentally useful. Conway observes Nietzsche’s own 
failure to attain rhetorical mastery for his inability to “enforce an effective distinction 
between [his] esoteric and exoteric teachings.”838
The distinguishing mark of rhetorical mastery is the strategic deployment of 
rhetorical devices in the service of larger political ends. The rhetorical master 
 This is based on Nietzsche’s own 
practical recognition that: 
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succeeds not only in assembling an elite cadre of esoteric readers, but also in 
persuading his exoteric readers of the wisdom and justice of his political vision; 
these latter readers need not be exposed to the master’s esoteric wisdom in order 
to serve his covert political ends.839 
 
As preeminent rhetoricians gradually succeed in indiscernibly usurping power by means 
of its discourses and hijacking its exertion and thus its control through bio-power, the 
esoterically conveyed values of the strongest will be productively misunderstood by the 
mob, populi or political parties, and so must be represented and exoterically enforced as 
“true” for a salubrious socio-ethico-political order to nurture the becoming of 
übermenschlich.840  
Before the herd, and particularly when challenged, it must be unyielding and 
strident – that is cruel, like any value system, through a system of reinforcing traditions, 
mores and laws – in order to be either appreciated or believed. For the dawning post-
modern epoch’s transhuman future this does not intimate revolutionary social upheavals 
in the usual sense of barricades in the streets, but an incremental intensification of the 
agon by the herd itself, the sublimation of its increased suffering accomplished through 
the simulacrums of neo-liberal capitalism and representative democracy that inure it and 
teach it to find satisfaction in its own exploitation. Such intensification will invariably 
hasten the overcoming of those social forms by fomenting crises the basis of which are 
generated by contradictions internal to their own doctrines, i.e.: capital process’s mantra 
of unlimited profit growth and democracy’s sham of political inclusion through 
predetermined participation.  
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Modernity must run its course and exhaust itself. Conway states an important 
correction to common misunderstandings of the role of the lawgiver or the even worse 
misreading of the Übermensch. 
No mortal can legislate against the economic destiny of his age as a whole. The 
emergence of a lawgiver who creates new values does not cause a new epoch to 
begin, but instead signals that the career of a new epoch is already underway.841 
 
Fundamentally transformed notions of ecological responsibility, innovation in bio-genetic 
engineering, artificial intelligence and prosthetic augmentations of the human form will 
assist a machinic evolution of transhuman freedom in and functioning toward a higher 
future. Nietzsche realized early on that a paradoxical feature of life in civil society and 
productive freedom was the systematic exclusion entailed in valuing and pitiless utility of 
a spectrum of exploitations. These were distinguishing and inextricably characteristic 
features of political life, or humankind in community, irrespective of the racial, cultural, 
or historical context of the society in question.  
Once again, it was in the early, unpublished essay ‘The Greek State,’ where 
Nietzsche first (and perhaps most evocatively) articulated his understanding of the role of 
the political dimension of human activity, as the formalized enactment of cruelty and 
appropriation, for the improvement of humankind: 
Accordingly, we must accept this cruel sounding truth, that slavery is of the 
essence of culture, a truth of course, which leaves no doubt as to the absolute 
value of existence. This truth is the vulture that gnaws at the liver of the 
Promethean promoter of Culture. The misery of toiling men must still increase in 
order to make the production of the world of art possible to a small number of 
Olympian men. …For it is not to be forgotten that the same cruelty, which we 
found in the essence of every culture, lies also in the essence of every powerful 
religion and in general in the essence of power, which is always evil; …Therefore 
we may compare this grand culture with a blood-stained victor, who in his 
triumphal procession carries the defeated along as slaves chained to his chariot,  
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slaves whom a beneficent power has so blinded that, almost crushed by the 
wheels of the chariot, they nevertheless exclaim: “Dignity of labor! Dignity of 
man!”842
This logos is enacted through their nomothetic legislations: their ongoing striving 
for perfection through regimes of self-cultivation and overcoming that comprise a 
personal praxis. The affective power of their vitality and effectiveness of their insight for 
life influences weaker types, spurring them to mimetically pursue creative disciplinary 
techniques of the self that further accentuate difference (thereby productively stimulating 
desire as a consequence of generating otherness) and fostering acceptance for the 
authentic rank order of types (Rangordnung). Along a spectrum from the strongest or 
healthiest to the weakest or sickliest, the authenticity of authorial selfhood becomes 
visible, from those ‘spiritual nomads’ and wanderers who, as authentically authentic – 
agonists who share the foundational experience (logos) of the No-thing and remain open 
to the mysterious source of Being (always understood as the entirety of becoming), to 
those who engage in meditative thinking and nobly struggle to resist fallenness, the ease 
of herd resignation to which less vital types succumb and who, strive though they may, 
 
 
If the objective of providing humanity with meanings for life requires the context of 
healthy cultures within which great works can fortify and disseminate values as ideals to 
be maintained, then some aspect of expropriation of productive activity must occur given 
the differences in the fallenness of the ‘They’ – the resignation and acquisitiveness of the 
herd – and the conative dispositions or anticipatory resoluteness of genuinely free 
individuals. The latter are distinguished from the many by their intuitive recognition of 
the logos, or underlying grounds for meaning and political authority provided by their 
extraordinary health.  
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are only able to become authentically inauthentic. The latter do not strive to perfect 
themselves, per se, but may nevertheless unwittingly serve to enhance the species by 
performing the inferior, albeit necessary role of calculative thinkers, out of whose striving 
the scientific rationality and technological society predicating globality arises.  
The basest and most dangerous type for life (the sort dominant in our hyper-
decadent epoch) is gradually eliminated. They are lent assistance in pursuing their own 
self-destruction and actively bred out of existence via the biopower exerted through rule 
by the best.843 These are the terminally ill, inauthentically inauthentic “individuals”, who 
utterly carefree and indifferent about it are content to exist as mere semblances of 
beings.844
Unlike Hume’s skepticism, which in an echo of Pyrrho went so far as to doubt 
even the basis for skepticism itself and so anticipated the contemporary aporias of 
thought and epistemological dilemmas so many liberal post-moderns find themselves in, 
Nietzsche’s übermenschlich types risk themselves by recognizing this transhistorical fact 
and accept the objective it sets for them to achieve a “truer” or re-naturalized order. 
Taken collectively the strategies comprising Nietzsche’s skeptical techne express a wary 
disposition toward a decadent society’s standard values – the prerogatives of the herd. 
Thus it constitutes an “ironic” scheme for identifying and achieving the good for the 
 Conversely, in a healthy milieu the best are uninhibited, and become masters 
both of action (which comes to comprise their exoteric teaching) and style (which comes 
to comprise an esoteric teaching) with the strength of will to affect change according to 
their social vision and corresponding political design for attaining the future greatness of 
European culture.  
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strongest (and by extension humankind), that consists with a Pyrrhonistic ephectic 
drive.845 
Developed in terms of the contingency of all truth claims and the “fundamental” 
irrationality of all solutions to humanity’s problem of meaning, it effectively accounts for 
the Habermasean objection to genealogical critique as leading to a performative 
contradiction. It also accounts for Fraser’s insistence on the need to postulate norms, as 
an explicit prescription for greater individual autonomy and type of normative program 
for expanding the capacity and capability of individual self-determination. Moreover, it 
fulfills certain Foucaultian objectives, for warrior-genealogists implement its critical 
ethos to sustain an anti-liberal ethics and practice of dissent.846  
Such a scheme will not appeal to irredeemable decadents, but energetic agents 
may enact it as an expression of and effort to realize their native vitality, according to the 
volitional resources they possess.847 Conceived as aesthetic acts in a nomothetic medium, 
those spirited enough to adhere to its tenants pursue and fulfill them in an ongoing effort 
at self-creation, taking themselves as their masterpiece, they become their own ongoing 
works of art. Thus this technique of the self directly corresponds to Nietzsche’s 
perfectionism and insistence on the necessity of positing values. 
Six interrelated skeptical principles comprise this pragmatic criterion through 
which pluripotent individuals may maximize their power, transfigure dissipative ascetic-
consumerist values and augment a more “natural” organization of macro-political 
instincts in the public sphere. They are explicated below (in no particular order of 
significance):  
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Akatalepsia, entails recognition of the impossibility of certain knowledge, or the 
ultimate ungraspability of truth. The doctrine of akatalepsia foreshadowed Nietzsche’s 
skeptical, interrogatory disposition toward all truth claims, a disposition that led him to 
formulate his notion of will-to-truth and to assume a “perspectivalist” stance toward all 
“truth” claims. This is brilliantly explicated in Nietzsche’s unpublished essay On Truth 
and Lies in a Non-moral Sense (1873), which anticipates the insights of Derridian 
deconstruction and much of twentieth century linguistic philosophy, among other 
movements that would become fashionable a century later: 
What then is truth? A movable host of metaphors, metonymies, and 
anthropomorphisms: in short, a sum of human relations which have been 
poetically and rhetorically intensified, transferred and embellished, and which, 
after long usage, seem to a people to be fixed, canonical, and binding. Truths are 
illusions which we have forgotten are illusions; they are metaphors that have 
become worn out and have been drained of sensuous force, coins which have lost 
their embossing and are now considered as metal and no longer as coins.848
“Truth” as a will to (self-)deception was, Nietzsche asserted, a complex operation 
in which an dividual chooses to believe in untruth for the convoluted reason (in a dual 
sense) of metaphysical realism and its enforcement via social convention. As settled-upon 
error, what gets called truth is really mass assent to matters of belief about putatively 
  
  
Nietzsche’s critique of values extends from a critique of the criterion of truth and the 
function of language in generating and validating it; the legitimacy of dogmatic assertions 
of facts and their objectivity in reality and the convictions that arise there from. Nietzsche 
rejects the positivist notion that objective truth is attainable but accepts that empirical 
observations of the world can provide a perspectivally contingent basis for the assertion 
of guiding facts for action in life. In this he possibly resembles a philosophical falliblist 
more than a skeptic of the Pyrrhonic variety.  
 491 
objective facts resulting from a mischaracterization of the facticity of things. This 
produces a tautologous circuitry to reinforce its own delusory portrayal of the world and 
engender confidence in a correspondingly grounded reality. The effort to externalize 
these mass ascensions to beliefs-cum-convictions and enforce compliance with them is 
the starting point of moral systems and arguably the political.  
Akatalepsia, in the spirit of open-mindedness and wonder is a crucial component 
of a Nietzschean worldview (Weltanschauung) that corresponded with Descartes’ famous 
counsel “de omnibus dubitandum [everything is to be doubted]”. Our awareness that 
objective or final truths are impossible is based on our recognition of the subjectiveness 
of our assessments of what is or is not an ‘evident’ object of inquiry, the establishment of 
which is a key precondition for ascertaining (such hypothetical) facts about the world 
beyond what is immediately, empirically evident; claims about the objective world. The 
evident – non-evident distinction over the nature of claims about legitimate matters of 
inquiry raises significant uncertainty about what possibly crucial dimensions of reality we 
are unable to access or sufficiently comprehend, thereby warranting akatalepsia.849
The doctrine of akatalepsia virtually compels another skeptical stance, that of 
epoche, the second aspect of the skeptical techne comprising Nietzschean praxis. Epoche 
refers to the practice of suspending judgment on the truth or falsity of moral values or the 
fixed applicability of particular ethical virtues (disregarding Nietzsche’s persistent, if 
romantic, preference for the virtue’s of classical Greece), and one’s belief or disbelief in 
certain notion, principles or ideas. It also involves recognition of the condition of 
isostheneia (equipollence) characteristic of opinions and the imbrications of all 
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perspectives in the health of the individual advancing them as well as the culture in which 
an individual/perspective developed.850 This is necessitated by the realization that: 
Human intellect cannot avoid seeing itself in its own perspectives, and only in 
these. We cannot look around our own corner: it is hopeless curiosity that wants 
to know what other kinds of intellects and perspectives there might be.  Rather 
has the world become “infinite” for us all over again, inasmuch as we cannot 
reject the possibility that it may include infinite interpretations.851 
 
On the will-to-truth in morality and science, Nietzsche asks:  
Just consider thoroughly: ‘why do you not want to deceive?’, especially when it 
should appear, – and it does appear! – as though life were aimed at appearance, I 
mean at error, deception, dissemblance, delusion, self-delusion, and when on the 
other hand, that great manifestation of life has, in fact, always shown itself to be 
on the side of the most unscrupulous polytropoi. Such a resolve might, to give it a 
mild gloss, perhaps be a piece of quixotism, a small, enthusiastic folly; it could, 
however, also be something much worse, namely a destructive principle hostile to 
life… ‘Will-to-truth’ – that could be a hidden will to death. – In that way, the 
question: why science? leads back to the moral problem: Why morality at all, 
when life, nature, history are non-moral? …our faith in science is still based on a 
metaphysical faith… that truth is divine …but what if precisely this becomes 
more and more unbelievable, when nothing any longer turns out to be divine 
except for error, blindness and lies – and what if God himself turned out to be our 
oldest lie?852
Epoche, is the practice of suspending one’s belief in final truths, as absolutely 
certain knowledge of reality is ultimately unattainable. It is adopted by ‘good Europeans’, 
to maintain a worldview (Weltanschauung) appropriate to their higher, “immoral” 
 
 
Every will-to-truth always already contains a moral dimension, in so far as it seeks to 
maintain an imposition of meaning on a world lacking any. Science, as Nietzsche saw it, 
rather than pursuing knowledge for its own sake for the sheer wonderment it excites and 
the passion it arouses, all too often served as a tool for rationalizing and justifying such – 
ultimately moral – impositions of meaning. Though Nietzsche would likely qualify this 
assertion today, he would have remained just as critical of the purposes science serves. 
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objectives. The practice of epoche supports their personal cultivation of the 
autochthonous habits and practices of “their” hybridized and plastic cultural, regional and 
national affiliations and identities so that they may in time transcend them, incorporating 
their history, facticity and socially conferred meanings into an encompassing 
cosmopolitan disposition (Weltanschauung) augmented by globality.  
Their recognition of the relative situatedness of all customs, habits and mores 
provides the distance required to both accept their “heritage” and integrate difference into 
their perspective on life (including, crucially, themselves). They may thereby 
strategically avoid the counter-productive extremes of an unmitigated Pyrrhonic skeptical 
stance and its deleterious consequences (popularly understood as a radical form of 
doubt—or unreasonable relativism—in which it is asserted that no truth claim can 
correspond with reality whatsoever, or that if one could its correspondence could not be 
definitively known). In other words the practice of epoche enables them to recognize the 
necessity of behaving as if truths were certainly real and as if the essentialisms of the 
arbitrary identities and culturally specific values that (at least initially) construct persons 
as “individuals” are transcendently true. Such behavior is unnecessary among their peers, 
but crucial to the preservation of order among weaker types for whom (universal or 
essential) truths are critically important.   
Ataraxia is the ancient skeptic and stoic doctrine of disciplined withdrawal; 
mastering one’s desires to achieve a state of relative imperturbability. As a part of a 
Nietzschean skeptical techne this doctrine must submit to a measure of qualification, for 
it is not included here to suggest any reluctance on the part of the practitioner of ‘good 
Europeanism’ to take decisive action (as it did in its original Stoical variation) rather, 
 494 
here the doctrine of ataraxia is applicable to Nietzschean praxis as the recommendation 
of long contemplation in the effort to become what and who one is. It is coterminous with 
Nietzsche’s ascetic practice of solitude, ramifying the cultivated state of 
contemplativeness and inner rumination necessary for self-knowledge. In addition it 
augments the free s 
pirit’s quiet rejection of the simulacrum’s simulated values and ersatz existential 
fulfillments, as well as the spectacular practices that serve to provide the herd illusory 
ontological purpose, through a critical stance toward all such specious truth claims. 
Toward this (and against “Socratic, malicious certitude”) Nietzsche asserts that:  
He shall be the greatest who can be the most solitary, the most concealed, the 
most divergent, the man beyond good and evil, the master of his virtues, the 
superabundant of will; this shall be called greatness: the ability to be as manifold 
as whole, as vast as full.853 
 
Mastering the ability to direct, via instinct, as much of ones superabundant will as 
possible is the challenging task that demands solitude and concealment (a particularly 
difficult requirement in an age of the public confessional). This will to power is 
expressed in the energy involuntarily surging through one as drives and impulses. 
This is a task Nietzsche recognized the importance of and attempted to master 
when poor health compelled his early retirement from academia. As Conway states, 
Nietzsche shifted his attention to his own becoming, or the political microsphere: 
In order to become a philosopher and reclaim the task [Aufgabe] reserved for him, 
[Nietzsche] withdrew from the political macrosphere as he understood it, 
resigning his professorship at Basel and vanishing into a lonely, nomadic 
existence. 
 
And further: 
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In order to see himself as a political agent, [Nietzsche] first had to situate himself 
within the microsphere of late modernity and discipline himself to acknowledge 
the ethical resources arrayed therein. He relocates his perfectionism to the 
political microsphere only after personally testing it for himself.854 
 
Nietzsche, like his Zarathustra, left the society of which he was a part in order to prepare 
for an “armed” re-entry to the political macrosphere, which would only occur 
posthumously through his works. In his final weeks of cogency this manifested itself in 
the form of threatening outbursts directed at prominent figures of his time in letters to 
friends, some of whom recognized his developing insanity thereby. However, his 
effectual reengagement in the macro-political sphere was also bodied forth in the texts 
and publication of those works he conceived and executed in solitude (i.e.: his oeuvre 
from the middle period onward). 
Echoing his Zarathustra, who returns to society knowing himself but appearing to 
those he encounters as a buffoon, Nietzsche’s late writings announce the macro-political 
project he settled on, only to be misunderstood, manipulated and much maligned in the 
century to come. Given our contemporary inability to read slowly and with due care it his 
project would still appear foolish to many. But when his works were beginning to be 
taken seriously in the Anglo-American philosophical community, he was “charitably”, 
though incorrectly, labeled an “anti-political” thinker (as explicated above).855
Ataraxia is a crucial component of the skeptical techne required to cultivate the 
outstanding misfits and invalids who will likely embody the highest development of the 
 With the 
dramatic increase in serious Nietzsche scholarship from the 1970s onward, the ethico-
political dimensions of his thought have been more thoroughly examined and 
appreciated. 
 496 
hyper-decadence afflicting our ‘late-late-modern’ epoch. As Conway observes, it is not 
the heroes and beasts of Nietzsche’s fantasies that may redeem us in our dissipative age 
of globalization, for the superlative individuals who will realize the abstract potentials of 
globality and hasten the transfiguration of values to revivify the health of humankind and 
initiate a new epoch, “are not readily apparent to us”, and anyway “will remind no one of 
[the] world-historical conquerors” Nietzsche frequently cites as exemplars of his own 
decadent vision.856 
The fourth principle is Apangelia, an avowal not involving a commitment to truth 
or falsity. Apangelia developed in recognition of the temporal contingency and 
epistemological situatedness (e.g.: determined nature) of all consciousness, knowledge 
and truth claims. Where Nietzsche remarks that “The charm of knowledge would be 
small if so much shame did not have to be overcome on the road to it,”857 he plays on the 
assertion, ‘I know only that I know nothing’ famously attributed to Plato’s Socrates.858
The charm of knowledge, such as it is, lies precisely in the realization that every 
assertion of fact is either tautologous (and therefore charmingly naïve) or hubristic (and 
charmingly brazen), and that to make any assertions of or appeals to knowledge we must, 
in good conscience, overcome the tremendous shame that would otherwise keep us as 
silent as Pyrrho of Elis. With such a realization in mind we may profitably reorder the 
microsphere (or political life of ourselves) and avow certain truths as always contingent 
 
The point is that even such a paradoxical (or falsely modest?) assertion amounts to a 
conceit that reveals tremendous arrogance vis-à-vis the actual condition of knowing in / 
having knowledge about the world.  
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and contextually situated and affirm the efficacy of proximate kinds of knowledge 
without committing ourselves to them dogmatically.  
In the macro-political sphere, however, it is prudent to cautiously adhere to 
certain of society’s mores, taboos and proscriptions, however incurably decadent one’s 
society has become. One’s self-creation or discovery of one’s übermenschlich potential 
requires no more undo interference than the innate eccentricities of such individuals are 
certain to incite – the hassles they will inevitably endure both inure them to certain 
hardships, including a degree of loneliness and obscurity, but they need not be aggravated 
needlessly. Though they are frequently alone and “their pursuits of self-perfection go 
largely unnoticed, along with the micropolitical legislations they enact,” this aids them in 
their self-creation and discovery as well as empowering them for future macropolitical 
labors. 
Adoxastos is a critical aspect of a Nietzschean praxis. The Greek word meant 
“without belief” and referred to the disciplined effort to resist forming firm convictions 
about any issue by its skeptical exponents. In terms of their engagement at the macro-
level of the political, adoxastos is demonstrated by ‘good Europeans’ through feigned 
conformity to the prevailing social conventions and value standards of the day. This 
corresponds with Nietzsche’s advocacy of the need to experimentally adopt masks, in 
part to represent oneself “correctly”. Through the donning of masks one may outwardly 
conform to social conventions and mores in order to maximize the quanta of power one 
is, in other words, succeed. In our declining epoch the sort of individual capable of self-
cultivation would be accustomed to deploying masks and disguises. Among 
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contemporary Europeans of all ranks Nietzsche is clear that none would be discredited 
for doing so: 
The hybrid European – a tolerably ugly plebeian, all in all – definitely requires a 
costume: he needs history as his storeroom for costumes. He realizes, to be sure, 
that none of them fits him properly – he changes and changes.859 
 
The actual virtues of superlative exemplars must be disguised from the envious masses, if 
only in the interest of their self-preservation. This is not analogous to advocating 
cowardice in the face of likely persecution; rather it is the sort of pragmatic stealth 
required in order for rare, pluripotent exceptions to remain immune to their society’s 
imposed identities and malignant dissipation. Artfulness and mimicry are necessary for 
them to stand any chance of success.  
Sensitive to the spirit of revenge inherent to the meanings liberal society confers 
upon life, the furtive efforts of the strongest must to a certain point be hidden. Their effort 
to remain veiled is symptomatic of their intellectual and spiritual strength – the ploy 
utilized to achieve a threshold level of conventional success and/or legitimacy, and 
possibly never revealed as such. Theirs is a truthful deception fabricated in the face of 
existential threats and with the future greatness of the species in mind.860
If liberal egalitarians would object to such distinctions and rank ordering of types 
and subvert, through slave ressentiment, the unpopular virtues of the healthiest, the threat 
the former pose to the latter’s becoming must be mitigated through deception.
  
861 This 
thoroughly “Nietzschean” strategy, despite requiring a pragmatic distrust as a part of the 
good-conscience of those capable of adopting it, can therefore by understood as quasi-
eudemonic, in so far as it facilitates continued, unobstructed self-overcomings among the 
best (the sustained expenditure of excess force through their positive will to creative 
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destruction as generative power) and coheres with their objective of realizing affirmative 
potentials of globality.  
The latter, as a macro-political aim, depends on the flourishing of the strongest, 
who seek to overcome, that is, to creatively destroy and thereby transfigure the 
globalization complex and the ultra-liberal-modern value matrix that sustains it. As the 
strongest have, by necessity, to turn within so as to continually re-discover and invigorate 
their “virtues,” this objective consists with the natural route of their becoming. 
We Europeans of the day after tomorrow, we first-born of the twentieth century – 
with all our dangerous curiosity, our multiplicity and art of disguise, our mellow 
and as it were sugared cruelty in spirit and senses – if we are to have virtues we 
shall presumably have only such virtues as have learned to get along with our 
most secret and heartfelt inclinations, with our most fervent needs: very well, let 
us look for them within our labyrinths!862
The feigned conformity to social conventions and popular, “common-sense” 
convictions, which the doctrine of adoxastos mandates for the strongest, necessitates 
mastering the art of employing masks. This does not suggest that they hide from the 
scrutiny of others, only that they refrain from revealing themselves in conformity with the 
confessional notion of openness that prevails among the herd.
 
 
‘Good Europeans’ would adopt this strategy of employing a multitude of disguises as a 
part of the Nietzschean skeptical techne and ascetic practices of self-cultivation to 
become who it is they are. Through the artful deception of masks—the enactment of 
certain social roles, such as professor, doctor, or politician—they may remain incognito 
long enough to constructively co-opt ultra-liberal-modern (secularized Christian-
Platonic) values and direct the transmuted volition in them to natural ends. 
863 Their works reveal what 
their outward persona does not, posing challenges to the spirit of revenge. Through 
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strategic expenditures of force they squander themselves with purposeful intentionality in 
willing their own inevitable downfall. Adoxastos may also be translated “as ‘without false 
or ungrounded beliefs’”,864 and calls for representing oneself “correctly” to succeed in 
the conventional terms of ordinary life without being impeded by or unduly suffering 
from popular herd chauvinisms and prejudices. This directly corresponds with another of 
Nietzsche’s insights, specifically that:  
The degree of psychological falsity and opacity needed to sanctify the affects 
essential for the preservation and enhancement of power (in order to create a good 
conscience for them).865  
 
It also matches his view, stated in another unpublished note that “Good Europeans”, in 
their “preparation for becoming the legislators of the future,” live: 
[b]eyond good and evil—but we demand that herd morality should be held sacred 
unconditionally. We hold in reserve many types of philosophy which need to be 
taught: possibly, the pessimistic type, as a hammer; a European Buddhism might 
perhaps be indispensible. We probably support the development and maturing of 
democratic institutions: they enhance weakness of the will: in socialism we see a 
thorn that protects against comfortableness… We take our accidental positions, 
our experiences, as foreground and stress them to deceive about our depths.866 
 
Active power cannot reveal itself fearlessly in a decadent epoch, and is therefore 
compelled to disguise itself: its source, motive and intention: ergo the psychological 
falsity required to ensure its preservation. On the contrary, reactive power always already 
ramifies the established order, or status quo of such unhealthy periods. Reactive power 
does not mask itself, but is intrinsically afflicted with a counter-productive bad-
conscience as it arises out of ressentiment so thoroughly sublimated in its very enactment 
that it appears natural. 
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In addition to the pragmatic use of masks and strategic (mis)representation, 
Nietzsche also asserts that willing against the stridency of all reactive will-to-truth is an 
integral characteristic of the übermenschlich: 
The great man is necessarily a skeptic (which is not to say that he has to appear to 
be one), provided that greatness consists in this: to will something great and the 
means to it.  Freedom from any kind of conviction is part of the strength of his 
will.867
Where this crass relativism, which prevails among educated philistines (the so-
called culture class), is not operative, overt and inflexible demagoguery is deployed to 
deprecate the value-systems and cultural meanings of others with whom the arbiters of 
the globalization complex come into conflict.
 
 
When considering the meaning of this passage it is useful to recall that Nietzsche loathed 
the popular, uncritical skepticism of the masses, which he heard as an echo of the ersatz 
skepticism of their (and our present day) ascetic-consumerist priests of ressentiment: a 
base appeal to the egalitarian, laisser aller, ethos of his and our own day. Such a shallow, 
equivocal doubt of all values is but one of the poisons the latter mixed with secularized 
Christian values and with which it effectively inebriates the herd.  
868 This is especially clear when one 
recognizes that most consumer automatons in the post-industrialized “West” (the centers 
of the globalization complex) cannot reflectively assess their society’s values or the 
significant features distinguish their culture from others. Falling back upon patriotism and 
jingoistic prejudices to justify their received worldview, they are unlikely to find their 
inability to cite substantive differences problematic and remain indifferent to the fact, a 
reaction that indicates how thoroughly an uncritical relativism has conditioned 
contemporary attitudes. The ultimately contented disposition Nietzsche associated with 
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the “last man” arises from the annihilation of life-affirming meanings and significations 
rather than genuine dialogue about reigning values. Although such indifference does 
enable a certain sort of tolerance, this let-it-be attitude is antithetical to the 
perspectivalism of good Europeans, who strive to overturn the all-too-human 
spectacularized meanings of ascetic-consumerist priests of ressentiment and re-introduce 
natural values according to their good-conscience, rather than merely pander to popular 
conviction.869 
The final tenet, Parrhesia, or fearless speech, is a concept and form of praxis 
recently examined in some depth by Michel Foucault. It developed as a part of the 
doctrine of the ancient school of the Cynics. This corresponds directly with the 
untimeliness of truly free or noble spirits, the efficaciousness of whose acts is enabled by 
the preceding stances. Parrhesia – if it is to be constructive and not an utterly self-
defeating exercise – must be practiced with irony, great humor and always toward 
immediately creative, albeit destructive ends that correspond with the long-term, 
constructive ambition of healthy individuals.  
As a sophisticated challenge to the reigning ascetic/materialist ideals its utility is 
realized by those (such as Nietzsche) capable of harnessing, as Conway observes, “the 
erotic power of ascetic practices to tempt some individuals away from the anti-affective 
animus of Christian morality.”870 The immediate objective of such “comedians of the 
ascetic ideal”871
Each of us bears a productive uniqueness within him as the core of his being; and 
 is to spur those with the native vitality into accepting the unique, 
constitutional danger that would single them out from the herd and drive them toward  
realizing their intrinsic greatness. As Nietzsche observed: 
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when he becomes aware of it, there appears around him a strange penumbra 
which is the mark of his singularity. Most find this unendurable, because they 
are… lazy, and because a chain of toil and burdens is suspended from this 
uniqueness.872  
 
It is the purpose of ascetic-consumerist ideals to turn the possibility presented by this 
essence of life against life itself; to distract persons from this potential within themselves 
until they are no longer capable of identifying it – what later existentialists would identify 
as self-estrangement. The ascetic-consumerist priests of ressentiment, who demand “that 
we should accompany” them, and who “impose [their] valuation of existence” 
universally, punish those who accept that chain of toil whose burden it presents in the 
form of a continual desire for self-overcoming as becoming other.873  
Anticipating Freud’s identification of Thanatos, a death instinct or drive, 
Nietzsche recognized that the ascetic-consumerist priest succeeds with the vast majority 
by exploiting the temptations to succumb to the reactive force or negative will to 
nothingness as nihilistic power.874  This is because, being too weak to enact healthier 
instincts, the many finds denying them easier than adhering to an agonal regime of self-
discipline and creation. Instead they yield to the pressurizing habituation of a culture of 
conformity imposed by ascetic-consumerist priests.  
…An ascetic life is a self-contradiction: here an unparalleled ressentiment rules, 
that of an unfulfilled instinct and power-will which wants to be master, not over 
something in life, but over itself and its deepest strongest, most profound 
conditions; here, the green eye of spite turns on physiological growth itself, in 
particular the manifestation of this in beauty and joy; while satisfaction is looked 
for and found in failure, decay, pain, misfortune, ugliness, voluntary deprivation, 
destruction of selfhood, self-flagellation and self-sacrifice.875
Contemporary asceticism in post-industrialized service economies resembles its classic 
predecessor only in so far as self-denial remains the definitive practice with the goal lying 
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in the attainment of rewards provided by crass materialism and/or an other-worldly 
suprasensible beyond.876 Its strategy for the attainment of self-denial is avoidance, not of 
physical exertion or pleasures or even of solitude, rather it is reached via innumerable 
acts of consumption intended to divert the attention of the consumer from the 
meaninglessness of her own existence. Activities such as shopping, exercise and fitness, 
myriad entertainments and petty diversions, career obsession, etc., completely occupy the 
consciousness—and encumber the consciences—of contemporary “ascetics”, who come 
to feel ashamed of themselves if they are not constantly occupied. By performing in 
accordance with their inherently slavish nature they maintain the happiness of the last 
man. Blinking idiots, they are bored and anxious when a pensive mood encroaches on 
them. Out of a mendacious truthfulness they consider themselves unworthy of authentic 
leisure, which they consider time wasted, and indeed, they are undeserving of it. 
The new form of ascetic denial consists of consciously resisting any temptation to 
engage in critical reflection. An anti-human form of practice co-extending with the anti-
cultural ethos of ultra-liberal-modernity, it consists of deliberate abstention from 
contemplative introspection. This exercise in self-denial is support with the medically 
prescribed (re: institutionally sanctioned and medically supervised) aid of psychotropic 
pharmacological therapies, when necessary.877
In its highly-secularized new form Christianity now functions to divert its 
followers from the most dangerous form of asceticism: self-denial for the sake of oneness 
with the eternal. With no time for esoteric truths, neo-liberal capital process cannot afford 
to have otherwise productive workers “going off the rails” in pursuit of some mysterious 
spiritual enlightenment. Since the death of God Christianity must promote compliance 
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with the values of a hyper-decadent consumer society to stay relevant, and this means 
shifting the focus away from what does not feel good, namely sin and suffering 
(including the suffering of Jesus), and onto self-fulfillment through the happiness that is 
achieved via the attainment of one’s materialist goals. Ever-increasing consumption is the 
new salvation offered through Christ. 
Among the best-types this counter-instinctual aversion to introspective 
examination is learned at a tremendous cost. Born into the ascetic/materialist milieu of 
our declining, hyper-decadent age, individuals are indoctrinated from birth into “slavish” 
forms of conceptual servitude and disciplined to behave as docile and obedient herd 
animals, “whose physiological capacity to live decreases,” and who, as an individual-
that-might-have-been-but-wasn’t, strenuously resists any effort by individuals-in-the-
making, those who seek to become themselves, through their efforts at becoming other, 
or in Nietzsche’s qualified sense, following Pindar, who it is they are. 
By adhering to these positive skeptical standards that collectively describe a 
Nietzschean technique of the self, individuals endowed with the prerequisite strength may 
attain enough conventional social rank, authority and power to engage, through a 
specifically genealogical approach, in generative acts of parrhesia. By speaking fearlessly 
they seek both to preserve the simulacrum and to challenge and re-naturalize society’s 
beliefs and habits of action. Thus their fearless speech constitutes a deliberate 
intervention in the dominant power-knowledge regime that confronts conventional, 
reactive authority. Evolutionary rather than revolutionary, their legislations must appear 
to preserve the existing social order precisely to allow them to insinuate themselves into 
conventional authority structures to increase their conventional power.  
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Skeptical of the veracity of all “truth” claims, warrior-genealogists (along with 
those who share their unspoken understanding of the perspectivalist nature of all truth 
claims, the significance is comprehensible in direct proportion to the relative strength of 
the individual, the practical utility of which is contingent upon their ability to translate it 
into power in a hyper-decadent era), still posit values, or “truths” that correspond to the 
interests of the best, that may ultimately transform the social order and stimulate other 
healthy individuals to do the same. The warrior-genealogist’s approach, “while not being 
able to effectively legislate autonomy, may nevertheless seek to demonstrate its 
possibility as well as its commitment to it, [wishing] to encourage others to ‘fight’ for the 
experience of freedom without recourse to universal norms.”878 Through parrhesia they 
are the only “real enemies and injurers” of the ascetic ideal, making themselves 
comedians of it “to deliberately arouse mistrust” of its precepts which they can then 
exploit.879 As Elbe further observes in the context of examining genealogical critique, 
What the genealogist hopes is that while he refrains from giving his insights 
universal attributes, the demonstration of his own critical distancing from traditional 
structures of thinking might lead others to recognize their capacity for critique, and might 
even motivate them to pursue a similar path.880
Hitherto these extraordinary promoters of mankind have seldom felt themselves to 
be friends of knowledge but, rather, disagreeable fools and dangerous question-
marks (who) have found their task, their hard, unwanted, unavoidable task, but 
 
They become, in Nietzsche’s term, artist-philosophers, who strive, through a 
stealthy militancy, to co-opt the reactive prerogatives of the simulacrum and gradually 
transfigure its simulated values to intensify and “re-naturalize” individuals’ experience of 
the agon. In so doing they elevate humanity.   
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finally the greatness of their task, in being the bad conscience of their age.  By 
laying bare the knife vivisectionally to the bosom of the very virtues of the age 
they betrayed what was their own secret: to know a new greatness of man, a new 
untrodden path to his enlargement.881
In Nietzsche’s naturalistic view the capable few strive to strengthen the forces 
disgregating the instincts in a declining age in order to hasten their transmutation and the 
overcoming of its decadence. In our era this would equate with the intensification of the 
metadiscourse of ultra-liberal-modernity and globalization’s corresponding forces, 
  
   
As Zarathustra propounded, myriad paths to man’s enlargement are most likely to be 
created by thoroughly unconventional individuals standing outside society’s mainstream, 
whose nomothetic actions are at first contemptuously dismissed by the so-called “higher 
men” who enjoy conventional social prestige and authority. But they may also be 
revealed by apparently unremarkable persons completely ensconced in conformist social 
structures whose enforced orthodoxy diminishes the vitality of healthy individuals. 
As long as institutionalized bad-consciousness and ressentiment have not 
completely debilitated them (as it does the vast majority) this can occur in whatever 
capacity or realm they have succeeded in attaining conventional power: as bureaucrats, 
corporate officers, politicians, academics, artists, etc. Thus, as a response to the 
simulacrum generated by globalization this skeptical techne provides a means to correct 
the millennia’s old inversion of natural relations between the strong and the weak (noble 
and base) by actuating the forces needed to maximize each individual’s quanta of liberty 
to ramify the positive potential in globality. 
 
Part Two: Increasing the utility of the herd to maximize the power of the strongest 
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processes and institutions to stimulate potentials of globality and augment their 
exploitation by the strongest. In so doing the healthy may become who they are, not to 
liberate the masses from their condition of mediocre complacency, but to segue 
humankind to a post-human future. Extraordinary individuals have a self-interested stake 
in the welfare of the herd that co-extends with their broader, noble concern with creating 
a higher culture to confer meaning on existence. This lies primarily in preserving the 
herd’s practical utility by maintaining the simulacrum that endows its life with a 
placating illusion of meaning and purpose.  
This concern, which is neither utilitarian nor eudaemonic, corresponds with their 
concernful engagement for reaching elevated meanings and truths, which in any case can 
never pertain to the herd, as it cannot be emancipated from its baser nature (the liberal 
fantasy). Therefore any abrupt end to the simulacrums of ersatz meaning and purpose it is 
provided by the contemporary spectacles of our technological society would be disruptive 
and damaging. Nietzsche’s tragic artist–philosophers merely hasten the tempo of the 
dance, to increase the feverish expression of globalized society’s ingravescent decadence, 
which would proceed apace anyway. In so doing they condition the possibility—or 
stochastic development—of its overcoming, the materialization of new emergents and the 
likelihood of the appearance of Übermenschen thereby. 
In an important, if counter-intuitive sense, this fulfills the Rawlsian (autocratically 
liberal) demand that inequality between strong and weak function to the advantage of 
society’s weakest members, for the hoi polloi lack strength to achieve, let alone tolerate, 
more complete liberty.882 Their “freedom” is realized in living regulated, predictable 
lives anchored by stable meanings and essences that fortify their existence with purpose. 
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As the majority of people cannot endure too much of the suffering inherent to becoming 
(to life itself) they seek the sort of psychological and moral anodynes globalization’s 
simulacrum provides.883   
Nietzsche was quite contemptuous of the popular skepticism and resulting 
relativism that typified his own era (much like Socrates), which ruined the most 
promising young men with the “incurable wretchedness of a heart which is no longer 
hard enough for evil or for good, of a broken will which no longer commands, can no 
longer command.”884 He saw it as coextending with the secularization of slave morality 
propagated through the liberal precepts of rationalism and individual autonomy. 
Nietzsche was adamant that the herd fundamentally needs sustaining beliefs in universal 
moral truths and for this reason he determined the creation of values to be among the 
highest objectives of the master’s of the future who should naturally rule the earth.  
The popular skepticism—or superficial relativism of ‘laissez aller’—that 
manifested the decadence of 19th century Europe and Wilhelmine Germany merely 
compounded the nihilistic outlook among the throng—the all-too-many who could not, 
even marginally, contribute to the development of humankind once infected by the 
poison of relativism.885 Such skepticism threatened the already weakened basis of culture 
through anarchy bred by an “anything goes” absence of socially enforced values that 
could undermine the collective sense of purpose nurtured by the social bond.886 Nietzsche 
therefore contrasts the “indubious qualities which distinguish the critic from the skeptic: I 
mean certainty in standards of value, conscious employment of a unity of method, 
instructed courage, independence and ability to justify oneself.”887  
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The term critic is here employed to distinguish the affirmative authentically 
skeptical stance adopted by his philosophers of the future, from popular skepticism that 
breeds a casual and ruinous relativism the motto of which might be ‘don’t worry; be 
happy’. As genuine skeptics Nietzschean critics already know there are no eternal or 
universal truths (consistent with the premise of adoxastos), but involuntarily act to create 
values they will universal adherence to, as their duty to themselves. This then is at once 
their “categorical imperative” and “noble lie”—an outlook corresponding to the truthful 
deception mentioned above. Good Europeans overcome the potentially paralyzing 
knowledge that ultimately nothing can be known through (critical) acts that correspond 
with and realize their native volition. 
The noble type of man feels himself to be the determiner of values, he does not 
need to be approved of, he judges ‘what harms me is harmful in itself’, he knows 
himself to be that which in general first accords honor to things, he creates 
values.888
In the present, which is increasingly characterized by the technological 
domination of humankind, the common objective of all artist-warriors is that of 
augmenting the institutions of globalization in order to exploit potentials of globality. As 
these largely reactive dynamics increase activity, and by extension suffering, the 
innovations they give rise to bring to light opportunities for globality’s further realization. 
This requires delicately balancing the need to conscript the herd as a resource by 
appealing to their self-interest as changes brought about by globalization force them to 
 
 
According to Nietzsche, the burgeoning power of mankind’s representative exemplars is 
synonymous with humanity’s development, and crucially depends on providing the herd 
with the relatively stable moorings of an ethico-political framework capable of duration.  
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adapt, and increase their suffering. The simulation of agonistic political relations 
practiced in contemporary democracies—the interpolating axiomatic narratives 
propagated through the meta-discourse of ultra-liberal-modernity by the globalization 
complex—realizes Nietzsche’s premonition regarding the consequences of decadence, 
the high costs of which “the naïve propagators and panegyrists, the apostles of ‘modern 
ideas’, would be the least inclined to anticipate.”889  
Modern democracy prepares the ground for the works of thymotic free spirits—
“philosophers of the dangerous ‘perhaps’”—able to call into question the usefulness of all 
values, or “truths”, for life. In the same passage where Nietzsche meditated on the likely, 
albeit unanticipated consequences of democratization for Western civilization and 
realization of the noblest ideal of Europe (the salience of which may be applied to the 
prerogatives of European unification and broader political trends of globalization today), 
he asserts: 
This process of the European in a state of becoming, the tempo of which can be 
retarded by great relapses but which will perhaps precisely through them gain in 
vehemence and depth… The same novel conditions which will on average create 
a leveling and mediocritizing of man – a useful, industrious, highly serviceable 
and able herd-animal – are adapted in the highest degree to giving rise to 
exceptional men of the most dangerous and enticing quality. While the total 
impression produced by such future Europeans will probably be that of 
multifarious, garrulous, weak-willed and highly employable workers who need a 
master, a commander, as they need their daily bread; while therefore, the 
democratization of Europe will lead to the production of a type prepared for 
slavery in the subtlest sense: in individual and exceptional cases the strong man 
will be found to turn out stronger and richer than has perhaps ever happened 
before – thanks to the unprejudiced nature of his schooling, thanks to the 
tremendous multiplicity of practice, art and masks. What I mean to say is that the 
democratization of Europe is at the same time an involuntary arrangement for the 
breeding of tyrants – in every sense of that word, including the most spiritual.890 
 
Here the likelihood is suggested that in some rare instances an exceptional individual will 
 512 
emerge to become self-legislating – in Call’s sense of the post-modern anarchist. Such 
unprejudiced “spiritual tyrants” seek to utilize the masses as a reservoir of power for the 
enhancement of their involuntary positive will. In such a capacity the herd might serve as 
a resource for the historically contingent means of revaluing advancing a life-affirming 
culture they pursue. In an epoch of ascending vitality governed according to the edifying 
tradition of cultural practices that facilitate a healthy instinctual organization of the drives 
and impulses at both the micro- and macro-levels of the political, the weak would derive 
the real meaning and true purpose of their existence through serving as the instruments of 
great creators.  
Nietzsche asserted that “the philosopher as we understand him, we ‘free Spirits’”, 
would be, 
…the man with the most comprehensive responsibility, whose conscience bears 
the weight of the overall development of humanity, this philosopher will make 
use of religion for his breeding and education work, just as he will make use of 
the prevailing political and economic situation.891
The notion of a nomothetic legislator (Gesetzgeber) creating custom and 
determining law by force of will as suggested by each of the passages cited above, is not 
at odds with the assertion that the democratization of Europe may breed magnanimous 
tyrants. Nietzsche’s use of the term ‘tyrants’ is interesting for many reasons, primary 
among which is his recognition of the character such a lawgiver assumes. Nietzsche plays 
on the conventional conception of the tyrant to suggest an important double meaning: the 
  
 
Good Europeans, who may become who it is they are through the skeptical praxis 
explicated above, make the most of existing conditions, however dissolute and philistinic, 
to hasten the appearance of future Übermenschen.  
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democratization of Europe is breeding liberal ascetic-consumerist priests of ressentiment 
who are modernity’s vengeful “tyrants” over socio-political life, supervising the 
diminution of Western culture.  
Additionally, a thoroughly democratized Europe is fostering conditions within 
which a few may effectively resist its infinitely regressing simulacrums and thwart their 
anti-natural ideals by hijacking them. Through their unique, experimental art 
(Versucherkunst) they may subvert and co-opt the interdependent, interconnecting web of 
dynamic relationships constitutive of the philistinic culture and its correspondingly ersatz 
political order. As every act of valuing expresses a will-to-truth (itself constituting 
arrogance toward life, as cited above) it follows that the positing of meanings and 
“truths” is always already “tyrannical” and necessitates an embrace of cruelty. 
Nietzsche’s use of these terms should properly be understood thus and taken to suggest 
his startlingly brave honesty.  
The motif of the nomothetic legislator (Gesetzgeber) could be seen as a 
romanticization, for in actuality no nomothetic legislator as such ever acted in a wholly 
autonomous fashion. The mythologized exploits of heroes such as Gilgamesh and Thales 
aside, more familiar, historically verifiable accounts of the acts (and travails) of great 
law-givers through recorded history essay the point, irrespective of historical epoch or 
cultural context. The exploits of diverse world-historical lawgivers such as Solon, 
Lycurgus, Xerxes, Alexander, Caesar Augustus, Charlemagne, Genghis Khan, Suleiman 
the Magnificent, Akbar and Dara Shikoh, Jefferson and Madison and Napoleon, all 
personify the type. Alternatively, those whom liberal-optimists would identify as great 
leaders, men such as Roosevelt and Churchill, Monnet and Schuman, Wałęsa and Havel, 
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are in fact “plucky bricoleurs” who stabilize a declining order, mustering the residual 
volitional resources of a society to extend its duration.892 They effectively put off a 
civilization’s inevitable expiration by doctoring their diseased age to recuperate its 
residual resources. However, they are too sickened by decadence to establish, that is 
nomothetically legislate, a vital new order.893
Nietzsche sought to contend with and reconcile a fundamental dilemma intrinsic 
to the political: that of our unavoidable dependency on others and the need for 
community it imposes, versus our desire to be autonomous. In his view only an 
exceptionally power few can expend the force required to truly approximate authentic 
individualism. His recognition of this inescapable human condition, aptly summarized by 
John Donne’s famous observation that “No man is an island”, as well as its complication 
by differences in the power that individuals are, motivated him to recommend the 
experimental art of tyrannizing oneself to cultivate a needed interiority in the public 
 
The experience of each of these “great men” also serves to underscore the point 
that the most independent and capable leaders are only able to exercise and maintain 
power by satisfying the interests of those social groups upon whom his authority as leader 
or tyrant depended, whether it was—in Weberian terms—charismatic, traditional 
(monarchical) or bureaucratic in form and structure. Otherwise, any notion of 
conventional power conceived in macro-political terms is a false one, as the possibility of 
unsanctioned domination—however “spiritual”—lies outside any conceivable notion of 
legitimate political community. Although conventional political authority always already 
rests on an originary act of usurpation, actual rule by one, as such, is in practice a fiction, 
except perhaps in the case of a person living as a hermit.  
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process of becoming who one is. He believed that societies had to enact similar violences 
of self-creation if they were to prosper and that so too would the human species, if it were 
to creatively evolve and not expire from exhaustion.894
To maximize their will to power, sufficiently strengthen themselves through their 
exploitation of abstract potentials of globality, uncanny individuals or “lucky strikes” 
may employ the aforementioned skeptical techne to carefully manipulate dominant social 
 
As noted above, every regime arrogates to itself the authority to make (inherently 
subjective) determinations of value and define “justice”—determinations that are 
invariably coercive and which mystify their own autocratic conceit. These presumptions 
inevitably strike some as unjust. However, the Disneyesque, villainous ‘tyrant’ of ultra-
liberal-modernist ideological representations, the “illegitimate dictator” or “authoritarian 
despot” serves to fortify self-justifying liberal myths legitimating democratization itself – 
doctrinal axioms upon which our hyper-decadent age’s ascetic-consumerist priests rely 
for their legitimacy.  
It is precisely through the superficially harmless yet extremely subversive 
participation of vivacious anomalists in the very mechanisms and procedures of 
tyrannical control over / upon everyday life dominated by liberal autocrats that the best 
may concretely initiate the thorough revaluation of all values (Umwerthung aller Werthe) 
they instinctively desire. The involvement of such noble types occurring through their 
involvement in repressive (i.e.: anti-natural) political networks of authority and 
legitimation, the modes of social conformity and prevailing reason sabotaged through 
appropriation, transgression and (sovereign) acts of taking that create new political 
antagonisms and means of dealing with their cooptation by conventional authority.  
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mores and beliefs into serving their interests (the creative destruction of prevailing 
nihilistic values) as need merits. Recognizing even in late-modernity’s secular faith in 
reason and fetish for science a kernel of the ascetic ideal, the final phase in its 
development, they conceal their doubt, atheism and incredulity toward all beliefs with 
masks of “orthodox faith” (be they secular-materialist and / or some form of coexisting 
faith in a supernatural divinity) and so outwardly appear to uphold and abide acceptable 
social conventions and practices through performative, mimetic enactments of 
conformity.  
Using the tolerance of (ersatz) difference that the metadiscourse of ultra-liberal-
modernity deploys to reproduce itself, they challenge the permitted traditions and identic 
sensibilities comprising that difference through mocking parody’s of it. Not to be 
mistakenly conflated with the crass relativism perpetuated by the globalization complex 
itself, their kynical irony and challenging lampoons of hegemonic values subvert 
globalization’s efforts to instantiate universal normative, positive law and neo-liberal 
capitalism. They upset received authority to encourage the idea of political authority as 
originating within and emanating from forceful individuals (those capable of expending 
the greatest quanta of force) rather than as imposed from outside.  
This is occurring in myriad ways and mediums, both in globalization’s primary 
loci and at its periphery according to a complex, variable calculus arising from the 
encounter of ultra-liberal modernity’s ideological prerogative with differing cultural and 
identic sensibilities. It happens in innumerable acts of brilliant defiance consisting of 
steady, consciousness-raising subversion that may or may not employ humor to make 
their point. Some examples from around the world include the anti-consumerism of 
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Adbusters, audacious subversions of corporate authority “performed” by The Yes Men, 
Zarganar’s seditious lampoons of the Burmese junta, Charbel Khalilor’s brave parodying 
of Lebanon’s fractious politics, Hikari Ōta’s comical spoofs of Japan’s parliament, and 
Sun Mu’s wry paintings which subtly deride North Korea’s state propaganda. Without 
humorous intent, the heroically militancy of environmentalist Paul Watson constitutes 
another example. His anti-whaling ‘Sea Shepherd’ missions play a dangerous game in the 
gray area of international conservation law to protect endangered marine life.  
These defiant acts incrementally hasten the demise of slave-morality by 
challenging social norms and exposing the absurdity of regularized practices. In 
culturally specific contexts they beg the question: “What does all will-to-truth mean?” 
Nietzsche elaborates: 
… and here I touch on the problem again, on our problem, my unknown friends: 
what meaning does our being have, if it were not that that will-to-truth has 
become conscious of itself as a problem in us?… Without a doubt, from now on, 
morality will be destroyed by the will-to-truth’s becoming-conscious-of-itself: 
that great drama in a hundred acts reserved for Europe in the next two centuries, 
the most terrible, most dubious drama but perhaps also the one most rich in 
hope…895
The will-to-truth is a product of the native volition to confer meaning to existence, an 
ultimately random and potentially dangerous activity in so far as it may be self-deluding 
and damaging to potential becomings. However, necessity compels us, in the Aristotelian 
sense of the spirit (nous and energeia as correlative of his concept of dynamis) to create 
such meanings. Good Europeans must creatively destroy (transfigure) the residual 
vestiges of slave morality so that the megalopsychoi in our midst can make new use, 
according to their pathos, of the herd. Putting the all-too-many to work, particularly in 
ways that provide them with contentedness and possibilities of self-overcoming (in so far 
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as they are capable), will enable would-be Übermenschen to engage in the productive 
agonisms by which they perfect themselves. By managing (politically ordering) the 
desires and irrational prejudices of common people be it through mass-education, a new 
religion, etc., the strongest few might thereby achieve a post-human future; a 
consciousness of unanticipated, and presently inexpressible possibilities and more 
empowering modes of being.896  
If successful in this risky endeavor, they may empower themselves (and the herd 
by extension) enough to engage in the aforementioned generative acts of parrhesia that 
incite every noble type to acts of self-overcoming.   
Whoever has thought profoundly about where and how the plant man has hitherto 
grown most vigorously must conclude that…the opposite of all the herd thinks 
desirable are necessary for the elevation of the type man. A morality with such 
reverse intentions, which desires to train men for the heights, not for comfort and 
mediocrity, a morality with the intention of training a ruling caste – the future 
masters of the earth – must, if it is to be taught, appear in association with the 
prevailing moral laws, in the guise of their terms and forms.897
Yet in the post-modern era of globality this danger is not as prevalent as in 
previous eras because forces of globalization also circulate simulations of defiance of 
their “norms” in alternative sub-cultures and organized civil disobedience. Ultimately 
they spectacularize the anti-globalization movement’s oppositionality as another 
commodified identity. The culture industries and mega-media glamorize the illegal and / 
or homicidal activities of governments (regimes both within the globalization complex, 
on its periphery and in a state of exception to it), political radicals of various stripes, 
   
 
Those who fail to attain a necessary degree of power but engage in acts of parrhesia 
anyway risk being dismissed as fools, shunned as social pariahs or even condemned as 
criminals and punished for their audacity and transgressions of norms.  
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criminal cartels (Hollywood, et al.) and terrorist networks (CNN and Al Jezerra), which 
utilize numerous aspects of globalization’s many forces and processes to flourish. 
Globalization’s diverse simulacra of autochthonous cultural practices and spectacularized 
desire as consumption come thereby to comprise a hyper-reality, the reactive forces of 
which aim at totalizing forms of control to manage the chaos they themselves bring 
about.898 Yet as a molar assemblage it is still dynamic enough to modify its objectives 
and interpolate (take possession of) alternative discourses that challenge it to banalize 
alterity without completely annihilating it.899  
Its internationalizing effects simultaneously accommodate and co-opt difference 
in striving to fulfill globality’s potential. However, in this post-modern environment 
(which arguably represents an improvement over the limitations imposed in late-
modernity) the success of potentially great individuals is still unlikely, and so must be 
qualified, for: 
In every kind of injury and loss the lower and coarser soul is better off than the 
nobler: the dangers facing the latter are bound to be greater, the probability that it 
will come to grief and perish is, considering the multiplicity of the conditions of 
its life, enormous. – When a lizard loses a finger that finger grows again: not so in 
the case of a man.900
This assertion is, however defensible, quite comic. For it seems obvious that those 
accustomed to leisure and a contemplative life are going to find enduring hardship less 
bearable than the “lower and coarser soul” inured to it by a lifetime of deprivation. 
Nietzsche’s aristocratic elitism is demonstrated in all its outrageous glory here. His 
political naivety led to such unqualified pronouncements, which lent his work a 
dangerous quality that comprehensively all-too-human political parties such as the 
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National Socialists of Germany would make murderous use of in the half-century 
following Nietzsche’s death. 
Transversally innovating the impetus of ‘good Europeans’ through their 
realizations of abstract potentials of globality, the exemplars of humankind, irrespective 
of their cultural realm, civilizational milieu or national origin, condition the possibility 
for future occurrences of becoming-other through their acts of seditious satire and 
comical derision of prevailing ascetic values, which are themselves largely culturally 
European in origin. Their kynical mockery also serves to diminish the probability that 
they will perish, that is resist succumbing to the reactive requirements of the prevailing 
spirit of revenge in our hyper-decadent era. It also enables them to reclaim their place in 
the world – to reassert themselves via an invigorated positive will to power to retake their 
cultural, social and political space from its appropriation by inauthentic, imposed 
European-ness – reclaiming these aspects of themselves through form-giving acts, 
evaluations and descriptive engagements that eventuate in new and enhanced hybrid 
varieties of life. This necessitates resourcefulness to convert injury and loss into positive 
conditions for their flourishing – the incorporation of wounds suffered in the course of 
becoming in a dissipative time into the multiplicity of conditions that conduce with the 
fullest realization of their emergent potentials.  
The ironic, skeptical, critical stance of good Europeans toward themselves and all 
truth claims admits a multiplicity of othernesses that enhances this capability just as 
effectively as it does among non-European peoples who may be resisting decadent 
Western influences or the anti-human effects of their now hybridized form of life. 
Against the prerogative of the globalization complex, the transformative potentials of 
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globality present opportunities both to individuals in their specific geographical locales 
and, when realized, to the becoming of others around the world almost instantaneously. 
The paradox is that even a residually Euro-centric concern can, even in the strong wake 
generated by centuries of racist (and occasionally genocidal) colonialism, foster such 
chances and prompt active transformations of anti-human institutions and practices. 
 
Part Three: The objective of ‘‘good Europeans’’ as nomothetic legislators: realizing 
a Nietzschean idea of Europe 
 
Nietzsche’s vitalist politics and power ontology may not provide a satisfying, or 
some would argue persuasive, program for the sort of fundamental transformation he 
advocates. Prankish acts of subversive defiance and experiments in value creation, 
however life-affirming, do not in themselves provide the outlines for practicable 
alternative institutions for organizing and governing human communities or 
administering their increasingly complex needs. Yet it is just such a positivistic 
outlook—an idealistic prejudice corresponding with the discourses of scientism—that 
Nietzsche identified as inhibiting our futural becoming. Kynicism, as Sloterdijk defines it, 
conceptually dovetails with Nietzsche’s effort—an anti-dogmatic praxis—to provoke his 
philosophical reader’s to become practitioners of the “‘art of experimentation’ 
(Versucherkunst)… [that] engender the superlative human beings who alone warrant the 
future of the species.”901 Becoming experimenters and questers and comedians of the 
ascetic ideals that would otherwise oppress them, does provide a means of hastening their 
own and society’s going-down, however in so doing they may prepare the way for 
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Übermenschen endowed with the strength for nomothetic acts of self-creation that 
legislate for humankind.902 
Before genuinely radical innovators could come along, our exhaustion in 
decadence would have—ineluctably—to occur. According to Nietzsche’s vitalist 
determinism, the pre-eminence of decrepit instincts at the macro-political level made 
such a collapse both unavoidable and necessary for the species’ revivification.  
It is no use: we have to go forwards, and I mean step by step further into 
decadence (– this is my definition of modern ‘progress’…). One can inhibit this 
development and even dam up the degeneration through inhibition, gather it 
together, make it more violent and sudden: but that is all you can do.– 903
Against the ascetic-consumerist priests of ressentiment of our age who inhibit 
authentic, positive change for the sake of preserving a defunct order and naturalizing 
decadence, ‘good Europeans’, as ‘unscrupulous polytropoi’, plucky rule dissidents and 
criminal betrayers of hegemonic values, customs and laws, act so as to increase the 
pressure on the dams that block the flow of change. They hope thereby to intensify 
society’s decadence – raising the shaky dam higher – as well as the pressure for release 
via their simultaneous discrediting of the all-too-human values that intensify decadence. 
This exerts amplified force upon the dam just as it exacerbates stress fractures in its 
 
 
The best individuals, or representative exemplars within our comprehensively hyper-
decadent culture, reflexively seek to overwhelm the metaphorical dam of which 
Nietzsche speaks in the citation above. They aim ultimately to hijack the EU by assisting 
in its perfection so as to overcome it. Their championing of the formal, institutionally 
driven, ongoing reactive project of unification is a subversive brand of support that seeks 
to transmute the EU’s ethos surreptitiously.  
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foundations. As satirists, ironists, humorists and critics they undermine the dam’s 
structure in order to unleash the cleansing flood whose violence and consciously 
augmented ferocity will, they know, eventually be forgotten as new, enhanced life forms 
thrive in the transformed landscape it leaves behind. 
To reiterate, Nietzsche’s vitalist approach to the political and corresponding 
power ontology do not provide means by which they can be empirically tested and/or 
refuted. But this criticism also applies equally to the more popular and hegemonic 
philosophical view of post-Enlightenment liberal-modernity, the tenets of which are 
arguably even less demonstrable in the world, as it were. On the basis of this putative 
lack of practical veracity, any doubts about Nietzsche’s theoretical program would 
provide no objective warrant or more substantive pretext for rejecting it than it would that 
of the reigning liberal paradigm. For however seemingly implausible or factually 
indemonstrable Nietzsche’s general theory of decadence may be, it is significantly more 
modest and more intellectually honest than its liberal–modern antipode. This is 
underscored by Nietzsche’s own acknowledgment of the impossibility of proving his 
theory’s accurate correspondence with the world – though he hoped it might and even 
expected that it would someday be proven true by science. Although this hope may have 
been a symptom perhaps of his own decadence – a falling back into inauthenticity via a 
wishful longing for the hypothetical reassurance empirical evidence would provide his 
theory by scientifically validating it in terms of the prevailing will to truth.904
Finally he suggests that we ought only to act as if it were a “true” (in the 
traditional, transcendent sense) basis for our instinctive “hatred” of the ugly exhausted 
and disintegrating in order to supplement the production of edifying culture and 
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maximize the thriving of mankind. Yet, with relevance to Nietzsche’s possible 
“vindication” by contemporary science, it is extremely interesting to note that recent 
developments in both cognitive neuro-science and evolutionary psychology have lent 
significant empirical support to some of Nietzsche’s most central (and philosophically 
innovative) insights in the form of discoveries pertaining to emotional memory. 
Additional support for some of Nietzsche’s key ideas may be found in the burgeoning 
fields of epigenetics (i.e.: the physical experiences of previous generations effecting an 
individual’s present health) and cosmology (i.e.: the notion of probability that any entity 
may physically re-emerge in the cycle of infinitely expanding universes in which 
everything that can occur will roughly correlates with his notion of the eternal return of 
the same, etc.). There is also a sense in which Nietzsche, in so far as he rejected 
Newtonian determinism and the corresponding (and metaphysically / ideologically 
sacrosanct) belief in free will, could even be said to have anticipated some of the 
philosophical issues raised recently by quantum physics. In summary it is highly probable 
that Nietzsche is still significantly underappreciated and if so this would suggest that the 
present flurry of activity in Nietzsche studies—of which we are now well into the third 
decade—is unlikely to abate anytime soon. 
Within his general theory of decadence Nietzsche’s vitalist politics and power 
ontology provide an analytical framework for assessing the health of a society and the 
disposition of individuals within it. Nietzsche’s core propositions essay a genealogically 
consistent hypothesis about what sort of shared values best conduce with the power of the 
strongest transversally (i.e.: across disparate cultures and traditions within Europe, and 
arguably beyond it). His theory of decadence is based upon critical, qualitative 
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deductions about the salubriousness of the values particular to a culture at a given time in 
its cyclical development. It maintains that the health, or political organization, of the 
society from which a system of values arises is symptomatized by its effective facilitation 
of durable institutions that maximize the highest potentials of all its members, but 
especially the creative powers of its representative exemplars. These individuals are those 
healthy enough to be capable of re-invigorating their culture’s signature institutions in 
healthy epochs, sustaining some semblance of them in declining eras or of destroying 
them to create new ones in decadent ages wherein the former vitality of a culture is 
thoroughly exhausted.905 
Via regimes of ascetic self-discipline (askesis) as well as self-creation and 
experimentation (auto-poiesis) the healthiest will instinctively strive to resist resignation 
to the besetting decadence epitomized by the banal mass culture and vapid consumerist 
society of our hyper-decadent era. In so doing they will simultaneously enact the decline 
of our age while exploiting liberalism’s simulacrum of equality and simulated 
enfranchisement, to perform both the “No” and the “Yes” of their eros. Though they will 
inevitably appear ridiculous to the all-too-many as they transform their very lives into 
monological works of art, their salutary acts give rise to a new praxis. Their disciplinary 
regime of self-creation, the desire to see the world as they would have it, and to will it so, 
will provoke emulation by others. As they realize the reality they envisage they become 
who it is they are and are simultaneously confirmed as nomothetic legislators 
(Gesetzgeber); each mimetic enactment and manifestation of their passion—or will to 
power—understood as the actualization their dialogical artwork.  
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The authentic nomos of their new praxis inspires mimesis by those who share a 
similar conative disposition or anticipatory resoluteness, and these performances 
generate form a part of the communal ethos of qualified cosmopolitanism in Nietzsche’s 
‘good Europeanism’. This encouraging ethos of life-affirmation spurs those sensitive to it 
to broaden their striving; it is likely by extension, to proliferate novel modes of being 
according to the thymotic pothos (longing for the unattainable) of the strongest 
individuals (the most efficient capacitor or dividuum). Their striving creates ascending 
values and secures an authentically meritocratic social structure that reflects natural 
hierarchy and cultivates an agonistic socio-political realm against the rule of the worst 
mob factions (kakistocratic ochlocracy) that the liberal-optimism and technological 
rationality of our age has brought into being.906  
Toward the ultimate attainment of an Apollonian organization of humanity, 
incrementally instantiated through law, such artist-philosophers must also abet the 
perfection of globalization’s myriad spectacles for a long time to come, as they mask 
their true, radical objective – to overcome and transmute the metadiscourse of ultra-
liberal-modernity – before the masses, who, startled by the appearance of free spirits, 
would demand that they give an account of themselves according to the parochial slave 
morality of taming. These übermenschlich types reveal themselves through irony, self-
parody and lampoons of the ignoble lie that all are equally free agents in the global liberal 
order. They must, according to the native volitions, become comedians of the ascetic-
consumerist ideals of our age.907
It is essential to their success that they preserve the soothing illusions of meaning 
and purpose to which the unsophisticated herd has become accustomed. Their reversal of 
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values must be a subterranean occurrence for some time to prevent a catastrophic 
paroxysm of violence originating among the most reactionary ascetic–consumerist priest 
of resentment, whose suicidal nihilism would prompt them initiate the complete ruination 
of the human race. Science will have to be brought back into the service of life and the 
responsible management of the earth, which will require radical even subversive means.  
The socio-political lines along which science is presently being employed may be 
leading directly to the horrors presented in fictional works such as Brave New World or 
Gattaca, which our ever-advancing technology and simultaneously deepening 
ressentiment have the combined power to realize. Khan suggests a plausible strategy for 
mitigating certain of the dangers technology presents through “the Western notion of 
freedom as a primitive concept”. He asserts, “We can think of technology as extending 
the scope of action over space and time. Such an extension is institutionalized in the 
history of development in the West through a coherent set of social, economic and 
political institutions and articulation of ideologies of modernity.”908
Analogous to a healthy immune response to an ubiquitous pathogen, the best 
individuals are consistently repudiating, in yes-saying acts that array “tremendous 
counter forces”
 By developing this 
primitive notion in accordance with the native volitions of the strongest, technology 
might provide the best with the range and reach to inaugurate a successor era to 
modernity.   
909 against the existential threat of slave morality’s social leveling that 
constantly seeks to infect them, the prerogatives of the sickliest and despisers of the body. 
These acts utilize the “fatality that lies concealed in the idiotic guilelessness and blind 
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confidence of ‘modern ideas’”910 against “the corruption, the ruination of higher human 
beings, of more strangely constituted souls.”911  
Their heightened “senses” – in the cognitive exercise and increased sensitivity 
their engagement with the enhanced consciousness of globality provides – endow them 
with the perceptivity needed to detect the disease of hyper-decadence that erodes noble 
values. This also enables them to take life-affirming prophylactic measures against the 
hegemonic mediocrity of the all-too-many, in acts largely invisible to the dull and so 
unperceived by the dissipated crowd. Thus the truly noble exceptions ineluctably edify 
one another. Through the productive agonism of contending disciplinary regimes of self-
creation they arouse the exceptions in their midst and breed future generations of their 
high-spirited kind to, fittingly, create values for—and so indirectly rule over—a more 
natural and healthy social organism in future. 
On a higher level their endeavor constitutes the creation of a new ascetic ideal for 
the perfection and overcoming of globalization’s ultra-liberal-modern nihilism by its 
transmutation into the life affirming abstract potentials of globality. In our “post-modern” 
era, the spectacles of neo-liberal capitalism and its corresponding democratic state form 
combine in the constructive simulacrum already disciplining advanced industrialized 
societies to serve as a basis for this double function. While promulgating profound 
changes (perceived as improvements) in the material conditions of the herd, the 
simulacrum maintains the appearance of “regularity” in everyday life even while 
radically altering it.912
Globalizing institutions such as the EU, and transformative processes such as its 
expansion, mollify the multitude with political empowerment (through representation) 
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and the promise of increasing material wealth while conditioning the possibility for the 
best individuals, as warrior-genealogists, to continuously overcome themselves. This 
improves the latter’s prospects of actualizing and maintaining their innate authority 
politically, to elevate humanity by determining mankind’s “where to” and “what for”. 
The happiness or fate of such “‘free Spirits’”—their eudemonic aim—is contingent on 
their striving to implement the aforementioned Nietzschean technique of the self, rather 
than in attaining political power or conventional recognition in fame. Thus they remain 
faithful to their duty to enact their authentic nature, behaving in with seeming “liberality” 
toward those innately inferior to them as they do so. This gives an especially “ironic” 
twist to the Rortian notion of solidarity, which it affirms in a way Rorty might have found 
surprising.913   
The successes of history belong to those who are capable of seizing these rules, to 
replace those who had used them, to disguise themselves – in part through self-parody – 
so as to pervert them, invert their meaning, and redirect them against those who had 
initially imposed them; controlling this complex mechanism, they will make it function 
so as to overcome the rulers through their own rules.914
… the ‘fundamental will of the spirit’ wants to be master within itself and around 
itself and to feel itself master… In this its needs and capacities are the same as 
those which physiologists posit for everything that lives, grows and multiplies. 
…Finally there also belongs here that not altogether innocent readiness of the 
spirit to deceive other spirits and to dissemble before them, that continual pressing 
and pushing of a creative, formative, changeable force: in this the spirit enjoys the 
multiplicity and cunning of its masks, it enjoys too the sense of being safe that 
  
By capitalizing on the nisus enabled by the EU within globality to build on its 
productive network of forces, the strongest may exploit the simulacrum, generate 
untimely becomings and describe a new aim for humanity. As Nietzsche asserts: 
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this brings – for it is precisely through its protean arts that it is best concealed and 
protected!915 
 
If enough healthy individuals can realize this “imperious and domineering” will of the 
spirit to become ‘good Europeans’ the anti-naturalism of our hyper-decadent social order 
(predicated on radical equality, the alleviation of suffering and advocacy of pity—all of 
which unduly constrain the experience of freedom of the strongest) may be completely 
transmuted in the future. In becoming ‘good Europeans’ and unifying the continent they 
strive to reinstate a natural order of rank to actualize further potentials of globality and 
thereby realize the strongest possible human type, with the aim of ultimately going 
beyond humankind via Übermenschen who derive joy from uncertainty, to attain a post- 
or transhuman future.916
In little more than a century since Nietzsche’s death science has brought 
humankind to the threshold of a new epoch, one in which we as a species may be able to 
take ever greater control of our future and transform our world. However misleading 
modernity’s discourse of progressivism may be, these momentous advancements in 
technology, biology and genetics, and cognitive and neuro-psychology are profoundly 
changing human life (primarily in the post-industrial societies of the West, at present) and 
are likely to change the trajectory of our species’ evolution. The developments to which 
these scientific innovations are giving rise will pose opportunities for revaluing the 
nihilistic values of our hyper-decadent age, including the liberal optimism and positivistic 
scientism which have in part enabled them. The changes they permit will create manifold 
ethical challenges concerning the future management of human societies and the earth, as 
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our ability to alter the world and enhance (or destroy) life—to overcome and assimilate 
ever greater quanta of power—increases exponentially.  
Specifically, developments in neuroscience, biotechnology, genetic engineering, 
computer science, nanotechnology and robotics may soon enable the convergence of the 
machinic and the human in a much-anticipated moment dubbed “the singularity”.  
Ongoing efforts to decode the human brain in order to replicate its functioning and 
translate our inner experience—or mind—into electronic signals will soon enable the 
replication of thought and consciousness as recordable, transmissible, manipulable data. 
Via quantum computers, which are in nascent stages of development, multiple minds—
and the very atoms comprising them!—may be utilized in the form of vast neural 
networks to simultaneously solve problems of enormous complexity by integrating many 
terabytes of information.  
This will ineluctably transform what it means to be a human being, and what 
constitutes authentic experience as the virtual and the physical worlds merge. Integrating 
our biological existence with a virtual one that will—at some time in the next century—
be augmented by and interfaced with other virtual minds, may make corporeality—an 
embodied existence—unnecessary.  In this dawning future, persons could hypothetically 
maintain two existences, one physical and the other virtual. Bodies could be programmed 
to work with or without the consent of their “owner”; it is possible that one day people 
won’t use their physical brains after some time for development, as the existence of their 
mind becomes virtual and integrated into an immensely large neural structure. A brain 
might be employed in multiple ways simultaneously, both in its physical form governing 
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a body and the performance of physical tasks, and in numerous virtual ones to solve other 
problems in a larger, integrated system.  
Other imminent developments include that of pharmacology and genetic 
engineering enabling enhanced intelligence, the elimination of deleterious deficiencies 
and illnesses, and physical strength; robotic and nano-technological enhancements of 
health through the treatment of disease and to provide artificial organs and limbs of 
possibly greater efficiency; the engineering of primates to attain a level of intelligence 
necessary for their use in manual labor. Obviously each of these brief scenarios (and 
there are many more) raises multiple and complex ethical, legal and social questions, all 
of which bear directly on the political.  
How an individual may (be allowed to) exercise control over their destiny 
(understood as comprising their mind and their physical body) will become more oblique 
as technology transforms the way our brains may function. Determining what rights and 
protections individuals should enjoy and what mechanisms will be created to enforce the 
free exercise of their prerogatives will inevitably foment conflict. These futural 
possibilities also raise terrifying prospects for the conduct of wars, with the possibility 
that nations of people could be surreptitiously pacified and manipulated, or physically 
zombified and used as instruments, or even genocidally annihilated through genetically 
engineered weapons targeting individuals from a specific ethnic or racial group. These 
innovations will radically alter conceptions of community and security as well as the 
measures employed to achieve and maintain it.  
The vast potential for instantaneous enhancement this would create raises the real 
possibility of a directed evolution of humankind. The implications of such innovations 
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are likely to affect every aspect of life, particularly how people are educated, how they 
work, the privacy they may expect and how the individual as such and her rights are 
conceived. The redefinition of the individual and personhood which will invariably occur 
also portends the reorganization of human societies in fundamental ways. As the 
problematic—and largely specious—notion of individuality wanes before the widespread 
recognition and appreciation of the dividuum each of us is in a unbroken chain of 
existentially crucial relations, challenging ethical questions will arise over how to 
accommodate the materialization of super-human specimens as well as manage the 
intentions of tremendously intelligent machines. These will be challenges best handled by 
good Europeans whose philosophical education, exceptionally broad experience of the 
world, ability to recognize and exploit the emergent potentials of globality and radical 
affirmation of life and its diversity of types will cultivate within them the needed 
disposition to effectively determine how they ought to be managed for maximally 
salubrious effect. 
Already both theoretical contemplation and practical research is occurring that 
attempts to deal with the implications of all of this for the political. The possibilities these 
questions, possibilities and scenarios raise are at once frightening and exhilarating, 
insofar as they indicate ways in which the human might be overcome and new means by 
our species might, as it takes control of and hastens its evolution, better fulfill its 
responsibility to the earth. The prospect of generating new socio-political power 
constellations in the process of overcoming the ossified nation-state and its negative bio-
power over life is very exciting.  
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That scientific “advances” arising from scientism’s naïve pursuit of truth as 
reality may be put to overcoming the ascetic-consumerist slave morality of taming that 
subtends it and cultivate authentic becomings (always a becoming-other) against the 
privileging of the ‘last man’ and his ideal of molar becoming-same, is a poetic reversal 
Nietzsche would have found very pleasing. The dangers will be tremendous as a few 
plucky, intrepid souls battle to prevent congenitally botched, world-reprehending ascetic-
consumerist priests of ressentiment from using technological innovations and the merging 
of the human and machinic to “perfect” their anti-human, no-saying socio-political 
mnemotechniques of control to further limit alterity and possibilities for authentic 
becoming. The human race could easily destroy itself in this process, either directly, 
through malice and stupidity or by creating machines over which it loses control. In a 
nightmare scenario from the perspective of Nietzschean good Europeans these 
burgeoning technologies could be applied in ways that enhance the spirit of revenge and 
leave humankind more thoroughly dissipated and enslaved than ever before. This could 
permanently inhibit the emergence of the profligate geniuses whose expenditure of force 
and going down condition the possibility for the emergence of übermenschlich types.  
Perhaps the greatest danger good Europeans face in overcoming themselves lies 
in the seduction of liberal optimism, which, naturalized by the meta-discourse of ultra-
liberal-modernity also drives much of the scientific innovation producing these 
transformative potentials. The axiomatic narrative rationalizing the status quo may inhibit 
the realization of the most significant possibilities for change. The universal dominance 
of the stories naturalizing secularized slave-morality and the corresponding reign of self-
idolizing, solipsistic ascetic–consumerist priests of ressentiment makes it likely that the 
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most radical potentials these innovations produce will be suppressed. Rather than 
enhancing prospects for the breeding (in both the literal and figurative sense) of a higher 
species man, social conditioning may prevail in favor of the further leveling and 
dissipation of man, extending our hyper-decadent era of mindless consumption and 
nihilistic self-satiation. 
In a related consideration of the apocalyptic potentials (in both senses of the word 
apocalyptic, i.e.: a revelation and the end of the world) being generated by technology, 
De Garis anticipates an “Artilect war” (“artilect” referring to the “artificial intelligence” 
of the “massively intelligent machines” it could be harnessed to create) between those 
supporting the creation of intelligent machines, whom he dubs “cosmists”, and those who 
will inevitably oppose such creations as threats to human life, whom he names “terrans”. 
This controversy will, he predicts, be understood in the most significant existential terms, 
and come to define the socio-political life of the late 21st century. His admittedly 
reductive scenario omits the possibility that critical ironists, such as good Europeans, may 
advocate the creation of such machines for specific purposes, as well as the contention 
that will arise over ethical considerations over them (i.e.: the uses to which they may 
legitimately be put). 
In de Garis’ vision, these ‘artificial intelligences’ will appeal to the “cosmists” in 
part because creating god-like machines will comport with the creation of a new 
scientific religion. Nietzsche anticipated and opposed such a possibility (as examined 
above, in part one of book two), fearing that faith in science—as a naïve ‘will to truth’—
might lead to a new form of uncritical, quasi-religious devotion. Insofar as super-
intelligent machines could be employed to found a gay science (fröhliche Wissenschaft) 
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that admits of a plurality of perspectives on life, enhance the discharge of active force in 
the positive will to creative destruction as generative power of healthy types, and 
augments the making of a higher culture, Nietzsche—and his free spirited descendents—
would support their creation. 
However, good Europeans might very well come down on the side of “terrans” in 
this battle if the prospect seemed too great that such machines would be used to advance 
the world-weary despisers of the body and their life-calumniating ideals. Unfortunately, 
the U.S. military is presently among the most enthusiastic researchers and developers of 
these new technologies, for the purpose of advancing the governmentality it exists to 
defend. By the waging of wars, suppression and comprehensive control over “enemies” 
and additional groups of people the conventional authorities with a monopoly on the 
legitimate use of force/violence others control over people might be extended in 
frightening ways that include neutralizing potential threats and defiance of the law by 
altering or even directing the very minds of resisters.  
Today the conventional realm of the political is a field of human activity (multiple 
forms of life and competing power constellations) dominated by cynicism, inauthenticity 
and the coercion of unproductive antagonisms that constrain dissent and inhibit 
becoming. But it could, through the despotic negative power of the globalization 
complex, enable a means of attainting biopower over life more sinister and invidious than 
in any previous epoch of human history. That terrible possibility is one that good 
Europeans instinctively oppose through their active realization of adjacent possibilities 
provided by technological innovation and the exploitation of cognitive spandrels in the 
“architecture” of international society—potentials comprising abstract potentials of 
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globality. Aware that a quantum difference in thought can change the world, 
humankind’s highest exemplars are resisting the temptation to succumb to nihilism and 
exploiting the opportunities provided by our hyper-decadent, ultra-liberal-modern 
condition to become who it is they are. However seemingly obscure or insignificant, 
these defiant ‘outliers’ and probable buffoons are transforming the future in doing so.917
Another effect of their involuntary volition is that their highly visible eros arouses 
corresponding passions among those with a similar conative disposition or anticipatory 
resoluteness, exciting them to pursue the ‘political education’ necessary for the 
 
 
Conclusion: Toward a Re-naturalized Future 
When a fortuitous individual successfully capitalizes on his innate ability, self-
discipline (askesis) and chance (in amor-fati) via these four stances, adopting Akatalepsia 
as a governing disposition and the remaining three doctrines as a practical strategy for 
gaining necessary conventional authority in order to transform it, they may, through 
nomothetic, creative acts and fearless—if tactically pragmatic— speech, implement a 
revaluation of all values that ultimately redirects and augments the course of human 
development.  
While becoming who it is they are in innumerable, diverse capacities, they mask 
their agenda before the priests of ressentiment in order to ‘go down among them’ and 
utilize the existing social milieu and governing institutions to surreptitiously achieve the 
improvements they desire. In so doing it is as though they are ‘returning to the cave’ to 
cast new shadows on the wall before its mesmerized audience; shadows they have 
learned to make as their self-undertaken political education has advanced.  
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cultivation of a higher, edifying culture.918 Among these potential exemplars, some may 
attain conventional authority and even inhabit some (of the EU’s innumerable) offices to 
achieve their political objective.919 In whatever role they assume, they all strive to engage 
in acts of fearless speech to transform their polity’s (re: the EU’s) ethos and objectives. 
Exploiting the abstract potentials of globality in this cunning manner such ‘good 
Europeans’ will gradually execute a revaluation of all values to revivify an authentically 
agonistic, Dionysian politics, instantiate a corresponding rank order of types 
(Rangordnung) and reinvigorate European culture for the improvement of mankind.  
Nietzsche’s particular idea of Europe is one in which no nation-state borders 
constrain the movement (life) of individuals and all are free to develop themselves as far 
as they are able. It is anti-liberal precisely for its commitment to truthlikeness, which 
necessarily refuses both the transcendental “Truths” of equality and rights presupposed 
by our post-Enlightenment liberalism and its consequent if somewhat paradoxical 
“relativizing” of all values. The immanent crisis that Western civilization faces is further 
suggested by its inability to square the supposed universal applicability of its legally 
instantiated notion of equality and rights protections with certain of its own practices 
which do not cohere with these ultra-liberal-modern regimes as well as those of the 
manifold cultures into which it disseminates its relativity of values via the globalization 
complex.920
 “Nietzsche believed the dominant economic, political and cultural forces of the 
age were progressively “barbarizing” European society and preparing the way for a series 
of calamities.”
 
921 Rather than conclude the crisis of nihilism, the catastrophic conflicts of 
the twentieth century gave rise to the meta-discourse of ultra-liberal-modernity and a 
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reactive globalization complex to universalize its intensified decadence. A significant 
assemblage within that larger power constellation, the EU has traded former social 
disparities for new forms of existential ennui and malaise codified in legal equality and 
human rights. As a consequence, it symptomatizes the century’s hyper-decadence. 
Nevertheless, the molar growth of its reactive mode of life is hastening the ultimate 
demise of ultra-liberal-modernity and conditioning the possibility for fundamental 
regeneration through globality.  
Nietzsche thought his idea, and counter-ideal, of Europe would be embodied in 
individuals of exceptional integrity, whose will to power would nurture an enlarged 
perspective, far-sightedness and corresponding capacity to think freely and to shrewdly 
speak the truth. An authentic commitment to truthlikeness necessitates no small quanta of 
cunning and subterfuge in a hyper-decadent age; their faithfulness to themselves gives 
rise to a wily form of candor. This sophisticated verisimilitude corresponds with a 
dedication to fearless speech (parrhesia), such as that practiced by the cynic philosophers 
of Classical and Hellenistic age Greece, and the partiality of radical life-affirmation or 
yes-saying. 
A “change of attitude” (or conative disposition) and determined effort to take hold 
of oneself (corresponding with anticipatory resoluteness) among the artist-philosophers 
Nietzsche anticipated “will be required to transcend” the spirit of revenge characteristic 
of “modernity”.922 Actualizations of abstract potentials of globality may augment an 
authentic being-towards the Dasein of a future mode of ennobled European life that 
secondarily spurs existentially significant modifications of the ‘They’ (such as the EU 
and the institutions, forces and processes typical of the globalization complex) and its 
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Publicness. As with their positive realizations of globality, which these adventurous 
Gewaltmenschen conceive from unique, epiphantic experiences and realize via the 
pursuit of their passions (eros) which their concernfully absorbed actions arouse in 
others, their ecstatic affirmations of life and embrace of chance (amor fati) may uncover 
previously buried possibilities for being-towards the Dasein of ‘good Europeanism’ and 
its ownmost possibility for Being.  
In contemporary Europe (as in America) these tests are likely take the form of 
novel challenges to and unanticipated developments of the EU’s authority; the objective 
of ‘good Europeans’ being a certain perfection of the EU’s institutional apparatus as 
prerequisite to the EU’s eventual overcoming. They are neither sedentary academics nor 
are they solitary hermits who withdraw from society by way of rejecting it, rather they 
are charismatic individuals proactively engaged in the tasks of everyday life, which they 
perform in accordance with their striving to perfect the EU so as to destroy it. In masking 
this intention they become authentically inauthentic in order to adapt various social roles 
and outwardly conform to the prevailing – reactive – social mores of the day. This could 
easily and correctly be understood to include theorists of European integration, whose 
works – the envisaging of a reality which they would will into being – as acts of world 
creation, occasionally resonate in such a way as to dominate conceptions of the project of 
Europe’s formal political integration for sustained periods. Ideas factically create worlds. 
With the long vision particular to ‘good Europeans’ these exceptions prepare the 
way for future generations of more vigorous men who will be capable of implementing 
the fundamental revaluation of all values to which such a growth is indispensable. Theirs 
are futural acts undertaken with a good-conscience according to their involuntary 
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instincts and drives that incrementally generate a qualified aristocratic ethos shared 
among a few and out of which a new master morality may arise “that justifies the strong 
and makes possible the solitude and the leisure of the few”.923 
Supplemented by conscious enactments of their volitional urges (e.g.: their 
experimental art or Versucherkunst) which excite others, the auto-poiesis of ‘good 
Europeans’ further serves the ends of genuine integrity. Underscoring the principle 
concern Nietzsche had in cultivating vital political community as a work of art for the 
enhancement of power, Elbe summarizes Nietzsche’s vision of Europe as: 
…one that (i) avoids nationalist and racist interpretations of existence; (ii) that 
refuses to fix the deeper meaning of the European idea and thus also remains open 
to those who currently remain outside the borders of the European Union; (iii) 
that would not seek to impose its freedom on others, but would equally not shy 
away from exemplifying this commitment to a deep experience of freedom; and 
(iv) that seeks to address the problem of the increasing globalization of the ‘last 
man’ through combating the refusal to cultivate, within existence, an important 
reflective depth.924
While the third point is slightly problematic for its unclear meaning (what, in practical 
terms, would it mean to “exemplify this commitment to a deep experience of freedom”?), 
Nietzsche’s ‘good Europeans’ would be foremost concerned with the depth of their own 
experience of freedom in so far as it augmented their individual regimes of self-discipline 
and creation. As opposed to MacIntyre, their “ethics” (Nietzsche occasionally heaps 
scorn on the category, as the “science of morals”, and the leveling “morality of 
mediocrity”
 
 
925), can only be decided personally; its broader social coherence depends on 
their masking of the awareness that—at least among healthy individuals—all such 
determinations are subjective.926 From this perspective Nietzsche’s ‘good Europeans’ are 
fictionalists, insofar as they act as if, or make-believe that there are moral facts, when 
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they “know” there are none.927 The need for order as a civilizational requirement compels 
them to pretend as though transcendently true values corresponding with a knowable and 
certain reality, exist.928
The benefit of a Nietzschean analysis of the EU and its expansion may not be 
immediately apparent to many Europeanists, because it starts from unfamiliar premises. 
Its value lies in the disconcertingly honest way it denudes liberal-modernism’s ideals of 
their desirability and provides a strategy for the overcoming of the decadence they 
generate. It is also uniquely valuable for the recognition it provides of the ideological 
equivalence of the partisan debates in which many European integration and 
globalization theorists are engaged. Finally, it points the way toward viable and radically 
 In Nietzsche’s view the question—one of ultimate significance to 
the political—is who determines that “reality”, those made healthy by life or those ailing 
from it. 
‘Good Europeans’ would likely take it as given that peoples outside the Anglo-
European (“Western”) cultural realm—those outside the centers of the globalization 
complex—would have a quite different, albeit deep, experience of freedom that, being 
largely inaccessible to them as Europeans, would necessitate the suspension of their 
judgment of its qualitative merits. Aside from this ambiguity, Elbe’s points are generally 
correct. The fourth point in particular corresponds with my own concern, one that I am 
confident Nietzsche would have shared: that of devising a practical strategy for 
overcoming of the nihilistic prerogatives of the globalization complex through the 
revaluing of the decadent values that typify our hyper-decadent age. Toward that end an 
experimental art to realize abstract potentials of globality that I have expounded on above 
shows the way forward. 
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different directions Europe (and by extension, the world) could take in its beneficial 
development of the species man. Nietzsche’s vitalist politics queer, and thereby make 
visible, the reactive and debilitating power arrangements that naturalize the degeneration 
of man.  
His co-extending critique of liberal-modernity (which I have contemporized and 
applied to our hyper-decadent age of globalization) strongly suggests the necessity of 
(reactive) EU expansion and globalization for subordinating the Staatinstinkt (state 
instinct) and ultimately nation-states themselves to ultimately attain an even higher 
purpose. That preparatory process entails an invigoration of the positive will to creative 
destruction as generative power (foreshadowed by globality) among those “legislators of 
the future,” whose descendents will possess the instincts and strength to act as “masters 
of the earth”.929 As an initial objective in this European and global development, ‘good 
Europeans’, as “a new caste dominating all Europe,” nurture the growth of “a protracted 
and terrible [European] will “which could set its objectives thousands of years ahead.”930
According to Nietzsche true philosophers, the ‘laughing lions’ among so-called 
“higher men”, avoid directly ruling over their society except on ‘millennial occasions’ 
when they undertake to reinvigorate it by revaluing their decadent society’s exhausted 
values to bring a natural hierarchy into being. The compelling active force of such a 
hierarchy, predicated on an affirmative pathos of difference between types to facilitate 
the authenticity of each, would ensure its duration, which is the philosopher’s primary 
aim. The most important consequence of their imposition of order over society is the 
permanence of that order – the creation of an epochal regime lengthy enough to foster the 
emergence of civilization and above and out of that, an authentic, lasting culture.
  
931 The 
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crass lust for rule, in the conventional exercise of power over others, is today, as it has 
been throughout Europe’s decadent epochs, usually characteristic of the spirit of revenge 
and inauthenticity compelled by ascetic priests who tempt the majority to resigned 
fallenness and enforce the prerogatives of ressentiment against all that is strong and 
healthy. Nietzsche cites a few exceptions to this generalization, including Napoleon, who 
arose from the ruins of a decadent era to revitalize Europe with a new hope and 
instantiate an enduring order.  
Those herd-leaders who are afflicted with a lust to rule over others emerge as 
embodied symptoms of their society’s dis-ease. They signal the degeneration of its 
culture and reigning forms of life, the corresponding order that extended from these as 
well as the evaluative stance, conative disposition and anticipatory resoluteness necessary 
among its highest exemplars to sustain them. Ochlocratic leaders undermine the 
efficaciousness of formerly noble ways of esteeming, thereby subverting the modes of 
being these maintained. In so doing they seek validation and recognition out of their bad-
conscience and through the ressentiment of others. It is the envy of the ‘They’ which they 
most value.   
The rare artist-philosopher is—even in our hyper-decadent era of abjection under 
the metadiscourse of ultra-liberal-modernity—at once a subversive and a nomothetic 
legislator (Gesetzgeber) whose valuations or acts constitute an on-the-way that transitions 
mankind to a future return to his natural surface; although these philosophers have 
difficulty occupying the present due to its pervasive spirit of revenge and imposition of a 
guilty bad-conscience, they struggle heroically – and in anti-modern fashion – to “give 
the realm of appearance an ontological foundation”.932 
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In Heideggerian terms the mood of ‘good Europeans’ (a feature of their 
distinctive conative disposition and manifold perspectives) tunes them into certain 
realities of life on the continent in such a way that the Dasein of the EU (as a macro-
political entity) is disclosed to them in all its fallenness. In taking hold of themselves in 
anticipatory resoluteness they are sensitized to the way in which the average-
everydayness of the EU compels inauthenticity and rewards the das Man state of 
becoming-same that Nietzsche associated with the herd mentality and its hegemony.  
In addition to more truthfully, and by extension accurately, perceiving the nature 
of the EU and its affects throughout the continent and world, ‘good Europeans’ 
comprehend its Existenz and the Being-towards its ownmost potentiality for Being, or 
future potential becoming, thereby. The EU’s fallenness consists in large part of the tasks 
and performances it requires in order to sustain and perpetuate itself and the forms / 
modes of life it favors, namely an approximation of Schmitt’s “quantitative total state”. 
This consists with its privileging of the ‘They’ – the leveling down and obligatory 
mediocrity of its Publicness (ways of Being for the “they”933
‘Good Europeans’ are, on the contrary, actively engaged in the tasks they 
perform, thereby authentically becoming who it is they are and living ontologically – as 
concernfully engaged Daseins. This crucially distinguishes them from the masses who are 
unreflectively absorbed in the daily inauthenticity – the average everydayness – of 
) – by which ‘good 
Europeans’ identify the contemporary mob-hodgepodge which exists according to 
dissipative ascetic-consumerist values and uncritically inhabits the simulacra provided it 
by the globalization complex of which the EU is a part. This correlates with Nietzsche’s 
notion of the comfortable resignation of the herd to the imposed slave morality of taming.  
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fulfilling the expectations their communities, nations and the EU itself prescribe for them 
as its “citizen constituents”. The ‘They’ disburdens these individuals from the 
responsibility of creating themselves and imposing disciplinary regimes for their fullest 
flourishing, diminishing their inherently limited eros, which becomes one-dimensional.  
Conventional society also naturalizes the partial repression of their native instincts 
and drives (while aiming to completely repress them, the instincts and drives are, 
however enfeebled, irrepressible), and their condemnation as harmful to the greater good, 
so as to impart the bad conscience of self-regulation. It simultaneously makes the herd 
into an ahistorically quantifiable and instrumentally useful component of the 
technologized life of globalization complex. The tasks with which the EU is primarily 
concerned are oriented toward weakening the capacity of individuals to make choices, 
meaning that they are always already giving an account of themselves in their 
performance of the tasks for which they are held responsible. The herd, as a contented 
mass of automatons, surrenders to a regularizing regime of ascetic-consumerist discipline 
imposed from without, and which arises from and thoroughly imbricates them in the 
spirit of revenge—the ethos of ultra-liberal-modernity. This cynicism turns them, 
consciously or not, against their fellow human beings, their environment and life itself, to 
ossify in ressentiment of the world into which they have been thrown. 
Simultaneously, ‘good Europeans’ would vicariously utilize the international 
class of laborers out of whose toil abstract potentials of globality may be realized.934 The 
possibilities in those actualized potentials could enable the eventual modification and re-
naturalizing of the means by which labor is organized, without gratuitous violences or 
undue suffering – not involving any more exploitation than that which mainstream 
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liberals already explicitly accept as reasonable, or any life-affirming Nietzschean would 
find necessary.935 The product of an authentically agonistic drive in an inauthentically 
antagonistic socio-political milieu, the utilization of globality would occur with a good-
conscience and in accordance with the nature of those who by virtue of their innate 
capacities and conative disposition ought to create without the limitations imposed by 
anti-natural, life-denying values, as explicated above. As well as symptomatizing suicidal 
nihilism, the aforementioned characteristics of our hyper-decadent age indicate 
exploitable potentials, which redirected could augment the creation of a vital civilization 
of global proportions. Such a quasi-cosmopolitan development would be flexible enough 
to include any and all nations and peoples, while resisting the reactive urge to impose a 
uniform culture on them.   
In the present the inherently deficient existential meanings required by the herd 
can continue being provided via simulated identities, ersatz happiness and mass media 
spectacles. The marketing, entertainment and culture industries will continue to create 
injurious desires and provide the means to fulfill them for the foreseeable future. 
Ensuring the ability of the all-too-many to consume will continue satiating their need for 
ontological purpose. Rendered docile, the masses remain preoccupied with (enslaved by) 
mindless diversions, thereby providing those compelled to exploit globality relatively 
greater leeway to do so.936
The global environmental emergency caused by current levels of consumption in 
the industrialized “North”—the primary loci of the globalization complex—also provides 
good Europeans with a potential means of transmuting the values of ultra-liberal-
modernity. These nihilistic values (indifference and resignation) have directly led to the 
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ecological disaster humankind has stupidly created, a disaster that threatens its survival as 
well as the survival of many species of flora and fauna. For the sake of the earth 
Nietzsche’s thymotic experimenters would—paradoxically, given the momentous role of 
science in industrialization and its methodical destruction of the natural world—employ 
all scientific means available to reverse the destruction of the planet and conserve 
endangered species. If the conditions for life are to be sustained, levels of consumption 
will have to radically change for all human beings. This will require a profound 
transformation of life as we know it, with wealthy residents of the West consuming far 
less and poor residents of the developing “South” receiving assisted in environmentally 
responsible developmental strategies. A radical affirmation of life impels good Europeans 
to forcefully advocate for the earth as they pursue their distant goal of overcoming 
humankind. Such an advocacy amounts to an act of self-conservation in personal 
expenditure. 
For those capable of conducting them, globality presents opportunities to 
transmute the decadent values of our declining age. However, good Europeans, as 
immoralists, would not seek to deny, nor imagine themselves capable of depriving the 
all-too-many of their nihilistic standards. Aware that the meta-discourse of ultra-liberal-
modernity universalized by the globalization complex is driving humankind into a new 
and bleak kind of slavery, they can only exploit this tragic state of affairs to develop 
conditions conducive to humankind’s future legislators.937
 
 Their revaluation of values 
cannot be executed in a day. These iconoclasts must live philosophically as they struggle 
to overcome the decadence in themselves, educating / arousing a few others by their  
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example (eros), and preparing the way for Übermenschen who have yet to be born.  
Law giving moralities are the principle means of fashioning man according to the 
pleasure of a creative and profound will, provided that such an artist’s will of the 
first rank has the power in its hands and can make its creative will prevail through 
long periods of time, in the form of laws, religions, and customs.938 
 
Such artist-philosophers furnish life—and the going-down of humankind with tragic 
meaning through their striving. Their works joyously affirm the suffering that is 
characteristic of existence as it maximizes the power they are. This determination to 
prepare the felicitous environment required for preeminent individuals, “future masters of 
the earth,” prompts them to spontaneously create out of their tremendous passion and 
higher (noble) egoism.939  
The changed mentality engendered by globality and exploited by ‘good 
Europeans’ can be expected to transform the norms and practices that typify the 
globalization complex by invigorating the instincts of a few and fortifying nascent 
übermenschlich types. Ultimately such exceptions aim to reorder Europe and the world, 
as well as to provide a mechanism for the rejuvenation of European culture, through a 
positive “Europeanization” that both originates from and manifests itself in “‘good 
Europeans’, who can actually tolerate free thoughts.” Such individuals stabilize the 
herd’s decline through a spectrum of disciplinary techniques comprising the slave 
morality of taming sublimated in ever-diversified practices of consumption and the 
reification of productivity. 940 This could include subversively theorizing European 
integration to unmask the EU’s constitutional conceits and the anti-natural basis of the 
values in which it originated and which it continues to embody. 
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Mutatis mutandis, these transformed conditions are likely to secure the necessary 
order for the enhancement of higher types, thereby preventing “the physiological 
ruination of mankind” Nietzsche so feared.941
Good Europeans strive to bestow an aim upon human life by imbuing it with it 
with a salubrious if imperfect meaning. Their transformed consciousness of the individual 
as an involuntary agent of will to power in the world generate life-enhancing affective 
 As the healthiest, pluripotent types steadily 
transfigure and overcome the forces, processes and institutions of globalization through 
their realization of globality they effectively breed an improved, or higher, species man. 
Nietzsche’s ideal of ‘good Europeanism’ and his idea of Europe offer practical, anti-
metaphysical aims by which individuals might edify their own lives by becoming who it 
is they are and transform the world via their increased authenticity.  
The efforts of exceptions are at once involuntary and consciously pursued, per the 
cognitive limits to conscious recognition of the affective power that limit the self-
understanding. This consists with the spirit intrinsic to Nietzsche’s perspectivalism, in 
that it acknowledges the multivariate, dynamic relationship between an individual’s 
native volition and the effective nurturing provided by their environment; that is to say, 
the conative disposition or anticipatory resoluteness which permits them to resist 
succumbing to the socio-cultural infirmities of their epoch. Realizing abstract potentials 
of globality, their striving conditions the possibility of a new type of man, expressed in 
re-founded, if not entirely original ascetic practices – kynical techniques for sabotaging 
and hijacking the all-too-human ascetic-ideals of globalization to redirect their coercive 
power and mock their life denigrating valuations – will facilitate the self-discovery, –
overcoming and –creation required for free spirited ‘good Europeanism’.  
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capacities (exemplified in their unique practices of discipline and self-creation) to foster 
the appearance of genius within disparate cultures and societies in all the regions of the 
world. As a revaluation of all values the realization of their potentials, even if halting and 
uneven, incrementally reshuffles the social DNA controlling society’s development, 
effectively reprogramming its governing norms, mores and rules. The ascendancy of a 
healthy instinctual organization of the drives and impulses from these strong individuals 
provides the necessary elements for remaking the social organism (at the level of the 
political macro-sphere) from within. Over time, the body politic may thereby become 
polymorphously proficient at correcting deficiencies and ablating threats to its health. 
The expressed passion of good Europeans arouses the eros of others to become who it is 
they are in an authentic agonism productive of the sort of individuals necessary for an 
authentic community’s maximal flourishing and long-term immunity to the disease of 
decadence. 
Consistent with his anti-dogmatic perspectivalism, Nietzsche was reluctant to 
universalize his values, so refrained (or failed?) to posit a programmatic alternative to the 
decadent, liberal-modern values that were coming to prominence in Europe during his 
lifetime, and which in an evolved and intensified form naturalize the hyper-decadent 
ethos of our ultra-liberal-modern era. Resignation to its life-calumniating ascetic-
consumerist values sustains contradictory yet wholly interrelated practices of self-denial 
in and through self-destructive levels of consumption. This nihilism is maintained by the 
cynical, enlightened false consciousness that typifies our culture of abject conformity.  
In this work I have striven to disclose how Nietzsche’s critique of the Western 
tradition of metaphysical rationality may be seen as providing a coherent and practical 
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means of overcoming our disabling decadence and realizing his idea of Europe. Toward 
this end I have explicated the under-acknowledged problems inherent to the prevailing, 
illusory economic optimism of our globalizing world. In that context I have analyzed the 
EU as a primary institutional locus of the forces and processes that are fundamentally 
transforming the European continent and, by extension, the world. My analysis has 
accorded with a syncretic reading of Nietzsche’s vitalist politics, power ontology and 
perspectivalist epistemology. 
The unconscious drives and impulses that imperfectly express the anorganic 
forces surging through us, as enacted in symptoms of our will to power, within socio-
political constraints imposed from outside into which we are thrown by fate and which 
we mediate via our instincts, largely determines our destinies. Nietzsche’s cheerfulness is 
counterintuitive to those convinced of the contemporary liberal-optimistic view, for he 
accepts the fact—as a radical affirmer of life—that the vast majority of people are 
“bungled and botched”.942
Clever individuals, who remain relatively imperviousness to the many “corrupters 
of the will, the great slanderers and vindictive enemies of life” by creating personal 
regimes of self-discipline (askesis) in accordance with their unique passions (eros), 
virtually without regard for social proscriptions, may subvert the ascetic-consumerist 
  However, for a lucky few – the anxiety-inducing question that 
unsettles ultra-liberal-modern readers of Nietzsche) the very limited control indicated by 
the ability to exercise of discipline over our instincts and our ability to affirm our fate 
suggests that ultimately it is up to each one of us to become who it is we are by 
discovering the capacities through which we might strengthen our will to realize our 
noblest potential, be it in a dignified obedience to and instrument of a genius.  
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values of our age.943 Through witty lampoons that piercingly mock decadent values they 
may condition the possibility for future nomothetic legislators to overcome the ascetic–
consumerist ideal that now corrupts human life. Those proto-Übermenschen may then 
unreservedly posit values according to the native volition—an overflowing health. Future 
generations might benefit by the vivifying “presenc[ing] of life… the process whereby 
life strives for immanence, strives for and succeeds in manifesting itself”, thusly.944  
By reinvigorating instincts of strength and joyful power at the macro-level of the 
political sphere and instituting a new, authentically agonistic order predicated on life-
affirming values, future Übermenschen could renew European cultural greatness for the 
fullest flourishing of the strongest types. For such free spirited good Europeans, the zest 
for life and the suffering it induces are simultaneously increased in the process of 
maximizing the positive will to creative destruction as generative power, by which they 
give style to their character and create an environment conducive to who it is they are.945
Toward realizing Nietzsche’s idea of Europe through the overcoming of petty 
state politics and the uniting of the continent, the EU is providing for the emergence of a 
new European consciousness. Combined with innovations and challenges from social 
‘outliers’, self-experimenters and norm-entrepreneurs determined to realize abstract 
potentials of globality  this, arguably, is occurring in numerous ways. It may very well be 
the case—in ways counter-intuitive to most Nietzscheans—that among the more 
remarkable examples of this is the creation of “multilateral human rights mechanisms”; 
the creation of inter-governmental and non-governmental organizations that “draw their 
authority from global and regional international organizations… [and] lawmaking 
treaties”.
  
946 Precisely because these ultra-liberal-modern institutions provide a space for 
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the best to develop relatively uninhibited by the preachers of death, the “destruction of 
loftier types” might be mitigated.947
However, the sort of gratuitously exacerbated suffering resulting from malice 
which originates in a nihilistic spirit of revenge—whether Christian or secular in origin—
offended him to action (e.g.: his Genealogy of Morals). His anti-liberal, anti-modern 
program is a product of his desire (a will to truth symptomatic of a will to power) to 
devise a naturalistic—authentic—means of contending with suffering through the joyous 
affirmation of life. There is no reason, by Nietzsche’s own terms, that the healthiest 
exemplars wouldn’t put their strength to securing the masses from the egregious cruelty 
of a cultural philistine par excellence such as Hitler. In order that great individuals might 
 
Although it will likely strike many Nietzsche scholars as counter-intuitive, I 
contend that the potentials that human rights protections and laws generate for reversing 
the anti-natural values out of which they arose make them suitable instruments for the 
future masters of the earth. For most Nietzscheans “rights” is an offending term. Yet 
although Nietzsche consistently opposed claims to rights, there is no reason to think 
Nietzsche would not have supported international efforts to prevent senseless killing and 
mass-genocides, however tainted by liberal-optimism; he too would have been horrified 
by the Holocaust that motivated adoption by the United Nation in 1948 of the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights. Nietzsche recognized both that ‘suffering for what’ is the 
ineliminable question preoccupying human existence (a condition which always entails 
suffering), and that the answers to that question have traditionally proffered other-worldly 
explanations for human suffering that denigrate life, ossify its forms and inhibit their 
becoming—leading to decadence. 
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become who they are, by being allowed the freest play to realize their passions, Nietzsche 
would very likely have supported human rights as an instrument, if only a temporary one, 
for nomothetic legislators to revalue the decadent values—“herd animal ideals”—that 
lead to mass psychosis and unwarrantable violence.948  
Human rights need not serve to enforce mediocrity or to eliminate the natural rank 
order of types, but may be utilized as a means for elevating culture by dissuading would-
be persecutors of difference. The will to dominate (will to power) that Nietzsche 
celebrates cannot be correctly equated with a will to annihilate human diversity or 
eliminate opposition. “Only when a culture has an excess of powers at its disposal can it 
also constitute a hothouse for the luxury cultivation of the exception, the experiment, of 
danger, or the nuance: —this is the tendency of every aristocratic culture.”949
Human rights, an anti-natural product of ideals conceived in reaction, have 
themselves given rise to unanticipated, abstract potentials of globality by providing 
salubrious means by which those capable of becoming strange to themselves might do so. 
While consisting in undeniable ways with the ethos and ideological thrust of our epoch’s 
metadiscourse of ultra-liberal-modernity, the developing body of international human 
 An 
authentic agon conduces with a form of polity (be it democratic, as Hatab so persuasively 
has shown, or otherwise) which fosters an ‘excess of powers’ embodied in differences 
between types that cultivate nobility of soul. Such a socio-political milieu also permits 
the terminally flawed to pursue their own ruin. Contrarily, the ultra-liberal-modern 
polities of our hyper-decadent epoch pursue their downfall—an inevitability which might 
also exterminate the human race—by enforcing a spurious equality and prohibiting the 
botched from destroying themselves. 
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rights law is strongly suggestive of just one of the practical (if also counter-intuitive or 
even paradoxical) means by which the nihilism of our hyper-decadent era—and the 
resignation (re: enlightened false consciousness) to cynicism it compels—may ultimately 
be overcome. The instinctive physiological and spiritual weakness of genocidal regimes 
and the extreme danger to life and culture posed by their psychotic nihilism provides 
apodictical evidence of the necessity for universal human rights against the ascetic–
consumerist priests of ressentiment, however imperfect or occasionally ineffectual. These 
regimes are fortifying healthy types who have been—or would be—systematically 
weakened by world-weary despisers of the body, incrementally transforming them into 
strong-willed personifications of authentic health in the best (Nietzschean) sense.950
Human rights law, though born of post-Enlightenment, liberal individualist 
(quasi-Rousseauian) ideals that Nietzsche opposed and which from the perspective of his 
vitalist politics largely ramify slave moral values and the spirit of revenge they 
rationalize, comprises a notional apparatus especially suitable to hijacking for the purpose 
of combating the very forces of ressentiment and anti-naturalism from which it arose. 
Either through the struggle to codify the ultra-liberal-modern ideals in law or once 
established as customary norms, human rights law offers a means for subversively 
critiquing power, waging a productively agonistic, anti-dogmatic struggle against ossified 
traditions and interrogating and combating irrational prejudices as an active revaluation 
of all values. Human rights law, conceived positively as means of a recognizing the 
existing variation of natural attributes, volitions and differences in the degree of 
anorganic power surging through  persons, might facilitate the differing affective 
capacities of every individual, enable the ‘outliers’ of society and its stultifying 
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conventional values—Nietzsche’s free spirited good Europeans—to discharge themselves 
via active forces expressive of a positive will to creative destruction as generative 
power.951 
The EU hardly approximates the unification of Europe Nietzsche envisaged 
according to his Napoleonic ideal of grand politics (grosse Politik).952
In becoming good Europeans—a process the EU, in combination with abstract 
potentials of globality, inadvertently facilitates—healthy individuals are revaluing the 
 However, insofar 
as the EU constitutes a nascent form of supranational political governance and economic 
management, and stands as a primary loci of human rights law throughout the world, it is 
a development, which, though imperfect, may be utilized as a preparatory labor toward a 
new genuinely aristocratic ideal for humankind. It can be commandeered to establish a 
naturalized rank order of types, one prevenient to a future ruling caste comprised of the 
continent’s healthiest exemplars.  
Europe’s integration is certainly generating a new ethos that may be made to 
correspond with the realization of a potentially Nietzschean, quasi-cosmopolitan idea of 
Europe based on the alleviation of gratuitous cruelty and violence arising from the urge 
for revenge, both of which Nietzsche opposed. Advocating these rights as a mask in 
accordance with the skeptical doctrine of adoxastos, they may use the powerful social 
narratives of equality before the law and accountability to re-naturalize the inverted rank 
order of types of our decadent age. Modifying these principles would also realize their 
broader aim of undertaking a revaluation of all values (Umwerthung aller Werthe). In so 
doing they may become who they are while joyously affirming the totality of life in the 
process.  
 558 
prevailing values of our hyper-decadent age. This includes challenging the axiomatic 
narratives propagated by the meta-discourse of ultra-liberal-modernity and particularly its 
representation of democracy as the only legitimate, valid and effective means of affecting 
social and political change.953 The inspiring self-discipline (askesis) and passion (eros) of 
their self-creation (auto-poiesis)—the struggle entailed in their experimental art 
(Versucherkunst)—is likely to arouse emulation (mimesis). A fundamental transformation 
of values may follow, along with the establishment of new political myths to ground 
corresponding attitudes and beliefs about human prosperity, the proper role of cruelty and 
legitimate authority.  
New myths capable of providing the masses with truly life-affirming meanings 
that galvanize them to their task of working in the service of greatness, to create a 
genuinely vital higher culture, promise to test anew the possibilities and limits of moral 
change in the world and initiate the eventual overcoming of liberalism as a living political 
tradition. As a quantum difference in thought may transform the world, the concerted 
endeavoring and unconscious expenditure of active force in the positive will to creative 
destruction as generative power of good Europeans is accelerating salubrious change—
the “evolving self-understanding of the meaning and implications of [liberalism’s] central 
theoretical commitments.”954
The experiments and self-overcomings of the thymotic good Europeans Nietzsche 
envisaged may elevate and ennoble humankind by this means, then serve as a basis for its 
overcoming. Their attempts to re-naturalize our political order conditions the possibility 
for the appearance of future Übermenschen – individuals with the requisite vitality to 
transmute the enfeebling values of our nihilistic age. Not imaginary figures in a salvific 
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fantasy of redemption, these kynical ironists—the good Europeans and highest exemplars 
of humankind Nietzsche hailed—will discredit the poisonous ascetic-consumerist ideals 
of our day through comic mockery, to posit viable, life-affirming alternatives that 
transfigure the human by facilitating innovative, non-linear becomings. 
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Notes 
 
                                                 
1 Nietzsche’s “good Europeans”, are the audacious, “preparatory human beings” (GS: 
283) and “free spirits” (BGE: p) he hailed as the nomothetic legislators whose 
involuntary passion would hasten the down-going of a decadent and exhausted European 
[Western] civilization. In so doing they lay the groundwork, as it were, for the 
appearance of Übermenschen capable of overcoming the human and initiating a 
transhuman future. 
  
2 I employ the term ultra-liberal-modern/ity both to convey the intensification of 
decadence since the late 19th century, which Nietzsche identified as ‘late-modernity’, and 
to acknowledge that the present is not yet ‘post-modern’. The term ‘ultra-liberal-
modernity’ conveys the global extension of the Enlightenment project and ubiquity of the 
liberal-modern precepts and capital processes typifying the enervated condition it has 
conferred on contemporary life. An ideological juggernaut, ultra-liberal-modernity is 
thoroughly reactive, but it is not static, rather it is reflexive and dynamic. It re-
interpolates challenges to its prerogatives and contains or punishes dissent. It refracts 
desire in particular ways, to focusing the attention of consumers whilst distorting 
perceptions of need. It affectively directs the priorities of both individuals and 
communities. Informing my use of the concept is Khan’s observation that “the ensemble 
of attitudes and institutions that are assumed to be coterminous with the idea of 
modernity are themselves in flux and need to be described as a system of motion.” Khan, 
2003: 329. 
 
3 Nietzsche’s conception of “the morality of decadence”, a central feature of his vitalist 
politics and power ontology, is explicated at (among other places in his oeuvre) TI: 
skirmishes-35. 
 
4 By “globalization complex” I refer to the inextricably connected and mutually 
reinforcing machinations of capital-process and the ideology of ultra-liberal-modernity, 
which consist of the interrelated institutions, processes and forces conventionally 
associated with globalization. Without reifying the affective capacities engendered by 
these reactively dynamic processes, they are understood in summa as a power 
constellation. As such it simultaneously exemplifies and coercively disseminates the 
nihilistic meta-discourse of ultra-liberal-modernity.  
 
5 Conway, 1997a: 20 
 
6 Ibid, citing A: 4 
 
7 Conway, 1997a: 3 
 
8 Conway, 1997b:14 
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9 Ibid 
 
10 There are numerous examples documenting this position throughout Nietzsche’s texts. 
See TI: The Four Great Errors, 1 – 8, for a particularly notable example. 
  
11 Peters, 1967: 42 
 
12 See WP: 1067 
 
13 The apodicity and veridicality of Nietzsche’s system (including the will to power 
hypothesis, corresponding theory of decadence and eternal return of the same) is no more 
vulnerable to positivistic critique than any of the major systems of speculative philosophy 
in Western intellectual history. 
 
14 GS: 112 
 
15 Williams, 2001: 55 
 
16 There are a number of variations and types of liberalism, all of which correspond with 
a set of shared value presuppositions emphasizing the equality of the individual. Among 
these differing expressions of the liberal impulse Donnelly distinguishs neo-classical or 
market oriented economic liberalism; rights based political liberalism the origins of 
which are found in the works of John Locke, Keynesian neo-liberal economics, and 
democratization as liberalization. Donnelly, 1998: 156 
 
17 Donnelly, 1989: 69 
 
18 See for instance, D: 179 and 184, BGE: 203 and 207, GS: 357, and WP: 783, among 
others. The modern notion of the individual reduces the multiplicity of a person—more 
properly understood as a dividuum comprised of competing affective forces—to a 
modern subject. It is this condition which reduces persons to citizen-constituents, 
“individuals” vulnerable to the whims of the modern state. This threat necessitates the 
construction of protective rights against the organizing structure of the community upon 
which the existence of the protected depends. This contradiction is a result of 
inconsistencies inbuilt to the nation-state, the preeminent and hegemonic form of political 
organization in our era. The contradiction is particularly glaring in the case of democratic 
nation-states, whose legitimacy theoretically derives from the consent of the governed, 
and which purports to guarantee the security and uphold the innate dignity of a citizenry 
it ultimately demeans and who rightly distrust it. This topic is revisited throughout this 
work. 
 
19 Nietzsche’s genealogical methodology was utilized to great effect in the penetrating 
works of the French social critic Michel Foucault, who applied his own powerful 
variation of it to a number of subjects including the development of medical treatment, 
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the prison and carceral thought, the social construction of sexuality and the category of 
insanity. 
 
20 Nietzsche’s psychological insights would heavily inspire Freud nearly half a century 
later. 
 
21 By contrast, Marxian analysis does not provide this; but from a Nietzschean 
perspective reiterates and intensifies the prerogatives of ascetic-priests of ressentiment in 
the service of a semi-secularized Christian–Platonic notion of justice. Post-Marxian 
critical theories do provide it, in proportion to their indebtedness (acknowledged or not) 
to post-Nietzschean critique. My work draws upon the latter. 
  
22  KGW, v.4:2, 402 cited in Bergmann, 1987: 109 
 
23 Stefan Elbe’s “Europe: A Nietzschean Perspective,” is an important secondary text on 
the crucial link between Nietzsche’s notion of good Europeanism and his idea of Europe 
in the broader context of his perspectivist epistemological critique of the Christian–
Platonic will to truth and the death of God. 
 
24 Conway, 1997b: 94. 
 
25 I use the term “Anglo-European” to refer very generally to the entire, extended 
European cultural realm, which includes the member-states of the EU and the European 
Free Trade Association (EFTA), the United States and Canada, and Australia and New 
Zealand. These are typified by the ethos of ultra-liberal-modernity instantiated in the 
mutually ramifying and by extension globally hegemonic, if locally varied, institutions of 
liberal democracy and neo-liberal capital process. Other loci of Anglo-European value 
norms and practices include Chile, Argentina and Brazil. Non-European majority regions 
such as the UAE, India, South Africa, Turkey, South Korea, Japan and Hong Kong, 
among others, have been profoundly transformed by modified variations of these 
nihilistic values, which arguably dominant in their societies, at least insofar as they 
prejudice national priorities and drive “development”. 
 
26 On Non-places the erasure of frontiers and the management of transformed social 
spaces in ultra-liberal-modernity see Augé, 1995. 
 
27 The “quantitative total state” was the liberal-interventionist form of bureaucratic 
administration Carl Schmitt strongly opposed. He considered it the most obtrusive sort of 
state, in so far as it attempted to micro-manage the lives of its citizens. Furthermore, he 
thought it the least organic form of state and contrasted it with what he took to be the 
Hobbesian, qualitative state. See: Scheuerman, 1999: 215. 
 
28 Hardt and Negri’s idea of “Empire” is itself an ideologically loaded explanation of the 
imperialistic character of and interpolative capacity of globalization. However, despite its 
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Marxian excesses, it does provide some fairly insightful perspectives on and apt 
descriptions of the globalization complex. 
 
29 These include discourse analysis, deconstruction and constructivist approaches, though 
Nietzsche’s work has also significantly impacted post-Marxian debates in the IP 
discipline and the field of European integration theory, respectively.  
 
30 John Richardson’s term for Nietzsche’s complicated notion of being as a process of 
becoming via will-to-power – see his excellent and rightly influential study Nietzsche’s 
System. 
 
31 WP: 708 
 
32 Among eminent Nietzsche scholars who discount the importance of his thought for the 
political, is Walter Kauffman. 
 
33 WP: 12a 
 
34 As Conway states, “Decadence [as Nietzsche understands it] is predicated not of the 
visible, corporeal body, but of the “invisible,” instinctual body, the subsystem of drives 
and impulses that propagates the native vitality of the animal organism. Whereas the 
visible body invariably (if erratically) manifests the prevailing condition of its governing 
system of instinctual regulation, only the visible body directly bears the affliction of 
decadence (Conway, 1997b: 25).”  
   
35 Conway (1997a: 48) explicates this distinction  stating that “The political macrosphere 
comprises the network of relations that obtain between a people’s institutions and its 
representative exemplars, while the political microsphere comprises those relations 
between a people and its representative exemplars that are not mediated by social 
institutions.” Throughout this work I utilize this understanding and also use the terms to 
distinguish more generally between the community (as the macrosphere) and the 
individuals comprising it (microsphere) of the socio-political. 
    
36 Eros is understood hereinafter, following Hutter, as denoting erotic drive, creative 
force and an emotional attachment or enthusiasm. 
 
37 Conway, 1997a: 8 
 
38 UM: III–6 
 
39 Conway, 1997a: 8 
 
40 Martin, 1995: 144 
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41 Donnelly defines democratization as “the process of establishing electoral democracy.” 
He states that “Although it might be seen as a type of liberalization, the qualitative leap 
involved justifies a separate category.” Liberalization, by contrast, “involves a decrease 
in human rights violations and opening of political space for at least some previously 
excluded groups, which roughly means progress in civil and political rights short of 
democratization.” Donnelly, 1998: 157 
 
42 It may be surprising to many readers to learn that political scientists are not often 
absorbed by axiological concerns. 
 
43 On a Nietzschean notion of post-modern anarchism, see Lewis Call’s “Postmodern 
Anarchism”. 
 
44 Kaufmann, 1950: 412, 418; contrary to Nietzsche’s opposition to the idolatry of the 
state and political liberalism, it does not follow that he is, as he asserted in the context of 
denying any affiliation with political parties of his day (EH: I-3), “antipolitical” in the 
broader sense Kaufmann takes from the statement. Rather, he is opposed to partisan 
politics as constituted in a liberal-modern and thoroughly decadent epoch.  
 
45 Those who dismiss Nietzsche as a bonafide political philosopher must deliberately 
ignore these parts of his work. 
 
46 TI: VIII–4 
 
47 Discourse analysis, textual analysis and historical analysis are the primary 
methodological tools applied in this study. 
 
48 “In simplest terms, governmentality refers to the arts and rationalities of governing, 
where the conduct of conduct is the key activity.  It is an attempt to reformulate the 
governor – governed relationship, one that does not make the relation dependent upon 
administrative machines, juridical institutions, or other apparatuses that usually get 
grouped under the rubric of the State.” Pp 4 of the collaborative introduction from 
“Foucault, Culture Studies and Governmentality”, editors: Bratich, Jack Z., Cameron 
McCarthy and Jeremy Parker; 2003.   
 
49 See Althusser, 1984; and Gramsci, 1988 and 1991. It should be noted that the strongly 
Marxian elements of their respective philosophical analysis are downplayed in this work. 
 
50 Ibid 
 
51 Conway, 1997b: 12 
 
52 On Nietzsche’s views of the law as formative, see BGE: 188; GM: II-2 and III-9; A: 
57. 
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53 Right should here be understood as suggesting ‘warrant’ or ‘authorization’. 
 
54 See Lewis Call’s Post-modern Anarchism, 2002. 
 
55 GM: I-10 and 13 
  
56 GM: I-7 and 8 
 
57 GM: II-12 thru 14 
 
58 In the present, figures such as the late Princess Diana or the business tycoon Bill Gates 
personify this impulse and corresponding system of values. Gates has famously donated 
hundreds of millions of dollars to a foundation of his own creation that seeks to find cures 
for diseases such as malaria and AIDS, toward the amelioration of suffering and—as he 
imagines—poverty in the “developing” world. 
 
59 WP: 963 
 
60 For the concepts of the simulated (the feigned or ersatz) and simulacrums (copies that 
lack any original) I here rely on conceptual innovations by Jean Baudrillard, specifically 
in “Simulacra and simulation” who drew in part on an earlier notion postulated by Pierre 
Kosslowski (author of “Nietzsche and the Vicious Circle”). 
 
61 My use of the notion of ‘spectacle’ and the contemporary ‘spectacular technoculture of 
every day life’ derives from Guy Debord’s seminal work “Society of the Spectacle” 
among other works including post-Situationist Nietzschean studies, including 
“Nietzsche’s Corps/e and the Spectacular Technoculture of Everyday Life”, by Geoff 
Waite (see bibliography). 
 
 
62 My understanding (and this account) of Nietzsche’s vitalist politics is significantly 
indebted to both Daniel Conway’s Nietzsche’s Dangerous Game: Philosophy in the 
Twilight of the Idols, and his Nietzsche and the Political. For other excellent extended 
examinations of Nietzsche’s politics see Leslie Paul Theile’s Friedrich Nietzsche and the 
Politics of the Soul, Bruce Detwiler’s Nietzsche and the Politics of Aristocratic 
Radicalism, and Tracy Strong’s Friedrich Nietzsche and the Politics of Transfiguration.  
 
63 HH: II: 2–292 
 
64 HH: I: 475; note that the first volume of Human, All Too Human, was published 1878, 
two sequels (Assorted Opinions and Maxims and The Wanderer and His Shadow, written 
in 1879-80 were published latter as the second volume.  
 
65 BGE: 242 
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66 BGE: 254 
 
67 BGE: 242 
 
68 BGE: 256 
 
69 GS: 377; Cf. A: 36 
 
70 An example of the former would include the pledge of allegiance; shrill media pundits 
exemplify the latter. 
 
71 See Z: I-11(On the New Idol) 
 
72 Lampert, 1986: 55 
 
73 Smith: 154 
 
74 This is a term from the early essay The Greek State, translated by Carol Diethe.  Levy 
translates the same term “international homeless money hermits” by which Nietzsche 
aptly referred to the then emerging class of international business owners and 
monopolists who utterly lacked the positive aspects of the “state instinct”. 
 
75 Call, pp. 56. 
 
76 Hutter, pp 60 – 61 
 
77 Conway, 1997a: 64, 90-1 and ‘plucky bricoleurs’. 1997b. 
  
78 Lampert, 1993: 229 
 
79 A deconstruction of the nation-state must include its evolution and its essential 
characteristics such as sovereign independence and territorial integrity, in addition to its 
absolute power to determine and confer formal communal identity and political 
belonging through citizenship. 
 
80 See Z: I-11 (On the New Idol) 
 
81 BGE: 61 
 
82 Appel: 15. I shall henceforth refer to the modernity of our contemporary era –and all 
the offshoots of modernity Appel specifies – summarily under the moniker ultra-liberal-
modernity. 
 
83 Conway, 1997a: 76 
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84 Hutter, 2006: 167 
 
85 WP: 963 
 
86 Conway, 1997a: 7 
 
87 My conception of Empire is only distantly related to Hardt and Negri’s conception of 
“Empire”. Hardt and Negri define Empire as a totalizing, yet continually shifting and 
decentered phenomenon: “In contrast to imperialism, Empire establishes no territorial 
center of power and does not rely on fixed boundaries or barriers. It is a decentered and 
deterritorializing apparatus of rule that progressively incorporates the entire global realm 
within its open, expanding frontiers.” Hardt and Negri, 2000: xiii 
 
88 Ibid: 9 
 
89 Mandalios, 2008: 1 
 
90 On Nietzsche’s view of ‘the hybrid mixed man of Europe’, see BGE: 223; his 
acceptance of difference should not be conflated with the superficial, and difference 
annihilating “multi-culturalism” of our ultra-liberal-modern era, the relativistic basis of 
which is to be found in the axiomatic narratives comprising its meta-discourse. 
  
91 At GS: 40 Nietzsche distinguishes between the dominant industrial societies that had 
arisen in Western Europe and the US in the late-19th century and traditional military 
culture that he favored over the former. Obviously he could not anticipate the merger of 
industrial society and military culture in the latter half of the 20th century, which would 
give-rise to a form of militarism that he would have seen as bereft of the merit-bestowing 
qualities and identity forming honor codes characteristic of traditional European military 
cultures. 
  
92 This assertion echoes Debord’s over-arching thesis in ‘Society of the Spectacle’. 
 
93 I use the term ‘cover-up’ in the Heideggerian sense, as an indeliberate revelation; 
Freud’s notion of Thanatos is clearly related to Nietzsche’s concept of nihilism. 
 
94 Lampert, 1986: 55 
 
95 Danto, 1980: 142 
 
96 See “On the Genealogy of Morality,” and “The Antichrist(ian),” among others of his 
works. 
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97 See “The Gay Science,” “Beyond Good and Evil” and “Twilight of the Idols,” among 
others of his works. 
 
98 See the essay “On Truth and Lies in an Extra-moral sense”, “Beyond Good and Evil”, 
and unpublished notes collected as “The Will To Power.” 
 
99 For Nietzsche’s qualified critique of liberal-modernity and the negative side of the 
Enlightenment—particularly its Rousseauian strand—see HH: I–26, 150, 463, and II 2–
221; D: 197; BGE: 44 (on “the scribbling slaves of the democratic spirit and its ‘modern 
ideas’”), 46; TI: skirmishes 38, 39, 48, 49; and CW: epilogue. 
 
100 Nietzsche doctrine of will-to-power is complicated and incorrectly understood as 
being in some way analogous to the metaphysical notion of autonomous agency that 
plagued Western philosophy. Nietzsche wrote, “The will-to-power not a being, not a 
becoming, but a pathos – the most elemental fact from which a becoming and effecting 
first emerge (WP: 636).”  
 
101 Conway, 1997b: chapters two and three 
 
102 Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari thought these important concepts; I draw them from 
their respective works and the important application of them by Keith Ansell Pearson 
(1997).    
 
103 Ansell-Pearson, 1997: 91 
 
104 This sentence constitutes a partial response to claims by Lampert, 1986: 55, which it 
paraphrases. 
 
105 Kynical is the adverbial / adjectival form of Kynicism, a term derived from the Greek 
term, kynismos, and has been utilized by Peter Sloterdijk to refer to the playfulness that 
transfigures cynicism. He defines kynical acts as the “kind of argumentation [which] 
respectable thinking does not know how to deal with”, “a dialectic of disinhibition” 
characterized by a “cheekiness” that “gives a new twist to the question of how to say the 
truth (Sloterdijk, 1987: 101– 4).” In Book four I link it with the Cynical doctrine of 
Parhessia. 
 
106 Notably, Frankfurt School Critical Theorists Max Horkheimer and Theodor Adorno 
did make this discomfiting connection in their ‘Dialectic of Enlightenment’, as refugees 
from Hitler’s Germany. 
 
107 Plato’s concept of forms, Augustine’s notion of grace, Spinoza’s idea of substance, 
Leibniz’s theory of monads, Kant’s postulations of synthetic a priori reason and 
categories, Hegel’s belief in world spirit, Marx’s view of labor, and Rawls’ theory of 
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justice, are all just as vulnerable to dismissal as indemonstrable metaphysical 
suppositions. 
 
108 For just a few examples of this single aristocratic aspect of Nietzsche’s broad concern 
with the subject of beauty see HH: II: 1-118; GS: 85-6, 339; TI: VIII-5, IX-47, A: 57 and 
in the Nachlass see: August – September 1885, 41 [1 – 16]. 
 
 
109 This is suggested in a modified form by the Frankfurt School’s mid-twentieth century 
critique of Enlightenment liberal modernity, which had produced the opposite of its 
original ideals. See Horkheimer and Adorno’s Dialectic of Enlightenment.  
 
110 BGE: 208.  Hardt and Negri’s notion of Multitude whose act to resist Empire, bears 
some, albeit little, relation to Nietzsche’s best or noble types and their enactments of 
positive will to creative destruction as generative power through active force. For, in so 
far as Multitude is an inclusive category within which exceptional, pluripotent individuals 
(irrespective of class, race, gender, etc.) in the nations of Europe (and the world) defy the 
reactive suppression of difference, they mimetically replicate (if not personify) primary 
tenets of ultra-liberal-modernity and come to re-comprise a mainly reactive herd.  After 
multiple readings of Empire I am still struck by what seems, in their notion of 
“Multitude”, to be a transparently obvious palliative for post-Marxians reluctant to 
disavow their populist and revolutionary sentiments. While they admit they are not 
speaking of the masses per se, but rather of exceptionally engaged individuals, it is 
difficult to distinguish the motives or objective of such individuals from the partisan 
liberal ideologues Nietzsche would have disdained for uncritically replicating the ascetic-
materialist herd values of ultra-liberal modernity. It is equally difficult to accept the 
“revolutionary” potential Hardt and Negri confer upon the Multitude’s insolent and 
raucous actions when they seem an obvious effort to expand liberal ideals.  Regardless, it 
is such conscientious, concerned individuals who Hardt and Negri assert collectively 
comprise a large and possibly transformative group, hence “Multitude.” Though I 
appreciate the inherent optimism of such wordplay, it seems prima facie obvious that 
relative to the hordes of those indifferently consuming in their midst, such individuals 
hardly represent a “multitude”. A mob of belligerent 20-somethings “demonstrating” in 
Seattle, Genoa or Prague may be disruptive, but however honorable their efforts, it does 
not constitute a substantive challenge to the power of the globalization complex, which 
was humorously demonstrated when the Ministerial Conference of the WTO was moved 
to Doha, Qatar in November, 2001 – a site so isolated and strictly controlled as to be 
impossible for protestors to get to. For an examination of the potentials inherent in 
popular dissent, which Nietzsche’s good European would seek to exploit as a mechanism 
for achieving their (far more radical) ends, see Bleiker, 2000. His analysis is as 
simulating and thoughtful as Hardt and Negri’s with the advantage of being significantly 
less vaporous.  
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111 Over a long period we might expect – as Nietzsche hoped – that these acts (and 
becomings) of ‘good Europeans’ will produce a new specimen, one endowed with 
exceptional foresight, a few “over” or “super”-men who, out of their own superlative 
will-to-power, appear preeminent from the fray. The advent of our ‘global age’ (and its 
positive abstract potential of globality) indicates that this is emergently possible. 
 
112 Elbe, 2003: 119  
 
113 For an example of Nietzsche’s disdain of work for its own sake or work undertaken to 
fend off boredom (as it anticipates “workaholism”, our pathological work fetish), see GS: 
42. 
 
114 Del Caro, 2004: 65 
 
115 D: 175 
 
116 Ibid 
 
117 D: 178  
 
118 The creative types Nietzsche envisaged should be understood in such a way as to 
exclude nearly all those engaged in producing contemporary popular media and related 
pap. 
 
119 BGE: 242.  Echoing this (and passages in TI) in more provocative language is an 
unpublished note (WP: 960) in which Nietzsche states, “From now on there will be more 
favorable preconditions for more comprehensive forms of dominion, whose like has 
never yet existed. And even this is not the most important thing; the possibility has been 
established for the production of international racial unions whose task will be to rear a 
master race, the future "masters of the earth";--a new, tremendous aristocracy, based on 
the severest self-legislation, in which the will of philosophical men of power and artist-
tyrants will be made to endure for millennia--a higher kind of man who, thanks to their 
superiority in will, knowledge, riches, and influence, employ democratic Europe as their 
most pliant and supple instrument for getting hold of the destinies of the earth, so as to 
work as artists upon "man" himself. Enough: the time is coming when politics will have a 
different meaning (WP: 960 1885 – 1886)). This forcefully expresses Nietzsche’s hope 
and objective for mankind and reiterates significant elements of themes expressed in 
unpublished prefaces in 1872 particularly The Greek State and Homer on Competition. 
One must take care to learn the subtle meanings of the seemingly familiar terms here, for 
Nietzsche uses many of them, including “tyrants” and “politics” in a very particular and 
deliberate sense. 
 
120 See TI: V-6  
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121 By Dasein, I take Heidegger’s (Nietzsche-influenced) notion and modify it to suggest 
the event of becoming through which the question of being comes into being, thereby 
giving rise to the need and ability to discern, elucidate and transform our mode of being – 
a need realized through Nietzsche’s vitalist symptomatology of affects, which Heidegger 
largely neglected.  
 
122 Although the worth of this oft-ballyhooed feature of neo-liberal globalization is 
regularly asserted by its faithful advocate-apologists – it amounts to better technology for 
more stupidity, and the “dumbing-down” of the herd (NCW: We Antipodes). 
 
123 The “last man” is the antipode to the Übermensch, a developmental cul-de-sac who 
personifies the end of personal growth. The last man as a type represents the terrifying 
death of becoming through ultimate resignation to the passive-nihilism of our hyper-
decadent age. This should not be conflated with ‘the ugliest man’ who, miserable and 
self-despising but without need of pity, contends with the meaninglessness of life after 
the ‘death of God,’ prompting Zarathustra’s awareness of the need for the overcoming of 
man (Z: IV – 7). By contrast, the ‘last man’ is untroubled about meaning or any crisis 
resulting from its absence, so long as suffering is abolished (Z: P-5; BGE: 202, 225). 
 
124 Conation is a Latin term for the innate propensity or striving of an organism or entity. 
It is related to eros, and hereafter shall be used in a specifically Nietzschean sense, as the 
“conative disposition” indicative of certain types of involuntary, erotic enactments of will 
to power. To the very limited extent that it can be consciously grasped, insofar as it is 
suggested by an innate proclivity towards life, it is further related to the useful 
Heideggerian notion of anticipatory resoluteness. 
 
125 Anankê, refers to the earlier, pertinent Greek idea of necessity understood as an 
irrational, undirected element in the universe that conveys a volitional tendency impelling 
(or impeding) certain actions through/as physical necessity. Throughout the paper I will 
relate it to nisus, the Latin philosophical term conveying the “creative tendency in the 
universe toward the production of qualitatively new emergents” (definition from The 
Harper Collins Philosophy Dictionary; see bibliography: Angeles, Peter A.). Importantly, 
each of these interrelated concepts serves both to substantiate and clarify the historical 
precedents, basis for and the precise meaning of Nietzsche’s central notion of will-to-
power. 
 
126 This should not be taken as a general rejection of development efforts in impoverished 
regions of the world, but as a practical critique of and view on both the desirability and 
utility of universalizing contemporary consumerist values (and attendant morality of 
taming and passive-nihilism) outside the post-industrialized, “developed” economies of 
Europe, the Anglo-European nations of North America, Australia and New Zealand. It 
also applies to Japan, South Korea, Taiwan and the Asian “tiger” economies, all of which 
have already succumbed to the ascetic-consumerist ethos of the West’s secular priests of 
ressentiment.  
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127 Nietzsche’s concern for human evolution has to do with a transformation of 
comprehension and elevation. It entails an unfolding refinement through an ever-
deepened cognizance of life, and that is the sense – versus a simplified or crude neo-
Darwinism – in which Nietzsche’s advocated evolution. Without denying his very real 
interest in the ultimate objective of breeding a ‘new species man,’ Nietzsche would have 
been appalled by early twentieth century Social Darwinism, and rightly seen its advocates 
as plebian exponents of a pathetically pseudo-naturalized ressentiment. See Weaver 
Santaniello’s Nietzsche, God and the Jews: pp 74, 87. 
 
128 Hyper-decadence is meant to connote the exponential intensification of the decadent 
trends Nietzsche identified in the late nineteenth century across the twentieth century and 
up to our present. It combines Baudrillard’s apropos critique of the hyper-real condition 
of contemporary life which Nietzsche’s nineteenth century critique of late-modernity 
anticipated and to which Baudrillard’s notion is indebted. Nietzsche correctly forecast the 
inexorable increase of negative forces he identified as characteristic of the decadent, and 
their culmination in a contemporary “hyper-decadence” in which they automatically 
naturalize and extend themselves aptly conveys the concentration of late ultra-liberal-
modernity’s decadent tendencies and their paralyzing effect on contemporary life. 
 
129 TI: IX–39 
 
130 WP: 887 
 
131 Owen, 1995: 56-7; on the philosophical outlook to which the ascetic ideal gives rise, 
see Owen, 2007: 124-25.  
 
132 Ibid 
 
133 Ansell-Pearson, The Eternal Return Of The Overhuman, in The Journal of Nietzsche 
Studies, Issue 30, Autumn 2005, pp 13. 
 
134 Smith, 1996: 144–6, citing BGE: 45 
 
135 BGE: 211 
 
136 Smith, 1996: 148 
 
137 Ibid, 147 
 
138 Ibid 
 
139 Elbe, 2002: 37 
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140 Aspects of Nietzsche’s idea of Europe are, however counter-intuitively, reflected in 
certain, however few, protections and guarantees promulgated by EU law. 
 
141 These provisions take a variety of forms, being legally codified or (especially in the 
social and cultural realm) adhered to as community wide norms.  Nearly all are 
articulated in the language of protected human rights guarantees. These are considered 
among the most “progressive” on earth. 
 
142 The reaction these liberal policies breed takes numerous forms, finding expression in 
political correctness that imposes strictures on language, for instance. 
 
143 HH: 109, cited in Elbe, 2002: 38 
 
144 Smith, 1996: 153 
 
145 Ibid 
 
146 GS: 270 and 335 
 
147 Nietzsche writes of the ‘supra-European’ way of thinking that characterizes good 
Europeans at WP 132. 
 
148 Nietzsche first wrote of ‘good Europeans’ in HH: 475, titled “The European human 
being and the abolition of nations,” then again in GS: 357 “What is German”, and 377 
“We who are homeless”.  In BGE he articulates the necessity of the strongest individuals 
to become good Europeans (or otherwise refers to them) in the preface, 201, 202, 241, 
242, 243 and 256. The theme is reiterated in GM: 3-27 echoing GS377; as well as at EH: 
I: 3 and variously in WP: 117, 132, 405, 765, 783, 868, 1051. The term is sometimes used 
in quotes to indicate Nietzsche’s self-conscious awareness of its short-hand utility. Good 
Europeanism in part references the ephectic drive and cultivated stance of skeptical 
ironism informing the conative disposition or anticipatory resoluteness of such 
individuals. It must be understood in the context of his vitalist politics and power 
ontology.  
 
149 BGE: 256 
 
150 BGE: 230 
 
151 BGE: 251 
 
152 Nietzsche’s vitalist politics largely consists of his symptomatology of the affects, an 
evaluative stance that corresponds with his Genealogy of Morality. It implemented his 
belief that “it is insufficient for philosophers simply to observe cultural practices; they 
must also interpret these practices as symptomatic of their invisible preconditions,” and 
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necessitated a performative reversal of perspectives in practice (Conway, 1997b: 79). The 
primary difficulty with it is that it relies on presuppositions which are contestable: those 
of his famous assessment of “master” and “slave” moral systems. As Conway notes, “he 
offers no empirical means of evaluating the merit of his ensuing diagnosis (Conway, 
1997b: 81),” however, this fact can in part be accounted for by his perspectivalist 
epistemology and hermeneutics, in the context of which it was developed – and it should 
be noted that this problem plagues advocates of any evaluative standard, i.e.: the veracity 
of ultra-liberal-modern values cannot be empirically demonstrated, either, yet its 
apodicity is widely, if falsely, assumed. Nietzsche’s related power ontology or hypothesis 
that everything is will to power provides him with a framework for theorizing the 
impelling force that is all that exists, which I also utilize to conduct this thought 
experiment and critique.  
 
153 TI: IX–24 
 
154 By ‘transformation’ I refer primarily to re-presentations of the meta-discourse of ultra-
liberal-modernity by its institutional arbiters/enforcers to interpolate challenges to 
it/them, but also to the development of theories explaining integration. 
 
155 Nietzsche is not considered to have done philosophy of science, per se, but to have 
critiqued the foundations for an appropriate philosophy of science and problematized 
(what were) conventional prejudices then informing—and in modified form still 
privileging—scientific practice (e.g.: positivism) as the best means of knowledge 
creation/acquisition (see Babich, 1994: 2–3). I must emphasize that it is neither my aim 
here, nor within the scope of my abilities, to give a full accounting of Nietzsche’s thought 
in the context of 20th century philosophy of science. It can be plausibly argued that 
aspects of Nietzsche’s thought can be identified with nearly all the major movements of 
20th century philosophy of science, due primarily to his anti-dogmatic perspectivalist 
stance and corresponding disposition toward truth claims and knowledge acquisition. 
 
156 Conway, 1997a: 127–8: “Although Nietzsche unequivocally declares bankrupt the 
grand, sweeping dream of the Enlightenment, his genealogical method nevertheless 
celebrates the subversive, unmasking power of local applications of reason. Drawing on a 
familiar image of Enlightenment, he praises the demystifying power of his Genealogy… 
If he is to contribute to the self-overcoming of Christian morality, then it must be the case 
that he too labors in the service of the will to truth, that he too takes his flame ‘from the 
fire ignited by a faith millennia old, the Christian faith, which was also Plato’s, that God 
is truth, that truth is divine (GS: 344, cited in GM: III–24)’.”  
 
157 Ansell Pearson, 1997: 55 
 
158 Moore, 2002: 8 
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159 See, for instance, D: 432–33. In the former, ‘Investigators and experimenters’ 
Nietzsche anticipates key concerns elaborated a century later by Feyerabend and Hempel; 
the latter aphorism ‘Seeing with new eyes’, contemplates “the faithful interpretation of 
actuality,” and “knowledge of reality”, in terms of the beautiful, and ponders the role of 
the artist in the age of science. 
 
160 His critique anticipates some of the insights developed according to a much different 
will to truth by philosophers of science a century later, for instance, in notions as diverse 
as Popper skepticism and aversion to dogmatism (set forth in The Open Society and The 
Logic of Scientific Discovery), Kuhn (the dependence of truth on a dominant scientific 
paradigm or worldview (Weltanschauung), and those of Feyerabend (incommensurability 
of theoretical stances). However, Nietzsche rejected the fetishization of rationalism and 
progressivism characteristic of much 20th century philosophy of science, seeing in their 
scientific ideal of truth a correspondence with metaphysical and moral prejudices.  
 
161 Babich, 1994: 3 
 
162 Babich, 1994: 147; Not so paradoxically however, the contemporary normative social 
science practices of which Nietzsche would likely have approved (versus efforts to apply 
analytical and/or quantitative methods to the study of social processes) could only have 
developed within the context of—and so are themselves a product of—the anti-natural, 
ultra-liberal-modern ideals to whose ends they were developed and are employed. 
Furthermore, when taken to their logical limits they inevitably lead to the recognition of 
the radical contingency of all knowledge claims. However, unlike in Nietzschean 
perspectivalism where this can be understood as productive, it results in a paralyzing 
relativism in the context of conventional social science practice, which presents a 
quixotic aporia for the latter’s most intellectually honest practitioners. (It is not much of a 
crisis for the average academic social scientist however, as they generally do not pursue 
the logic of their methods so far, selectively employing various methods as they fit their 
immediate aims. They are able as a consequence to maintain their comfortable faith in the 
univocality of reason and “Truth”.) 
 
163 TI: V-4 and VII-5 
 
164 Conway, 1997b: 56 
 
165 Again, see Conway, 1997a: 47-8 
 
166Again, kynicism is a derivation of the Greek term, kynismos, and has been utilized by 
Peter Sloterdijk to refer to the playfulness that transfigures cynicism. He defines kynical 
acts as the “kind of argumentation [which] respectable thinking does not know how to 
deal with”, “a dialectic of disinhibition” characterized by a “cheekiness” that “gives a 
new twist to the question of how to say the truth (Sloterdijk, 1987: 101– 4).” 
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167 GM: I-12 
 
168 Conway, 1997b: 233  
 
169 GM: III-12 
 
170 Conway, 1997a: 131 
 
171 Nietzsche’s concern with evidentiary proofs for his hypotheses is suggested at TI: IX–
20, among other places. 
 
172 See BGE: 34, a passage in which Nietzsche argues that “The faith in “immediate 
certainties” is a moral naïveté that reflects honor on us philosopher; but—after all we 
should not be “merely moral” men. Apart from morality, this faith is a stupidity…”, and 
that “there would be no life at all if not on the basis of perspective estimates and 
appearances…” and BGE: 36, where he suggests, by way of challenging Western “faith 
in causality,” that the world might be credibly understood as the sum product of our 
drives, the reality of which could plausibly be understood in terms of “one basic form of 
the will, namely of the will to power.”  
 
173 Philosophical critics have observed serious problems with the presuppositions of his 
critique of values in ‘On the Genealogy of Morality’, observing, for instance, that his 
account omits certain inconvenient facts about the very evidence it employs to make his 
case, such as his attempt to establish an ultimately arbitrary correspondence between 
master morality and health and slave morality and weakness. These are problems of 
unwarranted assumptions and argumentative circularity that at some level plague all 
philosophical works, a fact that Nietzsche would have seen as underscoring his view that 
all truth is perspectivally contingent upon the sort of life that compels us to posit values 
and which is symptomatized by those value standards. For the purposes of my application 
of his vitalist politics and power ontology to contemporary Europe, I largely set aside 
such objections to his arguments and proceed according to the specified strains within the 
secondary literature. 
 
174 Babich, 1994: 5 
 
175 Feyerabend famously rejected epistemological prescriptions, advocating 
methodological anarchism, in which the only guiding principle for scientists pursuing 
knowledge should be: anything goes. See his provocative work ‘Against Method’, pp 9 -
19. 
 
176 Babich, 1994: 5 
 
177 Conway, 1997b: 7, citing CW: P 
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178 The challenge of overcoming the decadence of our ultra-liberal-modern age does not 
reverse the effects of decadence and their consequences; rather it seeks to establish a 
radically different order through a creative discipline (poiesis and askesis) of great 
suffering. 
 
179 CW: E 
 
180 Z: I-15 
  
181 Ibid 
 
182 See Twilight of the Idols: Whether we have become more moral. 
 
183 See Conway, 1997b: 14-15, 119, 169 
 
184 GM: III-13 thru 15 
 
185 GS: 116 
 
186 Ibid 
 
187 Conway, 1997a: 111 
 
188 Conway, 1997a: 102 
 
189 Conway, 1997a: 44-5 
 
190 Albrow, 1996: 108 
 
191 Conway, 1997a: 48 
 
192 Conway, 1997a: 110 – 111 
 
193 Conway, 1997b: 43-44 
 
194 See Ansell Pearson, 1994: 53 
 
195 This is suggested in a modified form by the Frankfurt School’s mid-twentieth century 
critique of Enlightenment liberal modernity, which had produced the opposite of its 
original ideals. See Horkheimer and Adorno’s Dialectic of Enlightenment.  
 
196 BGE: 208. A note on Hardt and Negri’s notion of Multitude, which is somewhat 
analogous to Marx’s proletariat; the radicalized individuals who concertedly act to resist 
‘Empire’, is antithetical to Nietzsche’s aristocratic elitism where the best or noble types 
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rule in a naturally ordered polity. While Hardt and Negri assert that they are not speaking 
of the masses per se, but rather of exceptionally engaged individuals, it is difficult, if not 
impossible, to distinguish the motives or objective of such individuals as they describe 
from the partisan liberal ideologues Nietzsche would have disdained for uncritically 
replicating the ascetic-materialist herd values of ultra-liberal modernity. It is equally 
difficult to accept the “revolutionary” potential Hardt and Negri confer upon the 
Multitude’s insolent and raucous actions when they seem an obvious effort to expand 
liberal ideals. Regardless, it is such conscientious, concerned individuals who Hardt and 
Negri assert collectively comprise a large and possibly transformative group, hence 
“Multitude.” Though I appreciate the inherent optimism of such wordplay, it seems prima 
facie obvious that relative to the hordes of those indifferently consuming in their midst, 
such individuals hardly represent a “multitude”, so conceived. 
 
197 Over a long period we might expect – as Nietzsche hoped – that these acts (and 
becomings) of ‘good Europeans’ will produce a new specimen, one endowed with 
exceptional foresight, a few “over” or “super”-men who, out of their own superlative will 
to power, appear preeminent from the fray. The advent of our ‘global age’ (and its 
positive abstract potentials of globality) indicates that this is emergently possible. 
 
198 This practically defines the contemporary condition/affliction of hyper-decadence. 
 
199 Goode and Ben-Yehuda, 1994: 33–42, 127–29; Nussbaum, 2004: 255.  
 
200 Examples of recently re-emerging ontological essentialisms and conflicts they have 
fomented include the former Yugoslavia, conflicts in the former Soviet Union, the Darfur 
/ Sudan civil war, inter-ethnic and religious conflicts in Indonesia and Central Africa. In 
Western Europe it has taken the form of anti-immigrant movements, the erratic—but 
generally growing—support for ultra-nationalist parties and even a resurgence in 
Communist party support in Central and Eastern Europe. 
 
201 An algodicy is an interpretation and/or explanation of human suffering. 
 
202 Specifically the logic of self-determination, which the UN charter instantiates in law, 
as well as the developing corpus of human rights law, also set forth in the charter, holds 
this exciting and authentically life-affirming potential. 
 
203 Elbe, 2003: 119  
 
204 For an example of Nietzsche’s disdain of work for its own sake, efforts to dignify it or 
work undertaken to fend off boredom (as it anticipates “workaholism”, our pathological 
work fetish), see GS: 42. 
 
205 D: 175 
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206 See Love, 1986: 2 and 113–14 (on fetishism)   
 
207 D: 175 
 
208 D: 178  
 
209 The creative types Nietzsche envisaged should be understood in such a way as to 
exclude nearly all those engaged in producing contemporary popular media and related 
anti-cultural pap. 
 
210 BGE: 242; Echoing this in more provocative language is an unpublished note (WP: 
960) in which Nietzsche states, “From now on there will be more favorable preconditions 
for more comprehensive forms of dominion, whose like has never yet existed. And even 
this is not the most important thing; the possibility has been established for the 
production of international racial unions whose task will be to rear a master race, the 
future "masters of the earth";--a new, tremendous aristocracy, based on the severest self-
legislation, in which the will of philosophical men of power and artist-tyrants will be 
made to endure for millennia--a higher kind of man who, thanks to their superiority in 
will, knowledge, riches, and influence, employ democratic Europe as their most pliant 
and supple instrument for getting hold of the destinies of the earth, so as to work as artists 
upon "man" himself. Enough: the time is coming when politics will have a different 
meaning (WP: 960 1885 – 1886)). This forcefully expresses Nietzsche’s hope and 
objective for mankind and reiterates significant elements of themes expressed in 
unpublished prefaces in 1872 particularly The Greek State and Homer on Competition. 
One must take care to learn the subtle meanings of the seemingly familiar terms here, for 
Nietzsche uses many of them, including “tyrants” and “politics” in a very particular and 
deliberate sense. 
 
211 See TI: V-6  
 
212 I apply Heidegger’s notion of Dasein (being-there) to suggest the event of becoming 
through which the question of our being arises (comes into being), thereby generating the 
need to better discern our mode of life (being-in-the-world), an act which invariably 
transforms it. I relate this to Nietzsche’s vitalist symptomatology of affects, which 
elucidates the way in which the hyper-decadence of our era incapacitates the native 
volition of individuals, to impair authentic becoming. I also consider the latter as a 
possible means of overcoming that decadence for the healthiest to realize their ownmost 
potentiality for Being. 
 
213 Although the worth of this oft-ballyhooed feature of neo-liberal globalization is 
dogmatically exaggerated by its faithful advocate-apologists – it amount to little more 
than “better technology for more stupidity,” as a former professor of mine was fond of 
saying. 
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214 The “last man” is the antipode to the Übermensch, a developmental cul-de-sac who 
personifies the end of personal growth. The last man as a type represents the terrifying 
death of becoming through ultimate resignation to the passive-nihilism of our hyper-
decadent age. This should not be conflated with ‘the ugliest man’ who, miserable and 
self-despising but without need of pity, contends with the meaninglessness of life after 
the ‘death of God,’ prompting Zarathustra’s awareness of the need for the overcoming of 
man (Z: IV – 7). By contrast, the ‘last man’ is untroubled about meaning or any resultant 
crisis for its absence, so long as suffering is abolished (Z: P-5; BGE: 202, 225). See 
further notes for other references. 
 
215 Conation is a Latin term for the innate propensity or striving of an organism or entity. 
It is related to eros, and here used in a specifically Nietzschean sense, as the “conative 
disposition” indicative of certain types of involuntary enactments of will to power. To the 
very limited extent that it can be parsimoniously defined, insofar as it is suggested by an 
innate proclivity towards life, it is related to the useful Heideggerian notion of 
“anticipatory resoluteness”. 
 
216 Anankê (or Anangke) refers to the classical Greek idea of necessity understood as “that 
inner force which impels certain things to be done or prevents them from being done… 
the physical necessity understood as the constantly present, irrational, nonpurposeful, 
undirected and uncontrolled element in the universe”. Throughout the paper I will relate 
it to nisus, the Latin philosophical term conveying the “creative tendency in the universe 
toward the production of qualitatively new emergents” (Angeles, 1992: 11 & 204). 
Importantly, each of these interrelated concepts serves as substantiating and clarifying 
historical precedents for Nietzsche’s central theory of will to power. 
 
217 Bernstein, 2002: 121; paraphrasing Kristeva, 1982 
 
218 Frank, (2000):19, 50, 54-55 
 
219 There are innumerable examples of this in contemporary Western societies. The Bill 
and Melinda Gates Foundation’s focus on curing Malaria and aiding African nations 
exemplifies this trend. Such projects resonate with Western humanitarians while avoiding 
the scrutiny and controversy that would arise if they were to tackle difficult socio-
economic disparities in the developed world, particularly the United States, where Gates 
earned the larger part of his fortune. Another excellent example is the fashion of micro-
loans to small businesses in the Third-world, which can be done online by credit-card, 
thereby assuaging the shame of donors, who may or may not be aware of the fact that just 
a few blocks away homeless people go hungry or even freeze to death on America’s city 
streets. 
 
220 This should not be taken as a general rejection of development efforts in impoverished 
regions of the world, but as a practical critique of and view on both the desirability and 
utility of universalizing contemporary consumerist values (and attendant morality of 
taming and passive-nihilism) outside the post-industrialized, “developed” economies of 
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Europe, the Anglo-European nations of North America, Australia and New Zealand. It 
also applies to Japan, South Korea, Taiwan and the Asian “tiger” economies, all of which 
have already succumbed to the ascetic-consumerist ethos of the West’s secular priests of 
ressentiment.  
 
221 Nietzsche’s concern for human evolution has to do with a transformation of 
comprehension and elevation. It entails an unfolding refinement through an ever-
deepened cognizance of life, and that is the sense – versus a simplified or crude neo-
Darwinism – in which Nietzsche’s advocated evolution. Without denying his very real 
interest in the ultimate objective of breeding a ‘new species man,’ Nietzsche would have 
been appalled by early twentieth century Social Darwinism, and rightly seen its advocates 
as plebian exponents of a pathetically pseudo-naturalized ressentiment. See Weaver 
Santaniello’s Nietzsche, God and the Jews: pp 74, 87. 
 
222 Hyper-decadence is meant to connote the exponential intensification of the decadent 
trends Nietzsche identified in the late nineteenth century across the twentieth century and 
up to our present. It combines Baudrillard’s apropos critique of the hyper-real condition 
of contemporary life which Nietzsche’s nineteenth century critique of late-modernity 
anticipated and to which Baudrillard’s notion is indebted. Nietzsche correctly forecast the 
inexorable increase of negative forces he identified as characteristic of the decadent, and 
their culmination in a contemporary “hyper-decadence” in which they automatically 
naturalize and extend themselves aptly conveys the concentration of late ultra-liberal-
modernity’s decadent tendencies and their paralyzing effect on contemporary life. 
 
223 Through kynical acts, comedians of ascetic ideals expose the absurdity and counter-
productive effects of anti-human values. Their playful scorn, or seeming buffoonery, dis-
empowers conventional authorities whose interests the nihilistic status-quo serves, and 
who are unable to respond effectively to the undermining of their credibility. 
 
224 TI: IX–39 
 
225 WP: 887 
 
226 David Owen, Nietzsche, Politics and Modernity, pp 56 – 57. 
 
227 Ansell-Pearson, The Eternal Return Of The Overhuman, in The Journal of Nietzsche 
Studies, Issue 30, Autumn 2005, pp 13. 
 
228 Smith, 1996: 144–6, citing BGE: 45 
 
229 BGE: 211 
 
230 Smith, 1996: 147-8 
 
231 Ibid, 147 
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232 Elbe, 2002: 37 
 
233 Ibid 
 
234 Aspects of Nietzsche’s idea of Europe are, however counter-intuitively, reflected in 
certain, however few, protections and guarantees promulgated by EU law. 
 
235 These provisions take a variety of forms, being legally codified or (especially in the 
social and cultural realm) adhered to as community wide norms.  Nearly all are 
articulated in the language of protected human rights guarantees. These are considered 
among the most “progressive” on earth. 
 
236 The reaction these liberal policies breed takes numerous forms, finding expression in 
political correctness that imposes strictures on language and behavior, for instance. 
 
237 HH: 109, cited in Elbe, 2002: 38 
 
238 Sloterdijk, 1987: 5 
 
239 Smith: 153 
 
240 Ibid 
 
241 GS: 270 and 335; Nietzsche’s conception of masterly virtues  should not be 
misconstrued in terms of an imposition of power-over-others or traditional oppression, 
tyrannical authority or coercive power relations, but as an incorporation of weaker 
powers into stronger ones in ever-evolving power aggregations.  
 
242 Nietzsche first wrote of ‘good Europeans’ in HH: 475, titled “The European human 
being and the abolition of nations,” then again in GS: 357 “What is German”, and 377 
“We who are homeless”.  In BGE he articulates the necessity of the strongest individuals 
to become good Europeans (or otherwise refers to them) in the preface, 201, 202, 241, 
242, 243 and 256. The theme is reiterated in GM: 3-27 echoing GS377; as well as at EH: 
I: 3 and variously in WP: 117, 132, 405, 765, 783, 868, 1051. The term is sometimes used 
in quotes but should not be taken as an ironic trope. By placing the term in quotes 
Nietzsche meant to acknowledge his self-conscious awareness of its short-hand utility 
and convey this to his readers. Good Europeanism references a broad and cultivated 
philosophical stance as well as a corresponding conative disposition or anticipatory 
resoluteness that must be understood in the context of his vitalist politics and power 
ontology.  
 
243 BGE: 256 
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244 Smith: 154, citing BGE: 251 
 
245 For the concepts of simulation I here rely on conceptual innovations by Jean 
Baudrillard, specifically in “Simulacra and simulation” which draws in part on an earlier 
notion postulated by Pierre Kosslowski (author of “Nietzsche and the Vicious Circle”) 
and simulacrums (the replication of essential attributes without reference to an original 
copy; a referent’s lack of any original). 
 
246 Sartre, 1984: 112 – 113; The ‘Faith’ of Bad Faith: “Bad faith does not hold the norms 
and criteria of truth as they are accepted by the critical thought of good faith. …Bad faith 
apprehends evidence but it is resigned in advance to not being fulfilled by this evidence, 
to not being persuaded and transformed into good faith.”  
 
247 My use of the notion of ‘spectacle’ and the contemporary ‘spectacular technoculture 
of every day life’ derives from Guy Debord’s seminal work “Society of the Spectacle” 
among other works including post-Situationist Nietzschean studies, including 
“Nietzsche’s Corps/e and the Spectacular Technoculture of Everyday Life”, by Geoff 
Waite (see bibliography). It also draws on Baudrillard’s notion of spectacle, which goes 
beyond Debord’s notion of expanded commodity fetishism, conceiving it as processions 
of simulacra that transform material reality into pure representation simulating reality 
(Morrison, 1998: 203). 
 
248 Colm Hogan, 2001: 40, 43; Hogan also usefully examines the operation of ‘interest 
differentiation’ and ‘microhierarchization’ in the construction of socio-economic interests 
and desire—vis forces of conformity—in advanced capitalist democracies of the West 
(47–48). On the ‘New Economy’ consensus, and its myriad simulations of a thoroughly 
homogenizing non-conformity and putative celebration of “outside-the-box” thinking by 
individuals whose myopic worldview inhibits them from actually perceiving the “box”, 
see Frank, 2000: 18–19.  
 
249 As stated in Book One, my understanding (and this account) of Nietzsche’s vitalist 
politics is significantly indebted to both Daniel Conway’s Nietzsche’s Dangerous Game: 
Philosophy in the Twilight of the Idols, and his Nietzsche and the Political. For other 
excellent extended examinations of Nietzsche’s politics see Leslie Paul Theile’s 
Friedrich Nietzsche and the Politics of the Soul, Bruce Detwiler’s Nietzsche and the 
Politics of Aristocratic Radicalism, and Tracy Strong’s Friedrich Nietzsche and the 
Politics of Transfiguration.  
 
250 HH: II: 2–292 
 
251 HH: I: 475; note that the first volume of Human, All Too Human, was published 1878, 
two sequels (Assorted Opinions and Maxims and The Wanderer and His Shadow, written 
in 1879-80 were published later as the second volume.  
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252 BGE: 242 
 
253 BGE: 254 
 
254 BGE: 242 
 
255 BGE: 256 
 
256 GS: 377; Cf. A: 36  
 
257 I do not mean to suggest that Europe can be described in terms of a simple dyadic 
binary distinguishing those who support Europe and those opposed to it. The vast 
majority of Europe’s citizen–constituents are somewhere in the middle, between these 
camps. The majority recognize that unification has benefited them, but maintain 
somewhat ill-formed notions and incoherent reservations about the Union’s hasty 
expansion. There is also widespread reluctance to approve a deeper political merger 
occurring prematurely or in a way that erodes democratic accountability. Nonetheless, the 
reductive binary of Europhile versus Europhobe does capture some fundamental aspects 
of the debate. 
 
258 Sloterdijk, 1987: 5 
 
259 See Z: I-11(On the New Idol) 
 
260 Lampert, 1986: 55 
 
261 Smith, 1996: 154 
 
262 This is a term from the early essay The Greek State, translated by Carol Diethe.  Levy 
translates the same term “international homeless money hermits” by which Nietzsche 
aptly referred to the then emerging class of international business owners and 
monopolists who utterly lacked the positive aspects of the “state instinct”. 
 
263 Call, 2002: 56 
 
264 Hutter, pp 60 – 61 
 
265 See Z: I-11 (On the New Idol) 
 
266 BGE: 61 
 
267 Appel: 15. I shall henceforth refer to the modernity of our contemporary era –and all 
the offshoots of modernity Appel specifies – summarily under the moniker ultra-liberal-
modernity. 
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268 Conway, 1997a: 76 
 
269 Hutter, 2006: 167 
 
270 Conway, 1997a: 7 
 
271 My conception of Empire is only distantly related to Hardt and Negri’s conception of 
“Empire”. Hardt and Negri define Empire as a totalizing, yet continually shifting and 
decentered phenomenon: “In contrast to imperialism, Empire establishes no territorial 
center of power and does not rely on fixed boundaries or barriers. It is a decentered and 
deterritorializing apparatus of rule that progressively incorporates the entire global realm 
within its open, expanding frontiers.” Hardt and Negri, 2000: xiii. Despite their assertions 
to the contrary, this goes too far in the direction of a metaphysical ontology for me, given 
the specificity of the institutions, processes and forces driving globalization and the 
apodicity of their effects upon the lives of billions. In fact there are loci of globalization’s 
power, which definitely does establish barriers to exclude an outside from its central 
power constellations. Furthermore, in performing many of its key functions—all of which 
relate to the universal dissemination and enforcement of the meta-discourse of ultra-
liberal-modernity—it remains quite blatantly imperialistic. It is imperialistic in the 
cultural chauvinism of its fundamental tenets and through highly sophisticated and 
sublimated means of deployment. It also covers up the imperialistic nature of its action 
by deploying spectacles of fulfillment, simulated existential meaning and ontological 
purpose; the provision of a ready-made, massifying “reason for being” for the enfeebled 
homunculi it has reduced to and manages as “consumers”.  
 
272 Hardt and Negri, 2000: 9 
 
273 Mandalios, 2008: 1 
 
274 Moore, 2002: 11 
 
275 Ibid 
 
276 On Nietzsche’s view of ‘the hybrid mixed man of Europe’, see BGE: 223 
 
277 Aristotle, Metaphysics: 980a 
 
278 WP: 898 
 
279 Rawls, 1971: 3–4 
  
280 Van Ham, 2001: 135 
 
281  Ibid: 159 
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282 See BGE: 26 and 27. This should not be taken as implying that Nietzsche was 
opposed to science. Rather, he opposed its privileging above all other values, saying “the 
objective person…the ideal scholar in whom the scientific instinct, after thousands of 
total and semi-failures, for once blossoms and blooms to the end, is certainly one of the 
most precious instruments there are; but he belongs in the hand of one more powerful. 
[The scientist] is genuine only insofar as he may be objective. [He is] a precious, easily 
injured and clouded instrument for measuring… but he is no goal, no conclusion and 
sunrise… (BGE: 207).” In radically deconstructing the conventional notion of cause–
effect relations he asserted “one should use ‘cause’ and ‘effect’ only as pure concepts, 
that is to say, as conventional fictions for the purpose of designation and 
communication—not for explanation. In the ‘in-itself’ there is nothing of ‘causal 
connections,’ of ‘necessity,’ or of ‘psychological non-freedom’; there the effect does not 
follow the cause, there is no rule of ‘law.’ It is we alone who have devised cause, 
sequence, for-each-other, relativity, constraint, number, law, freedom, motive, and 
purpose; and when we project and mix this symbol world into things as if it existed ‘in 
itself’ we act once more as we have always acted—mythologically (BGE: 21).” 
 
283 These include the discourses of rationalism and universalism, for example. 
 
284 Sloterdijk, 1987: 5 
 
285 WP: 866 
 
286 The anti-human trends promoted by the ascetic ideologues of unregulated free markets 
and populist democracy may be productively subverted by attempters whose individual 
regimes of self-creation and discipline inevitably revalue the dissipative values 
subtending these institutions. 
 
287 Babich: 204 – 5. Also see BT: 15 and 18, for early indications of Nietzsche’s critique 
of science. 
 
288 To reiterate note two above, the discourses of scientism coextend with and ramify 
those of liberal-modernity, i.e.: rationalism, universalism, progressivism, secularism and 
humanism. 
 
289 See MacIntyre, 1998 (excerpted from ‘Whose Justice?, Which Rationality?’): 183–84; 
and Ricci, 1984: 3–4, 90–91 
 
290 It is interesting to note that the positivistic orientation that dominates most academic 
studies by the discourses of scientism occurred during the late 19th century’s age of 
nationalism, when the logic of self-determination and identic particularism (ethnic, racial, 
religious, etc.) drove the disparate constituent peoples of various European Empires to 
pursue sovereign autonomy via independent statehood. Political Science, as a distinct 
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academic discipline, arose in the late 19th century (largely and almost concurrently in the 
United States and the United Kingdom), at the same time ideology came to dominate 
Anglo-European politics and made a fetish of the state. Both the discourses of scientism 
and nationalism are coextending products of the logic (or technological rationality) of 
liberal-modernity, which was then reaching its late stages. Shortly after Nietzsche’s death 
it would culminate in the violent dissolution of those empires and the Holocaust. The 
same nihilistic impulse is still evident today, as the breakup of the former Yugoslavia 
demonstrates. 
 
291 The central tenet of Nietzsche’s epistemology is that all ‘knowledge’ is perspectivally 
contingent; “truth” insofar as it can be said to exist, is always conditioned by the 
experiencing “subject” (GS: 354; GM: III-12). It is not correctly understood as a 
simplistic “Protagorean” sort of relativism. See Wilcox (1974) chapters 4 and 5; Owen 
(1995) pp. 32-39; Conway (1997a) pp. 130-33; Richardson (1996) pp. 36-38, 200, 218-
19, 226-28, and 263-64. 
 
292 Primarily Ernst B. Haas’s work, specifically, “The Uniting of Europe: Political, Social 
and Economic Forces, 1950 – 1957,” SUP; Stanford, 1958; and “The Obsolescence of 
Regional Integration Theory,” Berkeley: Institute of International Studies working paper, 
1975a.  
 
293 Specifically, I refer to the work of Andrew Moravcsik, see “The Choice for Europe: 
Social Purpose and State Power from Messina to Maastricht,” UCL Press; London, 
1998. 
 
294 Prominent theorists of supranational institutionalism include Wayne Sandholtz and 
Alec Stonesweet. 
 
295 This is not to deny that these perspectives – as well as their advocates – are mutually 
understood as bitterly opposed in their own superficial, partisan political terms. 
 
296 Rosamund, 2000: 161 
 
297 See Ricci, 1984: 118-19, on ‘The Scientific Community’ and the problem of the 
acceptance of scientific propositions, such as the 19th century belief in the inherently 
unequal status of races, as well as Popper’s response to the danger of such undo 
endorsement, that being a scientific “spirit of experimentation” in the open society he 
envisaged. 
 
298 It is Nietzsche’s dilemma as well, exemplified by his postulation of Will to power as 
the prime agency in the world, which arguably shifted the “ultimate” cause in the world 
onto a different metaphysical grounding, than those of conventional science. Hence a 
significant part of Heidegger’s contention that Nietzsche was the last metaphysician. 
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299 Babich: 103 
 
300 Ibid: citing KSA IX, p. 506 
 
301 Diez and Wiener, pp 18 -19, in Wiener and Diez, eds., 2004 
 
302 The terms ‘not showing’ and ‘announcing’ are Heideggerian, and enable us to 
comprehend a hidden dynamic of the disclosure that occurs in much science. 
 
303 For an example of innovative critical perspectives on theories of European integration, 
Peterson (2001) considers whether integration theorists are developing theories that 
actually vie with one another, as they generally believe they do. He contends that major 
schools explain different outcomes at different levels in a multilevel system of 
governance, leading to misleading debates between ultimately compatible theories that 
masquerade as rivals. He argues that there is dearth of a credible general theory of EU 
governance and this raises particular dilemmas for theorists in choosing which type of 
outcome they wish to explain. 
 
304 It is known that prominent theorists in the field believe so dogmatically in the “truth” 
of their differing perspectives on integration that they nurture stultifying personal 
animosities for one another. 
 
305 Diez and Wiener, pp 2, in Wiener and Diez, eds., 2004  
 
306 Rosamund, 2000: xi 
 
307 Hass, 1971: 18; cited in Rosamund, 2000: 11; emphasis added  
 
308 Chryssochoou, 2001: 14 
 
309 These assumptions legitimate and naturalize the grounds for and development of the 
EU as an Urstaat, or totalizing, molar polity in Deleuze’s sense. 
 
310 What practical significance it does attain / provide, is not necessarily applicable 
outside the unique case of European integration. Philosophically it serves (redundantly) 
to reinforce assumptions always-already present in the meta-discourse of ultra-liberal-
modernity. 
 
311 Chryssochoou, 2001: 15 
 
312 There is nearly perfect correspondence between the ideological presuppositions of the 
major schools of European integration theory and the Copenhagen Criteria, which were 
agreed upon in June 1993 and specify the criteria for applicant state accession to the EU. 
These include liberal democratic political and legal institutions that comply with human 
rights norms and protect ethnic and cultural minorities from discrimination, a free market 
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economy and the institutional capacity to adopt and abide by the numerous obligations of 
membership et forth in the Acquis Communitaire. As far as I know, the values upon 
which the EU is founded are not interrogated anywhere in the literature on European 
integration. 
 
313 Diez and Wiener, pp 3, in Wiener and Diez, eds., 2004 
 
314 The significance of the differences between the approaches is quite exaggerated both 
in order to keep the scholarship vital (the academic stake) and for transparently partisan 
political reasons. For instance, scholars fiercely dispute whether the EU is integrating 
Europe along essentially neo-liberal, state-centric intergovernmental lines or whether the 
EU is not actually more characteristic of a set of supranational institutions that are 
incrementally supplanting the authority of decreasingly relevant nation states. In my 
estimation the answer is clearly both. Europe’s integration is a symbiotic process of 
intergovernmental cooperation that is giving rise to a set of supranational institutions 
(under the rubric of the EU) that has begun to dictate the terms of its member states’ 
cooperation and enforce a distinct will that shall eventually supplant its individual nation-
state members themselves as the preeminent political authority on thoroughly integrated 
continent. Each state’s respective mask may still slightly differ, but the actors wearing 
them are all players in the same carnival. 
 
315 Schmitter, pp 69; cited in European Integration Theory, Wiener and Diez, eds., 2004. 
 
316 However, it must be said that in ideological terms the spectrum of viewpoints 
represented in the academic realm is much narrower than in the partisan political arena. 
Whereas within the former (academic realm) there is general agreement on certain liberal 
premises, in the latter (partisan political arena) extreme nationalist groups, far-left Greens 
and reformed communists all compete for public attention, though the necessity of 
parliamentary coalition building tends to attenuate the radicalism of these political 
factions, once elected. 
 
317 The EU’s website, named Europa is accessible (English language) at: 
http://europa.eu/index_en.htm. 
 
318 An excellent example of the effort to be relevant and justify itself as such is the 
Europe Direct service, through which citizens can contact an expert for answers and 
practical information about the EU via telephone, email or by going to an information 
center in their community. See: http://ec.europa.eu/europedirect/index_en.htm. 
 
319 See the ‘Have your say’ page, at: http://europa.eu/debateeurope/index_en.htm 
 
320 The ‘European Cultural Foundation’ website on Advocacy Actions, at: 
http://www.eurocult.org/we-advocate/advocacy-actions/, accessed June 2008. Also see 
the EU Europa website page on the Commission’s decision to declare 2008  the 
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‘European Year of Intercultural Dialogue’, in order that the EU create a single means by 
which to raise awareness and promote the cultural sphere with a view to encouraging EU 
inhabitants to manage cultural diversity, at: 
http://europa.eu/scadplus/leg/en/lvb/l29017.htm.  
 
321 This was most evident in the Danish referendum on the Maastricht Treaty in 1992, 
which failed to pass and so was re-held immediately the following year; likewise the Irish 
voted against the Treaty of Nice, a defeat of the EU agenda intolerable to its “elites” and 
so-called “leaders” in both Brussels and Dublin; the next year it was repeated so that the 
“correct” result could be achieved, after which no referendum was held on the question 
again. In both Denmark and Ireland many of these respective treaties’ opponents 
protested such cynical and manipulative tactics, but to no avail. 
 
322 The “higher men” Nietzsche scorns are vulgarians and buffoons—masters only within 
the mob (Z: IV-11 and 13). They are clearly antithetical to the Übermenschlich types such 
as described by Zarathustra in ‘On Human Prudence (Z: II-21)’. 
 
323 Thomas Risse: pp 170, in Wiener and Diez, eds, 2004 
 
324 Tsoukalis,  2003: 170 
 
325 Colm Hogan, 2001: 122 
 
326 Underscoring this point, Wilmer observes that normalizing terminology “serve[s] to 
maintain a political order which in turn generates a reflexive and tautological discourse 
deployed to disarm contestations that might disrupt or subvert that order (Wilmer, 2002: 
59)”. 
 
327 This understanding combines Adorno’s seminal critique of the modern culture 
industry, through the massifying process of which a mediated “[r]eality becomes its own 
ideology through the spell cast by its faithful duplication (Adorno, 1991: 63)”, with 
Taylor’s notion of a ‘social imaginary’, by which he refers to “the ways people imagine 
their social existence, how they fit together with others, how things go on between them 
and their fellow, the expectations that are normally met, and the deeper normative notions 
and images that underlie these expectations (Taylor, 2004: 23).” 
 
328 WP: 584 
 
329 Nietzsche maintained that every philosophical work was, wittingly or not, 
autobiographical and therefore symptomatic of its author’s strength and vitality. 
 
330 See Dewey, 1929; Fitch, 1963; and Kvanvig, 2006. 
 
331 Dewey, 1929: 196 
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332 Burgess, Michael: 32, in Wiener and Diez, eds, 2004 
 
333 Ibid: 30 
 
334 Ibid: 26 
 
335 HH: I – 475 
 
336 WP: 748 
 
337 Richard Coudenhove-Kalergi’s publication of Pan-Europa in 1923 launched a formal 
effort to establish a cosmopolitan trans-national alliance of individuals committed to the 
neo-Kantian ideals of a unified Europe. Their concept of Europe as a political idea would 
find echoes in the Kellogg-Briand Pact—whose signatories renounced war—(1928), and 
Coudenhove-Kalergi expounded an anti-fascist position consistent with his pan-European 
ideals in his 1938 work The Totalitarian State Against Man. This contrasts with recent 
efforts among European far-right nationalist parties which have quixotically combined in 
an anti-cosmopolitan pan-European movement opposing European integration. Their 
‘Identity, Tradition and Sovereignty (ITS) Party’, briefly enjoyed official status as a party 
in the EU Parliament, until the “Italian MEP Alessandra Mussolini, the grand-daughter of 
fascist dictator Benito Mussolini, reportedly described Romanians as ‘habitual law-
breakers’,” prompting the Romanian delegation to resign in protest. See: 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/7086986.stm. For details about the constitution of the 
group and its 20 MEPs, See: http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/6249513.stm.  
  
338 Rosamund, 2000: 24 
 
339 Burgess, Michael: 27, in Wiener and Diez, eds, 2004 
 
340 Ibid: 31 
 
341 Chryssochoou, 2001: 42 
 
342 Ibid: 44 
 
343 Burgess, Michael: 38, in Wiener and Diez, eds, 2004 
 
344 Despite its initial “failure” (for being rejected by voters in national referenda in both 
France and the Netherlands), the content of the original constitution remains ninety 
percent intact according to some accounts. See: EU treaty 'same as Constitution' at: 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/politics/7034052.stm; and ‘The EU treaty, What Lisbon 
Contains’ at: 
http://www.economist.com/research/articlesBySubject/displaystory.cfm?subjectid=3833071&story_id=100
24471; the EU’s rather self-serving webpage promoting the treaty: 
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http://europa.eu/lisbon_treaty/glance/index_en.htm; and the full text of the Lisbon Treaty, at: 
http://europa.eu/lisbon_treaty/full_text/index_en.htm. The veritable imposition of the constitution 
upon the EU citizens via the Lisbon Treaty underscores what an elite driven project the 
EU is. Still, the treaty must be ratified by democratically elected member-state 
governments to take effect, so it is quite difficult to plausibly argue that it is in any sense 
illegitimate or undemocratic. 
 
345 Mitrany, 1966: 68 
 
346 Mitrany, David: A Working Peace System: An Argument for the Functional 
Development of International Organization. In Debates on European Integration, A 
Reader, pp 43 and 52; Mette Eilstrup-Sangiovanni, ed., (2006). 
 
347 Ibid: 57 – 58 
 
348 Ibid: 57 
 
349 Ibid: 43 
 
350 Chryssochoou, 2001: 41 
 
351 Mitrany, David: A Working Peace System: An Argument for the Functional 
Development of International Organization. In Debates on European Integration, A 
Reader, 65; Mette Eilstrup-Sangiovanni, ed., (2006). 
 
352 Henig, 2002: 15 
 
353 Ibid. 
 
354 Mitrany, David: A Working Peace System: An Argument for the Functional 
Development of International Organization. In Debates on European Integration, A 
Reader, pp 47 and 65; Mette Eilstrup-Sangiovanni, ed., (2006). 
 
355 Ibid: 45 – 51 
 
356 Mitrany, cited in Rosamund, 2000: 34  
 
357 Mitrany, David: A Working Peace System: An Argument for the Functional 
Development of International Organization. In Debates on European Integration, A 
Reader, pp 65; Mette Eilstrup-Sangiovanni, ed., (2006). 
 
358 Chryssochoou: 2001, 41 
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359 Mitrany, David: A Working Peace System: An Argument for the Functional 
Development of International Organization. In Debates on European Integration, A 
Reader, pp 66; Mette Eilstrup-Sangiovanni, ed., (2006). 
 
360 Rosamond, 2000: 33 
 
361 Haas, 1964: 9, cited in Rosamond, 2000: 33  
 
362 Mitrany, 1966: 82  
 
363 By the late 20th century Michel Foucault (along with other post-structuralists and 
post-moderns) would articulate a liberal relativist, genealogical interpretation of 
knowledge (while rightly acknowledging his significant intellectual indebtedness to 
Nietzsche) and would cast doubt on the authority of all knowledge and rationalities, as 
power – knowledge regimes that arrogate the determination of truth to themselves and 
perpetuate themselves discursively, comprising technologies of the self that formatively, 
constructively discipline individuals and communities through affective mechanisms of 
“bio-power”.  
 
364 Mitrany, David: A Working Peace System: An Argument for the Functional 
Development of International Organization. In Debates on European Integration, A 
Reader, pp 51; Mette Eilstrup-Sangiovanni, ed., (2006).  
 
365 Ibid: 65. 
 
366 Rosamond, 2000: 39 – 42  
 
367 On Nietzsche’s qualified optimism regarding the utility of science and scientific 
method, see (among others) D: 432 “Investigators and experimenters”, and 453, “Moral 
interregnum”. 
 
368 Innumerable functionalist technical bodies and specialized agencies oversee the 
administration of social programs in most nation-states today.  The UN is comprised of 
many, as are bureaucratic apparati in the US and the EU.  Albertini referred to the 
‘unitary trap’, which identified the “dilemma” that states’ faced in trying to solve 
common problems separately – one that compelled the functional imperative to European 
integration, which rejected permanent divisions of authority and ignored the alleged need 
of a governing constitution (as cited in Chryssochoou and paraphrased here; 
Chryssochoou: 2001, 41). 
     
369 Hooghe and Marks: 20 – 21 (Multi-Level Governance in the EU) 
 
370 Rosamund, 2000: 54 
 
 594 
                                                                                                                                                 
371 See Chryssochoou, 2001: 53 – 55; Schmitter, Philippe C. Neo-Neofunctionalism, in 
Wiener and Diez, eds, 2004; and Rosamund, 2000: 54 – 65. 
 
372 Haas: 12 
 
373 Chryssochoou: 54 
 
374 Rosamund, 2000: 55 
 
375 Haas, 1968: 388 – 9 
 
376 Haas’s dictum, from Beyond the Nation-State, pp. 450; cited in Chryssochoou: 54 
 
377 The (theoretical and practical) recognition of the inevitability of new bureaucratic 
forms of management and organization echoes Max Weber’s earlier observation that the 
most rational form of legitimate authority is the hierarchic, bureaucratic sort of 
administrative governance by the most qualified. See Weber’s Economy and Society.  
 
378 From a long historical perspective the Treaty of Versailles and establishment of the 
League of Nations in 1919 as well as the founding of the UN in 1945 are also formative 
moments in the arc of modernity’s process of elite socialization, edifying the neo-
functionalist intuition that increased cooperation gradually subordinates inter-state 
conflict and broadens elite perceptions of the national interest. 
 
379 Chryssochoou, 2001: 54 
 
380 Sloterdijk, 1987: 5 
 
381 Debord, 44: “The spectacle is a permanent opium war which aims to make people 
identify [existential and ontological] goods with commodities and satisfaction with 
survival that increases according to its own laws. But if consumable survival is something 
which must always increase, this is because it continues privation. If there is nothing 
beyond increasing survival, this is not because it is beyond privation but because it is 
enriched privation.” Debord points out the negative will to nothingness as nihilistic 
power of ascetic—consumerist priests of ressentiment in observing the fatuousness of 
their objective: enriched privation. In ultra-liberal-modern society new and improved 
commodities are the highest goods, “goods” in a dual sense equally imbued with 
existential importance. They are acquired not through proper training, critical reflection 
and a virtuous life, but by purchase. Their significance lies in their function as moral-
ethical surrogates for all other forms of action. The satisfaction with a materially 
improved survival to which Debord refers suggests – if not reiterates – Nietzsche’s 
contempt for the ‘last man’ who content, passively accepts the condition he finds himself 
in as the best of all possible worlds. ‘“We have invented happiness,” say the last men, 
 595 
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life, which is stripped of all greater significance and marketed back to them as perfect.  
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Canada, make the point rather well. 
 
397 The EU’s relations with Iceland, Norway, Turkey, Croatia and Israel, among others, as 
well as the (changed) attitudes among the populations of those non-EU states, 
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shaping of global culture by the hegemony of modernity.    
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647 Roland Bleiker, 2000: 184, 194–200; also see Stephen Gill, 2003, and Hardt and 
Negri, 2000. 
 
648 Gardner, 1997: 195–6 and 216–17  
 
649 Robertson, 1992: 27, on the role of globality in the formation of a post-modern 
consciousness. 
 
650 Albrow, 1996: 144 
 
651 Scott, 1985: 184, 241, 304 
 
652 This process of increasing demands for accountability is symptomatic of the 
entrenchment of the spirit of revenge, which the globalization complex invariably 
propagates. 
 
653 Donnelly, 1989: 210 
 
654 Ibid: 25 
 
655 Donnelly, 1989: 64 
 
656 Prominent among the theorizers of modern rights was John Locke in his second 
treatise on government. 
 
657 Donnelly, 1989: 25–27 
 
658 If every human being enjoys a discernable, inalienable degree of dignity it would be 
redundant to codify it in rights over-above pre-existing legal proscriptions on violations 
of another individuals’ personhood, such as assault, rape, murder, etc.,. As “rights” are 
thought necessary to ensure the preservation of that dignity, it is not clear that dignity 
really does inhere to every individual, only that we are expected to behave as if it does. 
The term dignity itself is never precisely defined by human rights advocates, who seek to 
make common a good of the notion, and thereby empty it of any meaning. Human rights’ 
defenders reference the term to the intrinsic condition of being human, which risks 
tautology, and is quite unrelated to the original meaning of the term, which specified 
nobility or elevation of character; worthiness to the deference of inferiors that accrues 
from possession of a high rank, office or station. According to Nietzsche, the reasoning 
behind the human rights notion constitutes a classic slave-moral move: an effort by the 
weak to invent pretexts that will secure for them privileges from the strong, whose 
dignity is—or would other-wise be—more demonstrable than their own. These mutually 
reinforcing notions of dignity and rights epitomize the conceits of liberal-modernism and 
underscore the bankruptcy of its rational basis. Nietzsche’s Good Europeans might 
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concede that “dignity” is a particular form of the qualia of being human, but that like an 
appreciation of beauty, such an experience is never the same between two persons 
(justifying equality of rights for all) or that it can in itself legitimately confer any 
privileges to the person experiencing it. It would be understood as a perspectivally 
contingent experience. Nietzsche would likely have responded by suggesting that there is 
a broad spectrum of such qualia, and that the differences between those experiences 
correspond to how much power an organism (as a capacitor of force) is effectively able to 
involuntarily discharge. Recognition of the need for an authentic socio-political agon in 
which such difference of vitality (or “dignity”) could be ascertained might itself indicate 
a higher level of “dignity”. An awareness of the need to overcome the human would 
presumably constitute another, even higher level of qualia. Nietzsche’s call for a re-
institutionalization of a natural rank order of difference (Rangordnung) between types 
specifically opposed the liberal-modern notions of “dignity” and “rights”, which serve to 
cover-up the anti-natural basis for ultra-liberal-modernity’s own hierarchization of types 
from a leveled mass of automatons. 
 
659 Hatab, 1995: 232 
 
660 BGE: 203 
 
661 BGE: 202 
 
662 Reminder: the metadiscourse of ultra-liberal-modernity consists of the interrelated 
positivist discourses of progressivism, humanism, rationalism, secularism and 
universalism. 
 
663 WP: 897 
 
664 WP: 894 
 
665 For example, the violent suppression of ostensibly pro-democracy Burmese monks in 
Yangon in late September of 2007 by the ruling junta elicited a tepid response from 
ASEAN members, who were embarrassed by the incident but ultimately unwilling to 
punish member-state Myanmar’s government for its action. 
 
666 Gill, 2003: 44 
 
667 The term ‘Washington consensus’ was coined by John Williamson in 1990. 
  
668 This paragraph draws on “Revisiting how Malaysia overcame the financial crisis”, by 
Martin Khor in Global Trends, Sunday 18 January 2004; on the website Third World 
Network at: http://www.twnside.org.sg/title2/gtrends1.htm. It also paraphrases the 
abstract of “Malaysian Economic Crisis: Causes, Effects, Recovery Actions and Lessons 
Learned” by Amir Hashim, Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey; online at: 
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http://www.stormingmedia.us/74/7449/A744973.html. Lastly it in informed by 
“Malaysia: The road less traveled”, from The Economist, Apr 29th 1999 edition. 
  
669 Eichengreen, 1996: 186 – 191. 
 
670 DeMartino, 2000: 239-40; Demartino advocates overcoming reductionistic 
characterizations of capital process toward a “more manageable [pragmatic] politics 
…for social change”. He proposes alternative strategies for contending with the excesses 
of neo-liberal capitalism by more liberal means. 
 
671 Went, 2002: 114 
 
672 Lyon, 2001: 40-2 
 
673 Dicken, 2007: 232-40 and 532 
 
674 Kiely, 1998: 11, 54-6  
 
675 Tehranian, 1999: Introduction 
 
676 Friedman, 1994: 86 
 
677 Sklair, 1995: 87-9, 150-2 
 
678 Paterson, 1997: 145-160 
 
679 It could be argued that no radical alternatives to the liberal-modern project have 
succeeded. Popular and influential satellite networks such as Al Jazeera in the Arab world 
/ Islamic cultural realm, hardly present a threat to the dictators of the region that most of 
their viewers inhabit. Closer to home, Amy Goodman’s “Democracy Now” is arguably 
typifies the ethos of ultra-liberal-modernity more than any broadcast in the United States 
today. 
 
680 EH: destiny-1 
 
681 D: 206 indicates his support for colonialism as a potential solution to the problem of 
superfluous European workers. 
 
682 EH: CW-3 reflects his derision of the German Kaiser’s aims in Africa. 
 
683 BGE: 208 
 
684 BGE: 241 
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685 Post-modern ascetic priests of resentment, the arbiters of secular slave morality, are 
ideologues who believe in and are satisfied by the “reality” generated by the simulacrum 
and its power to “emancipate” humanity. As the authentic representation of legitimate 
authority and desire, this consists with the over-arching objective of globalizing 
institutions and processes. 
 
686 HH: WS-9; by “ruling classes” Nietzsche contemptuously refers to those ambitious 
bureaucrats and professionals who, attaining high offices or positions, are paradoxically 
the most subjugated of men. 
 
687 BGE: 228 
 
688  Keith Ansell Pearson suggests that Nietzsche seems to have conflated aspects of 
Rousseau’s notion of the general will and its correspondence with the general welfare 
with Diderot’s notion of the general welfare, a cosmopolitan idea which Rousseau 
expressly rejected in favor of his notion of the unique, sovereign will characteristic of a 
people. The extent to which Rousseau remained consistent with this rejection is open to 
question. However, it must be stated that Nietzsche’s understanding of Rousseau was 
arguably informed by confusions and misreadings of his texts. Nevertheless it suffices to 
say that Nietzsche would likely have opposed Rousseau’s call that ‘the people’ join 
together through a ‘social contract’ to preserve themselves and remain “free”. The 
putative authority of the “general will”, a notion that like the so-called “state of nature” 
was imbued with metaphysical significance and never sufficiently explicated or 
demonstrated by its author; the former could not be shown to protect individuals from 
subjugation to the wills of would-be autocrats or other powerful persons anymore than 
the latter concept could be shown to be the salvific alternative to corrupting civilization 
Rousseau seemed to argue it was. In attempting to show that by ‘obeying themselves as 
collective authors of the law’, Nietzsche would have perceived Rousseau to be a clever 
ascetic priest of ressentiment intent upon seducing the masses into a narcissistic trance 
through anti-natural, and embarrassingly self-serving, populist rhetoric. 
 
689 For an extensive examination of Nietzsche’s misunderstanding of, commonality and 
rivalry with Rousseau, see Keith Ansell-Pearson’s Nietzsche Contra Rousseau. 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991.  
 
690 See GM: III-15 for corroboration. 
 
691 TI: 9-37   
 
692  TI: 9-37 
 
693 GM: II-17 and 18.  
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694 In this regard he was a great admirer of Machiavelli, and cited the Renaissance as an 
example of a healthy era, the most recent in Europe to his own lifetime. 
 
695 D: 371 
 
696 CW: P 
 
697 BGE: 260 
 
698 Indoctrinating practices that regularize “norms” and “rights” at the individual, local, 
regional, national and international levels provide the mob with fabricated meaning and 
purpose in services, information, etc. 
 
699 Generally high rates of employment, education, access to good health care, and a 
whole complex of social-welfare institutions as well as the norms of charity serve to 
reinforce this illusion of security. 
 
700 BGE: 197 and WP: 898, respectively. 
 
701 WP: 898 
 
702 WP: 898 
 
703 My understanding in this section, as elsewhere, of Heidegger’s notion of Ethics as 
abode, as I utilize it to explicate Nietzsche’s meaning of ‘good Europeanism’ as a 
disposition toward the world and praxis or engagement with it, as well as their fearless 
resolve in accepting the abyssal dimension of life as this Heideggerian idea relates to a 
Nietzschean affirmation of the tragic and corresponding embrace of the Dionysian is all 
heavily indebted to Lawrence Hatab’s reflections and analysis in his paper ‘Ethics and 
Finitude: Heideggerian Contributions to Moral Philosophy’, presented at the 1997 
conference “After Post-modernism”, online at: http://www.focusing.org/apm_papers/hatab.html. 
 
704 TI: IX-38 
  
705 See: WP: 954; it must be said however, that the übermenschlich are always-already 
“emerging” and that the practicum is their life itself and does not finally end until they 
perish. In other words they may never celebrate any sort of “graduation” where their 
becoming-other is concerned. 
 
706 BGE: 228 
 
707 TI: IX-37  
 
708 BGE: 212  
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709 Genocidal regimes are a consequence of the ultimate nihilistic breakdown of society 
through decadence. 
 
710 GS: 377 
 
711 For explications of these themes in Nietzsche’s works see Tracy B. Strong: 1988; 
Lawrence J. Hatab: 1995; Keith Ansell-Pearson: 1997; and Horst Hutter: 2006.  
 
712 From the ruins of decadent thought, skeptical “artist-philosopher militants” create new 
conceptual frameworks for organizing cultural, social and political life which they 
unyieldingly attempt to impose so to provide future individuals the conditions necessary 
to overcome themselves. As humankind’s highest exemplars such individuals provide the 
herd with meaning, purpose and dignity through their example.  
 
713 “Warrior-genealogists” comprehend how humanity has arrived where it is and so are 
most capable of leading the battle to chart its future, of nurturing it to health and strength 
from decadence and nihilism. The term corresponds with Nietzsche’s notion of 
“philosophers of the future”.  
 
714 Albrow, 1996: 115 
 
715 Ibid 
 
716 Beck, 2000: 79 
 
717 Ibid: 78 – 79 
 
718 Ibid: 80 
 
719 Shaw, 2000: 18-19 
 
720 GM: III – 19 
 
721 Albrow, 1997: 41, Traveling Beyond Local Cultures: Socioscpes in a Global City in 
Living the Global City: Globalization as a Local Process, John Eade, ed. 
 
722 Eade, 1997: 4–5  
  
723 Beck, 2000: 10 
 
724 Robertson, 1992: 142 and 113 
 
725 Robertson, (in Featherstone, Lash and Robertson, eds.) 1995: 30 
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726 Robertson, 1992: 102 
 
727 Shapiro, 2006: 478 
 
728 Nietzsche specifically addresses such matters at BGE: 268, in consideration of culture 
and the common experience of a people. 
 
729 Deleuze, 1995: 54 and 57 
 
730 See A: 36 and EH: CW-4 for Nietzsche’s notion of ‘world-historical irony’ in varying 
contexts. 
 
731 Nisus (as defined by the Harper Collins Dictionary of Philosophy, 2nd edition) is “a 
striving; an effort; the conative state of a thing,” and “a creative tendency …toward the 
production of qualitatively new emergents (pp 204).”  
 
732 Shapiro, 2006: 478 
 
733 D: 189 
 
 
734 Appadurai, 1990: 297–299. Briefly, Appadurai’s notion of ideoscapes refers to the 
global exchange and debate of ideas, the dissemination of propaganda, mass-marketing 
and publicity, and corresponding ideological interpolation and political resistances; his 
concept of ethnoscapes refers to movements of people that disrupt established links 
between place and belonging, and lead to trans-national identity formation; his idea of 
technoscapes refers to the instantaneous communications and financial transactions, 
transformed business practices that typify the global marketplace and their profound 
ramifications on labor practices and relations and methods of production. They are 
broadly specified dimensions of bio-power in the age of Empire. 
 
735 See Martin Shaw’s (1994) “The Theoretical Challenge of Global Society,” in: Martin 
Shaw, Global Society and International Relations. Sociological Concepts and Political 
Perspectives, Polity Press, and (2000) “Theory of the Global State: Globality as an 
Unfinished Revolution,” Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.  
 
736 Examples of globalizing institutions include regional economic and security 
organizations with international powers of legal enforcement such as the WTO, the ICC, 
the WB, the OSCE, the WHO, ASEAN, NATO the IMF, OAS, the UN and its plethora of 
agencies, and at other levels of influence and authority includes organ-izations such as 
Amnesty International, Greenpeace, Doctors without borders etc. 
 
737 Post-Fordist / Taylorist theories of economic organization, as well as neo-liberalism 
are complicated and debated, I invoke them reductively to refer to the contemporary 
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compound form of capitalist production. For nuanced definitions see Went, 2002: 96 – 
98.  
 
738 See Mark W. Zacher and Brent A. Sutton’s Governing Global Networks: International 
Regimes for Transportation and Communications (1996). 
 
739 Debord wrote, “The spectacle is a specialized activity which speaks for all others. It is 
the diplomatic representation of hierarchic society to itself, where all other expression is 
banned…(23),” and “[t]he spectacle is the existing order’s uninterrupted discourse about 
itself, its laudatory monologue. It is the self-portrait of power in the epoch of its 
totalitarian management of the conditions of existence. (24)” Of the bored and contented 
youth of his day, Nietzsche observed (in “the desire for suffering”), “[t]hey do not know 
what to do with themselves—and therefore paint the distress of others on the wall; they 
always need others! And continually other others! (GS: 56)” 
 
740 Deleuze and Guattari, 1987: 360; “the State-form, as a form of interiority, has a 
tendency to reproduce itself...” 
 
741 Globalization is a consequence of a radical extension—“molar” growth—of the slave 
morality of taming and instantiates the decadence that the latter naturalizes. It is a 
despotic machine cum Urstaat. See part five of “The Deleuze Reader,” ed. Constantine V. 
Boundas. 
 
742 Martin Albrow identifies the commencing epoch as the Global age, one characterized 
by “Globality,” the term he prefers because it leaves open the possibilities of human 
agency (Albrow, 1996: 4 – 5).  
 
743 Shaw, 2000: 18–19 (emphasis added) 
 
744 Albrow, 1996: 110  
 
745 Despite their recognition of the contribution they make to the hyperreal nature of 
everyday life in the post-industrialized Western world which they see as compounding 
their alienation, such passively nihilistic individuals are likely to still shop at Wal-mart 
for cheap goods, take their children to Disneyland and, perhaps, teach at a University. 
 
746 The damaging effects of globalization to human flourishing include environmental 
effects: the annihilation of pristine habitats, the disruptive effects of the so-called green 
(agri-industrial) revolution, global warming, etc.; cultural effects: the extinction of 
languages and indigenous cultures, urban sprawl and commensurate poverty in the wake 
of rural demographic flight, etc.; and economic effects: the emerging global division of 
labor and its effect of leaving billions in destitution while providing a level of 
consumption heretofore unknown in human history for the post-industrialized world. The 
destructive and disruptive consequences of globalization are experienced in many other 
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dimensions of human life. Little of the damage done is completely irreversible. However, 
these practices have fostered change and contributed to laying the groundwork, as it 
were, for an eventual revaluation of values through globality. With luck, technological 
innovation and adjacent possibilities creative geniuses realize will provide good 
Europeans to remain faithful to the earth and undo the environmental damage 
industrialization has wrought upon it. 
 
747 Nietzsche’s active / reactive binary as a tool for comprehending the response of an 
organism to such challenges and to adduce its health was usefully expanded by Deleuze 
into a rhizomatic / molar binary that is arguably more “Nietzschean,” in the sense that, as 
an observation of differing forms of growth, it withholds the implied judgment of positive 
/ negative that—it might be argued—inheres to the former dualism. 
 
748 Albrow, 1996: 5  
 
749 Ibid: 4, 107 
 
750 Ibid: 5, 109–11 
 
751 Eade, 1997: 4-5 
 
752 Beck, 2000: 10–11  
 
753 Robertson, 1992: 113  
 
754 Shaw, 2000: 19  
 
755 Haecceity (This thing, here is; or the “this-ness” / formally distinct particularity of or 
presence of a phenomena), a term Gilles Deleuze employs after David Hume (1711 – 
1776) and John Duns Scotus (1266 – 1308) to convey the experience of a set of 
nonsubjectified affects. According to Deleuze and Felix Guattari, there are assemblage 
haecceities, which refer to the dimensions of multiplicities, and interassemblage 
haecceities, which mark the potentialities of becoming within each assemblage (1987: 
262 – 3).  
 
756 The character of globality can be related to the ethos of the Eternal Return in so far as 
it anticipates the Dasein of Übermenschen, becoming consistent with a radical 
affirmation of life and its contingency. On the latter see Bernd Magnus’s discussion of 
“Nietzsche’s Existential Imperative,” Magnus, 1993: xiii and 142. 
 
757 Z: I–11 
 
758 Lowith, 1995: 204 
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759 GS: 377, as quoted in Lowith, 1995: 204 
 
760 Thomas Heilke argues, in his identically titled book, that “Nietzsche’s Tragic Regime” 
envisages a political education for the production of “Dionysian pessimists” who could 
effectively contend with European nihilism and thrive. 
 
761 The twentieth century was punctuated by the mass-slaughters of two World Wars and 
organized genocides in Anatolia, Europe, South-East Asia and Africa, across which and 
in response to, developments such as the universalization of secular-humanist values, 
democratization and rights codified in international law, etc. occurred. These events 
would strike Nietzsche as symptomatic of a spreading disgregation of the instincts and 
resultant weakness of will (akrasia). Such all-too-human violences, both the gratuitous 
seeking of power over others and conventional efforts to prohibit it indicate the perseity 
of decadence, the latter a form generated by ultra-liberal-modernity. 
 
762 HH: I–23  
 
763 Ibid; Cf. BGE: 260 and GM: III 25–27 
 
764 Nietzsche’s anti-modernism should not be mistaken as advocating a return to pre-
modern socio-cultural forms. He recognized that in the wake of the death of god, Europe 
would be forced to overcome the decadence into which it had descended and/by re-
creating meanings and traditions for itself. The existential calamity it faced was that of 
the irrecuperable nihilism (hyper-decadence) of the ‘last man’, the extreme danger of 
which was any future basis upon which persuasive meanings or new truths could be 
created might not be attainable. 
 
765 See Kees van der Pijl’s 1984 examination of the trans-Atlantic ruling class. 
 
766 Despite its ideological denunciations and anti-Capitalist vitriol, the Soviet Union’s 
reluctant and limited trade with the capitalist “West” and instrumental role in the creation 
of the UN and other post-war institutions attenuated any actual ideological or existential 
threat it presented.  Mainland China had already begun reforms to open its markets and 
“join” the world economy by 1991. 
 
767 The International Criminal Court (ICC) at The Hague provides an example. 
Unfortunately, the US has obstreperously refused to participate in that organization. 
 
768 See Malcolm Gladwell’s recent, fairly compelling thesis on the conditions that give 
rise to ‘outliers’. 
 
769 The doubt Nietzsche raises about such political rights brings us to a sticky point in his 
thought and one of the most difficult aspects of it for we ultra-liberal-moderns. 
Nevertheless, he would not have agreed with today’s liberal activists that a person or 
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group is inherently less free for being deprived of what we in the West consider “free” 
speech, or full political enfranchisement, etc. However, this is not to suggest that he 
would have condoned Beijing or dismissed its repression and systematic subversion of 
Tibetan culture, or the unauthentic agon imposed on the beleaguered people of Myanmar 
by the ruling military junta. Rather, he would have opposed these regimes for many of 
the same reasons he would have opposed the governing regimes in Washington and 
Brussels. 
 
770 Existential threats such as the recent menace of terrorism, or arms proliferation, etc., 
suffice to create an outside enemy.  
 
771 Martin Shaw, Theory of the Global State, pp. 228. 
 
772 Again: the OSCE, originally the CSCE, is a trans-Atlantic security organization that 
promotes conflict resolution, democracy and human rights. 
 
773 The Council focuses on promulgating and monitoring human rights and 
democratization among its members, among other functions. 
 
774 At least in military terms, if no longer in economic and political ones. 
 
775 WP: 866; also see 890 and 898 
 
776 WP: 866 and 868. 
 
777 GM: II–24 
 
778 Lawrence J. Hatab’s work “A Nietzschean Defense of Democracy” (see bibliography) 
makes this link extremely clear and thoroughly develops it. In particular see the very 
relevant chapters four (“Agonistic Democracy”) and five (“Democracy, excellence and 
merit”) of that work. 
   
779 GM: I-13 
 
780 BGE: 58 
 
781 This notion would seem to anticipate aspects of Leo Strauss’s mid-20th century 
thought, but Nietzsche’s vitalist politics crucially distinguishes his thought from 
Strauss’s. 
 
782 Conway, 1997a: 20 
 
 
783 Elbe, 2003: 13 
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784 BGE: 263; Nietzsche’s aspersion for the conventionally educated—the Democratic 
bourgeoisie—who he held primarily responsible for the vulgarization of European culture 
in the late 19th century. 
 
785 Its two-fold “moral imperative” is that shopping is in itself a spiritually edifying 
activity and that purchases equate with / provide existential fulfillment and satisfy an 
important social duty. When the consumer–automatons become reluctant to spend their 
money, they are incentivized by the government, as in the $168 billion fiscal stimulus a 
two-year program authorized by Congress and President Bush on Feb. 13 2008. Reported 
to be the largest legislative initiative to ease an economic downturn in American history 
(<http://www.ombwatch.org/article/articleview/4170/1/531>), it provided every American 
approximately $600. Six months later (28 November 2008) a man was trampled to death 
by a mob of hysterical bargain shoppers at a Wal-Mart in Long Island, New York. See: 
<http://www.nytimes.com/2008/11/29/business/29walmart.html?scp=2&sq=wal-mart&st=cse>. 
  
786 BGE: 62 
 
787 Jürgen Habermas is a preeminent contemporary advocate of this ideology and 
exponent of practices—he has dubbed “communicative action”—to instantiate it. 
 
788 The EU has become a powerful force for the dissemination of ultra-liberal-modern 
values globally, as explicated in Book Three above. 
 
789 Hutter, 2006: 104 
 
790 In Nietzsche’s view the newly established Reich and its personification, Bismarck, 
exemplified the decadence of German culture during his lifetime. 
 
791 From a Nietzschean perspective the paradox of this formal abolition of war is that 
every institutionally instantiated form of political authority entails a fundamental 
arrogation of right – a conceit whose enforcement necessarily requires coercion along a 
spectrum of violences. Foucault’s numerous exegeses’ of power / knowledge regimes (in 
practices concerning health, carceral techniques and in/sanity brilliantly elaborated the 
point. 
 
792 I refer to the potential to transform the EU while using it as an instrument to advance 
their aim of conditioning the possibility for genuine culture in Europe through a gradual 
instantiation of authentic, agonist relations predicated on a natural rank order of types. 
 
793 Examples include legal provisions for the export of cultural goods and the return of 
cultural objects unlawfully removed from the territory of a member state, as well as 
codified regional policy, various aspects of which are overseen by the European 
Parliament’s Committee on Culture and Education, the European Regional Development 
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Fund and the Committee of the Regions. The COE’s European Committee of Social 
Rights and Directorate of Culture, Cultural and Natural Heritage, as well as the OSCE’s 
High Commissioner on National Minorities augment the EU’s policies. 
 
794 This argument was persuasively made in a recent editorial by Roland Vaubel, a 
professor of economics at the University of Mannheim, in The Wall Street Journal. See: 
State of the Union: Disproportionately Undemocratic, July 30, 2007 edition. 
 
795  Elbe, 2003: 79 
 
796 See The Greek State, wherein Nietzsche voices concern with the “present day 
phenomena in which [he detects] dangerous signs of atrophy in the political sphere… 
[attributable to] men [lacking any sense of obligation to the state] placed by birth… 
outside the instinct for nation and state, who thus have to recognize the state only to the 
extent to which they conceive it to be in their own interest…” Nietzsche refers to them as 
truly international homeless, financial recluses as really those whose fear stands behind 
[the] movements… [the liberal–optimistic, post-Enlightenment world view and 
democratic ethos of universal suffrage].       
 
797 Again, nisus refers to “a striving, the conative state of a thing, also a creative tendency 
in the universe to produce qualitatively new emergents” (Harper-Collins dictionary of 
Philosophy, 2nd edition). This corresponds nicely with the emergentist strains of 
Nietzsche’s vitalism. 
 
798 Conway explicates Nietzsche’s dual conception of the Will to power, “to designate the 
boundless, amoral agency that propagates itself through human capacitors [and] the 
system of instincts that best provides for the unimpeded propagation of vitality.” 
(Conway: 1997b, pp. 49.) 
 
799 “The profane crowd,” an evocative term Nietzsche used at D: IV – 298. 
 
800 This is expounded in the notes. “Types of my disciples.-- To those human beings who 
are of any concern to me I wish suffering, desolation, sickness, ill-treatment, indignities--
I wish that they should not remain unfamiliar with profound self-contempt, the torture of 
self-mistrust, the wretchedness of the vanquished: I have no pity for them, because I wish 
them the only thing that can prove today whether one is worth anything or not--that one 
endures. [The note continues in Nietzsche's MS: "I have not yet got to know any idealist, 
but many liars… (WP: 910 [Spring-Fall 1887])." Later Nietzsche writes, “That one stakes 
one's life, one's health, one's honor, is the consequence of high spirits and an overflowing, 
prodigal will: not from love of man but because every great danger challenges our 
curiosity about the degree of our strength and our courage (WP: 949 [Nov. 1887-March 
1888]).” 
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801 Nietzsche implored his readers to ‘become who they are,’ a notion adopted from 
Pindar (and possibly Stirner), toward arousing recognition of the necessity for self-
awareness (a recognition of our existenz) and self-overcoming toward fulfilling ones’ 
highest potential, or destiny.  
 
802 In our hyper-decadent age the political-education of Übermenschen is a largely self-
undertaken endeavor resulting from their erotic concern with mastering themselves and 
the world. In Nietzsche’s ideal polity this dimension of breeding the best-types would not 
be left to such chance but would be deliberately cultivated (As is the case that Socrates’ 
expounds in Plato’s Republic). 
 
803  GS: 121 
 
804 Heilke, 1998: 35 
 
805 GS: p3 
 
806 Shapiro, 2006: 478 
 
807 GM: III - 11 
 
808 Baudrillard explicates the simulation that interposes on everyday life, noting 
especially the role of the copy and representation’s displacement of the real in our 
electronic, digitized and wireless age which has impaired our sense of time and space. 
Moreover, the media driven dissociation of values from any referential criteria has the 
effect of deterring the real, as all meanings are banalized through the absence of 
equivalence toward the annihilation of authentic culture.  My notion of ‘hyper-
decadence’ is supported by Baudrillard’s observation that, “The universe, and all of us, 
have entered live into simulation, into the malefic, not even malefic, indifferent, sphere of 
deterrence: in a bizarre fashion, nihilism has been entirely realized no longer through 
destruction, but through simulation and deterrence.”  
 
809I refer to the Heidegger’s notion of Dasein’s awareness of its own being-in-the-world.  
 
810 TI: 6–8  
 
811 See Nietzsche’s unpublished early essay “The Greek State (1872)” on the dignity of 
work. 
 
812 See The Greek State (in On the Genealogy of Morals: A Polemic (1887); translated by 
Carol Diethe; Cambridge University Press, 1994) and WP: 866-68 
 
813 One is here reminded of our self-aggrandizing, stultifying “creative class,” which 
proudly take themselves for the “higher members” of the mediocre crowd. 
 627 
                                                                                                                                                 
 
814 For Nietzsche’s critique of the Western moral tradition and the predominance of the 
slave morality of taming see all of On the Genealogy of Morality and The Antichrist. See 
BGE: 260 for a specific example of how he anticipated the intensification of decadence to 
come in the century ahead – the development of which I have labeled the ‘hyper-
decadence’ of our age.  
 
815 Many individuals are actually “sedated” through the use of psychotropic 
pharmaceuticals. 
 
816 See (the notoriously misused passages from) TI: IX – 36 and A: 2. 
 
817 Far from being a merely rhetorical or metaphorical exhortation, Nietzsche’ advocacy 
of this master morality of breeding finds explicit expression in both the late published 
works (BGE: 61-2, 213, 262; TI: VII-2 – 5 ; A: 3-4, and as a system of breeding is related 
by example via the law of Manu, which Nietzsche cites to illustrate how a well ordered 
polity might by ordered and its health preserved, 57) and the Nachlass (see WP: 397-98, 
866-68, 898, 957). Also see Strong, “Nietzsche is talking about developing men who are 
not subject to the “human-all-too-human.” He repeatedly uses the word zuchten, which 
means to breed, raise rear, grow or cultivate, as word normally used in connection with 
animals or plants. After leaving Basel, he conspicuously stops using erziehen, which has 
connotations of “bring up” and educate (Strong, 2000: 274).” Also see Conway (1997a) 
pp. 34-9;  
 
818 See Conway, 1997b, pp 32–35. 
 
819 GS: 377 
 
820 Ansell-Pearson, 1997: 110 
 
821 I refer to the terminal condition of anti-culture, the state of laisser aller which prevails 
in decadent epochs. 
 
822 Conway, 1997b: 76 
 
823 Ibid. 
 
824 WP: 866 
 
825 WP: 868 
 
826 BGE: 225; Conway, 1997a: 89 
 
827 Conway, 1997a: 18 
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828 Von Ham, 2001: 70 
 
829 Ibid; also see Rorty, 1989: chapter 9 on solidarity, and page 198 of the text. This is not 
to endorse Rorty’s position on the previous page that Nietzsche and Heidegger “privatize 
their projects, their attempts at sublimity – to view them as irrelevant to politics and 
therefore compatible with the sense of human solidarity with the development of 
democratic institutions has facilitated. …[T]hat they subordinat[e] sublimity to the desire 
to avoid cruelty and pain.” Rorty is anxious that the Nietzschean pursuit of sublimity 
deprives us of a shared neutral ground for the creation of alternative institutions to 
hegemonic liberal democratic ones, but this assumes the latter are the best (most 
efficacious for human flourishing) and that nothing more effective will come along as a 
consequence of pursuing Nietzsche’s project of attaining sublimity via experimental art.  
 
830 Pappas: 201; BGE: 209 
 
831 BGE: 209 and 242 
 
832 See Hutter, 2006: 65 
 
833 That being to comprehend life, man’s place in the universe, the nature of “truth” and 
the best strategies for living.  
 
834 On “lucky strikes” see A: 4 
 
835 Baudrillard, 1994: 164. 
 
836 D: 535   
 
837 WP: 480 
 
838 Conway, 1997b: 148 
 
839 Ibid 
 
840 See: H: II-71 
 
841 Conway, 1997b: 94 
 
842 TGS 
 
843 See TI: IX-36 
 
 629 
                                                                                                                                                 
844 This condition is, in Heideggerian terms, a state of irrecuperable fallenness; such 
failures comprise the ‘They’: beings from whom Being has withdrawn and whose 
presence is only an absence; personifications of Nietzsche’s thoroughly nihilistic ‘last 
man’ type. 
 
845 I disregard Nietzsche’s derisive use of the term at GM: III-9; the ephectic drive—
which arguably characterized the native volition impelling Nietzsche in his own life’s 
work—need not lead to shallow relativism and nihilism. 
 
846 Elbe, 2003: 105 and 113 on the creative ethos of good Europeanism. 
 
847 Conway, 1997b: 54-5 
 
848 OTL, in Breazeale’s “Philosophy and Truth, Selections from Nietzsche’s Notebooks 
of the early 1870s”, pp 84. 
 
849 Bailey: 123 - 25 
 
850 Hankinson: 314 
 
851 GS: 374, Our new “infinite” 
 
852 GS: 344, How we, too, are still pious 
 
853 BGE: 212 
 
854 Conway, 1997a: 50 
 
855 This can be attributed to Walter Kaufmann, among others. Kaufmann was largely 
responsible for re-habilitating Nietzsche’s work in the post-war era among generations of 
scholars for whom the prevailing representation of Nietzsche’s ideas and advocacy had 
been a malign mis-characterization that dissuaded serious readings of them.  
 
856 Conway 1997a: 51 
 
857 BGE: 65 
 
858 The quote attributed to Socrates takes numerous forms. Among them is: “I know 
nothing except the fact of my ignorance.” Socrates, from Diogenes Laertius, Lives of 
Eminent Philosophers. Variations on this theme occur in Plato’s dialogue the Apology, at 
21d7, for example. However, Priscilla Sakezles, an Associate Professor of Philosophy at 
the University of Akron, has published an interesting argument claiming that this is a 
popular misinterpretation of Socrates’ (Plato’s) meaning. See her article, ‘Socratic 
Skepticism’ in the June 25, 2008 edition of eSkeptic, the newsletter of Skeptic Magazine, 
at: <http://www.skeptic.com/eskeptic/08-06-25.html> 
 630 
                                                                                                                                                 
 
859 BGE: 223 
 
860 Although adoxastos might remind some of the Islamic concept of taqyyia, it is not 
analogous. The Nietzschean skeptic and good European acts only on the instinctual urge 
to become who it is they are, against a decadent society determined to thwart them. 
Furthermore, they act out of strength rather than weakness. 
 
861 There is no paradox in the need for the adoption and employment of disguises among 
‘good Europeans’ as the strongest individuals. Given that the value of their strengths (i.e.: 
their constitution and the nisus of their Being) being discredited and held in contempt by 
the hyper-decadent society they find themselves thrown into, they must contend with the 
most virulent animosity and constant efforts to weaken them and divert them from their 
noble course. The hatred they provoke among the multitude is in fact proof of the 
intrinsic weakness of the latter, their (would-be) oppressors; the crucial need to hide 
ones’ essential character and values should not be taken as a sign of weakness when 
revealing oneself would be self destructive. 
 
862 BGE 214 
 
863 I refer to the undignified openness that admits of no private realm. It is motivated by 
the ultra-liberal-modern will to truth and its injunction to reveal oneself in a pathetic 
gambit for social acceptance, a premise that presumes toleration of the most venal acts 
and types. It also, somewhat hilariously, presumes the supposed merit of humility among 
the botched whose lack dignity it exposes. Secularized Christian pity and charity—a 
Rawlsian concern with ‘freedom from shame’—operates to cover-up the degrading 
nature of the charade. However tawdry, pathetic or humiliating the facts revealed are the 
subject is praised—and thanked!—for their “bravery” in revealing them. The audience 
experiences a voyeuristic catharsis through the act of witnessing another’s confession, 
and the spirit of revenge is briefly satiated. These spectacles are nearly ubiquitous in the 
Western world, and exemplified in popular television talk-shows hosted by insipid 
celebrities such as Oprah Winfrey, et. al. 
 
864 Bailey: 188. 
 
865 WP: 726. Nietzsche recognizes that the maintenance of power requires manipulating / 
managing the herd’s resentment either by the best, in active will to power that creates an 
authentically good conscience or by ascetic priests, in negative will to power, which 
naturalizes a bad-conscience to make it seem good. 
 
866 WP: 132 
 
867 WP: 963 
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868 Take for example the treatment President Mahathir bin Muhammad, the quasi-
authoritarian leader of Malaysia, came in for when he took his nation’s currency and 
exchange mechanisms out of the international system to protect his domestic economy 
from speculative foreign investment during the Asian monetary crisis of 1997 – 1999. 
Despite widely acknowledged systemic flaws in the very international financial 
institutions (and apart from Mahathir’s shrill pronouncements and irrational blame of 
individuals such as George Soros for South-East Asia’s brief financial turmoil) he was 
excoriated by Western arbiters of globalization as “protectionist”. 
 
869 Good Europeans are Nietzschean “great men”, or the closest approximation to them 
we can expect to encounter in our decadent age. 
 
870 Conway, 1997a: 109 
 
871 Conway, 1997a: chapter six 
 
872 UM: III- 3 
 
873 GM: III-11 
 
874 Much of Freud’s thesis in Civilization and its Discontents constitutes little more than 
an unacknowledged extrapolation from the third book of Nietzsche’s On the Genealogy 
of Morality. 
 
875 GM: III-11 
 
876 Some conservative strains of American Protestantism combine these notions of 
reward, linking material wealth with God’s grace, understood to be a consequence / 
reward for their divinely conferred grace faith here on earth. 
 
877 See, for instance, the novel “Prozac Nation,” by Elizabeth Wurtzel (1994). With 
maniacal, mindless consumption celebrated above all else, contemporary Protestant 
Christian religious services are adopting the entertainment ethos, holding Las Vegas style 
services at converted sports arenas to accommodate the throng. Celebrity pastors eschew 
“negative” messages about guilt, sin, and eternal damnation in favor of a feel good 
message that serves to cover-up their faith’s condemnation of life with a mindless happy 
face. For an example of this trend see the Lakewood Church of Houston, Texas, led by 
celebrity Pastor Joel Osteen. 
 
878 Elbe, Stefan. Millennium, 2001. Vol. 30, No. 2, pp. 280. 
 
879 GM: III-27. 
 
880 Elbe, Stefan. Millennium, 2001. Vol. 30, No. 2, pp. 280. 
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881 BGE: 212 
 
882 This would, from Nietzsche’s viewpoint, have seemed a fact that Rawls, as an ascetic 
priest devoted to proselytizing an anti-natural form of idealistic liberalism – a secular 
slave-morality of taming par excellence –  would be incapable of seeing, or at least 
admitting. 
 
883 “All becoming and growing–all that guarantees a future–involves pain.” TI: X – 4 
 
884 BGE: 209 
 
885 The liberal-modern will to nothingness (relativism) that deprives all former meanings 
of veracity and all traditions of their authority would provoke an intensely homicidal-
suicidal reaction epitomized in the National socialist party a few decades later. That 
reaction would destroy Germany and much of the world.   
 
886 BGE: 208.  Nietzsche suggests by way of an example, that the growing power of 
Russia might produce “a single will by means of a new caste dominating all Europe – so 
that the long-drawn out comedy of its petty states and the divided will of its dynasties and 
splintered will of its democracies should finally come to an end.”   
 
887 BGE: 210 
 
888 BGE: 260 
 
889 BGE: 242 
 
890 Ibid; cf: WP: 954 
 
891 BGE: 61 
 
892 Conway, 1997b: 76; the designation “liberal-optimist” also applies to such notable 
20th century figures as Gandhi, Kemal Atatürk and Ben-Gurion, as they each effectively 
established—or laid the groundwork for the establishment of—nation-states which are 
ressentiment-driven polities. 
 
893 Conway, 1997a: 104 
  
894 Conway, 1997a: 129, on the publicness of healthy self-creation. 
 
895 GM: III – 27 
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896 I mean ‘empowering’ in a specifically Nietzschean sense here, as that which increases 
the active forces expressed as a positive will to creative destruction as generative power 
in healthy individuals. 
 
897 WP: 957 
 
898 Baudrillard, 1994: 121 
 
899 Take the World Social Forum at Porto Alegre, Brazil, for instance: it is the wealth 
generated by globalizing institutions and (capital) processes that gave rise to the 
infrastructural capacity and motility that enabled so many to travel there from all points 
of the earth. The delegates attended the forum, held in a distant locale, to protest 
globalization and strategize opposition to its prerogatives. These acts in turn mingle 
perspectives (however reactionary) to generate new and/or increased awareness of 
globality and realizations of its abstract potentials, irrespective of their ideological 
motivations. It is globalization that makes such organizing—alternative ascetic practices 
and experimental arts—directed against the inauthenticity and reaction inherent to 
“exploitative capital process” possible. 
 
900 BGE: 276 
 
901 Conway, 1997a: 78–9 
 
902 GM: III – 27; Conway, 1997a: 105 
 
903 TI: 9–43 
 
904 See TI: 9-20 for his discussion of the imaginary “dynamometer” with which he 
hypothesized the degree to which the ugliness or degeneration in an entity might be 
quantifiably measured at some distant time in the future. 
 
905 Conway, 1997b: 14 
 
906 BGE: 211; a condition that, by Heidegger’s understanding, constitutes a deprivation of 
Being from beings. 
 
907 GM: III – 27 
 
908 Khan, 2003: 330 
 
909 BGE: 268 
 
910 BGE: 203 
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911 BGE: 269 
 
912 See Michel DeCerteau’s The Practice of Everyday Life. 
 
913 See Richard Rorty’s Contingency, Irony and Solidarity, which put a liberal face of 
sorts on some influential aspects of Nietzsche’s thought.  
 
914 Foucault, Nietzsche, Genealogy, History, pp. 151.  
 
915 BGE: 230 
 
916 WP: 1059; also see WP: 999 
 
917 See Gladwell, 2008 
 
918 See OFEI and UM–3 
 
919 It must be noted that in an unpublished note Nietzsche forbade his future heirs, 
intellectual successors or ‘good Europeans’ from seeking conventional power or 
participating in the “base” activity of ordinary political life. This is somewhat 
incongruous however, as every one of the exemplars Nietzsche admires achieved 
conventional success, power and authority in their particular historical context within and 
through the political life of their respective socio-political milieu. Nietzsche may have 
contemplated exhorting ‘good Europeans’ not to feel as though they must immerse 
themselves in the repellent setting of conventional political institutions – to the extent 
that avoiding them is possible. 
 
920 Nietzsche would understand these rights as a cynical contrivance and ideological tool 
for rationalizing further penetrations into other cultures by the globalization complex. 
 
921 Taylor, 1997: 3–4 
 
922 Smith, 1996: 170 
 
923 Ibid: 147 
 
924 Elbe, 2003: 120–21 
 
925 BGE: 186 and 262 
 
926 MacIntyre, 1998: 202 - 220 
 
927 Nietzsche asserts (against Platonic faith in truth and reason and corresponding 
arguments against relativity, such as those in the Parmenides) that “there are absolutely 
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no moral facts” (TI: VII-1), and “Morality the Circe of humanity, has fundamentally 
falsified – moralified – all psychologica – to the point where you get complete nonsense 
like the claim that love is something unegoistic …” (EH: Why I write—5). 
 
928 On Nietzsche’s qualified fictionalist stance see Nadeem Hussain’s paper Honest 
Illusion: Valuing for Nietzsche’s ‘free Spirits’, in Nietzsche and Morality, ed. Leiter, 
Brian and Neil Sinhababu, (2007). Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
 
929 WP: 132 
 
930 BGE: 208 
 
931 Smith, 1996: 166-7 
 
932 Ibid: 169 
 
933 Heidegger, Being and Time: 165 
 
934 As alluded to above; for corroboration of my understanding of Nietzsche’s view on 
the utility of the masses / labor of the herd see his essay The Greek State; HH: I – 475, II 
– 304; BGE: 242, 258, 259, 262; TI: 7 – 3; A: 57, and WP: 866-68. 
 
935 Fukuyama (1992) was led by certain ambiguities in Nietzsche’s thought to conclude 
that ultra-liberal-modernity and capital processes provide the ideal means of fulfilling this 
objective. This (neo-Straussian?) imputation mis-reads Nietzsche, whose exoteric 
teaching clearly conveys his condemnation of these reactive and decadent ideologies. 
Nietzsche resists making specific recommendations as to how the aims of his good 
Europeans would be attained. The apparent efficacy of ultra-liberal-modern values to 
ensure individual freedom and rights, as well as the strong faith individuals have it them 
suggests that overcoming them will be a long process indeed, and speculating about what 
it might produce would be futile. 
 
936 Certain “post-modern” critiques of everyday life, such as those posited by Jean 
Baudrillard and (the Situationist) Guy Debord, while undeniably valuable and relevant, 
are hereby revealed as implicated in the very “decadence” they themselves identify and 
condemn as characteristic of their age (an echo of Nietzsche’s own self-implicating 
critique of decadence). This is evidenced by the fact that they largely fail to glean the 
positive potential in the simulations and spectacularizations of reality they respectively 
(reactively) identified as primarily negative for human and civilizational development. 
 
937 Consider HH: 224, BGE: 202 and especially this passage from the late notebooks, 
“My philosophy aims at an ordering of rank: not at an individualistic morality. The ideas 
of the herd should rule in the herd—but not reach out beyond it: the leaders of the herd 
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require a fundamentally different valuation for their own actions, as do the independent, 
or the ‘beasts of prey,’ etc.” WP: 287 
 
938 WP: 957 
 
939 GS: 328; TI: 85; WP: 957 
 
940 Elbe, citing Nietzsche, 2003: 121 
 
941 EH: VII-2 
 
942 WP: 116 
 
943 Ibid 
 
944 Del Caro, 2004: 63 
 
945 D: 364 
 
946 Donnelly, 1998: 82 
 
947 BGE: 269 
 
948 WP: 936 
 
949 WP: 933 
 
950 Recent historical examples abound: the Turkish genocide of Armenians, the Nazi 
holocaust in Europe, the genocide of ethnic Tutsi’s by racist Hutu extremists in Rwanda, 
and the ongoing genocide of Darfuris by Arab Sudanese. 
 
951 See Malcolm Gladwell, 2008. 
  
952 GS: 362 
 
953 A number of economists have recently suggest that in the wake of the global financial 
crisis, which has tarnished the Western “Washington consensus” model of capital process 
and economic globalization, China’s policies of development resonate among the leading 
elites in developing nations.  
 
954 Donnelly, 1989: 103–4 
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